Carnage and Culture : Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power

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Summary: Textbook example of revisionist history
Review: Sir Winston Churchill once remarked: "History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it." It is this characteristic blend of assertiveness, blunt honesty and a hint of good-natured irony which so endears the British bulldog to his admirers, and which makes his account of the Second World War not only an informative read, but an immensely enjoyable one as well. Moreover, the admission of subjectivity does not detract at all from Churchill's writings, but rather serves as further proof of his greatness, making them an even more impressive and valuable source. The result is history at its most fascinating, from a man who made it.

Then there are those who write about it. Victor Davis Hanson is such a professional historian, or at least used to be full-time before he took up political punditry. As readers of those vociferous columns will know, he lacks not in assertiveness, but rather more so in honesty or self-irony (the latter, particularly, is never the mark of "angry" writers). And even though he is usually a lot less accurate, impartial or thorough in his depiction of history than Sir Winston ever was, Hanson presents his work as Gospel truth under the mantle of scholarship, and as the result of careful research and study. In truth, his aim is political rather than historical. The result is revisionism, from a man who rewrites history around his own, highly personal and contemporary agenda.

A textbook example of this approach is "Carnage and Culture", or in another edition: "Why the West Has Won: Nine Landmark Battles in the Brutal History of Western Victory" . Reserved taglines, both! Here Hanson is trying to uncover the underlying reasons for a huge and apparently simple fact: that for the last 2500 years, the West has generally beaten the non-West in armed conflict. By "the West", lest we forget, he refers to (or rather assumes) a curious and underdefined cultural continuity that somehow stretches from ancient Athens and Rome through feudal Europe, the Spanish conquistadors and Victorian England right up to present-day America. By the non-West, he means the rest.

The precision continues: Hanson illustrates his case not with, say, an exhaustive analysis of long-term political, social or economic developments, but rather pinpoints nine (no less!) "landmark" battles throughout the course of the two-and-a-half examined millennia. Apparently, the argumentative structure here is a little more fragmented than Hanson's notion of a homogenous West... Anyway, the battles presented range from ancient times (Salamis) over the Medieval and Renaissance Ages (Poitiers, Tenochtitlan) to 19th century colonialism (Rorke's Drift) and World War II (Midway).

As varied as the times and places involved are the reasons which Hanson cites for Western victory: there are overarching factors like the development of science and economy, which ensured that the West had better weapons, and more of them. There are large-scale social conditions, such as the fact that Western armies used freemen and citizens rather than slaves and mercenaries, or that their conduct of war was subject to open debate. On a tactical level, there is the superior morale of citizen-soldiers, and the initiative of people brought up in free societies. All of these factors are valid and relevant to a certain extent, of course, and even though there is nothing really original about any of this, they illustrate nicely the outcome of the individual battles that are discussed,. It's just that they never form any sort of cohesive argument, let alone one that would support the questionable thesis of "Western values" continuity which Hanson traces from Themistocles through Cortez to McArthur.

Rather than attempting to argue coherently in any clearly defined direction, Hanson works like a lawyer - the more arguments he can pile up, the better. Moreover, he picks and chooses, seizing only the points that will make his case, and omitting or explaining away all others. Like, for instance, all those battles that do not quite fit the "Western victory" mould - three Roman legions slaughtered by Germanic warriors at Teutoburg Forest, several centuries of defeat against Ottoman land forces, the German blitzkrieg that crushed France in 1940, or the significant contribution that Stalin's Soviet Union (emphatically not a democratic state) made to eventually overthrow Hitler's regime. But Hanson just has an a priori argument about Western superiority (military and in general), and like any good revisionist, he fits the evidence to his argument rather than the other way around.

"The faults of this book are legion" as The Independent remarks, "so there is space to concentrate only on the most egregious." Like the peculiar take on Rorke's Drift: readers might think that the technology gap between the Zulus and the British sufficiently explains which side was going to prevail, but Hanson characteristically adds the fact that the Zulus served a despotic leader. The spear-throwing warriors could have won or at least prolonged the war, one presumes, if they had only adopted a constitution... After noting a tally of 400-800 Zulu dead and over 20,000 expended British cartridges, the author concludes about the superior Western military culture: "Strict firearms training guaranteed that they would usually hit what they aimed at." Quick maths check: divide 800 by 20,000, remembering that the battle took part at close range - do we find anything that warrants the term "usually"?

At least in the final chapter, where Hanson claims the Tet Offensive as an American victory which only the "coffeehouse academic posturing" of liberal opinion turned into a defeat, he's honest and reveals for a fleeting moment the true political agenda of the book - even though it means contradicting his earlier argument that societies with democratic scrutiny of the military win more wars. Whatever, it will delight the good people who have always distrusted the confusing complexities of those defiling intellectuals, and who prefer a cozy black-and-white worldview. In fact, "Carnage and Culture" is made for them. More educated readers, and those who value accuracy over polemics, will put down Hanson's book well before the end anyway, and return to Sir Winston.

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Summary: A book for the Ages
Review: I particularly enjoyed ancient Greek warfare. This is of course Hanson's specialty. But I do think this should be required reading for any student of warfare or politics,

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Summary: The Way of Western War
Review: In this book author Victor Davis Hanson explains why the West was able to conquer much of the world and why to strongest militarys in the world are mostly Western Countries. According to Hanson Western militaries are powerful because of cultural aspects of the West that impact Western militaries. Hanson decribes nine aspects freedom (western military personal have a high degree of freedom in their home countries), decisive battle, Citizen Soldiers, Landed Infantry, Technology and the Wages of Reason, The Market, Discipline, Individualism, Dissent and Self-Critique. The West won't win every battle but these atributes will give a western millitary the edge when the skill of the commander, technology and numbers are the same.

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Summary: We're just SO lethal!
Review: A self-congratulatory tone combined with a bizarre ignorance of military history sullies this book. You could go through any encyclopedia and look up with battles that were won by luck and come up with a more realistic explanation of why "the West" is now so dominant in the world. It's easy to pick apart this book from the military side and the history side. It ignores the really huge battles of the 20th century which don't fit into the "Western lethality" thesis. It claims victories (such as Tet for the U.S.) where none exist.(Will there ever be an American author who can admit we LOST the Vietnam war ?) It ignores even ancient historical examples that don't fit into the author's very narrow view of world history. The biggest battles of the 20th century were fought by the Germans and the Soviets- participants definitely NOT in the "western" tradition described by the author. The Battle of Midway was mostly won by luck- not necessarily by the square-jawed determination "western" heroes. In fact "western" militarism was never able to squarely defeat a communist country by force of arms. Rourke's Drift followed the Battle of Isandhlwana where the Brits were hideously defeated- Rourke's Drift is like Dunkirk- a hollow propaganda "victory". So really "western" lethality didn't and doesn't always work. and in itself the "lethality" concept just means "technological advantage". I have a feeling that jury is still out on whether our overwhelming military lethality will finally win the terrorism war. Western "democracies" today win wars by picking and choosing the ones which will make them look good and seem tough- you could call it the Cowardly Turkeyshoot (or Craven Cakewalk?) concept where overwhelming technological and economic forces are brought to bear on basically defenseless Third World countries. Individualism, democracy, freedom and the Ancient Greek tradition added up to this?

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Summary: Hanson explains why Western Culture Adapts, Scales, Wins
Review: Professor Hanson work expresses rationale supporting the idea western warfare flourishes because of principles of western culture: constitutional governments, free trade, innovation, free speech and open debate, industrialization, leaders who take initiative, technology, and communication. Hanson does not separate military strategies from human suffering, disembodiment, and lose of life from tactical planning. Here are my conclusions:

Salamis,Cannae Poiters,Lepanto,Guagamela,Tenochitlan,Zulu Wars,VietNam

Alexander the Great tactics (square formation, draw the enemy to the left flank, attack the center, collaspe the enemy and attack from the rear). Military campaigns with democratization produce short lived empires. Alexander the Great empire was short lived. Western culture military innovation, political freedom, infantry shock tactics, and power protrays an awesome advantage in terms of killing capacity. Alexander's kill ratio increased a thousand fold as he completely destroying his enemies until they had no capacity to fight back.

Greek myth of the dead forced Greek military commanders to account for their dead. The dead could not be abandoned. The Military machine was accountability to Political machine. The battle of Cannae demonstrated more Greek command center Automy, individualization, and initiative. Communication increase with open debate of tactics and strategy both by the political and public entities. The wealth of a nation help win wars by providing the resources to win wars. Hanson suggest capitalism moves the market industry to produce products faster, better, and quicker in war time. Thus, free market system produce superior military products. In contrast, Persian king Xerxe sat a watched from his look out post like an piercing eye demanding obedience. Disobedience by his commanders was punishable by death. Technology and tactics would play an important role in the Greek naval victory. The greeks used terrain tactical advantage by not fighting the Persians in open seas where they could be outmaneuvered and destroyed. Tritermia ramming technology provided fast attack patterns breaking apart the Persian ships with free men rowers rather than slaves.

The battle of Lepanto is about the superior ship design of the Venetians and usage of cannon to crush the Turks. Sea warfare had changed from ramming to projectiles.

Hannibal would use elephants and terrain to defeat the romans in one their worst defeats. Hannibal was from Carthian. Carthian was considered a merchant community not a government entity. The romans would conscript civilians to fight. Civilian Army to become the most powerful army in the world. If the civilian army was destroyed another army would be raised. At one time over 50 percent of the males were serving in the army.

Cortes method of warfare focused on logistics. Cortes create a elaborate supply chain from Vera Crus to Mexico City. At the same time he strangulated all aztec supplies coming by cannon. By controlling the supply chain of food an water Cortez defeat an enemy.

Western philosophy of how wars start with an moral outrage. In this case it was the Boers who covenanted Zulu land and encroached upon their territory. Complex terms were sent to the Zulu lord without any effect and the killing started. British Disciplined Fighting shock tactics improved killing capacity. Poor logistics planning lead to a disaster as ammunition was not being adequated distributed to the front line. In contrast at Rorks Drift the effectiviness of having well coordinated logistics and supplies demonstrate an increased killing capacity for the British.
Midway
Information wins battles as the US was able to break the Japanese Code and discover the location of four aircraft carriers. The locations provide an suprise attack and demonstrated the importance of intelligence information in defeating the enemy. Western economy of scales showed a 16:1 US destroyer ratio compared to Japan, industrial production increases over Japan in the production of aircraft, innovation verse codes of honor producing new more adaptative aircraft.

Vietnam demonstrated more battle exposure for infantry. Air support provide more protection allow ground movement. However, clear objectives, complete obiliteration of the enemy, and freedom to act serverly hampered the war. Conclusions: Shock Battle Tactics replaced with high tech bombing with their effectives to save lives being questioned and resistance against using momentary annihilation nuclear weapons instead of massive bloody confrontations.

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Summary: Interesting Though Repetitive
Review: This book makes a very good case for the dominance of Western military power. The gist of the book is that the Western world has been able to produce dominant military power due to our culture of openness, capitalism, and science. He demonstrates that in the long term any Western army will demolish a non-Western army. Actually the only country the West has to worry about is another Western country. I found the book to be quite interesting though quite repetitive. I find some repetition useful due to my limited attention span. However, I felt like the author was trying to beat me over the head multiple times during each case study. I was able to finish the book and received a new appreciation of how the West was able to dominate. I personally wonder if Western public opinion is turning against the resulting slaughter of non-Western armies and whether the Muslim world has developed a formidable weapon in the suicide bomber. If you have an avid interest in military history, this book is for you. If not, you may have problems finishing it.

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Summary: An interesting read and has many true points at that
Review: Why was the roman citizenry still eager to fight after dozens of years of defeat, while Carthage was destroyed after one battle? Is it feasible to simply assume that Cortez's men, who had not numbered more than a thousand came to dominate a foe, whose forces numbered in the hundreds of thousands, simply because of superior arms and armor? Why is it that an islamic caliphate, with vastly superior resources and manpower only been able to defeat weak and unpopular empires, and their armies defeated upon coming to more organized, but in almost all other respects, weaker franks? Why was it that the more advanced, and much stronger Japanese unable to win support among thier neighbors, or defeat a usually weak fleet in the pacific?

This book makes it clear that explainations such as mere logistics, advanced technology, or, the most dubious of all, general superiority are simply not true, as the west would often prvail through just as much or worse (such as a crusade was over a much longer and dangerous road from france to Jeruselumn, than from spain to Paris). Along with this, it is also an enjoyable read and hard to put down

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Summary: Not a book but a collection of essays
Review: There are great historians (William Manchester, Martin Gilbert), near great historians (Stephen Ambrose), and then there are the good. Victor Hanson (VH) belongs to this latter category. Think of "Culture and Carnage" as a series of essays about significant battles, rather than chapters with building blocks of an argument, as VH is ultimately unconvincing in his thesis. He is not convincing because he makes the common mistake of confusing correlation with cause. Yes, the West did win all the battles in his book (that's the correlation), but VH is unable to prove why (that's the cause). Ironically, VH's bete noire, Jared Diamond, understands this principle much better.

In the first chapter VH presents a rambling definition of the western social and cultural values that made western arms superior. He describes the Greeks as having consensual government, equality among the middle class, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism and rationalism (p. 4, Anchor edition). However, at the battle of Salamis, VH in no way shows how these ideals contributed to victory. That the Greeks were defending their homeland was certainly a motivating factor. Moreover, an important part of the Persian navy, the "experienced Egyptian contingent" (p. 44), did not take part in the battle, therefore the Greeks were more evenly matched. Perhaps the western value that resulted in victory was Fortuna.

Moving forward, how then were these values demonstrated in Alexander's Greece, who by VH's own words Alexander was an unelected king, from a land of masters and surfs? VH asserts that Alexander's father, Phillip, adopted the Hellenic tradition of individual initiative (p, 80). Really? How is this manifest? Phillip also "embraced the rationalist tradition and the disinterested pursuit of science and natural inquiry apart from religion and government" (p. 80). Sounds pretty forced to me, and it's not clear at all how one could extrapolate such nuances thousands of years later. On the following page, not letting his own facts get in the way, VH tells us that Alexander rejected constitutional government and civic militarism. We're only to the second battle of the book, and if VH hasn't already refuted his own assertion (western values equal military might), then he's at least guilty of changing the definition of what western values are. Yet he keeps trying: page 93 VH tells us "only freemen who voted and enjoyed liberty were willing to endure such terrific infantry collisions"; VH just told us Alexander's soldiers didn't vote - which is it?

It rarely gets better. We're asked to believe that the armies that fought at Cannae (Roman) and Potiers (feudal Europe) represented societies that had equality in the middle class, a consensual government, or politics apart from religion. The same can be said for the Spanish from Inquisition, Catholic Spain at the battle of Tenochtitlan. And so on.

Unlike other reviewers, I enjoyed, but did not necessarily agree with, VH's writings about the Vietnam war. Of particular interest are the observations on the impact of television and mass communications on the public's perception of the war. (William Manchester foreshadows this in his WWII memoir, "Goodbye Darkness". Manchester recounts the Pentagon's decision to release photos of dead Marines on Tarawa, and the ensuring public outcry.)

VH's attempted reply to Jared Diamond's (JD) "Guns, Germs, and Steel" is rather puny. Consider the case where VH, while describing the battle of Midway, states that "Japan is thus the classic refutation of the now popular idea that topography, resources such as iron and coal deposits, or genetic susceptibility to disease and other natural factors largely determine cultural dynamism and military prowess." Let's leave "genetic susceptibility" and "cultural dynamism" on the table, ok? For JD, the race has ended by 1500 A.D, when European culture begins to expand and dominate worldwide. By comparison, Japan's rise and fall, coming much later, is just a flash in the pan, hardly a credible counterpoint. Japan, for the most part never had any colonies, was in fact hindered because of a lack of natural resources, and, as VH well describes, adopts the steel of the west. Of course, VH is also offended by JD's statements about European intelligence; he need not be. JD's assertions in this area are wholly subjective and can in no way be substantiated.

At times the writing is peculiar. Consider the vocabulary when discussing death in battle; it is the vocabulary of morbid fascination, and the uninitiated. Samples include "murderous dividends" (p. 4), young men "rotting", "harpooned", or "washing up in chunks", machine gun bullets to the brow, carving and ripping arteries and organs in the belly (p. 7), and "robust physiques turned into goo" (p. 8). There's no shortage of colorful language. In the chapter on Roake's Drift, VH detours to discuss a hypothetical case of a motorcycle gang armed with Uzis taking on a regiment of VMI students, unblemished by misdemeanors or shots fired in anger. How now? What kind of Tom Clancy garbage is that? Further along, in the chapter on Midway, VH confirms Tom Brokaw's theory of generational greatness, when he frets that an "America of suburban, video playing Nicoles, Ashleys, and Jasons" (p.351) would likely never equal the greatest generation. This is a variation on the theory that the hardship of the Depression prepared the United States for the rigors of WWII. I would concede this is partially true, but no generation has a monopoly on duty, honor, or love of country. And don't tell VH that video games are in fact used in a soldier's training.

Read "Culture and Carnage", but do not expect too much. There's lots of interesting information about the battles, but there's really not much else.

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Summary: Excellent Writing, Interesting Book, but Strained Theory
Review: Carnage and Culture is a fascinating and very well written book. Professor Hanson's subject is Western military prowess, which in his view stems from inherent cultural advantages that have, for the past two and a half millennia, endowed the West with a uniquely lethal way of waging war against its adversaries. He chooses nine landmark battles in which western armies either triumphed, usually against numerical odds, or else recovered from defeat with a vigor that demonstrated indomitable military superiority. He starts with the dramatic naval victory of the ancient Greeks over the invading Persians at Salamis, and moves chronologically forward up through the so-called Tet Offensive, in which twentieth century Americans battled Vietnamese communists. Along the way, he discusses Cortez's destruction of the Aztecs, the British conquest of the Zulu nation, the American victory over the Japanese navy at the Midway, and four other bloody encounters between Western forces and Muslim, African or Asian adversaries. Professor Hanson opens each chapter with a vivid description of the battle itself, then devotes the remainder of his text to placing the battle into the political and social context of it's time and to weaving in the threads that tie it to the bigger historical picture he wants us to see. While I found Carnage and Culture to be highly thought-provoking, I have some problems with it too. Critics on the left will discern a conservative ideological agenda at work here, most obviously in the Vietnam chapter, where he digresses into a well-argued but off-the-subject attack on the 60's anti-war Left and the media. Beyond that, the book tends to strain as the author squeezes 2500 years of complex history into a pretty narrow dimension. He's selective in his focus and dismissive of much that doesn't seem to fit. Problematically, he never really addresses the question of what he, or the rest of us, mean exactly when we talk about "The West". He states, and I think sincerely, that he's not making any kind of racialist argument here. But then what? Aztecs or American Indians or Zulus are not part of "The West". Alexander the Great was, but presumably contemporary Macedonians would not be. Oddly, he rarely mentions the Russians, and it's not clear which box he would put them into - probably NonWest, since they usually seem to lose their wars. If what he's really doing is simply generalizing about technologically underdeveloped people and telling us they lose wars, then the argument devolves into tautology. But I think he's doing quite a bit more than that. Hanson is a professor of classical studies, and his understanding of the ancient Greeks permeates this book. If pressed on the issue, he would probably define "The West" in the conventional manner as those societies whose cultural and intellectual roots can be traced back to these remarkable people. Reduced to basics, Hanson's thesis is that it is the spirit of empirical pragmatism - i.e., scientific method - that facilitates development of tools for cultural, economic and military dominance. At this level, of course, the argument is beyond debate and too obvious to be of much interest. However, he goes on to argue that it is the spirit of democracy which unleashes the full power of scientific method, providing both the creative freedom and the incentive necessary for an unrestrained pursuit of practical objectives, including the annihilation of enemies on the battlefield. Since the ancient Greeks were pioneers of both scientific method and democracy, it is with them that we see the first flourishing of this lethal combination. It is with them and with modern-day Americans that Hanson's thesis rings most convincingly, but with much that lies between, it tends to falter. Hanson, to my mind, goes too far in attributing the benefits of democracy and scientific method somehow to the various monarchies and autocracies that have dominated much of Western history until recently. Furthermore, he seems to rely too much on assumption and stereotypical thinking in describing the relative disadvantages of the ancient Persians, medieval Muslims, and the other non-Western adversaries, about whom historians really know very little. Hanson teaches at an American university, and I'm told by my university friends that at most schools today, debates about "The West" are fashionable, with embattled conservative minorities generally defending "The West" against ascendant leftist multi-culturalists. It seems likely that the ideological edge to Hanson's book emanates reflexively from his own pre-occupation with academic politics. It's odd, though, that he isn't arguing any moral superiority on the part of the West, only superior capacity for mass slaughter on the battlefield, a point with which his leftist critics would surely concur. So the debating point would seem to be wasted anyway. Hanson is a lucid thinker, a knowledgeable historian, and an excellent writer, and despite its limitations, I enjoyed Carnage and Culture immensely. He could do much more with this subject if he would let himself turn away from the tedious West-NonWest focus and give us an objective study exploring the historical relationship between democracy, science and military power.

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Summary: An example of bashing square pegs into round holes
Review: The author of this book is a right wing newspaper columnist. He has written a number of other books mainly about ancient Greece.

This book tries to establish a particular line. That is the reason why Europe became powerful was because of the institutions of private property, the success of the market economy, the existence of a free society and the use of well armed infantry forces.

The book examines a number of battles which include the battle of Salamis, a sea battle which occurred in 480 BC between a coalition of Greek City States against the Persian Empire moving on to Guagamela, Cannae Poiters, Tenochitlan, Lepanto, Rorks Drif, Midway and the Tet Offensive.

The problem with the book is that it is mostly nonsense. The style of the book is to not to analyse the various propositions sought to be advanced but rather to use anecdote, factoid and bland assertion to create a picture which is basically false. This of course is not to suggest that private property, and a market economy are not important.

The reason why the book is poor relate to a number of issues. The first is that in reality there is no continuos stable society that contains the values he suggests through Western History. If we look at The Greek City States and the Early Roman Republic, he might well have a point. However for most of recorded history Europe has not had a free society and it has had an economy which is a long way from market capitalism. Following the victories of Alexander at Guagamela (and he was a king not an elected official) the Macedonians controlled a huge empire. That lasted for a long time but it was basically an autocratic society that used mercenary armies in the main. After the collapse of the Roman Empire Feudal Society was again unfree and instead of their being a free market, the economy of most western countries were characterised by guilds and market dominated monopolies.

The second issue is that what is the west anyway? North Africa appears not to have been part of the west although Carthage was a state which was very similar to that of the Greeks. They had a commercial sea faring economy and the government seemed similar. Carthage however for some reason is not seen to be part of the west. Russia which has been similar to more eastern states is seen to be.

The last issue is that the book contains a massive attempt by the author to bash square pegs into round holes. One battle that is discussed in some detail is the battle of Leparto. This is a naval battle in 1571 between the Ottaman Turks and a coalition of powers that included Spain, the Papal States and Venice. The battle of Leparto occurred in year in which the Turks conquered Cyprus from the Venetians after a heroic siege. Concerned about the Turks running rampart through the Mediterranean an uneasy alliance was formed by the Christian powers which led to the battle of Leparto. Despite the defeat the Turks had within a year rebuilt their fleet and taken Tunisia back from the Spaniards. In reflecting on the loss of the battle the Sultan of Turkey said, the loss of Leparto is like having my beard singed, for in time it will grow back. The loss of Cyprus is like the loss of an arm for once an arm is cut off it will never grow back.

In discussing the battle the author suggests that the reason for the victory of the battle by the Christians was the ability of commercial capitalism to build weapons of war such as cannon and arquebuses. He suggests that Turkey did not have the economic wealth of these countries and this was the reason for the defeat and the decline of the Turkish empire. None of this seems true. The ability of the Turks to re-build their fleet was seen at the time as a miracle. To build this many ships as quickly was something which the Christian countries were simply not capable off. The reality was that despite the loss of the battle, the Turks were still within a short time able to mount offensive operations against the Christians. It was not for three hundred years that the Turks were forced to give up Cyprus. Other historians have suggested that the reason for the Turks being contained at the time had less to do with the battle of Leparto but the fact that they had to contend with a series of wars with Persia a strong military power at the time.

A key weakness of this book is that it will make assertions about the comparative commercial strength of the powers involved and provide no evidence to show that there is a basis for the assertion. The book also takes a battle such as this out of context and does not discuss the importance of other Turkish victories and their ability to continue to mount successful military operations.

This is a rather tiresome book to read. Most narrative histories will simply contain a narrative of the relevant events and an argument which is based on the material. This book however relies on anecdote after anecdote, with florid descriptions of military engagements followed by homily after homily on the glories of the west. A very tiresome book to read.