Rating: 
Summary: Essential Reading
Review: Hanson's thesis and the battle histories with which he supports his thesis make "Carnage and Culture" essential reading, especially today with West and East facing off against each other once again. What it is in Western culture that makes its armies so lethal on the battlefield, is worth serious study by both East and West. Once again we have a numerically superior people who believe in the glory of individual acts of suicidal bravery confronting a West that believes in massive retaliation by disciplined, well-equipped, close-order ranks of defenders fighting a coordinated and relentless mission of anhiliation. It's a story that, according to Hanson, has been told over and over again. And it's a story that certainly suggests what the tactics and the outcome are probably going to look like as the US and a few real allies prepare to do battle with a badly mobilized fifth-column of terrorist paladins. Very timely book.
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Summary: The Western World's Unrivaled Ability to Kill its Enemies
Review: Victor David Hanson superbly argues that "Western civilization has given mankind the only economic system that works, a rationalist
tradition that alone allows us material and technological progress, the sole political structure that ensures the freedom of the individual, a system of ethics and a religion that brings out the best in humankind---and the most lethal practice of arms conceivable." The author offers abundant evidence found in the historical documents of battles fought in ancient times until the present. Soldiers of Athens, Rome, and the United States, unlike their foes, enjoyed a great degree of freedom and true citizenship. Warriors were not always soldiers, but civilians called upon temporally to fight for their nation. "To live as you please" is a value taken very seriously. A sense of fairness and justice pervades the ranks of the Western soldier. Virginia Military Institute officer candidates, for instance, "are largely protected through a system of military justice from capricious punishment--and (also) accept that gratuitous violence on their part will be severely punished."Embracing traditional methods solely to honor the ancients is alien to the Western mindset. Killing the messenger who brings forth bad news is the normal practice of the less free non-Western powers. Not so for those in authority within Western regimes. Individualism is highly cherished. Dissent and the questioning of past practices underpin the western military model. "A military command may steal secrets daily over the Internet, but if it cannot discuss those ideas openly with its civilian and military leadership, then there is no guarantee that such information will find its optimum application to ensure parity with the West," warns Hanson. This military historian's insights on how America defeated Japan during World War II is reason enough to justify the price of this magnificent volume. Trained to remain in formation during battle, the Western soldier often defeated enemies physically and numerically stronger. Hanson points out that courage alone isn't sufficient. The ability and willingness to fight in an unrelenting disciplined and intelligent manner turned ordinary men into ferocious killing machines. The
barbarism and fearlessness of the Aztec warriors, American Indians, and the Zulus were ultimately no match for their Western opponents. "Carnage and Culture" is an indispensable book to read during our country's current trials and tribulations. It demands a prominent place on your personal bookshelf.
Rating:
Summary: Good
Review: I don't know military history very well, so I'm like the color blind man who is told "that's red," and since I don't know what red looks like, I have take it on faith that that brown color I see is red, when in fact it's brown. So, from my admittedly naive perspective (knowing little military history), Hanson makes a convincing argument that Western cultural values are at the foundation of Western military victories over the millenia. I, personally, am fascinated by how seemingly incidental cultural values can have huge impacts on entire eras, countries, economies. So this book was of particular interest. I DO know a bit about business and management, and the same examples that almost invariably result in big BUSINESS successes, are the same ones Hanson claims lead to military victories, (individuality, relatively boudaryless hierarchies, freedom), so from that perspective, his claims make a LOT of sense. And I found of PARTICULAR interest, the chapter on Vietnam, where he claims the war was easily winnable. He takes a VERY politically incorrect view of the Vietnam war, for which I'm sure he'll get MAJOR flak. I, personally, found his take on the war refreshing, and even daring. Again, I don't know enough about Vietnam to judge whether his arguments are wrong or right. But he DOES back up his conclusions with statistics, facts, and quotes from those directly involved. A worthwhile read.
Rating: 
Summary: Mediocre
Review: Victor Davis Hanson has written one of those books, which gives military history a bad name among historians. While serious, thoughtful, intelligent, provocative, even tragic monographs are ignored among the public, it appears that any mediocrity can slap a few ruminations about Gettysburg or D-Day and make a bestseller. To be fair Mr. Hanson is a well reputed professor of Classics and he has written extensively on military affairs. But this popular book shows many of the weaknesses of military history. It suffers, for a start, from a monomaniacal thesis, what Matt Groening once called "The Nation that Controls Magnesium controls the Universe" syndrome. Looking at eight battles from the Greek victory over the Persians at Salamis, to the defeat of Tet Offensive, Hanson announces a bold reason for the supremacy of the Western world. The West, and only the West, has developed a uniquely powerful military combination that has triumphed over all others. Whereas others suggest the West's supremacy over the rest of the planet rose in the last two or three centuries, Hanson looks back to the fifth century BC. Although it is not entirely clear in Hanson's account whether this supremacy is the cause or effect of western triumph, there is clearly some articulation between its essentially liberal and capitalist values and its triumphant militarism. In the west, the combination of "Civic Militarism" with a uniquely thorough, ruthless and vicious style of warfare has led to victory after victory. Well, while obviously the West would not have triumphed if it did not have military superiority, Hanson's superficiality soon becomes clear. "Civic militarism" has some kind of strange continuity that moves from Athenian municipal democracy to Roman oligarchy to Dark Ages Chaos to Feudal Europe down to the present day. If "civic militarism" is so powerful, why was Machiavelli so unsuccessful in promoting it in Florence (and why was Florence so unsuccessful in promoting it in Italy, or Italy in 16th century Europe)? Capitalism is dated back anachronistically to the early Greeks. Dealing with the great Muslim conquests that would seem to have deprived Europe of clear military superiority for about a millennium, Hanson comments that the Arabs were most successful in those parts of the Roman empire that weren't "really" western. This would apparently include Greece, under Ottoman rule for about half of the last millennium. The comparison with China, the key area of discussion in Why Did the West Triumph? debate, is brief and superficial, and the fact that much of the West's military technology, from stirrup to gunpowder, came form China is continually elided. (No mention of Kenneth Pomeranz or Joseph Needham here) When the non-West triumphs over the West it is simply because they copied Western technology and practice. From this book you'd think Europe invented base ten arithmetic and algebra. And it is hard to see "Civic militarism" playing much of a role in the single most important battle of this century, Kursk. There is also a tendency for Hanson to vigorously denounce alternative arguments, only to incorporate them later in his account (particularly in discussing the Spanish conquest of the Aztecs, and the role of native help and disease). So Hanson's account comes down to the argument that civic militarism always won, except when it didn't. I can't say I particularly care for the sneering reference to Jared Diamond. But the most irritating chapter is the final one on Tet. Basically, Hanson's view is that of the Republican Right, the defeated generals and the 'revisionists' that the United States won the military battle on Tet, but lost the war thanks to a deceitful media, whining and traitorous intellectuals, and a muddled political and military strategy that failed to smash the North Vietnamese. That this view is widely popular does not alter the fact that it is wrong. First, off the battle of Tet did not take a few weeks, it took a year and a half before the NLF was decisively defeated. And a couple of years later they were on the road to revival. Second, the American problem in the Vietnam war was not so much an inability to defeat the NLF or the North whenever they met in open combat; it was the political failure of the Southern government that required consistent American aid all the time, and the consequent inability of the South to defend itself despite having large military superiority until the very final weeks. Hanson adds nothing new to this and his own comments are glib and shallow. He suggests the United States should have invaded the North in 1965 and glibly dismisses the prospect of Chinese intervention. Yet as Edwin Moise and other scholars have pointed out, Chinese intervention was a real possibility, not an idle threat. And one does not find in National Review in 1965 consistent support for massive escalation. Hanson rather airily suggests that perhaps the United States should not have been involved at all, though he spends much of the chapter denouncing those who pointed that out. He sneers at those who complain about the hundred or so who were murdered at My Lai, when in fact close to 500 were murdered there (and the perpetrators got off almost scot free). He all but calls Peter Arnett a liar on little more than the word of the fearlessly dishonest American military public relations regime. He conscripts 'Fortunate Son' and 'Born in the USA' as pro-war songs, and in his scapegoating of the media he ignores William Hammond's and Daniel Hallin's books which shows how long the media gave the government the benefit of the doubt. I think this chapter is crucial. It shows that even Hanson's hindsight isn't 20
Rating:
Summary: An Important Book to Read
Review: Seldom does a book appear by accident at a time when it is most needed. Victor Hanson's Carnage and Culture systematically explains why it is that Western armies, from their humble beginnings with the Greeks, have proven superior to opposing military systems with astonishing consistency. As a classically trained military historian he brings a scrupulous attention to detail to bear on the nine battles he examines. His thesis? When a democracy arms itself for war, there is no, nor has there ever been, a more effective killing machine. The Greek victory at Salamis was as much the product of open debate and consensual government as it was the Greek's ability to lure the capricious and hubristic autocrat, Xerxes, into the narrows. Few exceptions throughout history obstruct Hanson's thesis that when real Western armies, predicated upon popular sovereignty, are confronted with comparatively primitive, or militaristic, autocratic, theocratic, or otherwise centralized authoritarian systems, or even suicidal fanaticism, they somehow manage invariably to trump extraneous factors like bad weather, bad luck or even more obvious disadvantages in numbers or generalship. Any such exception (as the author shows with Rome's loss to Hannibal at Cannae) often turns out to be the exception that, in the end, proves the rule. Parallels abound in the history of warfare and Hanson has spanned the scope of history to draw a picture of consistency--a continuity that a careful reader will see corresponds with the rise of consensual government, free expression of ideas, and the destructive capacity that only a society such as that can make manifest. Civic militarism is at the heart of Western military success. The notion that a free society will forgo egalitarian luxuries when it becomes necessary to defend liberty is attested in the instantaneous buildup of the Greek fleet just before the second Persian invasion in 480 BC. As at Salamis, America's ability to harness industrial might, popular moral, and élan among average-folks-turned-soldiers some twenty-five-centuries later bears out the commonalities we share with our intellectual forefathers, the Greeks--a truth that Admiral Yamamoto recognized immediately when he bemoaned in his trepidation that a sleeping giant had been stirred from its slumber, and that the Imperial navy could run wild for six to twelve months, but then.... His warning fell on the deaf ears of the militaristic leaders in Tokyo, who concerned themselves more with adhering to the bushido code and submission to the Emperor than critical analysis of the situation. Likewise the reified plans of authoritarian inflexibility at Salamis, Lepanto, and Midway all share similar flaws--to say nothing of a lack of ingenuity, both materially and intellectually. The ability of the Roman army to rebound after the disaster at Cannae (50,000-70,000 Romans plus their generals butchered in a few short hours) reflected the notion that Rome, like America, was not so much a place as an idea. Hanson forces us to confront the question all too easily missed: could Carthage or any other power have survived such a crippling blow? Could it be that America's political debacle in Vietnam had far less to do with our Western military efficacy than our lack of political will to fight a Western style war--one where the primary objective is always to take and control land until the enemy is conquered? Hanson points out that when American soldiers, despite politics at home, were allowed to fight on their terms, they won without exception: a fact seldom acknowledged. The Author argues in his diachronic march through Western v. non-Western conflicts (one that by no stretch exhausts the models that substantiate his thesis) that there is a common thread of continuity throughout the ages, from Salamis, Gaugamela, and Cannae to Rork's Drift, Midway, and even Tet that demonstrates an unmistakable superiority any non-Western army readily acknowledges--even if we ourselves are too often too critical to accept it. But, now as we stand on the brink of a new conflagration, and while many are clamoring that a "new way of war" is necessary, we will do well to remember (as Hanson tells us), our way of war is already lethal beyond the wildest imagination of any guerilla or terrorist thugs presently skulking about in our modern era. All we have to fear is not so much fear itself but rather another Western army. And therein lies the immediate and long-term value in this (though, perhaps unfashionable) most informative book. It is one that every free-voting citizen should read.
Rating: 
Summary: Original thesis that needs more work.
Review: As a teacher told my class last quarter at UCI, a thesis must be a statement that a reader can disagree with. Hanson's thesis is that the Western way of war is more effective, and has been so for a long time, because the Western nations are simply better at killing their enemies. Now, this is a charged statement, but as a thesis, although wanting, I find it fascinating. I tend to react with healthy skepticism to claims that the root cause of this or that extremely complex situation is just one simple thing out of which everything else flows. So, at first, I doubted that Hanson's book was going to offer anything refreshing, but since it included the Battle of Lepanto, I picked it up and read it. To my surprise, his work is original and controversial, and even though I disagree with some of the evidence he presents to support his thesis, I recommend it. Hanson's point is that the West, with its democracy and its commitment to basic liberties and rights, appears weaker than other types of governments, with absolute dictators and despots at the helm, but is actualy stronger. This is shown is the Western way of war, which goes for the absolute destruction of the enemy rather than compromise. That is Hanson's thesis. The problem with that thesis is that it relies far too heavily on our modern concept of the West and democracy. It is true that at Lepanto the Christian League defeated the Ottoman Turks thanks to a combination of naval know-how, technical innovation, and military prowess (the galeasses that smashed the Turks' galleys), but it is also true that the Christians were about to be defeated because Doria hesitated. At Salamis --another example offered by Hanson--, the Greeks defeated the Persians because they bottled them up against the coast, but the main reason the Greeks could even confront the Persians was that Themistocles had tricked the Athenians into believing that they needed a strong navy to protect them against other Greeks. The trickery worked and the Greeks had the ships to confront the invaders, but a well-intentioned deception saved their lives, not democracy. As it happens, the Athenians thanked Themistocles by voting to ostracize him, and he was banished from the city for ever: not exactly democracy's best moment. I understand Hanson's point and his thesis is fascinating, but much of the development of the Western world --social, military, scientific-- is not linked to an idealized democracy, but to the urgent necessities of the times. Democracy is a work in progress, and the West is the best example of such work. Neither the West, nor democracy, have a perfect working relationship when it comes to war. Just the example of Japan during WWII is clear: it defeated both the British and the Dutch, and it was not squeamish at all in waging total war. Overextended and biting more than it could chew, it took on the US and lost. Hanson argues that Japan lost because it confronted a democracy. The truth is that Japan lost because the US, which happened to be a democracy, was big, rich, industrialized, and modern, and shielded enough by distance to be relatively well protected. Australia, on the other hand, also a democracy and a big country, had few people, not much industry, and was too close for comfort. If the US had not protected Australia, the Japanese would have walked all over the Aussies as they did against the British in Singapore, the Dutch in Java, and the isolated American troops in the Philippines. The matter was not democracy, but sheer size and distance. Still, there is something to the idea that democracies, particularly the modern versions, produce more effective soldiers and more effective means of killing the enemy. And since democracies are overwhelmingly located in the "West," it is tempting to equate efficiency at war with the political system that helps them be so efficient. Key word here is "help." The West is better at war, and has extended its military as well as its peaceful influence accross the globe, because of a confluence of reasons, some more important than others, but none insignificant. There is more than one root cause for western military prowess and competence, and democracy is clearly included, perhaps even dominant. But it is not the only cause.
Rating:
Summary: Maggie's Drawers
Review: Hanson's ambition: Use selected "landmark" battles to demonstrate that Western power uniquely contributed to victory, then identify the secrets of "Western power." He misses. Older histories dealing with decisive battles come much closer to what made for victory, and what for defeat. Greater numbers, better weapons, better tactics and training, greater spirit, and disease have all played their role, but the author's attempt to trace this to what he calls "Western" social and political virtues seems far-fetched and dragged in by the hairs at the end of each chapter. The crucial Battle of Midway was decided by U.S.Navy code breakers and three USN squadrons of dive bombers. All the other American combatants served only to distract the Japanese by immolating themselves. It was a damn close-run thing; the only triumph of the American way of life was the rapid repair of the carrier USS Yorktown. Again, Hanson counts the Tet Offensive as an American victory. So it was tactically, but our side lost the war nonetheless, because we didn't want to win it as much as the North Vietnamese did. Hanson says that the West usually wins by smacking the enemy in the teeth until he is destroyed (George Marshall's strategy for the war in Europe)and gives less credit to "indirect warfare", striking around flanks and in unexpected places. That's what the Japanese did, and in Hanson's view, this is un-Western. Fact is, of course, that both strategies have worked at one time or another. The author would be better off adding recent history (e.g. his account of Hue and Khe San)to the roster of decisive battles - we have pretty good ideas already why those in the past were won or lost.
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Summary: From what I've read so far...
Review: I'm about half way through the book and so far it seems very well thought out. My biggest complaint is how Salamis is glorified and Thermopylae's contribution to the Greek defense is downplayed to a ridiculous extent. Overall Carnage and Culture is a very well thought out book that explains Western military dominance.
Rating:
Summary: A Timely But Controversial Book
Review: Hanson's "Carnage and Culture" is worth reading for its vigorous style as well as its thought-provoking thesis. Books about military history are often fairly dry, but Hanson writes clearly and in the active voice, perhaps unconciously emulating the Western military tactics he describes. He argues that Western success on the battlefield is a cultural phenomenon, not just the result of good fortune in the allocation of resources or the serendipity of technology. Free nations produce leaders and soldiers who take the initiative. Citizens who are protected by law against arbitrary action feel free to "audit" battles and criticize soldiers, leading to improved strategy and tactics. Western military commands are heirarchical, but not unduly so, so that they adapt well to changing circumstances. The result is an approach to battle that has been evolving since the time of the ancient Greeks, and that now involves applying maximum disclipline and violence at the point of engagement in order to annihilate, not merely defeat, an opponent. Hanson discusses a series of battles to illustrate the differences between the "Western" style of war and the practices of cultures that he deems to be "non-Western": Salamis (480 BC); Gaugamela (331 BC); Cannae (216 BC); Poitiers (732); Tenochtitlan (1520-21); Lepanto (1571); Rourke's Drift (1879); Midway (1942) and Tet (1968). Each of these struggles illustrates a Western preference for decisive battle that inflicts enormous and disproportionate casualties on the loser. Throughout, Hanson is very careful to stress that the losers are brave, smart individuals--he is not a racist and goes out of his way to explain that, person for person, the citizens of the West are no better than their non-Western counterparts. He does, however, argue that Western culture, for better or worse, produces better results on the battlefield than non-Western culture does. This position is sure to be viewed as politically incorrect, but it is certainly worth pondering. "Carnage and Culture" is particularly interesting in these troubled times. I began reading the book shortly after the September 11 attacks, and I have found it to be highly predictive of the American conduct of the war in Afghanistan, as well as America's relentless success in that war. The collapse of the Taliban that seems remarkable to media pundits and those untutored in the Western way of war looks almost inevitable to those who have read Hanson's work. A wounded republic, like Rome after its horrendous defeat at Cannae, is a determined and ruthless enemy. As the historian Ross Leckie wryly observed in "Hannibal": "The Romans were a thorough lot. Carthage is a memory." Having said all this, Hanson's book leaves almost untouched some fairly important questions. If freedom and initiative are so critical to Western military success, how do we explain the performance of totalitarian Germany's military in the early years of World War II and its quick defeat of the French democracy in 1940? Why were the Soviets, who endured purges and arbitrary executions in the 1930s and throughout World War II, ultimately successful against the more "Westernized" Germans? I suspect that Hanson could offer cogent answers to these questions, but it puzzles me that he did not volunteer them in his book.
Rating:
Summary: Answers the question left hanging by Guns, Germs, and Steel
Review: I really enjoyed this book. I suggest reading it after Guns, Germs, and Steel by Jared Diamond. At the end of that book, Diamond leaves the question hanging as to why Western Civilization ended up dominating the globe. This book provides a compelling answer.
I especially liked the section that described how the Spanish Conquistadors defeated the Aztecs. He explains that after landing in Mexico, the Spanish set up a gunpowder factory. All of the ingredients necessary for making gunpowder were there, but the Aztecs hadn't discovered it.
The other thing he points out is that the Aztec way of fighting emphasized capturing their opponents so they could be sacrificed in a ritual. The Spanish concentrated on killing the enemy. This difference and the fact that the Aztec dictatorship was unpopular in surrounding areas are what enabled a relatively small number of Conquistadors to defeat the Aztec empire.
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