Cassell Military Classics: The Desert Generals (Cmp)

Rating:
Summary: A Pinch of Salt
Review: I recently took part in an online discussion over the merits of O'Connor and Montgomery and came to the conclusion that my knowledge was lacking on the details of their respective attributes as General Officers in the field, so when I came accross this book I thought "Just what I want".

Once I read the introduction however, whilst assuming the details and history to be correct, what jaundiced my view was that the purpose of the book was to "prove" that Montgomery inherited his good actions from Auchinleck as opposed to 'creating' them himself. This raised the possibility of a 'slant' to the text in order to "prove" the authors contention.

Having said that, I thoroughly 'enjoyed' the read which was most informative.

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Summary: Barnett displays his keen ability to dissect high command
Review: In this book, Barnett again demonstrates a unique ability to dissect high command. Barnett was ahead of his time with his critical analysis of Montgomery. The latest edition includes a section which details the extent to which the allies in North Africa knew in advance what Rommel's moves would be, thanks to ULTRA intercepts. With this additional information, Montgomery's cautious conduct of the campaign in North Africa comes into even greater question. Barnett also details how the British, under O'Connor, were on the verge of driving the Italians from North Africa in 1940, but instead chose to send an expeditionary force to Greece on what was basically a poltical mission masterminded by Winston Churchill. That mission, like Churchill's foray into Gallipoli during the First World War, collapsed and Axis forces were not cleared from North Africa until early 1943. This book is highly recommended for anyone who enjoyed *Hitler's Generals* or *Swordbearers*, both also by Barnett, or anyone interested in the history of the Second World War, North African theater.

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Summary: The North African Campaign was not won by "Monty" alone
Review: Some may be inclined to call this a "revisionist" history, but Barnett presents a clear and compelling account of the British battle for North Africa from 1940-1943. He focuses on the British Generals, and aruges that much of Montgomery's success can be linked to the military proficiency of O'Connor, Auchinleck and others. (Indeed, Barnett labels Auchinleck "The Victor Of Alamein" while most accredit that title to Monty). A highly readable account of the struggle for North Africa before the U.S. joined the campaign. Armor enthusiasts might feel the tank battles are not detailed enough, but I believe it does not detract from the substance of the book. It is rewarding to see those who deserve credit get it in this book.

Rating:
Summary: Fills a gap and pays a well deserved tribute.
Review: This book examines the role played by some of the lesser known yet great commanders of the North African campaign. The arrival of Field Marshall Montgomery in North Africa and his subsequent victory at El Alamein in 1942 made him a overnight hero. Unfortunately, the commanders who had come before him were not given their dues, even though they had done a great job managing the situation in the North African theater during the intial difficult times. Undoubtedly, Montgomery had done a great job in winning the war in the North African theater, yet one must not forget that other great commanders such as O'Connor, Auchinleck, Ritchie, Wavell, Cunningham had set up the stage for him. In order to have a balanced view of the commanders in the North African campaign, this book is a must read.

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Summary: Classic account of leadership in the Desert War
Review: This book is a study of the leadership of the British army in the desert campaigns of World War II. First published in the 1960's, it caused a stir in its attempt to deconstruct the invincibility myth surrounding Field Marshal Montgomery.
Barnett makes a convincing case. His Montgomery is the villain of the book, a self-serving opportunist whose actual military skills never matched his inflated reputation. Barnett is especially indignant over Montgomery's dishonesty when first assuming command of the 8th Army, namely in taking the credit for much of Auchinleck's work and passing it off as his own. Consequently, there's a palpable relish in the way he describes how the famous Battle of El Alamein was unbelievably almost lost under Montgomery direction, and how the ensuing pursuit to the Tunisian frontier was hamstrung by his hesitancy and conservatism.
Barnett is equally highly critical of Churchill's direction of the war in the Mediterranean, for example with regard to the Greek campaign, which he maintains was based on unsound military strategy and fought by British forces for purely cynical political gain. Meanwhile, O'Connor is lamented as a forgotten hero, victor over a hugely superior Italian army. Ritchie and Cunningham are sympathised with as men hopelessly out of their depth. Auchinleck is the hero of the piece, a towering figure of stoicism and dignity, saviour of the Middle East yet virtually betrayed by his superiors in 1942 with his dismissal and replacement by Montgomery and Alexander. Throughout all this, Rommel flits in and out of the narrative, a genius with almost supernatural ability to prevail against overwhelming odds.
The book is virtually a condemnation of the entire British army officer class in World War II who, with honourable exceptions, are dismissed as good-natured yet plodding amateurs, anachronistic in their thinking and no match for a professional, modern German army. Furthermore, the author asserts that the 8th Army was effectively incapable of ever defeating the Afrika Korps in battle without overwhelming material and numerical superiority, and without the benefit of high-quality intelligence, i.e. the Ultra decrypts.
The case against Montgomery seems so persuasive that it is almost necessary to balance this out and seek an opposing viewpoint in his favour, which can easily be found among his own biographers. Barnett to his credit does note Montgomery's undisputed ability to inspire and raise morale among his troops and does admit that he was not a poor general as such. His huge reputation however warrants the most rigorous and uncompromising examination of his overall record, which Barnett is not afraid to carry out.
The Desert Generals is one of the best books I have read on any aspect of the Second World War. Well-written, reasoned and thought provoking, it will appeal to both the serious student of the period and to those with a more casual interest.

Rating:
Summary: Bashing the Montgomery Myth
Review: This work is a study of military leadership under stress, not a detailed blow-by-blow campaign history. The setting is the Libyan and Egyptian deserts, between June 1940 and January 1943. The perspective is thoroughly British and the fluctuating tide of British military fortunes is depicted by a detailed examination of the five key commanders in this period. Originally written in 1960, this work was revised in 1981 to incorporate the later information on the role of Enigma. Although Barnett's main contention - that General Montgomery's accomplishments were more mythical than factual - is not addressed until the last chapters, it is the primary intent of the author to debunk this myth.

The first chapters deal with the opening of the desert war and the initial victories of Field Marshal Wavell and General O'Connor over the Italians. Beda Fomm was O'Connor's brilliant victory, but today it is overshadowed by Rommel's battles. Despite the extent of these victories, the victors were soon forgotten: O'Connor was captured in the initial attack of the German Afrika Korps and Wavell was relieved by Churchill. Although this was an interesting phase of the war for the British, these chapters lack the dynamic quality that the rest of the book has.

General Sir Alan Cunningham, a hero of the campaign in Ethiopia, was sent to replace O'Connor. He was the first British general to face Rommel on even terms, but he lasted in command for only three months. When Cunningham took command, the British were still reeling from Rommel's first offensive and desperately attempting to raise the siege of Tobruk. Cunningham presided over the premature Operation "Crusader" to relieve Tobruk, constantly goaded by Churchill to strike at once. Barnett's portrait of Cunningham is interesting in two respects. First, as a successful colonial soldier suddenly thrust into command of a large mechanized army, Cunningham fumbled Operation Crusader (although more for non-technical reasons, like failure to achieve mass at the decisive point or maintain unity of effort). Cunningham was able to recover and muddle through to a victory of sorts, but suffered a loss of confidence that was fatal to his continued command. This is Barnett's second interesting point, on the strain of battle command upon the commander. Ostensibly, Cunningham was relieved due to "battle fatigue" but the erosion of his command authority and confidence was closer to the truth.

General Auchinleck, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mideast, then made a disastrous choice in selecting General Ritchie to temporarily command the 8th Army. Although Operation Crusader had forced Rommel to abandon the siege of Tobruk and pull back, Ritchie took over command as the Germans swept back up to the Gazala line outside Tobruk. Ritchie was well-connected politically and he possessed a soldierly image but unfortunately, his professional abilities were modest. Ritchie was unimaginative and indecisive - fatal attributes when faced by an adversary like Rommel - and his static defense and piece-meal use of armor resulted in the 8th Army's greatest defeat. After Tobruk was lost and Rommel pushed into Egypt, Auchinleck decided to relieve Ritchie and take over command of the 8th Army himself.

Barnett's portrait of Auchinleck and his chief-of-staff Dorman-Smith is intended to vindicate these men as the true saviors of Egypt and British military fortunes in Africa. The case is persuasive. Although only in command for a few months, Auchinleck stopped Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein and began the process of re-organizing the 8th Army into a more effective force. Dorman-Smith was a military intellectual, and he accurately predicted Rommel's likely course of action and advised Auchinleck on British dispositions. Unfortunately, Churchill visited Egypt right after 1st Alamein and Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith were relieved. The reasons are ambiguous, but the purge was due to political and personal reasons much more than military factors. The benefactor was General Montgomery, who became the new commander of 8th Army.

Barnett's portrait of Montgomery is even more unflattering than most American portrayals of this controversial general. I was unaware, for example, that while at Sandhurst Montgomery has set another cadet on fire as part of a hazing incident (and even recounted it in his memoirs). Montgomery took command when the British were finally receiving massive reinforcements in Egypt and Rommel's forces were at their weakest. Engima decryption also gave Montgomery valuable insight into the enemy's strength and weaknesses. Nevertheless, Montgomery's set-piece Second Battle of El Alamein was nearly a failure. The breakthrough battle was a muddle that nearly foundered on Rommel's minefields and anti-tank barriers. When German supply difficulties finally helped to turn the battle his way, Montgomery clearly fumbled the pursuit and allowed the Afrika Korps to escape. However, Barnett cites the creation of the Montgomery Myth - that his battles all went according to plan and that he was invincible - as necessary to restoring bruised British military prestige. In these pages, Montgomery is clearly labeled as a vainglorious liar of limited military capabilities, but with a keen eye for public relations.

This book is an excellent study of command. For these readers who believe that Hitler interfered with the German war effort, this book is valuable for showing how Churchill also interfered. Churchill's Greek adventure in 1941 weakened the British in North Africa at a critical moment, as well as his diversion of forces to the Far East in December 1941. Likewise, Churchill's insistence on holding indefensible Tobruk in 1942 led to a great British disaster. Furthermore, Churchill was constantly badgering his commanders to attack which reduced the amount of time they had to learn their commands and build up their forces.

There are only two areas I can fault in this book. First, the sketch maps are absolutely awful. The reader will need to find other campaign maps to support the text because these are crude in the extreme. The second area is on the strategic impact of the war in the desert. Several times, Barnett makes the assertion that the war could have been lost if the Germans had broken through at El Alamein. Of course, Barnett is British and the British would like to have everyone believe that the British Army won the Second World War (or at least prevented it from being lost). Barnett also parades "what if" fantasies about German troops reaching the Persian Gulf in a month or even going on to India. This is nonsense, even without hindsight. Rommel's logistics were stretched to the breaking point getting to El Alamein but Barnett makes it sound like going an extra 1,500 miles would be easy. The book lacks balance in placing the Desert War in its proper historical perspective: it was a sideshow for the Germans and a valuable training ground for the British, but the war was decided elsewhere. Loss of Cairo did not equate to loss of the war. Barnett might have done well to remember that Napoleon's conquest of Egypt under similar circumstances (British naval superiority) did not produce any great strategic result for him. It is hard to see how Rommel's handful of troops and tanks could have done much beyond taking Cairo and even harder to see how holding Cairo would have saved Hitler's empire.