Rating: 
Summary: Excellent
Review: This book goes into a fair amount of detail about events that were important for the allies winning World War II--Enough that it reads like a historical overview in those areas. But it makes little or no mention of other events. The result is a book that is too broad for a detailed study of particular events or ideas, but not complete enough to satisfy someone wanting a one-book introduction to the war. It also leaves the reader with an exaggerated idea of the potential for Axis victory in the war, at least in my opinion.The book is basically a collection of essays on different topics that stand alone. There is no unifying theme, except victory in World War II. Nor does the author give a single "pat" answer to the question implied in the title. He simply describes a number of things that the Allies did well, or the Axis (mostly the Germans) did badly that lead to the war turning out the way it did. And his points are all, or at least nearly all valid, even though they aren't comprehensive (he leaves out some important things, in my view). One of these points is actually a pretty good one. He does a better job than any other author I know of in demolishing the myth of German high technology and wonder weapons. He feels (justifiably, I think) that these projects actually detracted from the German war effort. The book has some good points--Many of the essays are decent, and the author seems to have scoured original source diaries and memoirs for relevant quotes that illustrate some of his ideas. The book is heavily tilted towards the European theater. There is some discussion of the naval war in the Pacific, a very brief discussion of the final bomber offensive against Japan (including the atomic bombings), and a short discussion of the deficiencies of Japanese ground forces. Otherwise, the Pacific War is mentioned in passing if at all. The US submarine war against Japan was very important in the defeat of Japan, but is mentioned only in passing. US amphibious invasion tactics and technology as used in the Pacific are not covered. There are some factual howlers in the book. To pick two from my area of expertise, the pretty good discussion of how the US and Britain developed their ideas on strategic bombing doesn't even mention the disastrous British daytime bomber raids in December 1939, which turned the RAF brass against unescorted daytime bombing. A less important one is an incorrect date for the first US air attacks on German forces--The author gives the date of the first raid by bombers entirely crewed by US airmen, but identifies it as the first US bomber attacks, which simply isn't true. I mention that, because it makes me wonder about whether the book has other slipshod facts in it that I don't recogize. Not an awful book, but overall it is too general for the specialist who is well-read on World War II, and has too many problems and gaps for an introductory book. I'd skip it.
Rating: 
Summary: A thoughtful book.
Review: This is an interesting work, and it helps one to rethink questions about the war one would have thought settled. On paper the military forces of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union vastly overwhelm those of Germany, Italy and Japan. One would think that military victory was assured. Richard Overy questions these assumptions in this useful book. After all from 1940 to 1944 Germany had most of the resouces of continental Europe to draw upon. If the gap between the two sides seems so vast, it is partially because Germany did not take full advantage of those resources when it could have crushed the other sides. Overy provides particular attention on the battle for the seas when it appeared up until mid 1943 that the Axis might cut the lifeline across the Atlantic, and when the battle of Midway turned for the Americans on the space of a few lucky minutes. He discusses such major events as D-Day and gives due attention to the vital battle for Russia, without which Allied victory would have seemed impossible. Crucial to this account is the economic side, however, and here Overy challenges two important scholarly opinions about the war. The first view, which developed in the sixties, looked at the relatively low levels of arms that the Germans produced, theorized that German war production was limited because of a need to placate German living standards. Because of this restriction Germany turned towards the devastating and hopefully quick stratgey of blitzkerig. The second view argued that aerial bombing was of limited success because German war production still rose from 1942 to 1945. Overy, however, argues that Hitler did not sacrifice guns for butter but always wanted a fierce military regime. The problem for him was that armaments levels were puzzingly low, barely keeping steady with Britain and France. The reason was not any lack of technical skill, since the Germans made many remarkable innovations during the war. Instead the German economy was not a well organized machine, but a set of dueling quasi-feudal principalities, where quality control ran amuck and where local party and company privileges hampered the rise of mass production. The contrast with American production is quite striking, and also with Soviet production, whose evacuation of much of its factory plant under the most desperate circumstances is one of the great untold stories of the war. It was only by 1942 that people like Albert Speer recognized the problem, and sought to correct it. Had it not been for the massive bombing, Overy argues, Speer's efforts to raise production would have been much more successful. There are many other interesting insights in the book. Overy, contrary to a rather dense reviewer in Commentary, does not reduce the remarkable performance of the Soviet army and people to NKVD terror, but to a remarkable genuine courage on their own behalf. The portraits of the leaders are also compelling, with Churchill being criticized for his romantic and often poor military judgement from Norway to France to Crete to Singapore. Stalin's military judgement gets high praise from conservative Anglo-American military officers, while there is a fine sketch of George Marshall, the greatest general America ever had, who never actually fought on a battlefield. There are some comments one should quibble about, such as Overy relying on James Bacque's tendentious Other Losses, but overall this is a fine book, and it has one of the finest final lines of any work of history this decade.
Rating:
Summary: First Rate Analysis
Review: This really is an excellent analysis of the causes of Allied victory in WWII. Anyone expecting an introductory history of WWII will be disappointed by this book. It presupposses a fairly good background knowledge of WWII and even its historiography. It is also a rebuttal to much of the facile triumphalism associated with writing on WWII. Overy begins by pointing out that WWII could have been won by the Nazis and their allies. He then goes on to identify important features of the Allied and German war effort that made the difference. Some of these are known well, specifically the remarkable industrial productive capacity of the American economy. Beyond this, Overy follows the lead of Alan Milward and other economic historians who have investigated the differential economic performance of the Allied and German wartime economies as critical determinants of success. Pushing beyond popular stereotypes, the Germans are shown to have performed poorly in this respect and the Allies, including Britain and the Soviet Union, quite well. Some of the success of the Allies, and conversely failure of the Germans, can be attributed to the democratic traditions of the Western states, and to the chaotic despotism of Nazi Germany. Overy also takes pains to emphasize, correctly, that the Eastern Front was the crucial theater of the war and highlights the incredible scale of combat on the Eastern Front. Americans, perhaps partly as a result of the Cold War, tend to be particularly ignorant of the importance of Soviet efforts in WWII. Overy also tackles some controversial issues. His discussion of the importance of the American-British bombing effort over Germany is very interesting. Against much popular opinion, particularly in Germany (see recent work by the novelist Gunter Grass), he argues that Allied bombing of Germany was crucial. The bombing campaign diverted crucial elements of German military production, particularly airplane production. This may have prevented the Germans from maintaining air superiority in the Eastern Front, which could have been decisive. While much of this bombing campaign was aimed at civilians, Overy makes a very strong case for its importance. It appears that targeting civilians (as in the NATO campaign against the Serbian dominance of Kosovo) was necessary for victory. This is an unpalatable but very likely correct assessment. Overy is less convincing on the idea that Allied moral superiority was crucial. How was the Soviet state morally superior to the Nazi state? Few would argue that the Germans didn't fight well. With incrementally better leadership and economic management, there would might well have been a Nazi dominated Europe stretching from the Atlantic coast to the Urals, with all its attendant horrors.
| 
