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Summary: A remarkable analysis of the last years of the Vietnam War
Review: Bob Sorley who has become one of the great biographers of military leaders has put his considerable research and writing abilities to the task of examining the nelgected years of the Vietnam War--the years that Creighton Abrams was in command. A first rate piece of scholarship and analysis.
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Summary: An inspiring insight to warfare in our "civilisation".
Review: By direct knowledge or experience of the events, others are better qualified than I to judge this book in a specifically Vietnamese context. It seems to me that Dr Sorley's work contributes most of all to a broader understanding of the changing nature of large scale military action in general.. The book struck three chords in particular:- First, its technique - of extracting the essence from actual conversations between some of the principal actors. Second, its courageous veracity - in trying to put the record straight. Third, its insights - to the increasingly complex interaction between political, economic, social and technological factors which IN PRACTICE determine the outcome of military affairs between nations and ideologies . Who but a madman or a genius would go to war in future? On the first aspect - new to me but probably not unique - what a treasure trove Lewis Sorley discovered in the taped conversations from the command tent! This is what people actually said. Not what they wished they had said, what their diaries said that they said - or what with hindsight they might have said. Here it is - sometimes incoherent, fragmented and unstructured - but always utterly convincing. I admit to liking General Abrams a lot after reading this, and finding in him qualities of humanity and leadership to a great degree. On the second aspect (challenging the received wisdom) Dr Sorley reveals his colours as a biographer who has, I suspect, also been seduced by the charisma of his subject! The interesting thing is that, even if this is a correct interpretation, it should not detract from the import of the conclusions drawn and the lessons learned. But it is the third aspect which earns this book a place at eye-level in my library. In the Prologue the author sets the scene: " ... a limited war within the larger Cold War within a global cultural revolution, and ultimately a failed endeavor." One can see in this narrative a plot on the trend line which began with the Bolshevik revolution, which ran through WWII, Korea, Malaysia .. and which continues through former Yugoslavia and now Kosovo. The key question is "What constitutes success?" or "What does Good look like?" Certainly success in actions which are undertaken to preserve an ideology or to protect human rights can not be measured by the scoring criteria of the football field or the boxing ring. How then are objectives to be set in terms which will at the same time inspire cost-efficient military action, satisfy the voters back home (wherever "home" may be) and please those whose rights are to be protected (if they live long enough to take pleasure from ensuing events)? What a chilling testimony is given in Dr Sorley's book : " .. almost 70% of the Army GENERALS (my emphasis) who managed the war were uncertain of its objectives ...". It doesn't look like success to be trailing from the last helicopter out of town as the enemy's tanks crash the gates - that's for sure. But if your score-card is marked in budgetary dollars and body bags saved, maybe that's different ?. And if you measure the success of affairs by commitments honoured and credibility sustained, what then? That is the tension of "A Better War" .. challenging stuff!
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Summary: A sober look at what could have been!
Review: For many years, I have been writing letters to the editor and telling friends and acquaintances that the war in Vietnam was not lost on the battlefield. Instead it was lost when the U.S. Congress refused to allocate the funding necessary to sustain the South Vietnamese government and military in their struggle to defeat the North Vietnamese invaders. Unlike most other historians writing about the war, Mr. Sorley painstakingly lays out the evidence of a successful Vietnamization program conducted by the U.S. advisory establishment in Vietnam. He also convincingly demonstrates that the military side of the war was being won by the South Vietnamese after a successful reduction or elimination of the political threat posed by the V.C. After coming back to the U.S. after a tour in Vietnam in 1973, I, along with my wife and small children, took part in a demonstration in front of the White House that was organized by South Vietnamese who were living in this country at the time. They were seeking continued funding from the U.S. for their government in Vietnam. The sad aspect was that few other Americans were there to show their support for the South Vietnamese, and funding was eventually eliminated. As Mr. Sorley so eloquently points out in his book, this country turned its back on a long time ally, and allowed millions of our Vietnamese friends to be swallowed up into a dreary, remorseless, totalitarian dictatorship. Unfortunately, most of the people in this country who permitted or encouraged this atrocity to occur have yet to accept responsibility for it. The greatest portion of this responsibility can be laid at the feet of the left-wing media that still holds political sway in this country.
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Summary: Better War a solid academic work and an entertaining read
Review: For readers or researchers seeking a thoughtful and thoroughly researched book on a critical period in U.S. history, Sorley's book should be high on the list. Sorley has given historians and students of the Vietnam War a unique gift in this examination of the later years of America's longest war. For those that think they already know all there is to Vietnam, "A Better War" is a must-read. This is a new perspective from a reliable source and footnoted in manner that puts other works such as Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam" to shame.
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Summary: An excellent,readable coverage from new factual info.
Review: Have just finished reading Lewis Sorley's A Better War. It is a must read for all who were alive from 1950 and after. Sorley does a superior job of winding a story that may have never been told had he not uncovered the audio/ factual reports of what really took place in the entertwined worlds of international and national war and the politics that surrounded it. It takes the wonder out of why the South Viet Namese appeared to fold as they did. It is extremely readable, exhaustavely documented and should be in all our libraries.
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Summary: To the point, candid analysis
Review: Having been there,A Better War provides comfort and a degree of satisfaction that many of us have sought for three decades. It should be prescribed for many veterans of the action.
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Summary: Not revisionist history
Review: I am writing in response to the many critical reviews of this book, as to the actual book. Many reviewers call this revisionist history, and claim that Lewis Sorley's admiration for General Abrams biases the work. Sorley is obviously a great fan of General Abrams, but hey, most people who knew him were fans of his. He was a great soldier, leader, and General. I studied guerrilla warfare before I went to Vietnam (1966-1967). I was part of the Westmoreland multi-battalion offensive actions against the communist forces. I returned to Vietnam (1970-1971) to experience the Abrams emphasis on population security and control. Both type operations are necessary to successfully win a guerrilla war, but Abrams emphasis was clearly the better long term strategy. I suspect that most of the critical comments about this book are written by those most against America's presence in Vietnam. I my opinion, Sorley speaks the truth here. He has done a masterful job of presenting the way the war was fought after the 1968 Tet offensive. Like it or not, that is the way it really was. It is a story that not enough people have heard.
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Summary: Relevance to Today's War on Terrorism
Review: I started reading this book prior to 11 September 2001 and just finished it. If for no other reason, this book should be read and examined in light of the recent mobilization of Reserves and deployment of service members to participate in the campaign against terrorism. It is clear to me that members of the Armed Services will be called upon to fight enemies that include both state and non-state actors that have the capability to cause immense harm to U.S. interests within this country and abroad.
I have suffered through numerous editorials that proclaim the best U.S. strategy, most by people who couldn't lead a cow to pasture. Few seem to realize what it takes to mount a serious campaign and the level of intelligence and foresight that is required from all facets of government to properly execute actions across the spectrum of government power. This book highlights the constraints faced during the Vietnam War and the remarkable job that was done without the help of anyone on U.S. soil.
A clear case is made within the book that several elements of our national power were never adequately employed. In fact, the diplomatic, informational, military and economic facets of our national power actually fought AGAINST each other.
Prior to 11 September 2001, the American government had been waging an ineffective fight against terrorism. Much like Vietnam, it was not a fight that the American public backed to any significant degree. Unlike Vietnam, it was not one that people protested against, the Congress fought against or the media attempted to subvert to prove their "credibility". Within hours after the attack on the U.S., this changed.
So how is this book relevant to today? The problems that we faced in conducting the war in Vietnam will be faced again as we prosecute this campaign. There is no pure diplomatic, informational, military or economic solution to the problem. All must share in the planning and the execution to understand the affects of each action. Today's military leadership has learned some hard lesons through the past 50 years. Sorley states, "every military leader is taught early on to make what is called an 'estimate of the situation,' the heart of which is consideration of what enemy course of action might be provoked by various friendly courses of action, with similar calculations performed for a range of alternative courses of action. Such calculations are the essence of modern wargaming as well, and often have significant impact on how the commander uses the force at his disposal." The difference today is that the military leadership understands that each application of military power will impact on the other elements of power and all must be combined to find the best course of action and to be prepared for the enemy response.
In addition, at least temporarily, the American public, Congress and media are solidly behind the President as he begins the campaign. Can it be maintained?
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Summary: Deeply thought-provoking; a must read.
Review: I started this book with considerable trepidation, but concluded it believing that it is a must read for all those interested in recent US history. The conclusions of the book are so different from the conventional wisdom about the Vietnam War that the book deserves to be widely read and debated. That won't happen, regretably. I would also observe that I have questioned a number of vets about their experiences in the 1969-1971/2 period and their recollections bear out Sorley's analysis. The war in that period was fundamentally different from the preceding stage and that much of Sorley's case tracks with their personal experience. Read it and judge for yourself.
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Summary: A well documented history that punctures many myths.
Review: I've read extensively about the Viet Nam war and found this the most provocative of those books. By focusing on the period post-Tet 1968, it examines the war in a way that few other books had. It reveals the true tragedy of Viet Nam-- that the war was being won, that Viet Namization could have worked, that political exigencies and shallow media impressions led to defeat and the enslavement of the South Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian people. A must read for policy makers and would be experts on Viet Nam.
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