Rating: 
Summary: An enjoyable and informative read.
Review: As one can probably surmise from its title, Death Traps is first and foremost an indictment of the M4 Sherman's performance in WWII. While Cooper's obvious disdain for the M4 is perhaps a bit unfair at times, his criticisms of the tank's limitations are generally well taken and his first-hand experiences certainly lend a great deal of credibility to his observations.
Cooper's narrative does an admirable job of blending personal anecdotes with a reasonably comprehensive treatment of the 3rd Armored Division's role in the war, thus making for a read that is both enjoyable and informative. The author comes across as very pleasant and knowledgeable and yet avoids the temptation to either pat himself on the back too much or preach to the reader. Perhaps most helpful is Cooper's thorough analysis and detailed description of U.S. artillery tactics. One is certainly left with the impression that but for the excellence of U.S. artillery and our domination of the skies, the German tank forces would have exacted an even more terrible toll on our troops than they did.
My major criticism of Death Traps is its lack of maps. With the exception of a few crude, hand drawn sketches, no maps of the battle fields discussed are provided. As an amateur historian / WWII afficionado, the inclusion of maps of the locations described in a book of this sort are always helpful tools. A secondary and much lesser criticism is Cooper's tendency to occasionally be repetitive in his summarization of his central theme. Still, I would enthusiastically recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject matter.
Rating: 
Summary: Armored Ordnance officer gives a bad review of US tanks
Review: Belton Cooper was an officer in the 3rd Armored Division, which fought its way across France and Germany in 1944-45. His job in the division was taking refurbished tanks from the repair depot to the front-line units of one Combat Command, and locating and recovering the tanks that had been knocked out. He tells you that his division, and his combat command in that division, had seen more combat than any other armored unit in the U.S. Army, and then tells you that he thinks he's seen more knocked out American tanks than any other person living. It's a believable claim.The book has a great deal going for it. There are a number of descriptions of armored combat at the close tactical level from the last year of the war. The illustration section has some very interesting photos, including one sequence where a Pershing tank duels with a Panther, and knocks it out. In the last photo you can see the Panther's crew bailing out. There's also a good deal of information on various American tanks. Cooper hates all of them, though he thinks the Pershing was better than the previous ones. He was involved in the deployment of a SuperPershing in the last days of the war, a tank which had a better gun and extra armor on it, and he tells you of the problems that they had with it, and it's fate. I would highly recommend this book if you're an enthusiast of WW2 or armored combat, because it's well-written and very informative. It's not War and Peace or anything, but it is full of information, and reads reasonably well.
Rating:
Summary: Good anecdotes, so-so perspective
Review: Belton Cooper's "Death Traps" is an excellent book when it sticks to first-hand stories about the 3rd Armored Division in World War II, but somewhat below average when it discusses the larger aspects of the war.
For instance, the stories of how to clean and repair a Sherman tank and get it back into battle are great fodder for any armor fan or model builder. Describing some tank damage: "The projectile penetrated the [M4] armor, passed through about a foot of fifty-weight oil, severed a five-and-a-half inch steel drive shaft, then passed through another eight to ten inches of oil and a one-inch arored back plate before entering the driver's compartment. By this time the shell has spent itself and nester between the driver's feet under his seat." Absolutely riveting stuff for any tank lover. The book is chock full of knocking out tanks, describing the detailed damage, and how the tanks were cleaned up and returned to the field.
Similarly, the stories of running liason reports from the front to the rear lines under constant danger, fabricating hedgerow choppers, dealing with Belgian mademoiselles, using a T2 recovery vehicle to recover dead cows, or watching P-47s bomb the enemy are full of detail and poignancy that any W.W. II researcher would love. The difficulty of keeping armor and trucks running with lots of excellent detail right down to the number of spark plugs needed in the early Wright powered Shermans (18) and the number of miles for the engine of a GMC "deuce and a half" 2.5 ton truck (10,000). If muzzle velocities and armor thicknesses interest you, you get plenty of this detail.
However, some of the broader statements and the overall strategic analysis of the war are somewhat less insightful. I was surprised that his section on discovering the death camp at Nordhausen only merited two and a half pages. At times, the strategic view of the war is missing. Very few maps and diagrams of the movements of the 3rd AD. And finally, there is quite a bit of repetition. Over and over, he states the same problems with the M4 and the greatness of the M26. The greatness of the Panther and Tiger. OK, once or twice is enough.
Overall the writing style is direct and easy to read. Chapters are divided into smaller sections. Each anecdote invites you to read the next, and turn a few more pages. So, despite some shortcomings, if you like the detail and close up view of the tanker's war in W.W. II, this is an excellent personal combat diary.
Rating: 
Summary: A Faulty Indictment
Review: Death Traps, a poorly written memoir by Belton Y. Cooper promises much, but delivers little. Cooper served as an ordnance lieutenant in the 3rd Armor Division (3AD), acting as a liaison officer between the Combat Commands and the Division Maintenance Battalion. One of the first rules of memoir writing is to focus on events of which the author has direct experience; instead, Cooper is constantly discussing high-level or distant events of which he was not a witness. Consequently, the book is riddled with mistakes and falsehoods. Furthermore, the author puts his main effort into an over-simplified indictment of the American Sherman tank as a "death trap" that delayed eventual victory in the Second World War. Cooper's indictment of the Sherman tank's inferiority compared to the heavier German Panther and Tiger tanks ignores many important facts. First, the Sherman was designed for mass production and this allowed the Allies to enjoy a 4-1 superiority in numbers. Second, fewer than 50% of the German armor in France in 1944 were Tigers or Panthers. Third, if the German tanks were as deadly as Cooper claims, why did the Germans lose 1,500 tanks in Normandy against about 1,700 Allied tanks? Indeed, Cooper claims that the 3AD lost 648 Shermans in the war, but the division claimed to have destroyed 1,023 German tanks. Clearly, there was no great kill-ratio in the German favor, and the Allies could afford to trade tank-for-tank. Finally, if the Sherman was such a "death trap," why did the US Army use it later in Korea or the Israelis use it in the 1967 War? There are a great number of mistakes in this book, beginning with Cooper's ridiculous claim that General Patton was responsible for delaying the M-26 heavy tank program. Cooper claims that Patton was at a tank demonstration at Tidworth Downs in January 1944 and that, "Patton...insisted that we should downgrade the M26 heavy tank and concentrate on the M4....This turned out to be one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II, and its effect upon the upcoming battle for Western Europe was catastrophic." Actually, Patton was in Algiers and Italy for most of January 1944, only arriving back in Scotland on 26 January. In fact, it was General McNair of Ground Forces Command, back in the US, who delayed the M-26 program. Cooper sees the M-26 as the panacea for all the US Army's shortcomings and even claims that the American offensive in November 1944, "would have succeeded if we had had the Pershing" and the resulting American breakthrough could have forestalled the Ardennes offensive and "the war could have ended five months earlier." This is just sheer nonsense and ignores the logistical and weather problems that doomed that offensive. Cooper continually discusses events he did not witness and in fact, only about one-third of the book covers his own experiences. Instead of discussing maintenance operations in detail, Cooper opines about everything from U-Boats, to V-2 rockets, to strategic bombing, to the July 20th Plot. He falsely states that, "the British had secured a model of the German enigma decoding machine and were using it to decode German messages." Cooper writes, "not until July 25, the night before the Saint-Lo breakthrough, was Rommel able to secure the release of the panzer divisions in reserve in the Pas de Clais area." Actually, Rommel was wounded on 17 July and in a hospital on July 25th. In another chapter, Cooper writes that, "the British had bombed the city [Darmstadt] during a night raid in February," and "more than 40,000 died in this inferno." Actually, the RAF bombed Darmstadt on 11 September 1944, killing about 12,000. Dresden was bombed on 13 February 1945, killing about 40,000. Obviously, the author has confused cities and raids. Even where Cooper is dealing with issues closer to his own experience, he tends to exaggerate or deliver incorrect information. He describes the VII Corps as an "armor corps," but it was not. Cooper's description of a counterattack by the German Panzer Lehr division is totally inaccurate; he states that, "July 11 became one of the most critical in the battle of Normandy. The Germans launched a massive counterattack along the Saint-Lo- Saint Jean de Daye highway..." In fact, one under strength German division attacked three US divisions. The Americans lost only 100 casualties, while the Germans suffered 25% armor losses. The Official history calls this attack "a dismal and costly failure." Cooper wrote that, "Combat Command A...put up a terrific defense in the vicinity of Saint Jean de Daye..." but actually it was CCB, since CCA in reserve. On another occasion, Cooper claims that his unit received the 60,000th Sherman produced, but official records indicate that only 49,234 of all models were built. Cooper claims that the 3rd Armored Division had 17,000 soldiers, but the authorized strength was about 14,500. Can't this guy remember anything correctly? Cooper's description of the death of MGN Rose is virtually plagiarized from the official history and a number of articles in ARMOR magazine in the past decade reveal that Rose was an extreme risk-taker. Reading "Death Traps," the uninitiated may actually believe that the US Army was badly defeated in Europe. Cooper even claims that, as the 3rd Armored Division approached the Elbe River in the last days of the war that, "with our division spread out and opposed by three new divisions, our situation was critical." If anybody's situation was critical in April 1945, it was Germany's. Actually, the 3rd Armored Division had one key weakness not noted by Cooper, namely the shortage of infantry. The division had a poor ratio of 2:1 between tanks and infantry, and this deficiency often required the 3AD to borrow an infantry RCT from other units. While the much-maligned Sherman tank was far from perfect, it did the job it was designed for, a fact that is missed by this author.
Rating:
Summary: A Faulty Indictment
Review: Death Traps, a poorly written memoir by Belton Y. Cooper promises much, but delivers little. Cooper served as an ordnance lieutenant in the 3rd Armor Division (3AD), acting as a liaison officer between the Combat Commands and the Division Maintenance Battalion. One of the first rules of memoir writing is to focus on events of which the author has direct experience; instead, Cooper is constantly discussing high-level or distant events of which he was not a witness. Consequently, the book is riddled with mistakes and falsehoods. Furthermore, the author puts his main effort into an over-simplified indictment of the American Sherman tank as a "death trap" that delayed eventual victory in the Second World War. Cooper's indictment of the Sherman tank's inferiority compared to the heavier German Panther and Tiger tanks ignores many important facts. First, the Sherman was designed for mass production and this allowed the Allies to enjoy a 4-1 superiority in numbers. Second, fewer than 50% of the German armor in France in 1944 were Tigers or Panthers. Third, if the German tanks were as deadly as Cooper claims, why did the Germans lose 1,500 tanks in Normandy against about 1,700 Allied tanks? Indeed, Cooper claims that the 3AD lost 648 Shermans in the war, but the division claimed to have destroyed 1,023 German tanks. Clearly, there was no great kill-ratio in the German favor, and the Allies could afford to trade tank-for-tank. Finally, if the Sherman was such a "death trap," why did the US Army use it later in Korea or the Israelis use it in the 1967 War? There are a great number of mistakes in this book, beginning with Cooper's ridiculous claim that General Patton was responsible for delaying the M-26 heavy tank program. Cooper claims that Patton was at a tank demonstration at Tidworth Downs in January 1944 and that, "Patton...insisted that we should downgrade the M26 heavy tank and concentrate on the M4....This turned out to be one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II, and its effect upon the upcoming battle for Western Europe was catastrophic." Actually, Patton was in Algiers and Italy for most of January 1944, only arriving back in Scotland on 26 January. In fact, it was General McNair of Ground Forces Command, back in the US, who delayed the M-26 program. Cooper sees the M-26 as the panacea for all the US Army's shortcomings and even claims that the American offensive in November 1944, "would have succeeded if we had had the Pershing" and the resulting American breakthrough could have forestalled the Ardennes offensive and "the war could have ended five months earlier." This is just sheer nonsense and ignores the logistical and weather problems that doomed that offensive. Cooper continually discusses events he did not witness and in fact, only about one-third of the book covers his own experiences. Instead of discussing maintenance operations in detail, Cooper opines about everything from U-Boats, to V-2 rockets, to strategic bombing, to the July 20th Plot. He falsely states that, "the British had secured a model of the German enigma decoding machine and were using it to decode German messages." Cooper writes, "not until July 25, the night before the Saint-Lo breakthrough, was Rommel able to secure the release of the panzer divisions in reserve in the Pas de Clais area." Actually, Rommel was wounded on 17 July and in a hospital on July 25th. In another chapter, Cooper writes that, "the British had bombed the city [Darmstadt] during a night raid in February," and "more than 40,000 died in this inferno." Actually, the RAF bombed Darmstadt on 11 September 1944, killing about 12,000. Dresden was bombed on 13 February 1945, killing about 40,000. Obviously, the author has confused cities and raids. Even where Cooper is dealing with issues closer to his own experience, he tends to exaggerate or deliver incorrect information. He describes the VII Corps as an "armor corps," but it was not. Cooper's description of a counterattack by the German Panzer Lehr division is totally inaccurate; he states that, "July 11 became one of the most critical in the battle of Normandy. The Germans launched a massive counterattack along the Saint-Lo- Saint Jean de Daye highway..." In fact, one under strength German division attacked three US divisions. The Americans lost only 100 casualties, while the Germans suffered 25% armor losses. The Official history calls this attack "a dismal and costly failure." Cooper wrote that, "Combat Command A...put up a terrific defense in the vicinity of Saint Jean de Daye..." but actually it was CCB, since CCA in reserve. On another occasion, Cooper claims that his unit received the 60,000th Sherman produced, but official records indicate that only 49,234 of all models were built. Cooper claims that the 3rd Armored Division had 17,000 soldiers, but the authorized strength was about 14,500. Can't this guy remember anything correctly? Cooper's description of the death of MGN Rose is virtually plagiarized from the official history and a number of articles in ARMOR magazine in the past decade reveal that Rose was an extreme risk-taker. Reading "Death Traps," the uninitiated may actually believe that the US Army was badly defeated in Europe. Cooper even claims that, as the 3rd Armored Division approached the Elbe River in the last days of the war that, "with our division spread out and opposed by three new divisions, our situation was critical." If anybody's situation was critical in April 1945, it was Germany's. Actually, the 3rd Armored Division had one key weakness not noted by Cooper, namely the shortage of infantry. The division had a poor ratio of 2:1 between tanks and infantry, and this deficiency often required the 3AD to borrow an infantry RCT from other units. While the much-maligned Sherman tank was far from perfect, it did the job it was designed for, a fact that is missed by this author.
Rating:
Summary: Death Traps review by one who was there
Review: I reviewed this book 2 years ago when I first read it because it was so truthful and realistic as written by this man. He was the young ordinance officer of my 3rd Armored Division, 33rd Armored Regimment. I was in Recon. Company and in his book he tells it as it was. I wrote the first review because of the impression it made on me. It is a book every military buff, every history teacher, every politican and every America should read especially those interested enough in our past wars to try to prevent the events in this book from happening again. WW II could easily have been lost or been like Vietnam and ended in a no win situation. I stongly recommend the reading of this for enjoyable, informative story line told from the veteran's level and prespective. I traveled to a 3rd Armored Veteran's reunion to meet the author and get his autograph. It was worthwhile. He is a fine , friendly man who wrote this book mainly as a tribute to his fellow soldiers and to tell a story that neederd telling which was how our soldiers died and suffered because of the inferiority of our tanks, guns and other equiptment to that of the Germans.
Rating:
Summary: An incredible up front view of an armored division
Review: I think the author may have been in the perfect position to write the best account of an armored division in Europe during WWII. And it doesn't hurt that the author is an excellent writer.
The author was in charge of maintance & repair for the division's tanks. So he was as close to the battle as you could be without actually fighting in one of the tanks. I think that one step removed gave him an even better view of events than if he was in a tank.
And his observations of the Army, West Point, the command structure, and others involved in the battle is brutally honest. He doesn't pull any punches.
A book you cannot put down that takes you there and gives you an honest picture of an American armored division.
Rating:
Summary: Theory vs. Practice
Review: I truly enjoyed reading this book for the same historical and technical accuracy mentioned by many of the other reviewers. This book is a remarkable memoir and provides a irreplaceable glimpse into a personal experience that would otherwise be easily lost to time. However, I must also admit that I found this text to be plagued by many frustrating shortcomings that detract from the overall reading experience. This book is deceptively advertised as being written by Cooper and noted historian Stephen Ambrose. I was truly irritated to discover that Stephen Ambrose's only contribution is actually just a SIX sentence foreword, which is itself little more than a cheaply disguised, glossy, and impersonal pitch for one of his own books. The editor did indeed fail the author on several instances, as was mentioned previously. Actually, I believe this statement was slightly conservative and the editor has actually done nothing: 1) The book is extremely repetitive. Various phrases, sentences, and entire paragraphs of text appear numerous times throughout the book - often almost word for word duplications. 2) There is little consistency in the terminology used and only occasional are definitions provided. I'm sure that many other readers who are, like me, not intimately familiar with finer details of military equipment and tactics will often find themselves lost on the importance of observations and discussions made by the author throughout the text. 3) Grammar. There are several rather simple (making them perhaps even more significant) grammatical errors in the text. These errors are not within quotation marks where they could be dismissed as slang. In a world of email and junk magazines, edited books are perhaps the last frontier of grammatical standards. The editor should have exercised some effort to ensure the quality of the book being published.
Rating:
Summary: Rebuilding shot up Sherman tanks
Review: Mr. Cooper was an ordinance officer with the 3rd Armored Division and his job was to reclaim shattered US tanks and return them to ordinance depot or other repair facilities and bring them back to action. If anyone knows the shortcomings of the Sherman tank it would be this man. His story is one of attrition, superior German tanks and SP guns being overwhelmed by the ability of American units to be resupplied with restored or new tanks. One interesting sidelight, Mr. Cooper is highly critical of Gen. George S. Patton's recommendation to build masses of Shermans rather than M-26 Pershings. The Pershing had much better protection, immensely better firepower and could have stood up to Panther and Tiger tanks much more successfuly than the Sherman. Patton thought the Sherman was more mobile but on muddy ground, the Pershing had more track width and was the quicker of the two. This is one of the best books on armored warfare and the war in the West in 1944 ever written. I highly recommend it.
Rating:
Summary: Armored combat from the perspective of recovery and repair
Review: Mr. Cooper's book covers armored warfare on the western front from a previously obscure service - armored repair and recovery. As a young lieutenant with this service, his job was to come forward in the evening and check the broken down and/or combat damaged armored vehicles for that day. From this unique perspective he was able to view horrific damage wrought to Sherman tanks by German high velocity antitank guns , tanks, bazookas, and mines. The tanks' weaknesses ( undergunned, under armored, high profile, loud gasoline powered engine, propensity for burning) became increasingly apparent to him as he saw the dismembered and burned crew members on nearly a daily basis. The author contends that the army knew of these greivous weaknesses prior to the Normandy invasion and had the opportunity to retool and build vastly superior M26 Pershing tanks; but didn't, to keep high , continuous production of Shermans instead. The author infers that this led to unnecessarily high tank losses and in particular losses of tank crews in the western campaign. On a more positive note, American ingenuity was displayed in his detailed description of tank repair close to the battle front, with the Americans able to send a much higher percentage of battle damaged tanks back into action. Also, the description of the 3rd Armored Division including its' different organization and its' critical use as a "spearhead" are of interest. In all, I would rate this book highly for its' coverage of this neglected, but very important, component of the U.S. armored division in WW II.
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