Rating: 
Summary: A sad day in our Navy's history
Review: I spent two tours of duty onboard U.S.S. Iowa; once as a young sailor in 1956-57, and again as an officer during Iowa's refurbishing in 1983-84. The Navy was my life for more than 30 years; a sizable portion of the wall in my den is devoted to Iowa photos and plaques. If only half of what author Thompson charges is true, and half of the allegations of those he interviewed, then, the Navy is guilty of gross mismanagement of this terrible accident to say the least. To blame the catastrophe on one sailor because of an oddball set of circumstances, is criminal. It would certainly appear that there was a rush to judgement by a number of senior Navy officers based on a horribly flawed investigation; some well-meaning people got suckered in and didn't do their homework. There is no reason in the world that guns designed in the late 1930's should not work flawlessly in the 90's if the equipment is maintained and the turret personnel well trained. Thompson is to be commended for bringing together a whole set of circumstances that all seemed to go wrong on that fateful day; any one or two might have caused the explosion. But, when a whole series of them came together -- powder, rammer, lack of experience, experiment, etc. etc. -- the results should have been predictable. Hopefully, lessons have been learned. This book should be a "must read" for all senior officers and public relations professionals in an out of the Navy.
Rating: 
Summary: USS IOWA crewmember review
Review: I was a crewmember of IOWA under both Capt. Fred Moosally and Capt. Larry Seaquist and had the utmost respect and admiration for both of these men. I shared that same respect for Iron Mike Fahey. The author points out that instead of respecting these men, I was in fact duped in a scheme of sorts. I can assure you that I was not. This is just one of a list of generalizations that Thompson makes of enlisted sailors in this book. Much is made of poor morale and an overall sense of impending danger -- I saw none of that. At times in this book, the author takes liberty in allowing the prose to speak for the entire crew and on nearly every occasion -- I did not agree with his surmises. As I can tell, this book condemns the Navy for blaming Hartwig and makes the notion of using a dead man as a scapegoat as one of the worst crimes on the planet. I agree, but shortly thereafter in the book, the author would have you believe that Buch and Backherms (both killed in the turret) were class A imbeciles and primed for disaster. After that the book all but blames them, Moosally, Fahey, Morris, Finney, Kissinger, Hickman and a host of others for the explosion. Now, instead of blaming one dead man, he's blaming a laundry list of the living and the dead. While condemning many, the author is very forgiving to others: Scanio, Meyer, Mortenson, Seaquist and Mullahey are all made out to be heroes. They may very well be. But as I see it, the only things these men have in common is that they were cooperative with the author. Thompson makes a big stink about how Ensign Buch fraternized regularly with his men but when he writes of Meyers' close relationships with his men -- he makes it out to be something great. You can't have it both ways. Thompson, in my estimation, joins rank with other malfeasants when he casts blame on my shipmates without proof. I urge all truth seekers to look elsewhere other than this book for information into the tragedy.
Rating: 
Summary: Abuse of power in the US Navy
Review: I was impressed by the level of research that apparently went into the writing of this book, but did wonder if the galleys were proofed. On page 78 it stated "Turrets One and Two were pointed out on the starboard beam about fifteen degrees off the bow. ..... The right gun in Turret Two was pointed directly over the left gun in Turret One,....." It can not have happened this way. On page 121 photograph one (1) is rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise, and on the next page (122) photograph one (1) is upside down. I assume they were trying to save paper and space, but I was continuously perplexed in attempting to decipher the dialogue by two or three or more in the same paragraph. Probably a good documentary of this event and its aftermath.
Rating: 
Summary: Well researched, Ponderously written
Review: I was impressed by the level of research that apparently went into the writing of this book, but did wonder if the galleys were proofed. On page 78 it stated "Turrets One and Two were pointed out on the starboard beam about fifteen degrees off the bow. ..... The right gun in Turret Two was pointed directly over the left gun in Turret One,....." It can not have happened this way. On page 121 photograph one (1) is rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise, and on the next page (122) photograph one (1) is upside down. I assume they were trying to save paper and space, but I was continuously perplexed in attempting to decipher the dialogue by two or three or more in the same paragraph. Probably a good documentary of this event and its aftermath.
Rating:
Summary: Well researched, Ponderously written
Review: I was impressed by the level of research that apparently went into the writing of this book, but did wonder if the galleys were proofed. On page 78 it stated "Turrets One and Two were pointed out on the starboard beam about fifteen degrees off the bow. ..... The right gun in Turret Two was pointed directly over the left gun in Turret One,....." It can not have happened this way. On page 121 photograph one (1) is rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise, and on the next page (122) photograph one (1) is upside down. I assume they were trying to save paper and space, but I was continuously perplexed in attempting to decipher the dialogue by two or three or more in the same paragraph. Probably a good documentary of this event and its aftermath.
Rating: 
Summary: I was there: Mr. Thompson's opinions may lead you astray.
Review: I was there. As a young officer onboard the Battleship IOWA, I lived through this tragic event. This book offers the reader a singular theory about the events surrounding the explosion. Don't expect this publication to give you an objective and completely factual account of the range of possibilities for this event. This author approached his work with a pre-determined outcome and then wove a series of opinions into facts to support that outcome. While it is compelling, much of what you will read is founded in the author's pursuit of his own views. You will learn both fact and factoid. Sometimes these facts seem first-hand although they are attributed to the wife of a disgruntled officer. Much of the story is true. In fact, some of the cover-up actually extends beyond what the author uncovered. Some of it is taken out of context and exaggerated to support the author's view. And some of it is just some guy's opinion, that of the author, which is presented to you as indisputable. A wary reader will catch the argumentative manner the author takes to put forth his theory. I do not know what caused this tragedy. I know there remains no certainty in anyone's mind, (except this author and those few sources for this book) as to the true cause. Don't believe everything you read. But in this case, it is worth reading about a military system which broke down in trying to invesigate their own, it broke down in the handling of the explosives, and it broke down to the point of a possible cover-up. Their mistake was pursuing facts to support a theory to the exclusion of the other possibilities. Unfortunately, this author made the same error.
Rating:
Summary: No wonder the surface Navy is in trouble
Review: If one tenth of this book's charges are true, the former captain of the Iowa, his executive officer, and all of the admirals and lower ranks involved in the coverup of this accident should be hanged from the yardarm. Their efforts to make an understandable ammunition loading accident look like a supposedly gay sailor's violent suicide are beyond the pale. Anyone who, like me, is appalled at the increasingly pathetic state of the surface fleet, should read this book and then write their congressman. The Navy needs to be cleaned up from top to bottom, and as a kicker, the military's asinine policy on gays and the paranoia it evidently inspires has got to go.
Rating:
Summary: Could this really happen in the United States of America???
Review: If you are planning on joining the United States Navy, PLEASE....PLEASE....read this book before you do. How quickly those in charge can close rank, and so carelessly decide to ruin an innocent sailor's memory and reputation after he is killed along with 46 of his shipmates. I simply cannot understand how those who investigated the IOWA tragedy, especially Milligan and Micelli are not rotting in a jail cell somewhere for obstruction of justice, destroying evidense, and lying before Congress. I am appalled at the conduct of these individuals! Mr. Thompson has obviously done his homework, and has become very involved in this entire tragedy right from the start. Congrats to you Mr. Thompson for uncovering the TRUTH about what happened during the IOWA investigation. I will definately recommend this book to everyone I know! My heart goes out to the families of the 47 sailors who died aboard the USS IOWA.
Rating:
Summary: A Good Technical Read
Review: In 10 years I have never read a more concise condemnation of the Navy and the NIS for their mis-handling of the investigation. Mr. Thompson does an excellent job of showing the so-called investigation for the farce it was. His treatment of the human side of this tragedy is somewhat less exemplary. His depictions of the treatment of "witnesses" and "subjects" by the NIS are sometimes as inaccurate or incomplete as the NIS Investigator's notes (upon which he seems to rely too heavily). Mr. Thompson has included in this book items which are of no relevance seemingly because they are titilating and/or salacious. One can only assume that Mr. Thompson is still more journalist than author.
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Summary: Turret One's Division Officer
Review: Lest there be doubts, IOWA exploded due to a combination of volatile gun power, the lack of safety interlocks, and an unknown event in Turret Two which pushed the crew faster than the power and gun system could manage. The men did their best given the constraints their peers, their command, and their Navy had placed upon them. I am IOWA's last Turret One Officer, at least the last Division Officer who daily mustered men on station in preparation for gunnery, underway. I am also one of the "Gang of Four" who aided Charlie with his book. My father retired after 38 years in the submarine service, and many of the senior officers in the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy while I was an officer knew of my father, and our family. From the outset, let me say that Charlie's book underscores the degeneration of what we used to call "they Navy Family". The command does not treat spouses and children (relatives, too) as an integrated part of the command (as it did when I was a child), or, indeed, as the citizens to which they are pledge to defend. Once you grasp this point, you can understand why the chain of command treated the memory, and families, of the IOWA-47 they way it did. This is a good book for prospective khaki or bluejacket to read, it is also a good book for Americans, in general, to read as they try to figure out whether the Justice Department has an accuracy problem with WACO, whether Energy Department employees were radiated and not told so, and whether gene therapy patients are dying without NIH knowing so -- there is a pattern of professional deceit centered on Washington these days. IOWA was just the first time the Officer Corps turned on its own men in order to save a Class of ship. Charlie and Dick's books must be read together, because I agree with reviewers who think Charlie came to the assignment with preconceptions. He is a Vietnam veteran, and he served with honor as a NGFS spotter. That war has left a bad taste in many a veteran's mouth. But his preconceptions were checked against the counsel of VADM Ed Snyder, who had more influence on this book than the reviewers may understand. Admiral Snyder's knowledge of the ship and its Class was unsurpassed. He was very hard on my comments to Charlie, and more than once he ferreted out bias on my part. Do not read this book looking for the excellence of IOWA, or of the great efforts of all crew members on April 19th. It is about the investigation, and that subject tailors all other facts. The complete story of the IOWA still waits to be told, and it would have to address why a "cover-up" was required at all. My own sense is that the trail exists all the way back to the decision, in the late 1970s, to reactivated the Class. Admiral Macauley seemed to understand this; Admiral Boorda knew it. The ships were old, and needed money for overhaul, money that went into missile systems. Given the budgeting environment of the mid-1980s, it does not surprise me that an investigation into a gunnery mishap would look for "personnel error" and not a "technical" cause. Charlie, due to space constraints, does not follow this important thread. What was Congress told, who told them the ships were safe, and why was the inspection process insufficient in ratting out the lie? I had no ax to grind in cooperating with Charlie, and I asked him to contact as many crew and wardroom members as possible, including Captain Moosally. The more sources, the more informed the book. Though some of the IOWA-47 family members were annoyed I waited until September, 1991, to allow Charlie to visit me, I had a war to fight in between my time on the IOWA and my resignation from the Navy. The first time it was possible, I met with Thompson even though the Chief of Naval Information asked me not to cooperate. Many would not cooperate with Charlie. In those instances, he had to rely on sworn testimony. I do agree that footnotes would have been useful, but the book is designed to sell as "popular" literature, and footnotes are not all that popular. My motive in cooperating with Charlie was to protect Turret One, and the reputation built by the sailors, not all of them gunners mates, who helped me and Dale Mortensen make that the No. 1 gun turret on that ship. And yes, there were facts about Turret One that didn't make it into ink. I was a little conceited, as a junior officer. Phil's closeness to his sailors, however, was not the same as mine. My men could do no wrong; Dale and I set impossibly high standards and they reached them. I was very proud of them, and was perhaps too chummy in saying so. But Meyer never drank with his men for more than 20 minutes. It was a rule of my father's Navy, and it was necessary to keep the Division Officer detached, so he could say "No"  the most important word in an officer's vocabulary. We had problems; but we controlled the events that could have turned them into an explosion. At least I'd like to think we did. It may have been a big game of Russian roulette. As for Captain Moosally, I have only attributed a level of responsibility to him that the Navy does to all sea captains. Charlie may have taken the analysis beyond the Navy's standard. And focusing on Fred can be misleading; the real failure came between him and Admirals Trost and Kelso. I tossed and turned over my chance to rat on the investigation (through family connections) in May, 1989. In the end, I did not. I still feel that had Admiral Trost known what his subordinates were doing, he would have protected the investigation from corruption. Had it been 1789, and not 1989, I may have called Edney or Miceli to the Bladensburg dueling grounds to settle the matter. But I just couldn't break the chain of command. I do think that my efforts with both authors (Richard Schwoebel and I discussed his thesis for about an hour) was necessary for very personal reasons. Damnation, in fact. Had I possessed the courage to stand down the command in October, 1988, those 47 men would still be alive. All I did was write a memo, which my superior took very seriously, and who was still working on a response when the explosion occurred. True, others in the Department, or the wardroom, could have done the same, or more. Phil himself wasn't too keen on pointing out our problems to the chain of command. But that still leaves me about six percent of the responsibility. And as it turns out, I was close to exactly six percent of that Turret: Blakey, Schlein and Bopp. When I am judged for my role on that day, it will be the souls of those men who decide my fate. In the final analysis, Charlie's book asks us to examine the relationship between national service and the American citizen. As hard as I want to be on the chain of command, or the Department of the Navy, etc., I do think the federal Government represented the American people throughout this nasty mess. The American people--as represented by many of the current presidential candidates--have a checkered past when it comes to serving this nation. A people divided on the good of national service will treat those who rise above the common norm with disdain; the example set is hard to live with, isn't it? Why are people called to the McCain candidacy? Because his mind is not divided on this issue. The worst decisions in the investigation came from officers worried about the reaction from Washington, D.C., a town with fewer veterans than any other community in America. And did Charlie get my "character" right? I think he made me sound like a crazy old drag queen. If my style of leadership ever came across that way, my since apologies to the gunners of Turret One. And Forward Main Battery is still No. 1 (Turret Two included!).
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