Death Traps : The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II

Rating:
Summary: Faulty Critique of a Worthwhile Book
Review: This review is as much a response to the snippy and somewhat pathetic review below ("A Faulty Indictment") as it is a direct examination of the book itself. True, Cooper's book does not represent the most lucid prose ever written in the category of war memoir. True, Cooper does make some factual errors and delves into other areas where he is out of his depth. But these are primarily in areas that are extrinsic to the main topic of his book. When it comes to dealing with the issue of the Sherman tank, however, Cooper is on much more solid ground. He offers a unique perspective on what is was like to crew an American tank during WWII. He was actually there. He was in charge of the crews that had to recover and attempt to fix up any number of shot up Sherman tanks (not to mention clean the goo that had been an American soldier off the insides of these same tanks). To nitpick the author regarding some side issues and then trot out a load of misleading stats that do not in any way refute the main thesis of the book (that the Sherman tanks was vastly inferior to the tanks it had to fight) seems to me to border on indecent when compared with the important issues Cooper raises in this book.

The reviewer below holds that writers of memoir should limit themselves to areas in which they have particular knowledge. Good advice. But when Cooper makes assertions in areas where he has perhaps unequaled knowledge and experience the reviewer seeks to rebut him with statistics that do not in any way contradict Cooper's contention that the Sherman was a death trap. He substitutes his book knowledge for the first hand knowledge that Cooper displays in this book. So what if the German's only lost 200 fewer tanks than the allies in Normandy? Isn't it possible that the overwhelming air superiority enjoyed by the allies at that time had something to do with that? Every time a German tank took to the field in daylight hours he risked attack from the air, something that American tankers did not have to worry much about. The other figures cited by Cooper's critic below likewise do not show that Shermans matched up well against German tanks in head on head engagements. If you want to get some relevant stats, just research the armor penetration capability of the Sherman's low velocity 75mm gun vs. that of the high velocity weapons used on the German Tiger, Panther and even the late model Mk IV tanks (which made up the majority of the balance of German tanks in Panzer units at that time). There is no comparison. The German weapons win hands down. This does not even get to the fact that the Tigers and Panthers had thicker armor, and, in the case of the Panther at least, better shaped armor to boot.

The fact (if it is a fact) that the Allies held an advantage in numbers of tanks of 4 to 1, or that the Sherman "was designed for mass production" does not show that Cooper was wrong about the faults of that tank. In any event, the problem of tank supply in 1944 was not production, but shipping and port capacity. Nor does the critic below offer evidence that production of superior tanks in the U.S. would have substantially reduced overall tank production. Also, if you are having significantly fewer tanks destroyed in the field (because they are sufficiently armored to defeat the enemy's tank ordinance, or because you can now destroy your enemy with your more powerful gun without having to get almost suicidally close to him, or because your tank doesn't catch fire every time it takes an otherwise non-fatal hit), you don't need as many tanks produced, as many ships to transport them, or as many docks and cranes to off load them, do you? This is not to mention the fact that your more experienced tank crews could continue to fight and fight more effectively (oh yes, and continue to live too) than the often green crews that would replace them (Cooper relates that after a time totally inexperienced infantrymen, who had never even been in a tank, were being thrown into tanks with little or no training due to the horrendous losses suffered by American tankers).

It's this last point that really gets my blood boiling. Does it matter to the crewman that has had 3 or 4 or more tanks shot out from underneath him that we won the numbers game with the German's with respect to tank production? Or, how about his buddies who had been in the same tank with him, but are now splattered on its insides? Were their families supposed to take comfort in the fact that the tank in which their love-one met his end was "designed for mass production"? In fact, one of the dirty little secrets of WWII is that we manufactured tens of thousands of inferior weapons because of our obsession with production totals. This was true with aircraft as well, but at least in that case we were usually producing some top-notch planes contemporaneously as well. That was not the case with respect to our tanks. By 1944, the Sherman tank was far outclassed by its counterparts. Our soldiers deserved the best our country could provide and we didn't give it to them. That is what this book throws into stark relief.

"Death Traps" is a worthwhile read for anyone wanting to get a full picture of what it was like to fight in an American armored division during WWII. If your interests lie in that direction, don't be misled by some nitpicking Monday Morning Cheerleader and pass it up.