Diplomacy

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Summary: Maybe it's because I was forced to read it for a class.....
Review: Kissinger almost tries to be poetic in the way that her writes, but as I read it, it became painfully clear that English is not his first language. While it provides a good political analysis, I feel as though Kissinger over complicates his statements. He rambles on for pages on an analysis that could be summed up in a paragraph. Kissinger is a very intelligent man, that much is obvious, but "Diplomacy" simply runs on and on and is overly redundant.

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Summary: The Origins of American Diplomacy
Review: Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger
Simon and Schuster, 1994
912 pages.

In his capacity as both the National Security Advisor and as the Secretary of State for two different presidents Henry Kissinger redefined the nature and scope of American diplomacy. He served in the most tumultuous administration of the twentieth century yet managed to invigorate foreign policy in what was also the nadir of executive prestige. With Richard Nixon he formulated a grand strategy based on the twin principles of Wilsonian idealism and European realpolitik that led to a period of geopolitical stability in the midst of America's extrication from the Vietnam quagmire. The Nixon-Kissinger team reshaped the nature of Soviet-American relations and introduced a period of détente using triangular diplomacy and the concept of linkage. As both an academic and as a practitioner of the art, Kissinger describes in his book the evolution and philosophical heritage of American diplomacy and its impact on global and regional stability during its rapid ascendancy as a superpower in the twentieth century. Kissinger provides both the casual reader and the foreign policy maven a refreshing history of American foreign policy as a reflection of its uniquely benign belief in its own exceptionalism.
In Diplomacy Kissinger lists two primary schools of thought that govern the conduct and define the characteristics of foreign policy. European diplomacy in its current form traces its roots to Cardinal Richelieu and the primacy of the state. Raison d'etat radically altered international relations because it provided the philosophical justification towards the secularization of national interest. No longer under the suffocating aegis of the church, nations shrugged off idealistic endeavors in favor of policies that provided tangible benefits. The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the modern state system and ushered in a tumultuous period due to the lack of a confluence of common interests and a shared system of values in the concert of nations. Following the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars Metternich presided over a period of relative stability in Europe by positioning the decaying Austrian Empire as the fulcrum of the European balance of power. In his relentless pursuit towards the creation of a unified Germany, Bismarck dispensed with incremental gains and boldly asserted Prussian hegemony with a series of wars buttressed by peace settlements that consolidated his gains. Bismarck unhinged the Vienna settlement and dealt the existing balance a mortal blow. The cold calculus of raw power supplanted the Metternich consensus of legitimacy and in the wake of the entangling system of alliances that ensued, a European conflagration became almost inevitable. Indeed the singular practice of realpolitik, Kissinger asserts, "turned on itself" .
Whereas realpolitik was distilled from the crucible of armed conflict, Wilsonian idealism reflected the triumphs of democracy and manifest destiny, together with the unshakeable belief in the exportability of the uniquely American system of values. While Kissinger lauds the style and substance of American diplomacy he nonetheless insists on the exercise of restraint governed by the realization of American national interest. According to Kissinger the most successful American statesmen were those capable of blending Wilsonian idealism with realpolitik. While Wilson provided the conceptual basis for American foreign policy in its ascendancy as a great power, he was unable to realize his objectives. A generation later, Roosevelt, borrowing heavily from Wilson's Fourteen Points, co-authored the Atlantic Charter and provided the framework for the United Nations. Roosevelt was successful because he possessed a surer grasp of the tenor of national consensus. He advanced Wilson's idealism and accepted the responsibilities of great power status yet accepted the territorial aggrandizement of the Soviet Union. The nation that implemented the Marshall Plan and sponsored the economic recovery of its former enemies was the same nation that unleashed weapons of unprecedented destructiveness on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
Kissinger's analysis of American diplomacy during the Cold War is particularly noteworthy. From the prescient George Kennan to the equally remarkable Ronald Reagan, Kissinger chronicles the evolution of American strategies of containment. As a statesman he refrains from the insensitive criticism of an academic, and as an academic he bases his analysis on research rather than a political or personal agenda. Kissinger traces the theoretical origins of Cold War diplomacy in the Truman administration through its first tests in Greece and Turkey and armed intervention in Korea. He clarifies the persisting debate on Vietnam and rather than vilifying a single administration as is the popular pastime of many historians, he traces the efforts of four separate presidents and nearly twenty years of American involvement. It is remarkable, however, that Kissinger merely brushes over an event as significant as the Cuban missile crisis.
Although Kissinger devotes the majority of his book to American diplomacy, he evaluates the actions of both allies and adversaries and their respective impact on the geopolitical environment. He supports Kennan's thesis that the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable but credits American diplomacy with limiting Soviet aggression and containing communist infiltration in regions vital to American interests.
American diplomacy, Kissinger asserts, is the product of American exceptionalism and democratic necessity. Lacking the unifying force of an opposing superpower, the United States may again fall victim to the siren song of isolationism. Kissinger devotes the final pages of his book to a call for the development of a national interest. National interest will undoubtedly combine elements of realpolitik and Wilsonian idealism and define limits in order to prevent the exhaustion of American will and an overextension of American capabilities. National interest will also provide the requisites for unilateral action in a world increasingly suspicious of the military, economic, and cultural domination of the sole superpower. The current outlook is not auspicious. Western Europe, for the most part a steadfast ally during the Cold War, is breaking ranks and currently one of the most vociferous critics of American foreign policy. Future administrations face new challenges in an increasingly complicated new world order where simple geopolitical calculations are rendered useless and threats to American security span continents in the form of decentralized terrorist cells. However, America has answered challenges to the Wilsonian goals of peace, stability, progress, and freedom for mankind with resolve and moral conviction in the twentieth century. And though it may be a "journey that has no end," Kissinger's faith in the purpose and goals of American diplomacy remains unshakable.

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Summary: Speaking as someone who loathes Kissinger...
Review: As much as I despise the policies and actions of Henry Kissinger, I must confess that I found this book to be a very well thought out look at the major historical events of the past century. Kissinger's central premise seems to be that the United States has swung back and forth between Wilsonian Idealism and a more pragmatic/Realpolitik perspective in which a nation is primarily responsible for looking out for its own best interests. While I deplore the lack of conscience or justice that Kissinger stands for, I found the book very helpful in understanding his position and in looking at world events through that particular lense. Certainly, he makes many valid and interesting points in addressing the relative pro's and con's of each approach. Also, the book is very readable - ideas are expressed clearly and it kept my interest throughout.

If you're interested in understanding the Realpolitik logic that has led to so many atrocities around the world, and how one might intellectually justify these actions, this book is an invaluable resource. Ultimately, whether you agree with Kissinger or not, I think it's important to understand him. The man is not simply "evil" or "insane" and the ideas that he represents are central to current U.S. policies around the world.

Important stuff, well articulated.

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Summary: The Diplomacy behind the History
Review: Dr. Kissinger takes us on a wonderful ride through modern (last 300 years) history and tells of the workings of diplomats and heads of states behind the scenes. Yes, we know that a war happened, but what were the diplomats saying to each other before the first shots were fired? Why did this country form an alliance with that country? Did they agree with each other (United States and England) or did they need each other to put down an enemy that was worse (England and Russia vs. Germany in WWII)?

This book goes beyond the typical history book and explains the strategy of diplomats when confronted with another power. It also explores the differences between a collective security (United Nations) and Balance of Power arrangements.

I have thoroughly enjoyed this book. Thought provoking and insightful. I highly recommend it.

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Summary: The History of Western Diplomacy in all its Gory Glory!
Review: Henry Kissinger is many things, that is for sure. But one thing he definitely is, is a brilliant elucidator of history. In this book, published in 1994, Kissinger sets before himself nothing less than the task of reviewing the entire history of western diplomacy from the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the bloody Thirty Years War and essentially established the idea of the modern nation state to the Post Cold War order, just emerging as this book went to press.

One can disagree with Kissinger over some of the conclusions he reaches yet fully appreciate his grasp of the complexity of the relationship between states. Kissinger describes, in considerable detail, the changing and evolving relationship between the states of Europe and the changing and evolving American role. The book begins with a chapter describing the competing approaches of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to American foreign policy. Roosevelt was a classic believer in "Raison Detate" a French term meaning pursuit of state interest. Wilson promoted a universal policy based on morality. As Kissinger demonstrates, every American administration since Wilson has pursued some form of Wilsonian diplomacy based on American exceptionalism. Prior to Roosevelt, the United States stood almost completely aloof from the diplomacy of the Old World, confining itself to pursuing a Europe free Western Hemisphere and trade relations.

Kissinger demonstrates how the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars led to a new international order in Europe based on the balance of power. The whole purpose behind the "concert of Europe" system was to ensure that no state became too powerful. Kissinger looks at the differences of each of the European powers and how they pursued their interests and how this pursuit ultimately led to disaster in the twentieth century. Britain tried to stand apart from European alliances, seeing its interests in having the world's most powerful navy and ensuring that no European land power became too dominant. As Kissinger shows, morality never entered into the equation. Britain went to war with France when Napoleon became too powerful and later clashed with the other powers for the same reason. France, stunted after the defeat of Napoleon engaged in a policy designed to regain its influence as the dominant land power of Europe, a policy it pursues to this day according to Kissinger. Russia is shown to be expansionist to its core and Kissinger argues convincingly that Soviet designs on Eastern Europe were simply an extension of Tsarist policy. Germany, once unified in 1870 by the machinations of Bismarck was ultimately bound to run afoul of both Britain and France due to its potential strength and size. Indeed, it was Germany's emergence as a unified and powerful nationalist force that made the tragedies of the 20th century inevitable. Skillful and complex diplomacy by Bismarck staved off the coming catastrophe, his unwise successors and the myopic Kaiser who fired him were unable to pursue, or even understand, Bismarck's dual strategy of increasing German influence while maintaining the balance of power.

Kissinger is clearly at his best when describing the breakdown of the complicated alliance system that led to the catastrophe of the First World War. He also is adept at explaining the flaws inherent in the treaty of Versailles that made World War II inevitable. Finally, the book arrives at the aftermath of the War, when the United States, with its disdain for balance of power diplomacy and its determination to halt Soviet/communist aggression, became the major player on the world scene. Whichever the administration, all viewed the Cold War, not as an assertion of American national interest but as the promotion of international morality. As Kissinger shows, this is the hallmark of American diplomacy.

Since Kissinger himself was a major player on the world scene during the years from 1969 through 1976 and so his discussion of this era requires a delicate balancing act and may engender controversy. I feel that, on the whole, Kissinger avoids being overly defensive as he describes and defends the policy of the Nixon administration. Others may feel his views as stated in this book might not fully coincide with his actions as the chief foreign policy architect of the Nixon and Ford administrations. When it comes to Vietnam, Kissinger makes a strong case that Nixon was a victim of a national situation that was beyond his control. He argues convincingly that Hanoi itself is responsible for extending the war to Cambodia. He ignores, however, the illegal action the Nixon administration took by lying to Congress. Nevertheless, this is a book on statecraft not a memoir of Nixon's Vietnam policy so these lapses are forgivable. Kissinger shows quite convincingly, the many obstacles laid by Hanoi and the American Left to reaching a settlement in Vietnam. In the end, of course, the settlement reached broke down after a mere two years and so the United States was utterly defeated. This demands an answer to the question of whether the United States gained anything by refusing to abandon the effort in 1968 when Kissinger claims the administration knew South Vietnam's survival was virtually impossible. Kissinger also defends the Nixon's administration's policy of detente while giving fair time to detente's detractors. He winds up the book with a look at the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new world order. He presciently closes the book by stating that it is not yet clear whether the next international challenge will come from a strengthening China or militant Islam.

Henry Kissinger is a polarizing figure disdained by many. The hard left views him as a war criminal. The right views him as alternatively a defeatist or an international chess player, lacking the morality they demand in American foreign policy. One thing that is beyond denial, however, is that he is a brilliant historian and teacher of the nuances of international diplomacy. Any fair minded person will relish his book.

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Summary: Too Detailed for Newbie
Review: I have always been impressed with Kissinger's lucid discussions of world events, but "Diplomacy" succeeded in making me feel a bit like a mental pygmy. I do not refer to Mr. Kissinger's ability to convey his ideas or even their supporting facts. I actually learned a great deal from this book. However, Mr. Kissinger's style is one of great familiarity with the subject matter (which he obviously is). However, as I read the book I felt as if I were listening to a lecture about people whom I hadn't met yet, but were just waiting down the hall. In other words, "Diplomacy" presumes that the reader knows a lot about the major players, including their personalities and histories. I must confess that I do not, and the book's tone affected my enjoyment of the book.

Would I recommend this to a student of 18th-20th century western diplomacy? Of course -- this book gets 5 stars for information. However, before I would recommend this book as an enjoyable read, I'd ask the reader several questions first.

Perhaps I'm spoiled -- I just read "Miracle at Philadelphia" and "The First Salute." Bowen and Barbara are masters at informing and entertaining -- I may have set the bar too high for Mr. Kissinger and other mere mortals.

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Summary: Very helpful for future diplomatics
Review: I was looking for a interesting book about america and its history, but i ran into this jewel of the diplomacy, i'm an international studies's student in caracas, venezuela, and i'd recomend this book for every single student who in its future plans it has being a diplomatic. 5 Stars. Buy it. you won't regret. Every chapter is more interesting that the other.

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Summary: Must read
Review: Kissinger's work is not novel, but his analysis is. This book is a must read for anyone interested in understanding foreign policy in the Western world. Kissinger shows a remarkable lack of bias, which makes the book truly useful.

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Summary: Brilliant exposition on realpolitik
Review: Kissinger is a known proponent on the art of realpolitik. In this book, he makes a brilliant case on how such a policy can be made to work and in fact achieve peace. His narrative begins with the congress of Vienna (he does refer back to older concepts like raison 'd etat though) and ends in the present day. To me, the brilliance of this book lies in making history appear not as a dead collection of facts, but as a living process. In this process, the options available to each country and leader are listed, analyzed and evaluated. The actual choices made are then evaluted in the context of these. For example his commentary on how the impulsive personality of Napolean III led him to make inconsitent foreign policy choices leading to demise of French dominance of Europe, was quite brilliant.

Where I did find the book lacking was in Kissinger's lack of appreciation for third world aspirations. He blames US foreign policy makers for not supporting their European allies in propping colonialism. Anybody from the third world will tell you, that colonialism always considered exploitative in the third world, had lost all credibility by the 1950s. Not being seen to oppose this decaying and decrepit structure, the US would have lost all claims to world leadership.

By virtue of cultural and ethnic affinity, all Western countries including the US were already seen as proponents of colonialism. Even a neutral proposition would discredited the US completely in the third world. When the US supported Egypt against Israel, France and Britain in the war of 1956, that allowed it to retain enough equity in the region that allowed it to retain key allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and in the future Egypt. And at the same time emerge as the leader of the democratic world by ensuring that France and Britain became second rate powers. A pure policy of realpolitik would see that this would be in US interest. Mr.Kissinger however laments their demise displaying a weakness - an emotional feeling for shared culural affinity with Europe. In this he is in contradiction with his own framework propounded elsewhere in the book. Given the overall intelligence of this book, I think this is a minor pecaddilo however

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Summary: This Book Should be a Textbook all All Major Universities
Review: At the present time I am attending University to get my Master's degree in International Relations. I bought this book so that I could use it for a paper I was writing, but it turned out to be much more than just a source, it became an indispensable part of my educational process. Diplomacy is more detailed and filled with such insight that leaves every one of my textbooks or required readings in the dust. The first half of this book talks about European politics and the evolution though World War II. It is so richly detailed that I know every time I read it after this I will glean more useful information and facts.
the second half discusses the United States and it's emergence as a superpower until the end of the cold war and the first Bush administration.
Even if you disagree with his conclusions and ideas it is a fascinating read and great insight to American diplomats. Kissinger does not pull many punches in this book. The fault of the French in the 1800's, the fault of the Germans in the first half of the 1900's, the fault of the British and their detachment from Europe, the missteps of American foreign policy and it's times of isolation. It is all in there. I cannot recommend this book high enough. It is truly exceptional.