Rating: 
Summary: Wish it were true
Review: Sorley doesn't have to convince me to like Abrams, or that his efforts at recovery in the wake of Westmoreland were remarkable. I wish it were true that we could have won the war under Abrams' leadership, but even Sorley's dedicated and painstaking review of new evidence did not convince me. Too much of the evidence is taken out of historical context, and it does not sufficiently address an essential variable: South Vietnam's government and military. A review of other old soldiers has proved more convincing to me, particularly the career, writings, and findings of General Matthew Ridgway. As Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower, Ridgway found himself confronting Indochina early on. Then and throughout the Vietnam War, he was a spokesman for military opposition to military intervention. Had Ridgway himself been in command, it would not have been a viable, sustainable means of negotiating or winning the conflict. Sorley's book provides insights and information worth reading, but it did not convince me that Abrams, or anyone else, could have won that war.
Rating: 
Summary: Great new viewpoint on the war
Review: Sorley has given us a great reference on the Vietnam war. The book is thoroughly researched and footnoted. It should be a must read for Dan Rather and others that did a great job skewing pubic opinion. It is a heavy tome, but readable, even exciting at times considering the seriousness of the material - if you want to be informed on what was really going on behind the scenes "in country" this is the book for you. I had formed some fairly firm opinions - Sorley changed my mind on a few of them. I recommend it without reservation.
Rating: 
Summary: An Embarrassing Book of Historical Wishes, Not History
Review: The author is clearly heavily biased in his opinions, causing him to create a book of unsubstantiated conclusions surrounding his hero, General Creighton Abrams. Many -- perhaps most -- of his revolutionary conclusions are completely unreferenced, even though he claims he could footnote every sentence. Given this, is the author deliberately deceptive, or just incompetent?Since the author's conclusions are so radically different than the consensus of dozens of highly respected writers, it becomes the case of "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." This the author clearly does not provide, and his gushing admiration of Abrams openly exposes his biases and complete lack of objectivity. Do not read this book if you want the truth about the Vietnam War.
Rating:
Summary: Required Reading for Both Pro- and Anti-War Advocates!
Review: The fact that Sorley's reviewers are so strongly pro or con must mean he's on to something. I'm not an expert, but have read many books on Vietnam, including both of McNamara's. This book differs from the great majority of Vietnam books by concentrating on the later years of the war. Sorley's assertion that by 1972 90-some percent of the countryside was under RVN control is a key point of the book. I look forward to the judgment of other scholars on this point. But no matter how much RVN controlled, the most important point Sorley makes is undisputable: the U.S. abandoned South Vietnam after the Paris Accords, breaking promises that we would continue to support them with funding and air power. It is not a proud moment in American history. Sorley's book will be debated for years to come, and, regardless of which "side" you may be on in the ongoing debate, is a must read.
Rating:
Summary: Don't Be Deceived by Any Negative Reviews
Review: The negative reviews you read here, while no doubt sincere, are written by people who have rejected the conclusions of this book before they read a single word between the covers. Critical reading of this work may well uncover a bias by the author, but read through that to the facts below and you will draw the same conclusions that the author drew - unless you've rejected them prior to the reading. This work adds immeasurably to understanding a period of our history that has been glossed over by those who seek an easy answer to what happened in South East Asia. I would also recommend Dereliction of Duty to understand the critical 1964 to 1965 period and Stolen Valor for insight into the many myths that have promulgated since the war's end.
Rating:
Summary: Don't Be Deceived by the Positive Reviews
Review: The positive reviews you read here, while no doubt sincere, are written by people who accepted the conclusions of this book (clearly explained on the cover) before they read a single word between the covers. The book's conclusion (that the war was completely winnable, but was lost by meddling politicians and the media) is what many people have desperately wanted to believe for thirty years, and now along comes a book which allegedly shows this to be true. How shocking that hundreds of writers and historians have missed this clear fact for the past three decades! The positive reviews are by those who are reading words in this book that they have accepted in advance and, in fact, have been longing to see. The amazing new source Sorley uses to buttress his conclusion are audio recordings of General Abrams made during the war. However, far from being compelling, such recordings, of Abrams or anyone else, are virtually worthless when writing Vietnam War history. Even the most amateur Vietnam historian knows that audio recordings of Lyndon Johnson show that he had many accurate and sensitive insights into the problems of the war, yet his actions were completely contrary to his spoken words. Most people know that McNamara's most personal feelings, expressed in conversations with his closest associates, show him to be deeply troubled by his certainty that the war was a lost cause, a conclusion he came to in late 1965. Yet McNamara's actions continued to expand the war for the next two years. It's clear that actions are what count. Lively, gung-ho discourses by the commanding general, while interesting, are useless for forming factual conclusions about the conduct and results of the war. The lengthy and tiresome quotes from Abrams are surrounded by Sorley's heavily biased, tunnel-visioned, and often just plain factually wrong analysis of the post-1968 war. Serious, objective scholars of the war dismiss this book as a ridiculously partisaned attempt to shine the legacy of the author's favorite general.
Rating:
Summary: Nothing more than a gushing tribute to Creighton Abrams.
Review: This book is an embarrassment to the genre of Vietnam War literature. It serves only as a long statement of worship of Creighton Abrams by the author, who, not coincidentally, was Abrams' biographer in 1992. The Kirkus review summarizes the broad failures of this book, so I will mention two smaller issues, one a fatal flaw, one enormously annoying: The annoying: because much of Sorely's background on Abrams is from his newly-produced transcripts of audio tapes made by Abrams during his Vietnam command, the book includes a large number of direct quotes from Abrams. Most of these are simply self-serving, but their presentation makes for excruciating reading, as they are littered throughout with italicized emphasisms, probably an average of three per sentence. Though I am sure these are present on the audiotape, their inclusion in print serves no purpose, and makes for extremely distracting reading. A fatal flaw: early in the book, Sorely addresses one of the biggest issues of the war, that of the bombing offensive in North Vietnam. Incredibly, he dismisses the entire debate in one paragraph, which itself is entirely without merit. Sorely's "argument" is that there were more sorties flown in South Vietnam than in the North, yet he admits he equates one B-52 sortie with one Cessna mail plane sortie! Finally, his "source" for this bizarre argument is nothing more than a footnote itself -- a footnote in nothing more than a letter to a historical journal. Whatever shred of credibility Sorely had up to this point in the book vanishes with this paragraph. I hope this book is soon relegated to where it belongs, in the Public Relations section (along with McNamara's two books), far away from the normally excellent and distinguished body of Vietnam War histories.
Rating: 
Summary: The best yet in Vietnam War Revisionism
Review: This book is by far the best in a new wave of scholarly works that contend the American War effort in Vietnam was legitimate and/or winnable. Sorely convincingly argues that the Free World Forces had essentially won sometime in 1970-1971 by successfully denying the Communists access to the Republic of Vietnam's population and through successful nation building. By this time, South Vietnam was a viable nation that could survive indefinitely as long as it continued to recieve US financial support and access to American air power. Mr. Sorley backs his thesis up with good statistics. He seems to understand that many will question any US government data from Vietnam and backs each contention with anecdotal evidence. Some examples of this include CIA chief Colby wandering alone at night alone in a rural area where years earlier he would surely have been murdered and South Vietnamese militia (the folks common wisdom says either ran away or defected on sight of Communist forces) going toe to toe and besting the cream of the North Vietnamese Army. Most criticisms of this book claim its just another in a line of "we were stabbed in the back by liberals and the media" tomes. Its more than that but there is a very minor undercurrent of this. If Mr. Sorely contends we had victory in the bag, then an exploration of why we ultimately lost is essential. Sorely seems to believe the opportunity for success was destroyed by liberal elites (here represented by Senator Kennedy and Jane Fonda) campaigning for a Communist victory even after American ground forces were being removed from the theater and by powers in the media largely refusing to broadcast the later successes in Vietnam (represented mainly by anectdotal evidence that Walter Cronkite spiked all reports showing the war effort in a good light during this time period). Such activity further sapped war weary Americans and the anti-communist leadership. This in turn allowed the pro-Comunist elements in our society to cut off the essential aid discussed above. All in all this is a very small portion of the book (10-15 pages at most). I docked the book one star because of Sorely's irrational hero worship of General Abrams who seems to be the prime mover in the reforms that brought such success. I agree Abrams was a much better commander than Westmoreland and he was largely responsible for the improvements Sorely describes. Unfortunately, Sorely pushes it too far at times. Heres a prime example. Abrams' main strategy was to secure population centers and use American forces in direct combat only if the benefits would be high and the price low. By doing this, he denied the Communists recruits and logistical support while not exaserbating American war weariness. This flies in the face of the "Hamburger Hill" Battle where elements of the 101st Airborne were sent head on up a fortified hill. Sorely says this was justified because it was necessary to open up an access route into Saigon. Im not convinced. By this time, ARVN had adequate resources to do the job. Also, the battle caused Congressional constraints that essentially ended his ability to use Ameircan ground forces in direct action again. Doesnt seem worth the price to me. However, this book is a keeper and essential to any serious study of the Vietnam War.
Rating:
Summary: The best yet in Vietnam War Revisionism
Review: This book is by far the best in a new wave of scholarly works that contend the American War effort in Vietnam was legitimate and/or winnable. Sorely convincingly argues that the Free World Forces had essentially won sometime in 1970-1971 by successfully denying the Communists access to the Republic of Vietnam's population and through successful nation building. By this time, South Vietnam was a viable nation that could survive indefinitely as long as it continued to recieve US financial support and access to American air power. Mr. Sorley backs his thesis up with good statistics. He seems to understand that many will question any US government data from Vietnam and backs each contention with anecdotal evidence. Some examples of this include CIA chief Colby wandering alone at night alone in a rural area where years earlier he would surely have been murdered and South Vietnamese militia (the folks common wisdom says either ran away or defected on sight of Communist forces) going toe to toe and besting the cream of the North Vietnamese Army. Most criticisms of this book claim its just another in a line of "we were stabbed in the back by liberals and the media" tomes. Its more than that but there is a very minor undercurrent of this. If Mr. Sorely contends we had victory in the bag, then an exploration of why we ultimately lost is essential. Sorely seems to believe the opportunity for success was destroyed by liberal elites (here represented by Senator Kennedy and Jane Fonda) campaigning for a Communist victory even after American ground forces were being removed from the theater and by powers in the media largely refusing to broadcast the later successes in Vietnam (represented mainly by anectdotal evidence that Walter Cronkite spiked all reports showing the war effort in a good light during this time period). Such activity further sapped war weary Americans and the anti-communist leadership. This in turn allowed the pro-Comunist elements in our society to cut off the essential aid discussed above. All in all this is a very small portion of the book (10-15 pages at most). I docked the book one star because of Sorely's irrational hero worship of General Abrams who seems to be the prime mover in the reforms that brought such success. I agree Abrams was a much better commander than Westmoreland and he was largely responsible for the improvements Sorely describes. Unfortunately, Sorely pushes it too far at times. Heres a prime example. Abrams' main strategy was to secure population centers and use American forces in direct combat only if the benefits would be high and the price low. By doing this, he denied the Communists recruits and logistical support while not exaserbating American war weariness. This flies in the face of the "Hamburger Hill" Battle where elements of the 101st Airborne were sent head on up a fortified hill. Sorely says this was justified because it was necessary to open up an access route into Saigon. Im not convinced. By this time, ARVN had adequate resources to do the job. Also, the battle caused Congressional constraints that essentially ended his ability to use Ameircan ground forces in direct action again. Doesnt seem worth the price to me. However, this book is a keeper and essential to any serious study of the Vietnam War.
Rating:
Summary: Different perspective, with faults
Review: This book is worth reading if the reader wants a full perspective on the Vietnam war.
In a lot of ways, the book is a wasted opportunity. Having additional sources of information (the Abrams tapes) available to him, the author feels compelled to quote from those sources at length. Wishing to point out who was responsible for a beneficial change in policy in the war, Sorley worships General Abrams and demonizes General Westmoreland. Wanting to illustrate the unimportance of bombing North Vietnam, he mixes up statistics of Cessna mail flights with those of B-52 raids over Hanoi. To persuade us that most South Vietnamese civilians were in safe hamlets and that the South Vietnam government was protecting its people, he forgets to tell us that the "safe hamlets" were not the villagers' own home hamlets.
His main point is that moving away from Westmoreland's "search and destroy" tactic to Abram's "clear and hold" tactic brought us to the brink of winning the Vietnam War. Yet let's not forget that the commanders' actions were often both dictated and limited by American politics: Westmoreland had Johnson, and Abrams had Nixon.
To what extent was South Vietnam a viable country? They were much more our "client" than our "ally," by any measure. Would pointless activities such as the Thieu/Ky rivalry, and Thieu's continuing support of ineffective generals, have ever resulted in a stable situation, such as we have now in North/South Korea? Would the North Vietnamese have ever given up? Would it be politically and physically possible to continually invade Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ to deny the North Vietnamese their staging and supply areas? Would we risk scuttling our valuable relationships with Russia and China to coerce Russia and China into abandoning North Vietnam?
If you read this book, keep in mind that it has its limitations, biases, and inaccuracies. Be sure to read other books, such as _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.
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