Rating: 
Summary:
Inferior Numbers to Bear
Review:
Even in decline, Rome held on to most of the territory staked out by Augustus (and a bit more), for two centuries. Luttwak's analysis of the Roman army structure illuminates how a single city managed to impose its own order on a substantial fraction of the world's population, stretching from northern England to the Persian Gulf at its greatest extent, while employing a fairly small army of 300,000 to 500,000 infantry, cavalry, and mariners.
In a rare display of historical trivia, one of the minor characters in the wonderfully dreadful Liz Taylor version of _Cleopatra_ remarked on how Caesar had arrived "with so few men". Luttwak explains the strategic vision that made that possible.
The same strategy has been arrived at (or stumbled onto) by later powers, while others have staggered under too much militarization. The USSR relied on ever-larger piles of weapons, huge standing armies, and proxy warfare outside its borders. That played a role in its demise, as did its failure in Afghanistan. Britain used a strategy similar to Rome's (and superior weapons) to conquer and rule a worldwide empire. The US uses a hybrid strategy to contain its enemies, build reliable alliances, and protect its interests. Superior weapons have also played a part in the US approach.
Rome on the other hand had to rely on discipline and tactics, because it didn't generally have superior weaponry to bring to bear. As others have pointed out, Roman equipment would from time to time leave Roman legions at a disadvantage (lack of a stirrup for example).
Relatively few will read this. Ancient history and warfare buffs should be among its readers.
Rating:
Summary: Ancient history for current events
Review: Although much of this book may be at a level of specificity of interest only to Roman history buffs, Luttwak's assessments of the Roman Empire's strategic strengths and weaknesses has much relevance to the modern United States, which occupies an historical position not unlike Rome's at the beginning of the Empire. For example, issues such as the efficient use of a relatively small professional army, or the maintenance of client states, are directly relevant to the modern world. Each section begins with a sufficiently adequate historical summary that readers not yet familiar with Roman history will not be lost.
Rating: 
Summary: Intriguing
Review: Edward Luttwak is the premiere scholar of contemporary grand strategy. In this book he brings his unique talents to the problem of Imperial Roman grand strategy. Luttwak has put together a fine and scholarly analysis of how the Romans kept their empire secure, and, how, ultimately, they failed to do so.The book is divided into three chronological sections. In the first Luttwak discusses the system under the early empire (or principate) from Augustus to Nero. He describes this system as being the "Republican Imperial system," by which he means that the system of empire used here was the old hegemonic system employed by the expanding Republic. Luttwak clearly praises this system for getting the most security at the lowest cost. Part two deals with the system from Vespasian to Marcus Aurelius. Luttwak describes the system in this period as being fundamentally different from that of the first. This system reflects the changed nature of the Empire from a hegemonic power to a state power. The chief object was no longer to defend Rome and Italy, but to provide complete security for every province of the Empire. The third part is focused on the military (and general) crisis of the third century. In this section Luttwak looks at the cost of maintaining a defensive system in relation to the benefits of doing so. Ultimately, he argues, the Roman Empire had to collapse because the benefits the provinces associated with being a memeber of a larger state were not worth the cost. It has been argued that Luttwak ascribes too much clarity of thought and purpose to the systems he describes. Other scholars have said that there is no evidence to support the thesis that the Roman Imperial machine ever sat down and planned a defensive system. Of course this is true, and does not counter what Luttwak is saying. Indeed, Luttwak himself says that the system was not necessarily planned as a whole, but evolved from responses to specific crises. He says, actually, that the lack of a "grand strategy" actually led to the collapse of the imperial system in the west. The primary evidence for this, as Luttwak argues, is that in the third period, whenever possible, the Romans reverted to the defensive strategy of the second period despite the fact that it was clearly outdated. Others have argued against Luttwak's analysis by claiming that the tactics used in one part of the Empire were dissimilar to those used in another. He does not make a claim counter to this, though. In fact, one of the strengths of this book is that it provides much detail on the different ways that the overall concept of a particular strategy was employed in the different regions of the Empire. Finally, the language Luttwak uses here is concise and clear, and definitely understandable by people unfamiliar with the jargon of the military and historical communities. In addition to this astute and understandable analysis are lots and lots of excellent maps and diagrams. They alone are worth the price of the book. Anyone interested in the Roman Empire or military history must read this ground-breaking work. As the debate on the policies of the Roman Empire continues, Luttwak's work will continue to be a prominent point of refference.
Rating:
Summary: Not necessarily for beginners, but will make you think
Review: Even if you don't agree with Luttwak's point of view, you'd have to agree that he makes a good argument. Many people feel that the Roman army of the glory years (i.e. 100-300AD) was a front line frontier garrison force that ended up being too thinly spaced to defend so huge a territory. Luttwak argues that what it was, in fact, was a set of frontier picket forces set up to warn the REAL army units, which were set up as "rapid deployment forces" in rear staging areas to react to danger from any direction. As a result, the Roman empire was able to defend itself with a ridiculously small standing force. While the book is very thin and very readable, I think it would help if the reader learned a bit about the basics of the Roman army and empire first. Graham Webster's excellent volume, 'The Roman Imperial Army,' comes to mind. Still, it is a good read on its own, and from a broader standpoint, a good illustration of how the academic mind works to prove and illustrate an idea. I know I certainly felt a little smarter after reading it!
Rating:
Summary: A lucid, controversial work on Roman Imperial Strategy
Review: I am just now getting around to re-editing my original review of this marvellous work, because I simply do not feel that the criticisms that have been levelled against Luttwak's book have been adequately addressed. Let's be clear about the criticism. It has been said elsewhere here that Luttwak's thesis was wrong -- that there was no "grand strategy". Accordingly the book is related to trash status and accorded single star reviews. The principal stick with which Luttwak has been beaten is a book entitled "Limits of Empire" by Benjamin Isaac, a Professor of Classics in the University of Tel Aviv. I thought it might be therefore illuminating for the public to hear what Isaac himself has to say about Luttwak. In his introduction, he writes, "It is a lucid study, but it is based on secondary literature. It reinterprets interpretations by historians and archaeologists and is a systemisation, not of historical material, but of modern scholarship. Hence it is based on....apriori assumptions." This in and of itself is fair and accurate, and indeed Professor Isaac's text (which I heartily recommend, by the way) goes on to analyse the primary texts and more careful consider archaeological evidence. But he has much more to say about Luttwak. Later (page 377), Professor Isaac has THIS to say, "Luttwak has described Roman strategy in a systematic manner. He assumes that there was a coherent system built up with an inner logic and that it is possible to describe the coherence and dynamics of this system. We can admire his lucid analysis, but we must still ask whether the system analysed did in fact exist. IF WE DO ASK THIS QUESTION IT IS THANKS TO LUTTWAK'S OWN ADMIRABLE SYNTHESIS [emphasis mine]. However, his central assumption, that their existed a system whose object was to defend and enhance the security of the empire is a hypothesis based on analogies with modern army organisation. It is not based on an independent analysis of the ancient literary sources or archaeological materials, but derives from a lucid perusal of modern literature, and naturally the result is an approach already implicit in the writings of most specialists on Roman frontiers." I hardly think I need to say any more. Professor Isaac's respect for Luttwak shines through everything he writes. Just because the thesis of a book MAY prove ultimately to be wrong, or just because it is superseded as the result of new evidence, does not make the book worthy of a "one star" review. Luttwak's book is brilliantly and incisively argued. And as has been pointed out elsewhere, it set off a firestorm of almost polemical debate. All right, so Professor Isaac has refuted him. I say, "so what"? As another reviewer noted, for all we know, Isaac may himself be proved wrong as time and research marches on. Being wrong doesn't, or shouldn't, relegate a writer to the trash heap of literature. I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject of Roman history. Take what Luttwak says with a grain of salt; and, yes, assuredly, read Isaac's "The Limits of Empire". I guarantee you that you will thrill to an almost scintillating debate. For my part, I regret that it is hard to fault Isaac's research and conclusions -- and I admit that it is difficult for me to abandon Luttwak's thesis. I ask myself why this is so, and the answer must be, sadly, that I so very much want Luttwak's analysis to be correct! I thank god that people like Luttwak are willing to advance risky, "big ideas". His work engendered a worthy debate and sparked research that ultimately over-mastered his idea -- And yet there is something in me that is not totally prepared to give up on it -- I wish he would write a second edition!
Rating:
Summary: Authoritative study of the principles of Roman strategy
Review: If you are interested in Roman history, this book is a MUST read. It was written 25 years ago and it still remains a reference point in Roman history - even historians who do not agree with Luttwak have to discuss his thesis (eg Ferrill). The problem with so many contemporary historians before this book was that they systematically ignored or misunderstood the forest, despite their detailed knowledge of the trees. For example, there was an incredible abundance of detailed studies of Roman fortifications in Great Britain, but barely anyone bothered asking the question of why the Romans gave up conquering the northern half of the island - a conquest that would have eliminated the need for such fortifications . This is an important question, because ignoring it implies ignoring the general principles guiding Roman expansion and defense across the empire. Luttwak's study provides an answer to this type of questions or, at the very least, poses the problem. Luttwak, an accomplished military strategist who has worked with the Pentagon in the past, ties together literary and archeological evidence from the Roman world, and adds his strategic insight to come up with a theory of the principles guifing the "grand strategy" of the Roman empire. Although one might doubt that these principles were consistently pursued at that time, Luttwak's analysis is fascinating. Moreover, his analysis of the role of the army in the early Roman empire (when an army of 250,000 men protected an empire stretching from the Rhine to the Euphrates) provides a wonderful analysis of the timeless principles of deterrence, and "power" as opposed to "force". There are only two faults to this book. First, that its author has always refused to be dragged into the polemic debate among historians that followed the book's publication - inevitably, this makes it impossible to write a 2nd edition. The second fault is that the book does not extend beyong the 3rd century; this is a real loss because it would be interesting to hear Luttwak's thoughts about the decline of the Empire.
Rating:
Summary: In Praise of Grand Strategy
Review: In a field that still remains open...and, in fact, in many ways, depends on the contributions of knowledgeable and dedicated amatures, Luttwak's work stands out as truly original contribution in the field of Roman military history. His thesis, that there was, in fact, a coherent, centrally controlled and over-arching and outwardly directed, military strategy that was actualised through an evolving empire-wide frontier policy that is both traceable in and understandable through, the archaeological record is a singularly original contribution that has potentialy major implications for our approach to and understanding of, roman socio-political, military, economic, and governance mechanisms. Luttwak has implicitly reinterpreted the conventional understanding of the roman world and in so doing he has opened the door to a broader, more coherent and,ultimately, more satisfying understanding of the functioning of the empire. It is the kind of contribution that perhaps only someone with the background and ability to apply a strategic vision and strategic frame of reference, could possibly make. As far as I know, it has never been done before in this field. Its now 25 years since Luttwak published Grand Strategy and the work continues to resonate in the field. Judging from the rate of continuing citations, it would appear to be virtually impossible to write on the subject of roman military history, frontier policy, or even imperial governance without dealing,in some way, with Luttwak. His contribution simply won't go away. Much time has passed since Luttwak wrote and, in the interim, Isaac has published his exhaustive, excessively detailed and, ultimately, convincing, refutation of Luttwak based on his review and analysis of the roman southeast frontier. But I don't think it matters...and besides, Isaac himself may be wrong...because what Luttwak has really achieved is to force a decisive shift in the frame of reference that we use to think about, analyse, and understand the Empire. Luttwak has reminded us, emphaticaly, that not withstanding the absence of a coherent body of written source material,we can and should think about the forest once in a while instead of endlessly pursuing counting and identifying only the trees that make it up. He shows us that such an approach can be highly rewarding. In my opinion this is NOT a dry work and, more than anything, it simply requires an interest in the roman empire and its functioning in order to be read and understood. Luttwak does not take the relentlessly scholarly approach that Isaac does but he does do his homework and he is familiar with his topic. Because he's not Isaac, he's infinitely more readable...and my copy, which I bought in soft cover about 5 years ago, had virtually all of its pages out of order...and I still got thru it! I
Rating: 
Summary: Luttwak is a good writer, on topics he knows about....
Review: Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire has been superceded and shattered by Benjamin Isaac's The Limits of Empire (1990). A quote from Isaac's concluding chapter will do a far better job than I: "The distribution of troops on the frontier and the rationale behind the location of forts are never the subject of discussion in ancient literature. This makes questionable Luttwak's assertion that, whether by intellect or traditional intuition, the Romans understood all the subtleties of strategy. If they understood by intellect they kept quiet about it. ... Luttwak has described Roman strategy in a systemic manner. He assumes that there was a coherent system built up with an inner logic and that it is possible to describe the coherence and the dynamics of this system. We can admire his lucid analysis of the material, accept many of his insights, and appreciate his systematic approach, but we must still ask whether the system analyzed did in fact exist. ... [Luttwak's analysis] is not based on an independent analysis of the ancient literary sources or the archealogical material, but derives from a lucid perusal of modern literature, and naturally the result is an approach already implicit in the writings of most specialists on Roman frontiers. The hypothesis suffers from a disadvantage familiar in the study of history: it cannot be proved or disproved by objective means." If you want a good book on strategy, get Luttwak's Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. He's better and more qualified at dealing with defense in modern times than speculative rationalization of defense in ancient times.
Rating: 
Summary: Only for the specialist.
Review: Only a small part of this book is for the layman: the analysis of the military strategy of the Roman emperor's.
Rome changed its strategy in the 1st century from attack to containment, based on puppet regimes and subsidies. The tactics were to frighten and threat by diplomatic means, and not to intervene violently.
The author states cleverly that the Roman soldier was absolutely not interested in fighting but only in making a career and in receiving a pension after his service. The other part is only for specialists. It gives a detailed dissection of the structure of the Roman army (e.g. how many men contained a cohort).
Rating:
Summary: Clausewitz in a toga
Review: This book is approachable to the strategist, the scholar and the simply curious. Well-written and well-reasoned, Luttwak has produced yet another excellent book. The approach of using modern strategical analysis on Roman politico-military affairs is something that has long been missing from studies of the Roman Army. Certainly the armchair legates who cry that the death of the Roman Empire was in its failure to continue expanding should read this book before continuing to rant their expansion-without-profit creed!
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