Diplomacy

Rating:
Summary: Very good
Review: I will assume if you are looking at this book and reading reviews about it, you are probably pretty smart. Good, you are going to need it. This is a heavy read and requires immense concentration to get a lot out of it - this isn't night table reading.

That said the book and the information it gives out is really fantastic. His cold war analysis is sensational, as well as his ability to dissect the motivations and histories of countries involved in different disputes. For instance, he is able to lay forth a compelling case for the conduct of Germany prior to WWI. He goes throught the history of the Balkans and the historical strategic aims of each primary world power. If you love history and geo politics, you definetly need to pick up this book. But, just don't read it lying down.

Rating:
Summary: Is Diplomacy usually confabulating euphemisms?
Review: I wouldn't want to be famous for criticizing people who keep attempting to describe reality, but who never get it right, if getting it right is still a concept that might have a particular meaning for a person who is fully aware of how often the view of Robert McNamara that "We were wrong," has been more true than anyone but a fool would admit. I'll be the fool in this, if I can do it in a way that exposes a vast exhibit of what is written in this book.

In an effort to construct a history of thinking as bombing, I looked for bombing in the index of this book, where it wasn't listed outright, and it wasn't listed as an entry under Cambodia, and there were no listings for Hanoi and Haiphong, but under Vietnam war, there were a few pages listed on "bombing halted in." Halting that bombing campaign was definitely one point where diplomacy was a major consideration, and most people will probably be glad that this book covers a few other topics, and leaves most of the history of bombing as thinking to those who are willing to be the disgruntled non-bombers of the world. Kissinger even seemed a bit surprised that such 20th century events could turn the U.S. Congress into a bunch of non-bombers as soon as a ceasefire had been proclaimed: "They treated the agreement as if it were the unilateral withdrawal they had always advocated. In June 1973, the Congress denied further funding `to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United States forces' after August 15, including aerial reconnaissance." (p. 696)

Checking the index for euphemisms, I found an entry for "Rolling Thunder" campaign, an attempt which was so early in the war that it was thought that some justification might be required. Page 658 tries to find something that might be a basis for that level of involvement without mentioning Pearl Harbor, but trying to get there anyway. For a true intellectual, the important thing is how much thinking went into the planning of the activity, and Kissinger tries to give the guys as much credit as they deserve:

NcNamara's Defense Department and Bundy's White House staffs were gluttons for analysis. Both were men of extraordinary intelligence. What they lacked was criteria to assess a challenge so at variance with the American experience and American ideology.
America's initial motivation in involving itself had been that the loss of Vietnam would lead to the collapse of noncommunist Asia and to Japan's accommodation to communism. In terms of that analysis, in defending South Vietnam, America was fighting for itself, regardless of whether South Vietnam was democratic or could ever be made so. Such an analysis, however, was too geopolitical and power-oriented for Americans, and was soon overtaken by Wilsonian idealism. One administration after another had attempted a dual task, each part of which alone would have been difficult to achieve by itself: the defeat of a guerrilla army with secure bases all around an extended periphery, and the democratization of a society with no tradition of pluralism.
In the cauldron of Vietnam, America was to learn that there are limits to even the most sacrosanct beliefs, and was forced to come to terms with the gap which can arise between power and principle. Precisely because America was reluctant to accept lessons so contrary to its historical experience, it also found cutting its losses extraordinarily difficult. Thus the pain associated with both these frustrations was the result of its best not its worst qualities. America's rejection of national interest as the basis of foreign policy had cast the country adrift on a sea of undifferentiated moralism.
In August 1964, a presumed North Vietnamese attack on the cruiser Maddox led to an American retaliatory strike against North Vietnam that was endorsed nearly unanimously by the Senate via the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This resolution was used in turn to justify retaliatory air raids a few months earlier. In February 1965, an attack on an American advisor's barracks in the Central Highland city of Pleiku triggered an American retaliatory raid on North Vietnam, which quickly turned into a systematic bombing campaign code-named "Rolling Thunder." By July 1965, American combat units were fully committed, and the American troop presence began to grow, reaching 543,000 by early 1969.
--p. 658.

McNamara's book IN RETROSPECT denied that this sequence was as intentional as the opponents of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and those who were later upset by the direct involvement of American troops in Vietnam's war claimed, and Kissinger's sequence seems a bit out of whack when he described the process as, "This resolution was used in turn to justify retaliatory air raids a few months earlier," but this might be a bad case of the truth trying to slip out (some kind of time-boggling confusion in the midst of so much confabulation). Trying, like the fool that I am and was, to reach some conclusion by combining the words at the end of each paragraph on page 658 brings about the following startling revelation: American experience and American ideology with no tradition of pluralism had cast the country adrift on a sea of undifferentiated moralism by early 1969. This might be even truer today than when Kissinger wrote Diplomacy, which is his fairly long way of saying the same thing, I think.

There is some real history in this book, for which I am thankful. I am quite fond of Kissinger's great praise of Bismarck's thinking, for having the kind of loyalty which "depended on flexibility and on the ability to exploit every available option without the constraint of ideology" (p. 125). Particularly interesting for those who are interested in a detailed history of the way that observing events might affect philosophers was the way that Bismarck's craftiness gave Nietzsche the opportunity to observe a war between the great powers before he wrote his first book. The realities of Nietzsche's times might have been very much as Kissinger put it in this book. "In one of his craftier moves, Bismarck used Napoleon's posturing to lure him into declaring war on Prussia in 1870" (p. 118). Prussia quickly won the war, "with the assistance of all the other German states" (p. 119) and used the occasion to unify the German states into a real Germany, "proclaimed rather tactlessly by the Prussian leadership on January 18, 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors of Versailles" (p. 119). The method used by Bismarck to bring this about (what anyone should expect to find in a book by Henry Kissinger), "he leaked the so-called Ems Dispatch to the press" (p. 118). Kissinger makes the French public, who were the ones who were the most outraged by what was revealed ("The edited version of the King's telegram looked like a royal snub of France" (p. 118)) appear to be the most upright and the biggest losers in that ordeal, if the damning of dignity might be considered an ordeal. Sometimes comedy works the same way, but on a deeper level, this account also helped me understand the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche, David Friedrich Strauss (who reacted with great pride in Germany), and public opinion in Germany during their lifetimes. If only Kissinger had been leading a nation of Germans or the great British empire, he wouldn't have to deal with so many moralisms or the U.S. Congress. He might have felt more at home if his main opponent had been Mahatma Gandhi.

Rating:
Summary: history of foreign policy
Review: Dr. Kissinger's "Diplomacy" is a history of the development of foreign policy from early 16 century to present time. He traces the advents of different ways of constructing the world order - from Machiavellian "Raison d'erte" policy of the First Minister of France Cardinal Richelieu, to the first concept of the "balance of power" advocated by Metternich at the Congress of Vienna, through breakup of that balance by Crimean War and Bismarck, from British policy of "Splendid Isolation" to British policy of limited alliances just before the WW1, from the mistakes of Treaty of Versailles, to the Marshall plan, from Kennedy policy of containment during the Berlin and Cuban crises, to Nixon's (and Kissinger) conduct of the Cold War.

This is a brilliant exposition of the academician and the practitioner of the art of diplomacy. Dr. Kissinger has the brilliance of style; and clarity of exposition which will put this book, not necessarily written for the general reader, at its reach.

Rating:
Summary: This standard work on 20th Century diplomacy is vital
Review: I use this book every year with my senior-level International Baccalaureate students. They find Dr. Kissinger's analysis sharp, incisive, and at times, very obvious once it is all laid out. At times, it can be a little long, but the coverage and intuitive handling of the chosen episodes for diplomatic action in the 1900s are without equal. I have yet to find anyone else discuss how important Gustav Stresemann was to restoring Germany's pride prior to the reign of Adolf Hitler. The background on the maneuvers prior to World Wars I and II are also very well researched, and his background as a professor and diplomat is clearly obvious. If my students' experiences count for anything, note these items: 1. My students pass their exams, the toughest in the world for high schoolers in history, at nearly a 90% rate every year. 2. When several arrived at their Ivy League schools, this book was required reading (which they still had materials from reading). 3. Of all the people my students discuss, they wish they could meet Henry Kissinger the most to be able to ask him questions. If you want to know why world history developed as it did in the 20th century, this book will show you why.

Rating:
Summary: I'll be Missing Ya, Henry Kissing-ga
Review: This is Kissinger's magisterial account of diplomacy, beginning with everyone's favorite puppet-master, Cardinal Richelieu (inventor of "raison d'etat," that decidedly Machiavellian view of diplomacy which permitted a Catholic cardinal to bankroll the Protestant Union throughout the Thirty Years' War). We then meet other great diplomatists such as that late seventeenth century cold warrior William of Orange, eighteenth century British mastermind Lord Castlereagh, mid-nineteenth century consensus man Metternich and late-nineteenth century expansionist, Bismarck. Throughout the account, Henry seems most enamomored with hard-men like Bismarck, and when we get to his phase of history, we soon deduce why: only by ruthless application of Realpolitik can we account for some of Henry's own excesses. Still, if you read this knowing the author has an agenda, it's great history.

Rating:
Summary: Wow
Review: Anyone reading a book by or about Kissinger comes to it with biases for or against the author. But no reasonable student of history or statecraft can dispute that this is a master work by a man of great genius. The scope of his knowledge of history is rivaled only by his keen analysis and insightful opinions about foreign policy. This book is a must read, not only for students of diplomacy, but for anyone interested in the last 400 years of Western history. Do not be put off by the scope of this volume. The book is clearly and engagingly written. Five stars are not enough.

Rating:
Summary: A sweeping history from Kissinger's view
Review: Kissinger's Diplomacy is a sweeping history of foreign relations from Cardinal Richelieu to George H. W. Bush's New World Order. Mainly, however, it is a view of world history through the approach of Realpolitik, and an argument that the US needs to move away from messianic, idealistic, Wilsonian rhetoric to an interest based foreign policy.

As a history, the book works well in explaining the causes of various geopolitical events. The impact of a united Germany on the world balance of power is particulalry well told.

As Kissinger moves forward in history, however, toward his own tenure as Secretary of State, the history becomes a little cloudier, as the reader is neot quite sure how much is apologetic and how much is objective historical analysis.

Still, Kissinger's voice is an important one and he has some very interesting things to say. I recommend the book.

Rating:
Summary: Likely the Best Foreign Policy Primer currently available!
Review: Although one of the most consistently prominent features in Henry Kissenger's books is Henry Kissenger, DIPLOMACY is strengthened by his approach and as a result covers these sweeping events without ever failing to allow us the understanding that each of these events and personalities helped to shape the geo-political world in which we are all living today.

This is a MUST READ for anyone interested in having a solid (though still hugley general - but a mouthful) understanding of the history and, more importantly, the rationale that crafted world political events and what the future may/can hold.

(Thank you Cassandra!)

Rating:
Summary: Do I have to say something?
Review: A book written by this gentleman is a masterpiece, the opportunity of knowing him really enlightens your mind and wisdom. It's a big book though, but a big amount of knowledge. 2 thumbs up!...END

Rating:
Summary: A self-directed survey course in Foreign Relations
Review: No living human being has more experience, knowledge and perspective on the interactions between modern nations than Henry Kissinger. Mr. Kissinger commits all of his resources to the telling of this fascinating and vital story.

I fully expected much of what this book offered: First-hand accounts of major events in foreign affairs, adept and shrewd analysis of developments, a straddling of the American vs. European views of relations between nations. All of these were on display in this tour de force. What surprised me was the quality and beauty of Mr. Kissinger's prose. This book is heavy on content, but not to the exclusion of the finer points of literature. Mr. Kissinger leavens his cavalcade of history with philosophical musings, personal observations and stories. He does this in a way that makes reading more pleasurable and memorable.

This is THE book to read to learn about foreign policy.