Rating: 
Summary: Close, But No Cigar
Review: Rush's book succeeds admirably in shedding new light on the U.S. Army replacement system during World War Two. However, the book has a number of significant flaws that limit its ultimate value. It is the first salvo in an important new debate, but it misses its target.The great strength of this book is the job it does in bringing the Army replacement system into a new light. Through careful research, Rush is able to show that the system functioned better than its critics have traditionally assumed. Rush illustrates how the Army training program adapted quickly to incorporate lessons learned at considerable cost on the battlefield. Significantly, he also shows how the system made great efforts to return wounded soldiers to their parent units. That said, the shortcomings of this book are numerous. First, there is the overall structure of the book. Instead of stating his thesis up-front and then proving it over the course of the book, Rush forces his reader to wait to the very end for his hypothesis on why the 22nd Infantry continued to function despite massive losses. Accordingly, it is like reading a 340 page introduction with a 10 page conclusion. His conclusion is that it was the unit's surviving veterans who provided a core around which the incoming replacements could crytallize into an effective combat unit. Sadly, Rush provides little actual evidence in support of this, and much of what he does cite is contradictory. Given that his own stats show 92% of the regiment's starting soldiers are killed or wounded, he really needed to discuss how his hypothesis worked in fact. He doesn't do this, and the book suffers accordingly. Moreover, he does not explore other contributing factors, such as the traditional naivete of green troops, or how the war's tangible end impacted the willingness of G.I.'s to fight on. His critique of the German system is disingenuous, inadequate, and simply misses the point. First, the units that he is comparing are just not equivalent. German type '44 Volksgrenadier infantry divisions were not designed to function in the same manner as U.S. infantry divisions, so he is comparing apples and oranges. In a footnote, he states that his critique does not apply to Waffen-SS, panzer, panzergrenadier or fallschirmjager divisions. So, he stacks the deck by only comparing the dregs of the German army to a quality American unit. The 22nd's opponents in the Hurtgen forest were a motley collection of young boys and old men taken from local police departments and fortress battalions; only a few hundred officers and NCOs had any real experience or training. Furthermore, the German system was plain busted by late 1944. The massive casualties suffered by the Germans, particularly in the summer of '44, had simply overwhelmed the system. Therefore, Rush's argument is the intellectual equivalent of complaining about the engine performance of an automobile that was in a head-on collision at 90 m.p.h. It is no surprise that the engine doesn't run well. The real failure of the German system takes place at the high command level: After '42, German planners should have adjusted to the new reality of increased loss rates. They did not (until it was too late), and ground up their seed corn as a result. They were also hampered by political in-fighting among Goering and Himmler which further crippled an already collapsing replacement system. Rush does not appreciate the strategic dimension of the German failure. Finally, Rush is a little manipulative with the data. For example, his graphs give the impression of a more intact cadre of experienced soldiers than actually existed. As his footnotes reveal, many of the 22nd's orginial soldiers were wounded in the first couple of weeks in France. Many of these men returned later that fall, but Rush's graphs give the impression that they were with the unit during the whole five months. Rather, the truth is that they had a couple of weeks of combat, were wounded and spent months recovering, then returned to the 22nd. Nor was there much of a 'band of brothers' at the company level. Rush's own charts show almost impossibly high casualty rates for that to occur. In addition, his stats reveal that returning veterans suffered much higher psychological casualty rates than the new replacements. Finally, the important Stouffer study is cited in a highly selective manner, and only when it supports Rush's argument. Despite these grave shortcomings, Rush's book is still very good. He should use it as the basis for a more in-depth study of how small unit cohesion functioned in the US Army and enabled it to keep fighting despite punishing losses. Barring that, he has improved the image of the US replacement system from 'criminally negligent' to 'merely awful'. Losing 86% of authorized personnel in a battle against some half-trained, malnourished and demoralized (albeit dug-in) boys and old-men is a rather modest triumph. However, the fact that the 22nd Infantry continued to function under such conditions is an important story, and one that needs to be told. Rush has the data to do it, but it will require a more disciplined approach to small unit cohesion; a gaggle of graphs and caricatures of Martin Van Creveld are not enough. He should probably also ditch the critique of the German system and save that for a book unto itself.
Rating: 
Summary: The best book on the subject!
Review: The hell that was the Hurtgen was over shadowed by the battle of the Bulge, however the carnage that was endured needs to be told. The book is a masterful account of the bravery of men who fought in tough terrain and inhospitable climates. The book, which draws from first person accounts, tells in great detail the battle as it unfolded, and the horrors of war. While I have read other books on the subject, this gripping, easy to read book is a must for any ETO scholar.
Rating:
Summary: The best book on the subject!
Review: The hell that was the Hurtgen was over shadowed by the battle of the Bulge, however the carnage that was endured needs to be told. The book is a masterful account of the bravery of men who fought in tough terrain and inhospitable climates. The book, which draws from first person accounts, tells in great detail the battle as it unfolded, and the horrors of war. While I have read other books on the subject, this gripping, easy to read book is a must for any ETO scholar.
Rating:
Summary: A Solid Piece Of Interpretative History
Review: This is a great example of how history should be written at times. I say, at times, because although the book is brilliantly written, for every act of empirical detail that strengthens Rush's thesis, there is a possibility that empiricism drags the narrative down a little, but only a little in Rush's deft hands. But this is no classical narrative of a battle. It is a specific empirical history of a regiment in some hard fighting. There is a tendancy that once well-worn furrows of known battles are worked over, historians start looking further afield for more obscure battles or greater detail and interpretive analysis. Of late, a lot of historians have been concentrating on so-called "forgotten" battles --- I do not know if I would go so far as to say that about the Hurtgen, but the subsequent events in the Bulge and the Fall of Germany did relegate this battle to a "lesser order" in the minds of many historians. Rush's attempt to rescue the battle and the valour is well appreciated and represents perhaps the Sterling effort of this campaign. Along the way Rush does an excellent job of demolishing several myths about the German Army --- akin to a belief that they could do no wrong, and were only beaten by mass weight of firepower and a storm of steel. Rush shows that the US really got it right in the area of replacements, constantly filtering reserves into understrength units instead of pulling units from the line to rest and refit. This made for weary and bleak fighting for those that remained in such units -- there was no rest, only the prospect of death, capture, mutilation and, if lucky, a wound that wouldn't kill one, but put one permanently out of action. Germans let units run down and then amalgamated them with other units, in some cases they did withdraw and reconsolidate some new units. The US method of supporting and not withdrawing units meant that the old hands could always be present, with ever building combat experience to call upon and to impart to new fills from the reserves. That meant one tough infantry unit. In the case of the 22nd Reg. some of the "old" soldiers had been fighting since June 06th 44. It is a depressing prospect to realise that the US really had it right to not withdraw units from the line --- it ironically caused less casualties. That was pretty cold comfort to the old infantryman who sometimes knew that they were going into the "death factory" day after day with no prospect for relief. Rush is right. The US really did have a superior method. I am not so sure that this dispells other so called "myths" of the German superman. German units could probably not be filled in the same way as Allied units anyway, because they simply did not have the men. Also British and Canadian units also arrived at the same method of support. In the bloody battles of Caen and latter, they had attrition rates much higher than their US counterparts --- in some cases whole regiments were virtually wiped out after 2-3 days of battle. The US method of replacing casualties was also used by the Allies. It was also resented at the time by all parties. I think that Rush reminds us the alternatives to not withdrawing from the line could have been much, much worse, but were universally not recognised at the time from the Soldier's eye level. Also there is still the disturbing fact that despite the German reserve method being substandard and the average German Landser being sub-par, they still managed to inflict frightful casualties on the flower of American soldiery for extended periods of time. Rush gives us a fresh look at the battle and the ramifications of the US casualty replacement method. How many myths he dispells will be left to the individual reader.
Rating:
Summary: Hurtgen Forect-22nd Infantry
Review: This new book is a super review of the 22nd Infantry Regiment's action in the Hurtgen Forest during WWII. It is extremely well documented. Having researched this unit in the National Archives Unit Records I can attest to the excellent documentation that he provides. His thoroughness includes having researched all of the morning reports for all of the units of the 22nd and comparing this with the casualty lists in the Unit Records. By doing this he was able to document 10 or 12 additional men who were lost but not included on the casualty list. He has done an excellent job with footnoting his references and has studied not only the American records but the German records for the units facing the 22nd Infantry.
Rating:
Summary: Hurtgen Forect-22nd Infantry
Review: This new book is a super review of the 22nd Infantry Regiment's action in the Hurtgen Forest during WWII. It is extremely well documented. Having researched this unit in the National Archives Unit Records I can attest to the excellent documentation that he provides. His thoroughness includes having researched all of the morning reports for all of the units of the 22nd and comparing this with the casualty lists in the Unit Records. By doing this he was able to document 10 or 12 additional men who were lost but not included on the casualty list. He has done an excellent job with footnoting his references and has studied not only the American records but the German records for the units facing the 22nd Infantry.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting for even the casual reader
Review: When I first picked up Hell in Hürtgen Forest, I wasn't expecting to be able to read more than about 75 pages in a week; the first chapter, which outlined the geography of the forest, seemed to confirm my fears. However, the book pulled me in immediately afterwards. The chapters outlining the training of the American and German units are quite interesting, and Dr. Rush illustrates the intensity of the battle exceedingly well once the chapters on training have passed. At first, the number of names given is quite intimidating, until the reader realizes just how intense the fighting was: very few of the men named survive even a single chapter after being introduced, and the use of names ultimately helps to make the horrors of the battle come to life much more effectively than a simple list of numbers ever could. Of particular interest is Dr. Rush's thesis, which is that the organizational structure of the American Army gave the 22nd Regiment a distinct advantage over the Germans. This belief runs counter to the views of many historians, and Dr. Rush makes his point both eloquently and effectively. Finally, the index is a joy! Prepared by Dr. Rush's lovely daughter, Miriam, in its pages a careful reader can see her amazing potential. We can surely expect great things from her in the future.
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