Rating: 
Summary: Different perspective, with faults
Review: This book is worth reading if the reader wants a full perspective on the Vietnam war.
In a lot of ways, the book is a wasted opportunity. Having additional sources of information (the Abrams tapes) available to him, the author feels compelled to quote from those sources at length. Wishing to point out who was responsible for a beneficial change in policy in the war, Sorley worships General Abrams and demonizes General Westmoreland. Wanting to illustrate the unimportance of bombing North Vietnam, he mixes up statistics of Cessna mail flights with those of B-52 raids over Hanoi. To persuade us that most South Vietnamese civilians were in safe hamlets and that the South Vietnam government was protecting its people, he forgets to tell us that the "safe hamlets" were not the villagers' own home hamlets.
His main point is that moving away from Westmoreland's "search and destroy" tactic to Abram's "clear and hold" tactic brought us to the brink of winning the Vietnam War. Yet let's not forget that the commanders' actions were often both dictated and limited by American politics: Westmoreland had Johnson, and Abrams had Nixon.
To what extent was South Vietnam a viable country? They were much more our "client" than our "ally," by any measure. Would pointless activities such as the Thieu/Ky rivalry, and Thieu's continuing support of ineffective generals, have ever resulted in a stable situation, such as we have now in North/South Korea? Would the North Vietnamese have ever given up? Would it be politically and physically possible to continually invade Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ to deny the North Vietnamese their staging and supply areas? Would we risk scuttling our valuable relationships with Russia and China to coerce Russia and China into abandoning North Vietnam?
If you read this book, keep in mind that it has its limitations, biases, and inaccuracies. Be sure to read other books, such as _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.
Rating:
Summary: Great information, could be better written
Review: This is a very serious book. It's packed with detail and analysis from previously unrevealed sources and first-hand interviews. That's both a good and bad thing. Good because Sorley makes his case very well, bad because sometimes the detail gets a bit monotonous and tedious. But, overall, this is a fine book that is sure to challenge some commonly held beliefs about the Vietnam War.As the subtitle makes clear, Sorley deals exclusively with the latter half of the war, namely from General Creighton Abrams' promotion to commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1968 to the final U.S. pullout in 1975. Sorley concludes that this period of the war was vastly different from the first half - different tactics, different strategy, different and better results. It was, in essence, a better war. Abrams' successor was General Westmoreland, and he preferred large divisions that searched for the enemy in the jungles. This caused high casualties, confusion among the ranks, logistical difficulties, and lowered morale, especially among the enlisted men. Abrams arrived with a different strategy. Rather than search-and-destroy with large divisions, he preferred secure-and-hold with smaller units. He believed that the war would be won at the village level. The villages must remain safe from North Vietnam Army (NVA) attacks and Viet Cong infiltrations. Once that happened, the larger cities like Saigon could go on the offensive and secure themselves from enemy shelling. With the cities and villages secure, the South Vietnamese could organize their own forces, units that included village, city, and regional troops. Once that was done, the U.S. Army could slowly leave the ground fighting to the South Vietnamese while supplying air cover, supplies, and advice. According to Sorley, by 1972 this strategy had succeeded, so well that the war could have been considered won. The villages were safe and secure, the VC was no longer a factor, and the NVA was nowhere in South Vietnam. Massive U.S. air strikes had slowed the flow of NVA troops and war equipment to the South along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So if all this is true, then what happened? Why did the communists win the war? Several reasons, according to Sorley: Lack of support from the politicians at home. Congress and the Nixon Administration were more concerned with pulling out and less concerned with victory. By 1972, Abrams had fewer than 50,000 troops at his disposal, which makes his achievements even more impressive.
Unflagging support for the North from China and the Soviet Union. When the Paris agreement was ratified, and the North immediately violated it by flooding the South with troops and tanks, the U.S. failed in its promise to punish the North with air support. The Communists proved better allies than the U.S., because they kept the North well-stocked, while the South steadily ran out of supplies.
North Vietnamese officials kept in constant contact with the anti-war movement in America, using it to spread communist propaganda and lies. This undermined public support for the war, which at one time was high.
This is the essence of Sorley's book. It's a powerful case. What I found sad was America's total abandonment of South Vietnam. We had fought for years to keep the country from communist domination and then threw it all away when victory was so close. It was not our finest hour.
Rating: 
Summary: A step in the right direction
Review: This well researched book answers some of the questions I had about Robert McNamara's book (Argument Without End) by examining the 1972 offensive and its use of newer sources (such as DeForest). I personally interviewed many of the NVA who particiapted in the An Loc offensive. Later I heard from a well placed source that the NVA was within days of a surrender during the bombing. Others have discredited that story, but one wonders if it were true or not. I hope that Sorley has the opportunity to read more of the Vietnamese literature and to talk to the Vietnamese. IF is always open to speculation, but one wonders if a victory of the south in 75 would have ended it. I don't think so. However, it is difficult to support the idea that the war could not be won. After all, we did much better in Korea. Can someone explain why it was so different in Vietnam?
Rating:
Summary: A Better General in an Awful War
Review: Those who opposed the war in Viet Nam will castigate Sorley for attempting to correct the media history of Viet Nam and criticize his "hero worship" of GEN Creighton Abrams, but those of us who were there know that he is right on the mark. For openers, the changes initiated by Abrams upon the departure of GEN Westmoreland were immediate and far-reaching. Real progress was made in everything from ensuring that widows of Vietnamese soldiers were provided for to promoting effective and honest leaders within the Vietnamese Army. Secondly, Abrams was a general officer who was bigger than life. In sharp contrast to the starched and patrician Westmoreland, Abrams--described by some as an unmade bed with a cigar--was a no-nonsense, soldier's soldier. If anyone could "talk with kings" without losing the common touch, it was GEN Abrams--except he didn't care that much for kings or congressmen. He preferred talking with soldiers, sergeants and young officers who carried the bulk of the combat responsibility. Don't forget, it was Abrams who commanded the tank battalion that broke the encirclement of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. If you weren't at Woodstock--or even if you were--you need to read this book!
Rating:
Summary: A Must Read For All US Citizens
Review: Vietnam has always been characterised as a big mistake that was a lost cause from the get-go! Sorley shows that it was winnable, and was in fact, won; if we had only stayed the course. The telling comment that should give all Americans pause; is that the Russians and Communist Chinese proved to be more reliable allies to North Vietnam than the USA was for South Vietnam. No war is perfect or is perfectly managed; but this one, as Sorley shows, was winnable had our country not caved in to the war protestors, negative assessments by the media and self-serving politicians. Had we stayed the course, South Vietnam would now be free and vibrant rather than the economic basket case it is under the communists. I'm thankful that historians like Lewis Sorley are now telling the true story of the Vietnam War. I only hope this book is read by all objective minded Americans.
Rating:
Summary: A very good reexamination of the Vietnam conflict
Review: We have been repeating certain truisms ad nauseum for the past twenty five years: "It was a civil war"; "The South Vietnamese fought reluctantly"; "The North Vietnamese fought a popular war"; "US tactics were ineffective." The Vietnam War has become a cliché in our historical memory. Lewis Sorley deflates each and every one of these truisms and helps to tell the real and much more tragic story of the Vietnam War. Through a thorough analysis of America's command strategy under Abrams he shows how Americans came to understand the war as it was and fought much more effectively. Sorley's experience as a military historian helps him to explain the course of the war on the battlefield, particularly the outcome of the Easter Invasion. Lacking the leftist biases of many Vietnam War historians also allows him to discuss the unsavory side of the Communist struggle - and the fact that they were just as dependent on their patrons as South Vietnam was on us. Additionally, his use of Communist sources details just how effectively the Allies fought after 1968. I picked up this book believing that we should have stayed out of Vietnam. I put it down feeling that our abandonment of the South was perhaps the most profound act of cowardice in American history. Sorley's book captures the tragedy of this abandonment - and the lost possibilities for millions of South Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians, too many of whom did not survive long after the "liberation".
Rating:
Summary: A very good review of a meticulously well-researched work.
Review: We have known Bob Sorley since he was a first lieutenant with an Armored Cavalry Regiment in Amberg, Germany, in 1958. He taught me all I know about the military and in return I offered him the comfort of my heated ambulance during field exercises. Fortunately, both of us survived this without incident, and I have enjoyed his books.
Rating: 
Summary: Major Problems with Facts, and Therefore Credibility.
Review: With most non-fiction books on complex subjects, the average reader cannot possibly know if what the author writes is correct. Careful reading might show some gaps in logic, and footnotes can be scrutinized. Yet it's easy for a good writer to write with persuasive logic, and not every sentence can be footnoted. In these cases, only prior knowledge and experience can determine accuracy. Typically, the average reader does not posess this knowledge; after all, he's probably reading the book to gain such knowledge. Furthermore, a book that makes extraordinary claims, as this book does, must be unassailable with respect to logic, sources, and facts. With all that said, this book fails on every count. There are enough serious flaws in logic, sources, and facts that all credibility is lost -- and it is perfect credibility that is needed when making such bold claims. Some of the more important examples: Another review already described Sorley's obviously flawed dismissal of the controversy over the bombing of North Vietnam (page 83, paragraph 3). Not only is the logic clearly faulty, but the source (page 420, #4) is as unsubstantive as they come, nothing more than someone's opinion in an exchange of letters to the editor of a military journal. Sorley writes his summary of the strategic hamlet program (page 167, paragraph 1), claiming that by late 1969, 92 percent of the people outside Saigon were living in hamlets, and thus "living under substantially secure conditions." This is a bizarre claim, as it is universally accepted that the strategic hamlet program was not only a failure in its goal of safeguarding the population, but actually produced increased support for the Viet Cong because of the resentment of the villagers to being uprooted from their ancestral homes and placed in artificial villages. Of course, the reader, upon reading this stunning new analysis about this famous program, is eager to see what source Sorley uncovered to allow him make this claim. Incredibly, the entire paragraph (which is even separated from the rest of the text for emphasis), is entirely unreferenced. For a pronouncement this big and important, it is intolerable that it not be footnoted. In explaining his sources on page 407, Sorley says that he has so much research material that "it would have been possible to footnote every sentence." Yet he believes this entire standalone paragraph, with a sweeping, shocking conclusion, doesn't deserve an indication of source? These two examples show not only that Sorley has some extremely important facts completely wrong, but show that he has extremely poor standards when it comes to writing history. This destroys his credibility -- and credibility is the most important thing he needed when presenting the revolutionary thesis of this book. Again, how is the typical reader to know of the major factual and sourcing problems in this book? That is why this book is such a disservice to the public interested in a better understanding of the Vietnam war: it promises honest, scholarly analysis, yet it is actually a harmfully misleading monograph.
Rating:
Summary: [Editorial Comment]
Review: [This is not a review per se, but I am trying to get word to whoever maintains these pages of the need for a small correction in the listed title of my book. What needs to be done is to remove the extraneous word "the" just before the words "Final Tragedy" in the book's sub-title. Thus the book's correct full title should read: "A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam." I would appreciate it very much if someone could make this change. Thank you. Lewis Sorley]
| 
