Rating: 
Summary: Clark's View of Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire
Review: "Winning Modern Wars" is General Wesley Clark's follow up to his similarly titled "Waging Modern Wars". Written in the days shortly following the end of major combat operations, he uses this opportunity to examine the war in Iraq against a context of terrorism and American ideals. In fact, his book is less about his title "Winning Modern Wars" and more about his subtitle "Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire".
General Clark dedicates the first half of the book to examining the basis for and the conduct of our recent military operation in Iraq. He chronicles the campaign's significant events while adding his own expert military analysis along the way. This portion of the book is pro-military, and judgmental of the Bush Administration. He extols the military's planning and execution of the campaign while criticizing the Bush Administration's characterization of the enemy forces and assumptions about Iraqi public support. General Clark is especially critical of Secretary Rumsfeld's management of the war effort and the process for deploying US forces.
The second major section advances the idea that following 9/11, terrorism should be the United States' major imperative. He faults the Bush Administration for failing to maintain an aggressive anti-terror campaign against Al Qaeda by pursuing action against Iraq. He goes on to criticize the Bush Administration's dealings with the international community and lack of UN and NATO endorsement. General Clark's assessment is that the US has disrupted the terrorist's ability to operate but failed to destroy their capability to mount an additional attack. At the same time the US is now fully committed to support Iraqi re-construction.
The final section is a look at some American ideals needed to remain a world leader. I question this chapter's relevance. It came across as a "what I believe" statement or perhaps the beginning of a political platform (he discusses the issue of his potential run for office in the introduction and admits readers will draw their own conclusions as to motive).
Overall, I enjoyed General Clark's book. I thought the first two sections regarding Iraq and terrorism were appropriate and an interesting report and despite my questioning the final chapter's relevance, the entire book is a deserving read. It is not a comprehensive examination of the issues surrounding the war against Iraq and terrorism, but provides the reader with top-level view of General Clark's opinions. When included with other books on the topic, it is an outstanding addition.
I recommend this book.
Rating: 
Summary: Clark Sounds Pretty Smart, but Bush is a Really Nice Guy
Review: "Winning Modern Wars" is retired general and former Supreme Commander of NATO, Wesley Clark's examination of what constitutes modern wars and how to win them. Clark is also, of course, a former Democratic candidate for the presidency, but even if one assumes the worse about Clark's intentions in writing this book, his arguments are as powerfully relevant as they are intelligent and are worth examining in a neutral fashion.Clark sets the stage for constructing his subsequent arguments by providing a detailed-and clearly loving-account of the American military's performance in Operation Iraqi Fiefdom. Those readers who are interested in military history and military science will find these pages extremely rewarding. In stark contrast to the abysmal, theme-driven war coverage provided by in-bed reporters, Clark provides an extremely lucid account of the successful Coalition military tactics and the reasoning behind them. Drawing on exponential technical advances and lessons learned since the First Gulf War, the American military was able to subdue Iraqi forces with far fewer troops and in considerably less time. Clark attributes this in large part to the "revolution in military affairs" that is essentially the product of several presidential administrations as well as an extremely flexible officer core that was able to rapidly adjust its tactics in the face of surprising new challenges on the battle field. Having used the opening chapters to establish his own military credentials as well as his unquestionable support of American troops, Clark then prepares his epistolary attack against the Bush Regime by explaining how the War on Iraq was a needless diversion from America's arguably more important and certainly unfinished war on terrorism. In this section, Clark argues that Iraq has no significant connection to al Quaeda or to terrorist threats at home. Worse, yet, Clark argues, the war in Iraq, if anything is making the United States less stable and is providing a breeding ground for terrorism. While readers might understandably treat these arguments with skepticism and wonder if they are part of Clark's presidential ambitions, they should consider the testimony of other experts. Under different circumstances both the CIA, and President Bush have publicly stated that Iraq had no significant relationship to al Quaeda and was not behind the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. (Bush subsequently reversed himself for political reasons by labeling Iraq the "central front of the war on terrorism" but he failed to explain this term in detail.) Furthermore, Visiting Professor Jeffery Record of the Army's prestigious War College wrote a report that criticized the war on Iraq as a flawed distraction from the more essential war on terror. Among other things, Record pointed out that rogue nations like Iraq-however dangerous they may be-can be subjected to deterrence because they are exposed to political and military retaliation, whereas because terrorist groups like al Quaeda are stateless, they are generally immune to military power. Finally, shortly after the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, leading terrorist expert, Jessica Stern stated that the war in Iraq had the dubious distinction of creating terrorists where none existed before. These experts and numerous others strongly reinforce Clark's argument that when seen in the context of the war on terror, the invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of potentially catastrophic proportions. Clark's next argument-really the heart of this book-is that modern wars require more than the obvious military success on the ground. In order to succeed, Clark argues, modern wars require detailed plans and funding for peace keeping operations long after the initial military phase ends. They also require international cooperation among powerful nations with shared security interests for two vital reasons: (1) to balance the staggering costs as the coalition did in the First Gulf War, and (2) to provide legitimacy. When a nation decides to "go it alone" as the Bush Regime opted to in the Iraq war, it risks bearing unsustainable costs and of becoming an international pariah. When even a nation as powerful as the United States becomes universally hated for its perceived imperial ambitions and arrogance, it becomes more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Clark concludes this book by arguing that there is a right way and a wrong way for the United States to operate as the dominant world power. Drawing on the works of thinkers like Joseph Nye Jr., Clark argues that prior to the disastrous foreign policy decisions of the Bush Regime, the United States operated very effectively as a "virtual empire". This means that the United States drew upon all of its reservoirs of strength including its economic leverage, its leadership role in universally respected institutions such as the United Nations, and the NATO military alliance, and its transparent but considerable "soft power" which includes the influences of its values, its institutions and its shared goals for universal public good in such areas as environmental preservation, the eradication of poverty, and global prosperity. In this context, Clark argues, military force is used exactly how every trained American officer knows it should be: as a last resort and with the full backing of as many allies as possible. By opting for an arguably flashy but more obsolete mode of traditional military imperial policy, Clark argues, the Bush Regime has essentially stripped the United States of many of the core components of its "virtual empire". In the process of doing this, it has considerably weakened the United States and rendered in less effective in prosecuting the war on terrorism or in meeting other global challenges. Even if you are an ardent supporter of George W. Bush, you should read this book and seriously think about this guy's arguments. He's a decorated combat veteran with leadership experience and a clear understanding of the complex political and military web that constitutes modern war. Of course it's easier to believe that Bush knows what he's doing when clearly he doesn't, but readers should overcome this primitive weakness and use their analytical capabilities even if it leads them to stark conclusions. Perhaps it is for this reason that Clark concludes that the United States can meet its global challenges in the coming years-if it has the right leadership.
Rating: 
Summary: It's An Election Year
Review: * General Wesley Clark's WINNING MODERN WARS is an extended essay on
the Bush II Administration's campaign in Iraq; the general's thoughts
on the war on terror; and his vision for the future of America. What we have here is more or less a typical election-year sort of book
that outlines the political platform of someone lobbying for the
presidency. While this sort of book does serve a useful purpose in
helping inform the public of a candidate's views, at the same time
said sort of book is also, effectively by intent, fairly disposable
and will be forgotten in a year or two, with no chance of being
reprinted unless the candidate takes another shot at the presidency
and comes out with a revised edition. As far as the content goes, WINNING MODERN WARS basically makes a case
against the Bush II Administration. I question that the case is very
persuasive, since it is the sort of thing that the left-outfield crowd
will proclaim as gospel and the right-outfield crowd will denounce as
lies and doubletalk. The argument goes on pretty much as it has. As far as I am concerned, there were things I agreed with in WINNING
MODERN WARS, but I am well past the age where I can read through a
book full of tidy-sounding assertions and not find them a bit glib,
wondering how much relationship they actually have to the untidy real
world. It's funny reading through a "topical" book like this from ten
years back -- you'll find them gathering cobwebs on library shelves --
because in hindsight it will contain statements that were completely
vindicated by subsequent events, and statements that turned out to be
completely ridiculous. I am honestly not criticising the author for this, since no
presidential candidate in his or her right mind gets up and waffles in
front of the public. I retain fairly positive impressions of General
Clark. Given what this book was written to do, it's hard to criticise
it, and about as hard to be interested in it. To the extent it
communicated General Clark's views to me, a magazine article of
moderate length would have done just about as well or better. I will, if not criticise, at least snicker at the general's up-front
claims that he did not write WINNING MODERN WARS to be partisan or as
political self-promotion. Even if that was his intent, there was no
way that such claims could be credible given his circumstances, and he
shouldn't have tried to make them: "Who do you think you are, general
-- Obi-Wan Kenobi? Your Jedi mind tricks will not work on me!"
Rating:
Summary: Ideal Primer for General Public, Satisfying on Key Points
Review:
Much of this book is a blow-by-blow account of the recent US invasion of Iraq, with generally complementary comments about the performance of the US military.
National security professionals will have every reason to skim most of the book, but they would be very unwise if they failed to read it. On balance, the author comes out as the only Presidential candidate who actually has deep experience in modern war, in managing very large complex coalition operations, and in handling the nuances (Bush has said he does not do nuances) of complex European relationships such as characterized his tenure as commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during which time NATO dramatically expanded to embrace the Eastern European (Partnership for Peace) nations and the Mediterranean Dialog nations. A few key points on the author's perspectives that satisfied me: 1) He understands that reconstruction cannot be successful unless internal security, stability, and legitimacy are established first. 2) He emphasizes the urgency of operating with other nations in strong alliances, not only to be successful in unilateral operations, but in avoiding competing crises elsewhere. 3) He is very critical of the manner in which the Bush Administration represses participatory democratic discussion of the threat and the new strategy. America was "shut out" from both the facts and the discussion in the path to war on Iraq. 4) He is sensitive to the enormous damage that America's arrogance (as reflected in the actions being done "in our name") is doing to our interests abroad. He notes, interestingly, that there is a huge difference between the messages carried by the US versus the international media (and implicitly, in our public's unawareness of that difference). 5) He is accurate and insightful in expressing concern about two simultaneous failures of the Bush Administration: first, failing to prosecute the war on terror instead of the sideshow in Iraq, and second, failing to actually make America any safer here at home. 6) He helps explain how the Bush Administration got off track by reminding us that missile defense, energy, and the Chinese incident with the US naval reconnaissance airplane all consumed the early months of the new Administration. 7) He provides useful perspective on the *considerable* challenges of terrorism that faced Germany (Baader-Meinhof), Italy (Red Brigades), Spain (ETA), England (IRA), Greece (November 17th group), Turkey (PKK), and other nations including Israel. He notes that these were defeated by constructive law enforcement campaigns, not unilateral military invasions. I found this section of the book to be extraordinarily mature, worldly, and sensible. 8) His account of the early planning process for the war against Iraq (never mind the policy process that misled America) slams Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for being disruptive and unprofessional, resulting in "an irregularly timed patchwork process that interspersed early-deploying units with those needed later, delayed mobilization, hampered training, and slowed overall deployments considerably." One example: 4th Infantry Division spent 45 days at sea *after* they arrived. 9) He provides incisive commentary on the failure of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia to provide much needed ports and airheads for the war. [Although General Clark refrains from making this point, the best minds at the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute have publicly noted that we won more as a result of Iraqi incompetence than US effectiveness.] 10) There are many small signs throughout the book that General Clark is a strategist. As one who feels that John Boyd is a hero whose work must be honored in our future deliberations, I was glad to see the author emphasize the value of leadership and training over technology. 11) The author corrects existing doctrine and advances the thinking by pointing out that the air supremacists were correct but not in the way they expected. Air versus C4I was not the decisive factor in the Iraq war, but rather air in support of ground forces, something the Air Force hates to do but the Marine Corps has always understood. 12) On page 79 he discusses how a B-1 bomber was dispatched to attack a reported place where Saddam Hussein might be, unleashing two 2,000 lb. bombs. This is so sadly a repeat of the Afghan story, where a B-2 bomber was called in against 18 men in a cave, that we want to highlight it. We have a heavy metal military unsuited for manhunts or gang warfare. 13) If there is one weakness in this book, it is that it glosses over the many information and intelligence deficiencies that characterized the planning process, the operational campaign, and the post-war peace and reconstruction endeavor. The author does not fail to give the current Administration and its operational arms (including intelligence) credit for successes against terrorism in 2002 (incidents fell by half, key people killed and captured). This is appropriate, and provides a good lead-in to his very detailed critique of how we are failing in the war on terrorism, the second half of his book. This can be generally summed up, in his words, with "We needed new thinking, and we needed to retarget our intelligence and adjust our means..." What I find most fascinating about the second half of the book is that the author is clearly charting a sensible course that is equi-distant from the incompetent neglect of the Clinton Administration, and the lunatic militarism of the Bush Administration. He makes specific reference to the now-public plans of Rumsfeld and his aids to follow up the attack on Iraq with attacks on Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. This is what we have to look forward to if there is a second Bush Administration. The author provides enough in the way of specifics (buying in, for example, with an explicit reference) to Joe Nye's views on the importance of using soft power in the context of multinational strategies for peace) to be very reassuring that his national security strategy, once fully developed, would be summed up with one word: balanced.
Rating:
Summary: Ideal Primer for General Public, Satisfying on Key Points
Review:
Much of this book is a blow-by-blow account of the recent US invasion of Iraq, with generally complementary comments about the performance of the US military.
National security professionals will have every reason to skim most of the book, but they would be very unwise if they failed to read it. On balance, the author comes out as the only Presidential candidate who actually has deep experience in modern war, in managing very large complex coalition operations, and in handling the nuances (Bush has said he does not do nuances) of complex European relationships such as characterized his tenure as commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during which time NATO dramatically expanded to embrace the Eastern European (Partnership for Peace) nations and the Mediterranean Dialog nations. A few key points on the author's perspectives that satisfied me: 1) He understands that reconstruction cannot be successful unless internal security, stability, and legitimacy are established first. 2) He emphasizes the urgency of operating with other nations in strong alliances, not only to be successful in unilateral operations, but in avoiding competing crises elsewhere. 3) He is very critical of the manner in which the Bush Administration represses participatory democratic discussion of the threat and the new strategy. America was "shut out" from both the facts and the discussion in the path to war on Iraq. 4) He is sensitive to the enormous damage that America's arrogance (as reflected in the actions being done "in our name") is doing to our interests abroad. He notes, interestingly, that there is a huge difference between the messages carried by the US versus the international media (and implicitly, in our public's unawareness of that difference). 5) He is accurate and insightful in expressing concern about two simultaneous failures of the Bush Administration: first, failing to prosecute the war on terror instead of the sideshow in Iraq, and second, failing to actually make America any safer here at home. 6) He helps explain how the Bush Administration got off track by reminding us that missile defense, energy, and the Chinese incident with the US naval reconnaissance airplane all consumed the early months of the new Administration. 7) He provides useful perspective on the *considerable* challenges of terrorism that faced Germany (Baader-Meinhof), Italy (Red Brigades), Spain (ETA), England (IRA), Greece (November 17th group), Turkey (PKK), and other nations including Israel. He notes that these were defeated by constructive law enforcement campaigns, not unilateral military invasions. I found this section of the book to be extraordinarily mature, worldly, and sensible. 8) His account of the early planning process for the war against Iraq (never mind the policy process that misled America) slams Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for being disruptive and unprofessional, resulting in "an irregularly timed patchwork process that interspersed early-deploying units with those needed later, delayed mobilization, hampered training, and slowed overall deployments considerably." One example: 4th Infantry Division spent 45 days at sea *after* they arrived. 9) He provides incisive commentary on the failure of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia to provide much needed ports and airheads for the war. [Although General Clark refrains from making this point, the best minds at the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute have publicly noted that we won more as a result of Iraqi incompetence than US effectiveness.] 10) There are many small signs throughout the book that General Clark is a strategist. As one who feels that John Boyd is a hero whose work must be honored in our future deliberations, I was glad to see the author emphasize the value of leadership and training over technology. 11) The author corrects existing doctrine and advances the thinking by pointing out that the air supremacists were correct but not in the way they expected. Air versus C4I was not the decisive factor in the Iraq war, but rather air in support of ground forces, something the Air Force hates to do but the Marine Corps has always understood. 12) On page 79 he discusses how a B-1 bomber was dispatched to attack a reported place where Saddam Hussein might be, unleashing two 2,000 lb. bombs. This is so sadly a repeat of the Afghan story, where a B-2 bomber was called in against 18 men in a cave, that we want to highlight it. We have a heavy metal military unsuited for manhunts or gang warfare. 13) If there is one weakness in this book, it is that it glosses over the many information and intelligence deficiencies that characterized the planning process, the operational campaign, and the post-war peace and reconstruction endeavor. The author does not fail to give the current Administration and its operational arms (including intelligence) credit for successes against terrorism in 2002 (incidents fell by half, key people killed and captured). This is appropriate, and provides a good lead-in to his very detailed critique of how we are failing in the war on terrorism, the second half of his book. This can be generally summed up, in his words, with "We needed new thinking, and we needed to retarget our intelligence and adjust our means..." What I find most fascinating about the second half of the book is that the author is clearly charting a sensible course that is equi-distant from the incompetent neglect of the Clinton Administration, and the lunatic militarism of the Bush Administration. He makes specific reference to the now-public plans of Rumsfeld and his aids to follow up the attack on Iraq with attacks on Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. This is what we have to look forward to if there is a second Bush Administration. The author provides enough in the way of specifics (buying in, for example, with an explicit reference) to Joe Nye's views on the importance of using soft power in the context of multinational strategies for peace) to be very reassuring that his national security strategy, once fully developed, would be summed up with one word: balanced.
Rating: 
Summary: Could be three and a half stars
Review: A friend of mine just returned from a year long depoyment to Kuwait gave me Wes Clark's most recent literary effort. I had read his earlier work that described his efforts as SACEUR and head of NATO's military. Gen. Clark, of course, was in charge of the successful "war" in Kosovo and was subsequently fired ignominiously by SecDef Bill Cohen at the behest of Bill Clinton. This book, "Winning Modern Wars", was obviously written as a prelude to Clark's bid for the Democrat nomination for president in '04. Having said that, I felt that General Clark presents a fairly balanced account of Bush 43's invasion of Iraq and the nuances of the decisions that led up to it. I got the impression that one of the author's sources in the White House was another Clarke(with an "e") whose book on terrorism has achieved more notoriety than this one. The first three chapters of this short (200 pages) tome are devoted to a recapitulation of Gulf War 2 from Gen. Clark's vantage point as a CNN consultant. As a student of military history this represents a concise summary of the combat and "post-combat" phase. Chapter 4 is an exploration of terrorism and how "success" should be defined in the nebulous war thereon. The fifth chapter "Flawed Arguments, Flawed Strategy" is probably the most valuable part of this book. Clark closes with a final chapter on his vision for "A New America" clearly the platform for this Rhodes' Scholar's presidential bid. The last sentences of the book sum it up: "Our actions matter.And we cannot lead by example unless we are sustained by good leadership. Nothing is more important." Overall, a good quick read that summarizes what led up to the war in Iraq that is still being fought (despite the Bush administration claims to the contrary) and the consequences of our actions.Just as we have had American troops on the line in Korea for over 50 years, we had better get used to the idea that we will have "boots on the ground" for at least as long in Iraq.
Rating:
Summary: Insight into our world!
Review: After General Clark describes the 2nd Gulf War he moves on to the real heart of the book --- his analysis of the America's role in the post-Cold War world. ALTHOUGH Bush's patriotic speeches are indeed inspiring, they fail for lack of a basis in reality. The US Army is not built to be an army of occupation, or an army of empire building. Our soldiers and our national character calls for the men (and women) to return home after a conflict. RATHER, our strength is in leading the world through example, in acting with international organizations, with allies --- and applying strength when necessary --- not in intimidating the world. That is a losing proposition. It may feel good to not bother to persuade, to act unilaterally, but do we have the millions of soldiers to garrison a world that resents us? General Clark handles prose with admirable felicity. The book is an enjoyable read. He also points the way.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent rebuttal of Bush policies
Review: Clark's book main topics include: the situation in Iraq, how to deal with terrorism, foreign policy, and the U.S. economy. He presents a smart rebuttal of the Bush administration policies. His ideas will resonate with the U.S. electorate. It will ensure our next President will be more of a Centrist. Clark was against the war in Iraq. This military venture has failed all intended political purposes. We have not found a Iraqi nuclear program. There are no links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The invasion of Iraq has not squelched terrorism, but instead exacerbated as thousands of terrorists throughout the Islamic World infiltrate Iraq and shoot U.S. soldiers as easy target. Installing a lasting democracy seems unlikely. The U.S. Administration post war planning was terrible. The Administration made utopic assumptions that the Iraqis would be ecstatic about being liberated by U.S. forces. The Administration underestimated the Baath party underground resistance, the degree of Shiite factionalism. It also disbanded the Iraqi Army adding 400,000 armed men to the rank of the unemployed. Many boosted the underground Baath party resistance. In attempting to retain full control of the Iraq post war situation, the Administration raised its costs and risks. This is instead of leveraging the UN and NATO peacekeeping forces. Per Clark, terrorism is supranational with no State allegiance. The Administration is attempting to fight it with an obsolete Cold War framework of State-vs-State conflicts. It is attempting to fight terrorism as it fought back Nazism in WWII, and Communism thereafter. The Administration has listed six other targeted countries for upcoming preemptive wars. These include: Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. This is a mistake that the U.S. can't afford. Taking over these countries will do nothing to fight terrorism. The U.S. is concerned about the wrong countries. The root causes of Islamic terrorism are:
a) Saudi Arabia extreme Wahhabist ideology which dominates its schools;
b) the impoverished, corrupt society of Pakistan and its madrassas schools which teach an equally extreme version of Islam; and
c) the supercharged linkage with the Palestinians.
But, the U.S. considers Saudi Arabia and Pakistan their allies. And, its Israeli bias further inflames the anti-Americanism throughout Islam. For Clark the solution to fight terrorism is to boost intelligence agencies effectiveness worldwide. U.S. funding should be redirected towards the CIA, FBI, and NSA. Cooperation with European and other intelligence agencies should be implemented. An international legal framework should be developed to reach uniform enforcement actions when dealing with terrorists worldwide. Regarding Islam, Clark accepts that achieving transformation of the region is a generation away. The concept that we can install democratic regimes that would take hold within these countries in a few years is utopic. These countries do not have an empowered informed middle class capable of supporting lasting democracies. Clark recommends that bringing the Islamic Middle East to converge towards the remainder of the World entails:
a) focusing on more pragmatic education (eliminate Wahhabism from school curriculum);
b) promote broader economic development; and
c) encourage wider political participation.
These measures are incremental and will take decades. They can't be enforced militarily. Regarding foreign policy, we have to end our unilateralism immediately. This foreign policy has inflamed both Islam and the West. It has threatened the viability of the UN and NATO. Unilateralism should be replaced by multilateralism. UN and NATO should be fully supported and lead by the U.S. The UN Security Council unanimous rule should be changed. It gives too much power to a single dissenting Security Council country member. And, it does promote doing nothing in even the most egregious circumstances. Clark understands that, and states it is up to the U.S. to lead in the amending of such policies so as to promote the effectiveness of multilateralistic supranational institutions. Clark has a far reaching 100 year vision. He wants the U.S. to maintain the best environment over the next 100 years. To him the environment has several meanings. It obviously means the physical environment. The U.S. has to do more to protect the Air, Water, and natural resources. He is also concerned about constitutional environment. The U.S. should maintain an integer legal and judicial system. It should also maintain a civic culture of transparency and accountability to set a world standard for governance. He is also concerned about the business environment. The U.S. should implement policies so as to encourage individuals and businesses to reap the fruit of their labor, innovation, and energy to the optimal level. Obviously, these different environments have some diverging interests. And, the key is to maintain an optimal balance between them, so that the U.S. society as a whole remains a leader and enviable model for the World in 2103 (hundred years from now). Clark is concerned about fiscal responsibility. The U.S. 10 year Budget has shifted from a $5 trillion Budget Surplus in 2001 to a $5 trillion budget Deficit in 2003. This negative swing of $10 trillion was in part due to a global economic contraction after 2001. But, it was in good part due to the Bush Administration policies that combined a reckless boost in Defense spending for fighting aboard combined with equally irresponsible series of fiscally damaging tax cuts. Clark economic plan follows pretty much the beneficial aspects of Clintonomics. This includes efforts to balance the Budget and reduce government debt. This would reduce government dissavings and promote private sector savings and investments. In turn, the private sector savings and investments will create new jobs and also reduce the U.S. skyrocketing current account deficit. This is because as domestic savings come closer to matching domestic investments, the need for direct foreign investments decline.
Rating:
Summary: Why General Clark's Four Stars Shine So Bright
Review: First of all, this title is heavy. It is not 'dumbed down' for the reading ease of the majority population. Second, prepare to be amazed because General Wesley Clark seems almost a seer in his predictions of the Iraq offensive (initiated by the Bush Administration). He explains in detail the dynamics of the Middle East, and exactly what type of participation needs to be involved to achieve peace. His theories are nothing short of brilliant, and sensitive, as were his CNN commentaries and analysis. You would be hard pressed to find so thorough a volume, so accurate a volume, by any other military leader. General Wesley K. Clark, with this book, gives credibility to his vast knowledge of foreign policy, and demonstrates his superior critical thinking skills. He is a shining star on the political horizon, and, quite possibly, will be the brightest military strategist and diplomat to hold the office of President of the United States.
Rating:
Summary: Well, once again the fools buy in to Clark
Review: Four-star General and presidential aspirant, Wesley Clark, has written a book that deals with the US role in Iraq and in world affairs. Clark does a good job of keeping his work concise and on-point. Clark begins the book by giving an excellent recitation of the background and actually fighting that occurred in the 2003 Iraq War. Clark also describes the post-war difficulties that America has experienced there since and he discusses how the Iraq effort may have impeded US policy in other countries. He faults the Bush Administration for failing to consider other alternatives to the war such as continuing with arms inspections and the embargo. He believes that even if war were necessary that the Bush Administration should have made more of an effort to seek United Nations approval and participation in the conflict. Lastly, he faults the Bush Administration for not having a better plan in place to police Iraq during the post-invasion phase of the operation. Clark does state, though, that it would be a big mistake for the US to pull out of Iraq at this point. Whatever happens--now that we have occupied the country--we must see the occupation through to a positive ending. Clark believes that failure to enlist more support from the international community before invading Iraq has harmed US interests in many ways: 1. Its detracted from the resources we have available to assist the pro-western government we installed in Afghanistan; 2. It destroyed much of the sympathy the US received from foreign countries following the attack by terrorists on 9/11; 3. It has strained our armed forces which are trying to get out a number of difficult missions around the globe with limited regular and reserve forces; 4. The cost of the war has limited the amount of money our government has to pursue homeland security needs within the US. The book is a solid matter-of-fact account about the Iraq War. It should give Americans who read it alot of food for thought about the direction their country has taken.
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