A History of Iraq

Rating:
Summary: Solid history
Review: A solid history of modern Iraq. Good background for specialists and non-specialists alike.

Rating:
Summary: Glosses over some of the more controversial parts...
Review: But this is still an excellent place to start if you'd like to know more about Iraq.

Tripp tells the story of Iraq through the many incarnations of the Iraqi state. This makes for a very organized, readable account. A bit more accessable than Phebe Marr's book.

Even though Tripp underplays the importance of the U.S. role during the past 25 years (for example...not informing the reader how the U.S. had placed spies in UNSCOM therefore undermining the inspections process), he is realistic in his assessment of Iraq's future. He notes that a system of corruption and patronism has been in place for as long as Iraq has been a state, and that any change in Iraq will have to take place over a long period of time.

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about Iraq, and also to those people so enthusiastic about the war, etc. who think that the U.S. can go in and wave some magic wand to fix everything. Either way...it's an interesting read.

Rating:
Summary: This book blew me away and made me smart
Review: I am a college student that knew nothing about Iraq before I read this. Soon after getting through Charles Tripp's text, Iraq immediatelly became clear and approachable and I now find it a much easier country to follow. Anyone who wants to obtain an immediate foundation on Iraq mustn't look any further than Charles Tripp's A History of Iraq. Take a week out of your life to read this thing and you will be much better for it. Also, Peter Sluglett's books are solid too.

Rating:
Summary: A sound work
Review: Not shallow, not too deep. A very good short history.
As the topic is vast, this is a excelent book for a person looking for a solid framework of facts. Almost every part of it could be written in length, but this is not the point of a concise one-volume history.

Rating:
Summary: Pity Bush didn't read this, instead of My Pet Goat
Review: Of course, that's asking a lot of our dyslexic President.

It is a pity because we learn in this well-written history that commencing in the 1970s, Saddam Husayn (to use the author's unexpected, perhaps more accurate, spelling) started creating offshore accounts to fund a return to power by means of a guerrilla war, yet intelligence reports dismissed the possibility of a guerrilla conflict.

The Bible tells us that wisdom cries out in the streets, and no man pays it any mind. It is consistently astonishing to me that in an era of Amazon and Borders, policy-makers should be so willfully informed...as if to crack a generalist book would put them out of the "loop" created by briefing papers, fantasies masqerading as inside information.

I am certain thoughtful and reflective troops serving in Iraq would appreciate a copy of this book to fill the spaces of boredom between the epochs of terror. They'd read accounts of the British essentially roaring about the shop in the 1920s in signal futility, "nation-building" a monarchy that shortly thereafter fell apart. The place names are all familiar.

In the author's interpretive framework, Iraq is a Thatcherite dream world for in Iraq, there is no such thing as society, instead clans and clan loyalty...Thatcher's vaunted "families" which the State can suborn to do its dirty business.

In fact, the author gives evidence of regression, for many Iraqis are reviving old and previously out of date mediaeval clan loyalties for self-protection.

Out of this, the Americans think to create some sort of capitalist and Christian dream-world and instead have created a nightmare.

Furthermore, the damage done by both the British and the Americans is irreversible, since "rational" borders tracking ethnic lines would involve mass transfers of population.

Rating:
Summary: Fundamental error
Review: On page 58, Keegan claims that the Shah of Iran forced Saddam in 1975 to accept a re-division of the Shatt el-Arab waterway (which divides Iran and Iraq) in a manner that gave Iran full control over the waterway. This is factually incorrect. In 1975 the two nations agreed to divide up the waterway along the Thalweg (the deepest part of the channel) with each nation controlling their own side of the waterway. Thus, Keegan's second point (on p. 60) that Saddam was 'driven' to invade Iran in 1980 when he concluded that he had 'no hope of settling the Shatt el-Arab dispute' with Khomeini in power in Iran, is double-incorrect: First, there was no dispute over the Shatt el-Arab (since the parties had already agreed to divide it along the Thalweg, contrary to Keegan's claim) and second, Saddam motives for attacking Iran extended well beyond the Shatt el-Arab & he made no secret of his desire to conquer and annex the entire oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan (he called it 'Arabistan') Also, while Keegan takes pains to explain (albeit inaccurately) the context of Saddam's attack on Iran, he does not do so with Saddam's attack on Kuwait (for example, no real discussion of the fact that Kuwait was historically part of Iraq.) The reader is left with the overall impression that Saddam's attack on Iran was somehow justified, but not attacking Kuwait. Such fundamental errors of fact and emphasis bring the accuracy of the rest of the book into question.

Rating:
Summary: ...
Review: Overall, I would characterize Charles Tripp's book as a chronological monologue that tells the story of what happened, starting from the beginning and going along in chronological order with meticulous attention paid to dates, and names of political figures. Reading this book often became a monotonous affair, as the author explained the names and dates of yet another coup d'état or of yet another rebellion in Kurdistan, each coup and ethnic rebellion not significantly different from the one before it. In terms of clarity of presentation that this book achieves, I would say that while it is very good at describing what happened, it is much less clear at explaining why things happened. It often presupposes that the reader possesses background knowledge of Middle Eastern politics or of other disciplines. For example, the book talks extensively about the war between Iraq and Iran, but fails to explain the nature of the Iranian revolution, and how such a revolution would affect the Shi`a in Iraq. The book talks about the Gulf War, but does not explain that the reason for US intervention was largely economic. Perhaps these questions do not pertain directly to Iraq, but I think that providing some background information about other countries' interests and situations (when these countries came in contact with Iraq) is necessary in order to understand what was going on. Another thing I found frustrating is that the book did not explain what the real difference between Sunnis and Shi'a is about, and why the Sunnis have always been in control of the Iraqi state, even during Ottoman times. Another issue that I found particularly bothersome is the lack of emphasis in the book on explaining why Great Britain chose to define the borders of Iraq to be the way they ended up being. Why was Kuwait separated from Basra? At no point does the author address this question. Overall, I would have appreciated this book more if the author spent less time talking about what, who, and when, and more time explaining why.

In terms of assessing the pedagogical value of the book, I would say that because this book doesn't make connections between histories of various developing nations, does not define general themes and trends, the book itself becomes much more meaningful when read in conjunction with another book on Third World Development, Howard Handelman's The Challenge of Third World Development, for example. When read in this way, Charles Tripp's "History of Iraq" becomes a colorful and clear illustration of the many issues that concern developing nations. From legacies of colonialism (national borders, rulers, elites, etc), to the use of patronage by third world countries' governments, to the impacts of agricultural reform, to ethnic and religious conflict, and the involvement of the military in the political affairs, this book serves as a real world illustration of the many themes that pertain to Third World development.

Rating:
Summary: No, no, no...
Review: The previous review is grossly unfair. The book is supposed to be a concise history, not an exhaustive analysis of every single issue and event in Iraq. There is an excellent list of suggested sources should the reader wish to engage in further research on any topic. The book is erudite and well-written. It does not assume that the reader has an extensive knowledge of the Middle East. Two friends borrowed this book for coursework and I had a hard time getting it back, actually.

Rating:
Summary: Charles Tripp is a true Genius
Review: This is the most important book one can read if interested in the fundamental state processes of Iraq. Reading its 300 pages is a far better alternative then laboring through Hanna Batatu's 1000+ page Iraqi Bible and is just as rich in content. His last chapter is near prophetic and its cautions were ignored and thus revealed after the invasion of `03. Had the War architects read this book before the invasion, Iraq would look much different today. Cheers to Charles Tripp and his unprecedented genius. Hopefully well versed regional experts like himself will one day have a greater impact on the formulation of foreign policy instead of being ignored by ignorant and reductionist politicians.