Rating: 
Summary: The Sick Man Myth
Review: A new approach to the topic that argues that the Ottoman empire was much more competent and vigorous than the traditional 'Sick Man of Europe' stereotype. Especially interesting to read this book in conjunction with some of the more traditional approaches like Goodwin and Fromkin
Rating:
Summary: The Sick Man Myth
Review: A new approach to the topic that argues that the Ottoman empire was much more competent and vigorous than the traditional 'Sick Man of Europe' stereotype. Especially interesting to read this book in conjunction with some of the more traditional approaches like Goodwin and Fromkin
Rating: 
Summary: Good background, poor reading.
Review: Fighting urges to put this book down after the first 100 pages, I finally finished after a couple days what I felt was a bland historical work, that's definately worth reading. Understanding the events leading up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of nation states in the Middle East is imperitive if one wants access to the situation that is currently being played out. In many ways the majority of problems plauging the M.E. right now are directly related to the time period this book deals with. I felt that the book gave me a far more solid understanding of post-empire mid east than I received in a university level history course. However, without previous exposure to Sykes-Picot, or the Hussein-McMahon letters (to name a few) the information from Karsh's book would not have stuck. I therefore reccomend this book for people who already have some knowlege about mid east history (musn't be anything special or thorough) and a desire to learn the dry basics before moving on. It's is also worth mentioning that Karsh's thesis is good counter-argument to a lot written about these issues, but hardly stands alone as the full and final truth of the matter. For that, this book is just the beginning.One more note, the maps in this book are terrible and confusing with most important towns and borders left out. Studying the Middle East without good maps makes the job a whole lot harder. Just a thought.
Rating: 
Summary: A struggle among equal players
Review: For a provocative thesis on the geography of the modern Middle East, one could look to Empires of the Sand, Efraim and Inari Karsh's bold acquittal of most of the accusations leveled at the West over the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The text actually covers a broader range of topics, with only the latter two thirds concerning the fall of the Ottomans. In broader terms, Karsh disputes the notion that modern day problems were all brought about by Western diplomats, often accused of being any of greedy, arrogant, ignorant, imperialistic, condescending, manipulative, or obstructionist. The text starts with Egypt. Several chapters show that it was forces within the Ottoman Empire, both in Egypt and in the capitol, that led to Egypt's breaking away from the empire (in fact, if not formally). Though western countries were involved, it was often to help out the Ottoman leadership rather than to work against it. This last point is important. Rather than seeking to destroy the "sick man of Europe", the other great powers went to great lengths to prop it up, and this was typically done in response to explicit requests by the Empire. The Nineteenth Century played itself out in this way. This is, of course, fully consistent with imperial politics of the era. No great powers wanted to see other great powers fail, for fear of what the political vacuum would bring. Finally, we get to World War 1. Karsh asserts that the Ottoman Empire, rather than being pushed into the war by the Entente powers, was encouraged by them to stay out, and mildly courted by Germany. Rather, it was the young Turks and their desire for power and furtherance of their empire that led the Ottoman Empire into the war. It saw Germany as the eventual victor and wanted to tag along at Germany's coat tails in hopes of territorial gain. The final major theme was the post-war division. It is true that the Western power divided up the empire. They did the same to the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well, and severely re-designed Germany's political structure. This happens to the losing side in a war. But rather than seeing the Middle East as populated by honest Arab nationalists, thwarted by the West, the main players in the region were quite competent and skillful. Further, there was no overarching Arab nationalism. The Hashemites, who lost Saudi Arabia but gained Transjordan and Mesopotamia (Iraq), wanted empire of their own. And they were supported at best by small numbers of their own people. And on a current topic of interest, it is true that Iraq is an odd conglomeration of populations. But Britain's main contribution to this was simply fusing three provinces of the Ottomans - Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. The exterior borders were already there, and had been for some time. This is also the way the new king wanted it. So much for the thesis. I'm not enough of an expert to say for certain that this book will overturn history as it is known. But the case is compelling. The largest fault I could find was stylistic - namely that it moved quickly and jerkily through many topics. I found it hard to follow at times. But on the whole it is still well worth the effort to get a feel for how Mid East - West relations have really gone.
Rating:
Summary: a good introduction to the Arabian History
Review: I find this book is well-organized and clear. It provides a good insight to the history of Arabia. I must say it is a hard job to draft this complicated history but Efraim Karsh amd Inari Karsh did it well. Although I think this book lacks deep analysis (well, it is quite impossible to do it in one book to analyse the history from 1789 to 1923!) I still think that it is a good introduction for those who are interested in Arabian history.
Rating:
Summary: A good account of Middle Eastern history 18c-1923
Review: I read this knowing very little about middle east history, and found it a very good overview. Written well, and flows good. I liked the argument, and found it convincing. The authors argue that actors with in the middle east had far more influence over events than usually suggested. Middle Eastern actors weren't just passive receptors of history, but influenced the course which history in that time span. This is an important account, particularly when most of the time you hear that "the European powers carved up the middle east with not regard to the inhabitants, leading to the problems that regions faces now." In fact, (this is not part of Efraim Karsh, Inari Karsh argument) the countries drawn out by the great powers were already regions during the Ottoman rule and not just 'carved up with no regard in Paris and London.' A good book for those unfamiliar with the region's history and an important argument for those who are.
Rating: 
Summary: Good evidence, wrong conclusions
Review: In this book the Karshes attempt to revise the notion that thecontemporary Middle East is largely a product of Great Power politicsduring the last 200 years. Although they have plumbed the Britisharchives and have read widely in the secondary sources (including Turkish, Arabic and French studies), the evidence they amass does little more than confirm the standard idea that the post-Napoleonic Ottoman Empire, its dissolution and the resulting Arab states are far more the product of European Power machinations than they are of the wishes and efforts of the indigenous peoples... The conclusion of the authors that "Great-power influences however potent, have played a secondary role, constituting neither the primary force behind the region's political development nor the main cause of its notorious volatility"(p.2), is simply unconvincing. No less troublesome is the argument that the contemporary Arab states came into being as a result of Arab efforts... While the primary arguments of the authors do not comport with the evidence, many of their subsidiary themes regarding the nature of Arab nationalism, the role of the Hashemites in the region, the war-time agreements with the Arabs, etc. do not represent departures from ideas that were developed 40 years ago and can hardly be regarded as controversial or groundbreaking. This book cannot be recommended to those seeking a sound introduction to the modern Middle East. The works of Elie Kedourie, Malcolm Yapp and Albert Hourani are better starting points.
Rating: 
Summary: Boring and biased account of events
Review: It happened that I started reading this book immediately after reading David Fromkin's book, A Peace to End All Peace. David's book was more concerned about the period around WWI 1910-1922. However, it striked me how referring to the same sources you may get totally opposite impressions of the incidents that happened in that same period! Then I realised that the Empires of The Sand is trying to convince me with four main themes:
1- The Turks are bad and imperialists.
2- The Arabs are bad and imperialists.
3- The British are good imperialists and never intended to divide the area but were forced by the bad imperialists to do so.
4- The Jews are good and real owners of Palestine.
It is clear that this book gives you the impression that it is well researched, but is basically what the authors wants us to know about that period of time and what serves the four above-mentioned themes.
I gave this book one more star than it deserves because I have gained some new information to research about local players in the Middle East and the Balkan regions at that period.
Clearly, this is another book written to serve the Zionist propaganda and claims in the Middle East and Palestine.
I would recommend reading Fromkin's book to get a more informative and intelligent and less biased view of the events of that important period in the modern history of the Middle East.
Rating:
Summary: Eastern imperialism
Review: People best remember their own experience and the recent past--a "framing effect" that behavioral scientists have successfully applied to the study of finance. These historians look beyond the recent Western "frame" at Middle East history, exposing the falsity of Arab claims that the region was illicitly colonized: in fact Arab and Ottoman rulers were the true architects of the modern Middle East. Hardly isolated from Europe, the Ottoman empire often called great Western powers to its aide: Napoleon Bonaparte's 1789 conquest of Egypt prompted Sultan Selim III to declare Jihad against the French and join the infidel British and Russian empires to keep his own in tact. In 1804, the Russian and Austrian empires similarly guaranteed the Ottoman empire's integrity. A falling out with Russia produced an Ottoman treaty with the British in 1809. And so on. Arab and Ottoman pleas brought Britain to Egypt too. The British, French and Ottoman empires originally opposed the Suez Canal, which they feared would violate Ottoman integrity, harming overland trade routes to Asia. But successive Egyptian khedives pushed the idea, concessions for which the Sultan ratified in 1866. Khedive Ismail's bribes to Abdul Hamid II brought Egypt to near-bankruptcy; he sold his Suez shares to Britain in 1875. In the following upheaval, the Sultan begged Britain to take control of Egypt. Prime Minister Gladstone refused. Only renewed Ottoman pleas convinced the reluctant British to send a naval squadron to quell an Egyptian rebellion in 1882--ironically making Britain the Canal's chief beneficiary, an entanglement from which she tried mightily to withdraw. The Sultan snubbed Britain's offer to give Egypt back. Similarly, Ottoman escapades redrew Europe's map. In 1854, the Ottomans aligned with Britain and France against Russia in the Crimea--beginning a war that they theoretically could not win--only to harness the great powers and fight "as a full-fledged member" of the coalition. Russia left Serbia, Moldavia and southern Bessarabia (seized in 1812); the Black Sea was neutralized. Eventually, Romania emerged, triggering a Balkan eruption. In 1875, the Ottomans met new Balkan threats with harsh reprisals culminating in bloodbaths. Abdul Hamid II balked at proposed British and Russian solutions. The resulting war cost the Ottomans more territory. Ottoman Europe fell after the Balkan War in 1913. Yet Europe's great powers remained loathe to devour the Ottoman carcass, by then controlled by the Young Turks. Russia even offered to go to war to prevent another power from taking Constantinople. In 1914, despite secret Ottoman-German and Ottoman-Bulgarian alignments, the triple Entente again guaranteed Ottoman territorial integrity--in exchange for Ottoman neutrality, which Enver Pasha violated, weighing into World War I on the losing side. The Arabs willingly followed. In short, the Ottomans, with Arab support, brought ruin on themselves--by pursuing an imperialist World War I plan to again expand the empire, a catastrophe ironically exacerbated by their wins at Gallipolli and Mesopotamia, and territorial gains from Russia's 1917 withdrawal. Europe cannot be blamed, either, for the Ottoman genocide of 1.4 million Armenian men, women and children; the slaughter of 150,000 Christians in Assyria; or the order to deport from Palestine all non-Ottoman subjects among 100,000 Jews there, which took 10,000 Jewish civilian lives before the Germans and U.S. intervened. The Arabs emerged decided victors: Sharif Hussein of Mecca convinced the British (falsely) that he had full Arab backing for a Caliphate to replace the Ottoman empire--creating lasting friction among Arabs and between Arabs and the West. His rule would exclude Palestine (then running from the Mediterranean to all of current-day Jordan)--which Hussein, negotiator Muhammed Faruqi and the de Bunsen Committee all accepted in 1917, despite Hussein's later denials. Yet Hussein four sons would rule Arabia, Iraq, upper Mesopotamia and Syria. The Saudis took Arabia. Faisal lost Syria, but took Iraq. Abdullah got what Hussein had previously agreed was off limits--75% of Palestine. You get here the big picture: Ottoman and Arab empire-building, war-mongering, calumny, double-dealing and perfidy probably had more effect on the modern Middle East than anything else. Alyssa A. Lappen
Rating:
Summary: Declining empires and books ...
Review: The first part of the book, dealing with the Ottoman Empire's reaction to Napoleon's aggression, the British and Russian response to it and the policy in the subsequent decades f.e. dealing with the Egyptian challenge is excellent. But what is lacking then is a description of the reasons and effects of Turkey's being the sick man of Europe. The entry of Turkey into the Great War is reduced to just a recount of the statements of its foolish imperialist leaders and their European vis-a-vis. The events and effects of the war remain background shadows at best. What becomes the main focus of the books second half is the Hashemite family's quest for an empire, any empire, and the English and French response to it that has shaped today's Middle East. The book is definitely well researched and challenges the established (T.E. Lawrence et. al.) history of the events in Arabia during and after the Great War, however that is also its weakness. It does not give a thorough overview of the Ottoman Empire's policy and decline - it is an argument of a new and particular of (parts of) the history of the region between 1789 and 1922. But it is not suitable as an introductory book into the history and policy of that time and area.
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