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Rating: 
Summary: Historian as politician and vice versa
Review: About halfway through Lukacs' chapter on Churchill and Eisenhower, I wrote down the phrase I used to title this review. One of the author's missions is to explore how Churchill's study and writing of history shaped his politics, statesmanship, and "vision." And sure enough, just a few dozen pages later, Lukacs himself, modifying a phrase of J.H. Plumb, described Churchill as "a historian-statesman and a statesman-historian" (p. 102).John Lukacs is himself a great writer and interpreter of history. And though I've read lots of things about Churchill over the years, few historians have impressed me as he has with their ability to synthesize and interpret. By all means, still read the longer biographies -- Gilbert, naturally, as well as Best and Jenkins more recently. But let Lukacs help you sort out what it all means. Among other things, you may well find yourself agreeing with him that Churchill "was not The Last Lion" (p. 17). Lukacs' description of Churchill as a patriot but not a nationalist (as contrasted with Hitler, who was a nationalist but not a patriot) is also a revealing one -- especially in an era when the two are too easily confused. Hundreds or thousands of volumes have been written on Churchill as statesman and war leader. But only one (Maurice Ashley's "Churchill as Historian," 1968), plus a few journal articles, have viewed him as a student and writer of history and tried to assess how that affected his other spheres of life. Lukacs views it as central, giving Churchill, as it did, a philosophy of history (p. 123) as well as a world view that allowed him to place events and ideas in their larger historical context (Lukacs sees this as the essential difference between Churchill and Eisenhower). Given the resurgence of interest in Churchill -- which never entirely wanes, of course -- post-9/11, several of Lukacs' insights and conclusions may come as a surprise, or be considered "controversial": notably, that Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton was less about the dangers posed by communism *per se* than about those inherent in a divided Europe; that Churchill's glory was not that he won a great victory, but rather that he prevented a great defeat; and that in his dealings with Stalin during and after the war, he tried "to save what was possible" (p. 182). This last point Lukacs deploys (in an excellent chapter on Churchill's failures and his critics) against those who hold Churchill to blame for the "loss" of Eastern Europe to communism (through the Machiavellian "percentages deal," for example). Lukacs argues that Churchill recognized there were only two real options: All of Europe dominated by Hitler, or half of Europe dominated by Stalin. There was, Lukacs says, no third way. Duff Cooper, a Churchillian, once wrote that one of the problems with democracies is that too few democratic leaders have read any history. Lukacs shows how Churchill's own reading and writing prepared him for the challenges of his century. Readers of this book, in turn, emerge with a clearer view, not only of those challenges, but also of The Man of the Century himself. Very highly recommended.
Rating: 
Summary: A throwaway
Review: And a tolerably worthwhile throwaway, considering Lukacs's knowledge of his subject. If you have decent familiarity with the issues, this book won't weigh you down and it adds nuance to the accepted portrait of Churchill. But this is certainly not an introduction to Churchill and the author's biases, particularly against Eisenhower, mar the presentation. This chafed at me in particular, and I hold no particular brief for Ike. But Lukacs is an historian, yet he swipes at Eisenhower throughout the second half of the book, almost never building an argument but rather using innuendo. He largely assumes that the reader shares his biases, more in the way of punditry than scholarship. I don't regret reading the book, but I am sure I could have made more productive use of the time and money on another Churchill work.
Rating:
Summary: A throwaway
Review: And a tolerably worthwhile throwaway, considering Lukacs's knowledge of his subject. If you have decent familiarity with the issues, this book won't weigh you down and it adds nuance to the accepted portrait of Churchill. But this is certainly not an introduction to Churchill and the author's biases, particularly against Eisenhower, mar the presentation. This chafed at me in particular, and I hold no particular brief for Ike. But Lukacs is an historian, yet he swipes at Eisenhower throughout the second half of the book, almost never building an argument but rather using innuendo. He largely assumes that the reader shares his biases, more in the way of punditry than scholarship. I don't regret reading the book, but I am sure I could have made more productive use of the time and money on another Churchill work.
Rating: 
Summary: Decent, but not compelling...
Review: For the record, I admire John Lukacs as a historian... However, this thin volume (essentially a collection of mini-essays) doesn't really do much to add to the already abundant amount of Churchill scholarship... Lukacs clearly worships Churchill and therefore the book comes across as a simple hagiography. Lukacs' strength is his ability to spin a narrative while not getting bogged down with excessive facts. However, sometimes he can seem to wander off on rather obscure emotional tangents... This book is fine as an introduction to Churchill, but for someone who wants a more in-depth look at the great man, I suggest turning to the rather more weighty biographies by Martin Gilbert and Roy Jenkins, or indeed his own earlier, and infinitely more interesting title, "Five Days in London."
Rating: 
Summary: An Ode to Greatness
Review: John Lukacs has written a number of books about and involving Winston Churchill. Most deal with his role in World War II. In this little volume, really just an extended essay, he waxes poetic on a man he clearly admires deeply. The book is divided into short chapters in which Lukacs considers a number of different aspects of Churchill's character and personality. First he considers Churchill as a visionary by examining some of Churchill's well known, Cassandra-like predictions such as the danger of Hitler and after the war of Soviet aggression. In the section on Churchill as statesman, Lukacs looks at Churchill's complicated relationships with Stalin, Roosevelt and Eisenhower. Lukacs also discusses Churchill's views on Britain's relationship with Europe and his take on the policy of appeasement. In a chapter on Churchill as historian, Lukacs looks critically at Churchill's most important works, in particular, his "Life of Marlborough", his biography of his father, "Lord Randolph Churchill" and his history of the First World War, the "World Crisis". Lukacs appreciates Churchill's talents as an artist of the written word. He demonstrates why Churchill's work succeeds not just as history but as literature. In the next section, Lukacs effectively refutes Churchill's severest revisionist critics in a chapter entitled "His Failures, His Critics". It may interest the reader to know that their exist so-called historians whose purpose in life seems to be to blame Churchill either for fighting Hitler or for losing the empire and world leadership to the United States. As Lukacs argues, this is ridiculous. Finally, in a beautiful essay that is alone worth the price of the book, Lukacs describes his feelings while attending Churchill's state funeral in 1965. Quite a bit is covered in such a small book but as a Churchillphile, I thoroughly enjoyed it. Lukacs has a true appreciation of human greatness and this book demonstrates why Churchill was a great man, one of the greatest of the modern era. Great does not mean perfect of course and Lukacs eloquently explains why Churchill, with all his flaws, was truly great. This is not a book of history or an appropriate reference for a study of Churchill. Nor is it the proper starting point for one seeking to learn about Churchill's life. But for one who already loves and reveres the memory of this great man, this book is balm for the soul. It makes the case, quite clearly for Churchill's greatness. It is at once poignant and eloquent. It is well worth reading.
Rating:
Summary: Lukacs and Churchill-the love affair continues
Review: John Lukacs is a Catholic anglophile and a conservative Christian Democrat who fled from Hungary at the beginning of the cold war. At the same time he has never forgiven the Republican party right for its refusal to help Britain (and the rest of Europe) at her darkest hour. Winston Churchill has always been his hero. About fifteen years ago Lukacs wrote a book on the 80 day "duel" between Churchill and Hitler in the summer of 1940. A few years ago he wrote a more popular book that looked at ten of those days. This third book concentrates on Churchill, and it is the most disappointing yet. Lukacs looks at Churchill "the visionary," and his relationships with Stalin, FDR, and Eisenhower. He then discusses appeasement, Churchill's skill as a historian, his failures, and then concludes with his memories of Churchill's funeral. Basically this book is a shallow collection of essays which add nothing to our knowledge of the man. There are not even many telling details or pungent anecdotes. There is nothing wrong in arguing, as Lukacs does, that Churchill was right not to make a deal with Hitler, and that he is not to blame for the fact that postwar Poland was a Communist dictatorship. But most historians have never doubted these matters, and Lukacs has nothing new to add. Lukacs has never really cared for archival research, nor has he really paid much attention to what other scholars say. At one point he states that the Soviet Union was not really interested in defending Czechoslovakia in 1938, nor was it really interested in negotiating an alliance with France and Britain the following years. Perhaps, but it is important to point out that in recent years Hugh Ragsdale and Michael J. Carley have produced well documented arguments to the contrary, and that Lukacs not only does not refute them, he appears to be unaware of their existence. Likewise, the chapter on Eisenhower and Churchill concentrates on Churchill's proposals in 1953 to try to make a deal with the post-Stalin leadership, which Eisenhower peremptorily brushed aside. Was an opportunity to end, or shorten, the cold war carelessly thrown away? Perhaps, but other scholars, such as John W. Young and Jaclyn Stanke, have discussed the issue in far greater detail than Lukacs. Many scholars dislike Stephen Ambrose for his terminus into plagiarism and middlebrow eminence. Notwithstanding that, his argument that Eisenhower and his small armies could not have snatched the honor of taking Berlin from Zhukov's larger forces still stands, and Lukacs does nothing to refute it. Lukacs exaggerates Churchill's perceptiveness. Contra Lukacs, Churchill's fears of German revenge in 1924 were not boldly original, but a commonplace among the British. It did not take great insight after the 1930 German elections to realize, as Churchill did, that Hitler was an important politician. And Churchill was not alone in 1935 in fearing a possible war from Hitler. The chapter on Churchill's histories is indulgent and complacent, as Lukacs applauds Churchill for his style and memorable image. Unfortunately, this confuses history with journalism, and Lukacs is less informative on this than David Reynolds and J.H. Plumb. Lukacs mentions Churchill's faults, but his account of the Dardanelles fiasco, the catastrophic return to the Gold Standard and Churchill's opposition to Indian independence are brief and apologetic. Christopher Thorne is more accurate on Churchill's bigotry and the price of his imperialist illusions. David Cannadine is far more acute on his awful family who, with the exception of his wife and his daughter, Lady Soames, were incredibly selfish and irresponsible. Cannadine is also acute on Churchill's ignorance of modern day life, noting that Churchill took the underground only once, and he had to be rescued, because he didn't know how to get off. "Churchill and Hitler were, at any rate, the two protagonists of the dramatic phase of the last war, even though Roosevelt and Stalin played the decisive role in its epic phase, at the end." As a distinction, this does not work very well. Was there nothing dramatic about the defense of Leningrad and the battle of Kursk? But for Lukacs it is important to view the conflict as one between Hitler and Churchill, even though he is well aware that Churchill could not have won without the USA and the USSR. For Churchill is an icon, a symbol of the liberal, aristocratic order. When Churchill saved Britain in 1940 he redeemed this order's honor. One can only contrast with the actual ruling class of interwar Hungary who led that country into a vicious, genocidal war. That contrast is more interesting than anything Lukacs has to say in this book.
Rating:
Summary: The Ever-Lasting Appeal of Churchill
Review: John Lukas clearly states at the beginning of his short book that his collection of essays is neither a biography nor a scholarly study of Winston Spencer Churchill (pg. xiii). Therefore, potential readers of Lukas' book who do not know anything about the key milestones in the life and career of Churchill should not start here. These readers can read books such as "Churchill a Life", "Churchill a Study in Greatness", "Clementine Churchill The Biography of a Marriage", "Winston and Clementine The Personal Letters of the Churchills" or "The Wit & Wisdom of Winston Churchill" to fill in the most glaring gaps in their knowledge of Churchill for that purpose. Lukas writes to the attention of an audience who has an unquenchable thirst to know more and more about an individual who remains a source of inspiration to many men and women who stand in the way of barbarity and illiberalism around the world. Although Lukas is generally sympathetic to Churchill, he is not blind to his major shortcomings: impetuosity, impatience, stubbornness and fancifulness (pg. 4, 154). Furthermore, Lukas reminds his audience in his essay "His Failures. His Critics" that Churchill had accumulated errors and mistakes that Churchill critics and detractors were attributing to his flawed character (pg. 129). For example, Churchill's futile fight against granting Dominion status to India from 1929 to 1935 was perhaps compatible with his imperialist credentials but certainly a clear blemish on his record. As a very experienced politician and knowledgeable historian at that time, Churchill should have known much better (pg. 14-15, 24, 135-136). Therefore, Lukas' collection of essays should not be construed as a shameful hagiography. Furthermore, Lukas reminds his audience in "Churchill's historianship" and "Churchill the visionary" that Churchill was generally cognizant of the lessons that he could draw from past events to articulate his often-visionary policies while reflecting on and shaping history on his turn (pg. 1-18, 47). Churchill was not only a spectator, but also a key actor and play writer of human comedy (pg. 102). Lukas also explores the ups and downs that Churchill had in his relationships with other history shapers such as Charles De Gaulle, Dwight Eisenhower, Adolf Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin (pg. 19-20). Lukas convincingly explains that Churchill was facing an unpalatable choice between a Europe entirely ruled by Nazi Germany or half of Europe dominated by the Communists in case of allied victory (pg. 11, 27-28, 35). Churchill rightly first gave top priority to successfully fighting Hitler to death before trying in vain to stop Stalin in 1944-1945. Unlike some unimaginative people, Churchill understood right at the birth of the Soviet Union that the Bolsheviks should be stopped immediately before they grew into a gathering threat to the world. War-weary, the victors of WWI, unfortunately, gave only half-hearty support to the White Russians in their desperate fight against the Soviets (pg. 23). Once again, long-term pains were the reward for short-term gains. Some (American) readers will not be very pleased while reading Lukas' unflattering portrait of Eisenhower and the men around him in "Churchill and Eisenhower." As mentioned above, Churchill was definitely right to try to thwart in 1944-1945 the apparently irresistible advance of the Soviets in Central and Eastern Europe. Churchill clearly understood that geography and territory mattered, not ideology (pg. 42). For that reason, the British army met the Russians east of the entry to the Danish peninsula at the request of Churchill in 1945 (pg. 45). Unfortunately, the American leadership did not want to hear anything about it at that time (pg. 35-40, 46). Some European regions such as former East Germany and the Czech Republic should have been eventually spared the murderous and inefficient rule of the former Soviet Union (pg. 43). The Greeks should continue to be very thankful to Churchill for saving them from a communist tyranny (pg. 41, 48). In his famous, visionary Iron Curtain speech in 1946, Churchill expressed his concern with the murderous, inefficient embrace of Communism in the European regions under Stalin's control. American reception of this historic speech was at best lukewarm (pg. 47). Churchill knew better and was predicting at the end of 1952 that time was not on the side of Communism (pg. 48, 79). After the death of Stalin in 1953, Churchill, Prime Minister again, could not convince his friend Eisenhower, who in the meantime became President of the U.S.A., of finding some kind of accommodation with the new Soviet leadership (pg. 70, 73-74). Subsequent events proved that Eisenhower was right when he saw no difference after Stalin was gone (pg. 71, 77). Contrary to what Lukas thinks, Eisenhower should not be described as a leader without any vision under the nefarious influence of men such as John Foster Dulles (pg. 79-80). Many western leaders shared Eisenhower's views on this subject (pg. 81-82). The former Soviet Union was not yet in sufficient decline in the early 1950s to negotiate in a position of force with it as world leaders such as President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher understood very well in the 1980s.
Rating:
Summary: The Ever-Lasting Appeal of Churchill
Review: John Lukas clearly states at the beginning of his short book that his collection of essays is neither a biography nor a scholarly study of Winston Spencer Churchill (pg. xiii). Therefore, potential readers of Lukas' book who do not know anything about the key milestones in the life and career of Churchill should not start here. These readers can read books such as "Churchill a Life", "Churchill a Study in Greatness", "Clementine Churchill The Biography of a Marriage", "Winston and Clementine The Personal Letters of the Churchills" or "The Wit & Wisdom of Winston Churchill" to fill in the most glaring gaps in their knowledge of Churchill for that purpose. Lukas writes to the attention of an audience who has an unquenchable thirst to know more and more about an individual who remains a source of inspiration to many men and women who stand in the way of barbarity and illiberalism around the world. Although Lukas is generally sympathetic to Churchill, he is not blind to his major shortcomings: impetuosity, impatience, stubbornness and fancifulness (pg. 4, 154). Furthermore, Lukas reminds his audience in his essay "His Failures. His Critics" that Churchill had accumulated errors and mistakes that Churchill critics and detractors were attributing to his flawed character (pg. 129). For example, Churchill's futile fight against granting Dominion status to India from 1929 to 1935 was perhaps compatible with his imperialist credentials but certainly a clear blemish on his record. As a very experienced politician and knowledgeable historian at that time, Churchill should have known much better (pg. 14-15, 24, 135-136). Therefore, Lukas' collection of essays should not be construed as a shameful hagiography. Furthermore, Lukas reminds his audience in "Churchill's historianship" and "Churchill the visionary" that Churchill was generally cognizant of the lessons that he could draw from past events to articulate his often-visionary policies while reflecting on and shaping history on his turn (pg. 1-18, 47). Churchill was not only a spectator, but also a key actor and play writer of human comedy (pg. 102). Lukas also explores the ups and downs that Churchill had in his relationships with other history shapers such as Charles De Gaulle, Dwight Eisenhower, Adolf Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin (pg. 19-20). Lukas convincingly explains that Churchill was facing an unpalatable choice between a Europe entirely ruled by Nazi Germany or half of Europe dominated by the Communists in case of allied victory (pg. 11, 27-28, 35). Churchill rightly first gave top priority to successfully fighting Hitler to death before trying in vain to stop Stalin in 1944-1945. Unlike some unimaginative people, Churchill understood right at the birth of the Soviet Union that the Bolsheviks should be stopped immediately before they grew into a gathering threat to the world. War-weary, the victors of WWI, unfortunately, gave only half-hearty support to the White Russians in their desperate fight against the Soviets (pg. 23). Once again, long-term pains were the reward for short-term gains. Some (American) readers will not be very pleased while reading Lukas' unflattering portrait of Eisenhower and the men around him in "Churchill and Eisenhower." As mentioned above, Churchill was definitely right to try to thwart in 1944-1945 the apparently irresistible advance of the Soviets in Central and Eastern Europe. Churchill clearly understood that geography and territory mattered, not ideology (pg. 42). For that reason, the British army met the Russians east of the entry to the Danish peninsula at the request of Churchill in 1945 (pg. 45). Unfortunately, the American leadership did not want to hear anything about it at that time (pg. 35-40, 46). Some European regions such as former East Germany and the Czech Republic should have been eventually spared the murderous and inefficient rule of the former Soviet Union (pg. 43). The Greeks should continue to be very thankful to Churchill for saving them from a communist tyranny (pg. 41, 48). In his famous, visionary Iron Curtain speech in 1946, Churchill expressed his concern with the murderous, inefficient embrace of Communism in the European regions under Stalin's control. American reception of this historic speech was at best lukewarm (pg. 47). Churchill knew better and was predicting at the end of 1952 that time was not on the side of Communism (pg. 48, 79). After the death of Stalin in 1953, Churchill, Prime Minister again, could not convince his friend Eisenhower, who in the meantime became President of the U.S.A., of finding some kind of accommodation with the new Soviet leadership (pg. 70, 73-74). Subsequent events proved that Eisenhower was right when he saw no difference after Stalin was gone (pg. 71, 77). Contrary to what Lukas thinks, Eisenhower should not be described as a leader without any vision under the nefarious influence of men such as John Foster Dulles (pg. 79-80). Many western leaders shared Eisenhower's views on this subject (pg. 81-82). The former Soviet Union was not yet in sufficient decline in the early 1950s to negotiate in a position of force with it as world leaders such as President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher understood very well in the 1980s.
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