Fighting Napoleon

Rating:
Summary: 3.4 stars; not entirely convincing
Review: For some time now historians have been critical of the democratic claims of the French Revolution. Where once people saw the birth of liberty, many scholars see mass indifference, active opposition and widespread fear. So I suppose it was only a matter of time that historians would start seeing the same things about the counter-revolution as well. And surely there is no place where the counter-revolution was as popular as Spain during the Peninsular wars? For not only did Spain provide a guerilla warfare unmatched in the rest of Napoleonic Europe, it even provided the term "guerrilla." But not so fast, argues Charles Esdaile. He relies on archives from Madrid, Barcelona, Tudela, Zaragoza and London, thirty-three contemporary newspapers, several dozen memoirs and contemporary accounts as well as a wide secondary literature. The result is a stimulating, provocative work, that is not entirely convincing.

After discussing the basic pro-Guerrilla historiography, and then giving a brief survey of the guerrilla war which seems to vindicate them (even Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother and king of Spain, said the guerrillas undermined the Spanish position) Esdaile starts to attack. He starts off slowly, arguing that what some people describe as guerrillas were actually local home guards. The regular Spanish army still existed and they often provided vital assistance. Many "guerrillas" were actually members of the regular army. Now moving in to the kill, Esdaile discusses the pro-Patriot response. The Bourbon elites still remained in power, and often had to repress angry Spaniards outraged over their corruption, brutality and use of conscription. Indeed, in parts of Spain they were serious jacqueries, which should be distinguished from social banditry. The guerrillas had little interest in larger social change, while the many bandits were decidedly anti-social. Not only was there resistance to conscription, but there was also mass desertion. Nor were the "guerrillas" particularly popular. Only in Navarre, where feudalism was extremely weak and the Church atypically mild, was there real enthusiasm for partisan warfare. Looking at the biographies of many guerrillas, Esdaile finds many lies and deceptions, and a strong streak of opportunism. Elsewhere, there was little enthusiasm for the struggle. People joined the guerrillas because they had to flee the consequences of their own actions, or because they were forced to by the often brutal guerrillas themselves, or because they were basically bandits. Economic disaster made joining the guerrillas an economically rational move. What achievements were made was the result of Napoleon's withdrawal of troops. Elsewhere guerrillas squabbled among themselves for the most petty and selfish of reasons, while they often looted and burdened themselves on the public at large. After the defeat of Napoleon the guerrillas' violence only intensified before they were suppressed by the state. Many romantic liberals thought this was unfair, but gradually realized that this was right. Finally, contrary to what people might think, few guerrillas became principled liberals; the most famous examples can really be explained by opportunism.

Such is Esdaile's argument. On a first glance it looks convincing, and it is backed by many examples. But a second glance reveals some problems. Commenting on the roots of the guerrillas, Esdaile writes that they "lay not in heroism but hunger, not daring but despair." But surely this is too sharp a distinction. After all one reason why many people would find the French intolerable was because of the economic crisis they encouraged. Another problem with the emphasis on opportunism is that opportunists and ne'er do wells could join the French occupying authorities. But they did not, or at least not enough to help them. A larger problem is a complete lack of comparative analysis. There is certainly no doubt that Spain caused more trouble for Napoleon than most of the rest of Europe together. Surely there must be some explanation for this ability. It certainly can't be the efficiency of the state or the effectiveness of the army that made Spain deadlier than the Netherlands, Switzerland or the domains of the Habsburgs. Likewise a comparison with Vietnam would undercut Esdaile's suggestion that guerrillas have only limited tactical abilities. And whether it is discussing wartime Greece, the French resistance or the Vietnam war, recent histories by Mark Mazower, Julian Jackson, Eric Bergerud and David Elliott have made clear that while partisans can be brutal, greedy and viewed with some skepticism by the local population, they can also receive genuine support and carry out real damage on the occupying countries. But Esdaile has nothing to say about the rest of occupied Europe and other guerrilla wars. Similarly if most of the guerrilla leaders were selfish, opportunistic and rapacious, were their betters in the regular army, the Absolutist state or Wellington's forces any better? We got no clear discussion of this point, and we get even less about the guerrilla rank and file. And Esdaile does not distinguish as well as he could between opportunism and a lack of political sophistication that would be inevitable in a country as autocratically run as Spain. Esdaile tells us much about politics in a country whose historiography often remains shadowy even among well educated readers. But there is an all or nothing tendency in his book that undercuts his points.

Rating:
Summary: 3.4 stars; not entirely convincing
Review: For some time now historians have been critical of the democratic claims of the French Revolution. Where once people saw the birth of liberty, many scholars see mass indifference, active opposition and widespread fear. So I suppose it was only a matter of time that historians would start seeing the same things about the counter-revolution as well. And surely there is no place where the counter-revolution was as popular as Spain during the Peninsular wars? For not only did Spain provide a guerilla warfare unmatched in the rest of Napoleonic Europe, it even provided the term "guerrilla." But not so fast, argues Charles Esdaile. He relies on archives from Madrid, Barcelona, Tudela, Zaragoza and London, thirty-three contemporary newspapers, several dozen memoirs and contemporary accounts as well as a wide secondary literature. The result is a stimulating, provocative work, that is not entirely convincing.

After discussing the basic pro-Guerrilla historiography, and then giving a brief survey of the guerrilla war which seems to vindicate them (even Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother and king of Spain, said the guerrillas undermined the Spanish position) Esdaile starts to attack. He starts off slowly, arguing that what some people describe as guerrillas were actually local home guards. The regular Spanish army still existed and they often provided vital assistance. Many "guerrillas" were actually members of the regular army. Now moving in to the kill, Esdaile discusses the pro-Patriot response. The Bourbon elites still remained in power, and often had to repress angry Spaniards outraged over their corruption, brutality and use of conscription. Indeed, in parts of Spain they were serious jacqueries, which should be distinguished from social banditry. The guerrillas had little interest in larger social change, while the many bandits were decidedly anti-social. Not only was there resistance to conscription, but there was also mass desertion. Nor were the "guerrillas" particularly popular. Only in Navarre, where feudalism was extremely weak and the Church atypically mild, was there real enthusiasm for partisan warfare. Looking at the biographies of many guerrillas, Esdaile finds many lies and deceptions, and a strong streak of opportunism. Elsewhere, there was little enthusiasm for the struggle. People joined the guerrillas because they had to flee the consequences of their own actions, or because they were forced to by the often brutal guerrillas themselves, or because they were basically bandits. Economic disaster made joining the guerrillas an economically rational move. What achievements were made was the result of Napoleon's withdrawal of troops. Elsewhere guerrillas squabbled among themselves for the most petty and selfish of reasons, while they often looted and burdened themselves on the public at large. After the defeat of Napoleon the guerrillas' violence only intensified before they were suppressed by the state. Many romantic liberals thought this was unfair, but gradually realized that this was right. Finally, contrary to what people might think, few guerrillas became principled liberals; the most famous examples can really be explained by opportunism.

Such is Esdaile's argument. On a first glance it looks convincing, and it is backed by many examples. But a second glance reveals some problems. Commenting on the roots of the guerrillas, Esdaile writes that they "lay not in heroism but hunger, not daring but despair." But surely this is too sharp a distinction. After all one reason why many people would find the French intolerable was because of the economic crisis they encouraged. Another problem with the emphasis on opportunism is that opportunists and ne'er do wells could join the French occupying authorities. But they did not, or at least not enough to help them. A larger problem is a complete lack of comparative analysis. There is certainly no doubt that Spain caused more trouble for Napoleon than most of the rest of Europe together. Surely there must be some explanation for this ability. It certainly can't be the efficiency of the state or the effectiveness of the army that made Spain deadlier than the Netherlands, Switzerland or the domains of the Habsburgs. Likewise a comparison with Vietnam would undercut Esdaile's suggestion that guerrillas have only limited tactical abilities. And whether it is discussing wartime Greece, the French resistance or the Vietnam war, recent histories by Mark Mazower, Julian Jackson, Eric Bergerud and David Elliott have made clear that while partisans can be brutal, greedy and viewed with some skepticism by the local population, they can also receive genuine support and carry out real damage on the occupying countries. But Esdaile has nothing to say about the rest of occupied Europe and other guerrilla wars. Similarly if most of the guerrilla leaders were selfish, opportunistic and rapacious, were their betters in the regular army, the Absolutist state or Wellington's forces any better? We got no clear discussion of this point, and we get even less about the guerrilla rank and file. And Esdaile does not distinguish as well as he could between opportunism and a lack of political sophistication that would be inevitable in a country as autocratically run as Spain. Esdaile tells us much about politics in a country whose historiography often remains shadowy even among well educated readers. But there is an all or nothing tendency in his book that undercuts his points.