Rating: 
Summary: Shock Troops, Schmock Troops! Reductionist and Repetative
Review: I enjoyed this book to no end, but from the start the really annoying thing (and its gets more and more annoying the further you read) is his endless repitition of his thesis: THESIS: The Western Tradition in war is the product of the Greek Polis and its continuance is manifested in the same ways as it essentially was during the good ol' days of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and whoever else they could fit around the table at the "Symposium": free citizen soldiers with certain rights to property, life, the ability to elect civic officials, and a scientific method of inquiry, all these qualities make better soldiers. Moreover they yeild a method of battle seeking to conclusively close with the enemy and defeat him in "shock battle" (I do not know how many times he uses that term). Hansen offers good cases studies in battles, but he draws them out WAY TOO MUCH.....! Therefore his best writing is at the beginning, when he introduces his ideas, and at the end, when he is forced to reach conclusions --- in both areas we are presented a lot of new, and therefore non-repetative, information. Some concerns with this book are: 1) Extremely reductionist. Every battle cited is further proof of his thesis. Even Cannae, where an army not of the western tradition the Carthaginians (an extremely contentious statement since Carthage was founded by Greeks, but hey, who am I to argue with a classics scholar), defeated the Romans who were the very apotheosis of the western tradition. Hansen has an answer however: the very fact they lost the battle was indicative that Romans were able to absorb enormous losses and then raise armies of free citizen soldiers again whilst those of Carthage were doomed to ultimately loose the war because they were ultimately an authoritarian state. Citizen soldier states win even when hey lose! The exception proves the rule as it were.... This is a supremely reductionist argument and one surprising coming from a teacher of the Classics. 2) War And the Liberal Tradition: Hansen rightly asks the question of what would happen if two nations of the western, classical tradition fight. Some notion is seen in the modern battles of the Somme, Passchendale, and Stalingrad. Hansen also reafirms the liberal assertion that democracies do not fight, but he also admits that there is little room for error in the future if they even do... But he does not go into the implications of this theory. There are only about 4-5 pages in the entire tome that deal with this subject. 3) Case Studies: His chapters on Salamis, Rourke's Drift & Midway are the best and although cliche at times, are supremely interesting and offer interesting perspectives on the nature of all combatants (I really liked his section on Midway and although I have read a lot on this battle, I found he had a lot new to say that was interpretive). His worst chapter is the one on Tet, which seems almost tacked on the end of the book (he should lose it) and offers nothing new accept the currently "conservative" fashionable reinterpretation that America really did win this war. There is no mention about the fact that, agree or not, this was a popular war of liberation (waged immorally by both the North and the US); the utter mendacity of US Generals and soldiers in the field and; no notion that just and moral regimes supported by the people could and should really support and fight for themselves. 4) Morality: One point that Hansen states is that the western way of warfare, although more efficient, is no more moral than any other and much more bloody because it seeks decisive "shock battle" with the enemy. His examples seem to bear out his assertion about the amorality of the western military tradition. However with a system of battle that is so destructive it is incumbent on western morality (itself a product of the Greek tradition) to explain how morality in war is linked, how it can be linked, and how it SHOULD be linked. Moreover if the Greek Classical tradition produced both western morality and the western way of warfare, how are the two necessarily mutually exclusive as Hansen would have us believe. I think that any discussion of western morality may muddy the water and would have lead to a much more complicated book, though perhaps one less repetative and much more interesting. His ideas are merely interesting. There are enough holes (cited above) in his thesis to fire an 18 inch round from the Yamato through. And in this sense the value of his ideas are really to be found in the heuristics of such a study, to say that there is "truth" here is to impute far too much: the case studies range from Very Good (Salamis) to Extremely Bad (Tet) and just plain bad (Cannea and Lepanto). Even though I disagree with a lot of what Hansen says, I still would say that he has established a worthy subject with a lot of hard questions that need answers. As a heuristic approach, his book is a tour-de-force.... Now if he could only get a better editor for the next book, he will find a willing punter in me, one willing to plunk the US $ 35 ...down on his next work.....
As long as Hansen can promise me that I do not have to read the word "shock battle" 10 times on the same page.
Rating: 
Summary: The Triumph of the West(s)?
Review: I enjoyed this book. The depiction of each set piece battle is masterfully researched and written, and I agree with the author's central argument, that Western cultural adaptability and political freedom culminate in war machines capable of projecting Western military power globally. The "West" is an elastic concept, however, and I would have liked him to pin it down more specifically. For example, the German tribes who resisted assimilation by the might of Rome and ultimately carved up her empire between them - were they "Western?" More "Western" than Rome? Had exposure to Roman cultural influence
"Westernized" them? Or was the degeneration of the imperial court into "Oriental despotism" the source of its downfall? In his afterward, Hanson complains about being deluged with a flood of "minutiae, with references to obscure battles and weapons that would substantiate, modify or reject my thesis - as if nine representative battles from some 2,500 years of military history could in any way be exhaustive in matters of detail." (p 462). Well, you were the one making the sweeping assumptions, Vic. Anyway, here is some minutiae of mine to add to the pile. "Past, present, and future, the story of military dynamism in the world is ultimately an investigation into the prowess of Western arms," Hanson assures us. How about Western luck? In 1241 an army whose discipline, mobility, and amorality had never before been seen (or emulated) in the West was at the gates of Europe. The Mongols, having already subdued the Asian steppe, overrun Russia, defeated the Poles and their German allies at Leignitz and Hungary at the Sajo River, were only stopped by the death of their khan in December of that year. Hanson does not refer to this - in fact, the word "Mongol" doesn't appear in his book. The most he will allow is to refer to "Tribal musters fueled by promises of booty," leading to "enormous and spirited armies... the nomadic invasions of Genghis Khan (1206-27) and Tamerlane (1381-1405), who overran much of Asia, are the most notable examples... But even the most murderous hordes could not really sustain - feed, clothe, and pay - a military force with sophisticated weaponry for a lengthy period of time." (p 275). This is an unfair characterization of the Mongols, who produced what remains, pound for pound, the most perfect war machine in history, and were the terror of the Old World for generations. Hanson says, "Adrianople (378) and Manzikert (1071) were horrendous Western defeats; but the Romans and Byzantines who were slaughtered there were for the most part vastly outnumbered, far from home, poorly led, and reluctant emissaries of crumbling empires." (p 12-13). "Poorly led," yes, but the Romans were not outnumbered at Adrianople and vastly outnumbered the Turks at Manzikert; far from being "far from home," Adrianople was less than a hundred miles from the imperial capital at Constantinople, and Manzikert, while remote, was still within imperial territory; and far from being "reluctant emissaries of crumbling empires," the Roman and Byzantine armies were comprised of professional soldiers led in person by their emperors and defending a state that had centuries of life left to it. In Chapter 5 - "Landed Infantry" - Hanson argues in rather romantic terms that the free, property-owning warriors of the Merovingian Empire saved Western civilization from the first great Islamic Jihad at Poitiers in 732. In fact, Europe had already passed its greatest test in a confrontation he only touches on - the Byzantine repulse of the Arab siege of Constantinople from 673-78, and their second successful defense against an even larger Arab Armada in 717-18 (which he curiously neglects to mention). Hanson admits, even in the event of defeat at Poitiers, "Permanent Islamic possession of the entirety of France... was unlikely." (p 143). If Byzantium had fallen, the Caliphs would have transferred their flag to Constantinople, and everything from the Bosphorus to the Baltic would have been Islamized within a generation. Christianity would have been isolated and hemmed in against the Atlantic. It may have collapsed altogether. This didn't happen because the Byzantines prevailed. Why? Because they were "Western?" Modern historians don't consider them so, and neither did contemporary Westerners. Arab penetration of Europe was halted not by free property owning citizen farmers defending a nascent democratic republic, but by a civilization no less theocratic, and much more rigidly autocratic, than its "alien" rival. The thesis of Chapter 9 - "Individualism" - which uses the example of the Japanese defeat at Midway do demonstrate superior Western initiative being harnessed as a component of a superior war machine, is also problematic. How much of "the West" are we talking about here? Japan was more than a match for any other Western power it challenged in the Pacific. First Russia (a "Western" power?) was humiliated at the turn of last century, then, in the space of little more than two months, Japan stripped The Netherlands of her entire empire in the East Indies, a region she had dominated for centuries, and inflicted some of the worst defeats in British history. On every front in 1941 Japanese tactics, initiative and equipment were superior to that of the Western powers they faced. The United States was capable of making a comeback. The others were not. Britain was no match for Japan. Even if she had been free to send her entire fleet to the Pacific to confront the Rising Sun, I strongly suspect the result would have been another Tsushima. Was the United States successful because it was more "Western" than the rest of the West? If so, how? The same question applies to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - both vastly more powerful than any Western power other than the United States, and capable of tremendous scientific achievements that gave them a cutting edge in warfare. How do they fit into Hanson's "Western" paradigm?
Rating:
Summary: the luck of favorable geography or superior (?) culture...
Review: If you read Guns, Germs, and Steel by Jared Diamond, then also read this book. Then decide if Diamond's central conclusion---that it is chiefly the random advantage of geography which has accidentally allowed some cultures to become dominant, and left others subordinate---is correct. Or, as Hanson argues, is it instead the importance of human-created cultural traits which comprise the central driving force allowing the dominance of certain cultures over others? After carefully reading both, I'd have to side with Hanson. He's not completely right, but he makes one heck of a case.
Rating: 
Summary: A Timely But Controversial Book
Review: Hanson's "Carnage and Culture" is worth reading for its vigorous style as well as its thought-provoking thesis. Books about military history are often fairly dry, but Hanson writes clearly and in the active voice, perhaps unconciously emulating the Western military tactics he describes. He argues that Western success on the battlefield is a cultural phenomenon, not just the result of good fortune in the allocation of resources or the serendipity of technology. Free nations produce leaders and soldiers who take the initiative. Citizens who are protected by law against arbitrary action feel free to "audit" battles and criticize soldiers, leading to improved strategy and tactics. Western military commands are heirarchical, but not unduly so, so that they adapt well to changing circumstances. The result is an approach to battle that has been evolving since the time of the ancient Greeks, and that now involves applying maximum disclipline and violence at the point of engagement in order to annihilate, not merely defeat, an opponent. Hanson discusses a series of battles to illustrate the differences between the "Western" style of war and the practices of cultures that he deems to be "non-Western": Salamis (480 BC); Gaugamela (331 BC); Cannae (216 BC); Poitiers (732); Tenochtitlan (1520-21); Lepanto (1571); Rourke's Drift (1879); Midway (1942) and Tet (1968). Each of these struggles illustrates a Western preference for decisive battle that inflicts enormous and disproportionate casualties on the loser. Throughout, Hanson is very careful to stress that the losers are brave, smart individuals--he is not a racist and goes out of his way to explain that, person for person, the citizens of the West are no better than their non-Western counterparts. He does, however, argue that Western culture, for better or worse, produces better results on the battlefield than non-Western culture does. This position is sure to be viewed as politically incorrect, but it is certainly worth pondering. "Carnage and Culture" is particularly interesting in these troubled times. I began reading the book shortly after the September 11 attacks, and I have found it to be highly predictive of the American conduct of the war in Afghanistan, as well as America's relentless success in that war. The collapse of the Taliban that seems remarkable to media pundits and those untutored in the Western way of war looks almost inevitable to those who have read Hanson's work. A wounded republic, like Rome after its horrendous defeat at Cannae, is a determined and ruthless enemy. As the historian Ross Leckie wryly observed in "Hannibal": "The Romans were a thorough lot. Carthage is a memory." Having said all this, Hanson's book leaves almost untouched some fairly important questions. If freedom and initiative are so critical to Western military success, how do we explain the performance of totalitarian Germany's military in the early years of World War II and its quick defeat of the French democracy in 1940? Why were the Soviets, who endured purges and arbitrary executions in the 1930s and throughout World War II, ultimately successful against the more "Westernized" Germans? I suspect that Hanson could offer cogent answers to these questions, but it puzzles me that he did not volunteer them in his book.
Rating:
Summary: Zulu war story question mark- black as hell, thick as grass
Review: Hanson presents an interesting thesis as to the bases of Western hegemony (scientific advance, church/state separation, and democratic ethos) but there are many holes to be plugged. The Mongols for example, who barely appear in Hanson's book, conducted some of the most sweeping military campaigns in history and were as ruthless, destructive and amoral as any Western example. What about the Byzantines? Then there is the problem of the Russians. Are they Western? And they could not exactly be said to be marked by personal freedom, or democratic ethos. Yet the Russians consistently built and deployed dominant military forces that outclassed almost anything "the West" could field during the latter stages of World War II, and its aftermath. These are major holes that Hanson needs to address adequately, particularly his definition of who is the "West".
[-----] Even what should be a straighforward example of the thesis raises some questions. It is a stretch to say that the personal freedom citizen-soldier part of the equation was responsible for defeat of the Zulu. In fact, colonial wars by more advanced civilizations against tribal peoples throughout history have been won by authoritarian regimes that did not have such traditions, such as the Russians against the tribal peoples of Siberia, or the Arabs in Africa, or the Turks against many others.
[-----]
The Zulu example primarily highlights the value of technological superiority. In fact such conflicts followed a familar routine: (1) the Europeans advance with modern weapons and set up a strongly defended position, (2) the natives conveniently charge, (3) the natives are decimated by superior firepower, (4) roll credits.
[-----]
The redcoats are certainly to be commended for their brave stand against the natives "black as hell, and thick as grass", and it paints a dramatic black vs white picture, but it is a PUFFED UP PICTURE. Such encounters were a common scenario in colonial warfare, usually ending with the defeated native armies melting away as bullets thud into flesh. And a stout stand by a small number of defenders is nothing new in military history. Defenders in a fortified or protected position always have certain advantages over attackers and only a small number are required to stalemate a larger force, as history shows numerous times.
[-----]
Hanson notes that the Zulu were well armed with guns after their great victory of Isandwalhana. But in fact, the tribal fighters were poor marksmen and did not know how to use firearms effectively. They aimed high, so as to give the bullets "strength" as Donald Morris points out in his classic "Washing of the Spears". But lest anyone be tempted to smile mockingly at the inept black natives, it should be pointed out that poor marksmanship and aiming high was a common criticism by some against the white French in the Penisular Wars against Wellington. Whatever the quantity of firearms available, at best, such firepower as the natives deployed was primarily of nuisance value. Effectively, the Zulu fought on as they always did- obsolete spear and shield, against bullet and rifle.
[-----] Western technological superiority can be countered in 5 main ways: (a) the opposing forces deploy over a wide area concentrating only when numbers are superior vis a vis local opposition, (b) they have a surplus of manpower (c) they lure the Western forces deep into prepared killing grounds or unfavorable terrain (benefitting from interior lines), (d) they maximize deception and surprise attacks, and (e) they exhibit mobility and tactical flexibility. There are other factors but these are the big 5.
[-----]
The VC/NVA proved this in Vietnam, as did the Chinese in Korea.
Osama Bin Laden proved this also on 9/11 drawing from the mix described above. The Zulu possessed some of these factors but squandered their advantages. Their problem was not simply lack of firearms (although this was a major problem). It also included inflexibility in tactics. They always attacked using the same "human wave" approach- with the outstretched "horns" of the flanking regiments encircling the opposing force, followed by crushing pressure from the main force units of the central "chest". Such an approach, and its variants from India to Mexico, was tailor made for easy European victories - see natives charge, see natives get shot down, see natives melt away.
[-----]
When the Zulu showed some flexibility they were much a more dangerous and challenging opponent, even though effectively armed with only spears and shields. At Isandalhana, they charged as usual in the classic "buffalo horn" formation, but they had managed to move up the bulk of their force at night (over 10,000 men) secretly within striking distance of the British, catching them when the redcoat camp was not fully consolidated for easy turkey shooting.
[-----]
At the Battle of the Holbane mountain where they drove back a British column, the Zulu again showed some flexibility, sheltering the regiments in ravines and reverse slopes, and attacking in several swarms when the redcoasts were strung out on the track, rather than advancing in typical, mass human wave fashion to be conveniently shot down by European bullets. At the Intombi River, they carried out a fairly rare night attack, to decimate a British supply force- something that could have been repeated to telling effect on exposed British supply lines. The Zulu War might have had a different outcome had the tribal fighters utilized their advantages more flexibly, and deployed more manpower over a wider area. They failed for example to attack the British rear area at Natal when it was at their mercy, fatally allowing the redcoats some leisure to resupply, re-equip, and redeploy.
[-----]
The same inflexibility marked Japanese operations in WWII as the Battle of Midway amply shows. Numerous battles can be detailed and the detail shows that parts of Hanson's thesis can sometimes be questionable. Hanson could have dealt more too with how the West can mobilize more massive resources on a sustained, and wider scale than non-Western opponents. This was certainly the case against Japan- enabling the US to advance on what some claim to be a "wasteful" 2 front approach- Nimitz's Central Pacific, and MacArthur's SouthWest prong.
Nevertheless, as a broad brush, broad stroke theory, Hanson's work certainly has much to commend it.
Rating:
Summary: Some sticks, some doesn't
Review: Ugh, it's the spaghetti strategy applied to military history! Hanson throws so much stuff on the wall that some of it is bound to stick. The problem is that some of the sticky stuff is excellent (indeed, bordering on brilliant), while some is just plain wrong (indeed, foolishly and demonstrably so). The entire project is guided by a conservative "reclaiming the west" motif that will make Hanson a darling of everyone from William Bennett and Pat Buchanan to Lynn Cheney and Diane Ravitch. It's a shame, because the book is extremely readable without the righist diatribes, which can only make cringe those without an ideological axe to grind.
Rating:
Summary: Good Thesis, Interesting, But Sometimes a Stretch
Review: Carnage and Culture is an interesting book with an interesting thesis: That Democratic countries are the best war machines since Democracy imbibes its fighters with a spirit and a sense of gain and loss impossible for other societies. Mr. Hanson, despite some flaws does a good job of making the arguments.The book is also an interesting response to Jared Diamond's more deterministic thesis presented in Guns, Germs and Steel. However, I think the battles chosen were chosen to specifically match the thesis and that a more thorough view of other battles may prove part of the thesis wrong. In other words I sometimes wonder if Mr. Hanson is stretching to prove a point. I also have some problems with Mr. Hanson's organization. While he makes his points he also seems to bounce around within each section so that the section does not necessarily seem unified by chronology or theme. This also makes parts of the book seem repetitive. This problem is exacerbated by Mr. Hanson's proclivity toward stating a fact multiple times. Still it is a good book and I found certain sections, like the one on Roarke's Drift especially fascinating.
Rating:
Summary: Eye-opening
Review: Before I read this book, I always assumed the dominance of the West was due to some luck; quick to use firearms, a few good generals etc. This book shows how important free markets, free minds, and liberty are in waging war and maintaining power. Magnificent book.
Rating:
Summary: A Must-Read for Military Members
Review: Classics professor Hanson uses seven battles in recorded history to exemplify the characteristics of western values that make our military what it is today. Whether one uses this as merely an innovative way to string together events in military history or a celebration of western values and their victories, this is an enlightening and fascinating read. Packed with detail and analysis, this is a dense read but worth the effort. I recommend this for any member of the military who wants to better understand our history.
Rating:
Summary: Hanson was far better in is precedent book
Review: "Carnage and Culture" by Victor Davis Hanson is an answer-book to Jared Diamond's "Guns, germs and steel" : if the UCLA's biologist explicated the western supremacy of the world with environmental and naturalistic causes, the historian from Fresno explicated with military reasons ; the West won cause he introduced a new way to warfare(this idea is not original at all, but was introduced by John Keegan).
This is a two-faces book : Hanson is good, often wonderful, when he describe battles and their horrors, is disputable when he express his ideology, sometimes ridiculous : English soldier of the XIX century was better than Zulu warrior only for gun, not for liberalism. Hanson was far more convincing in his precedent book "The Western Way of War", dedicated only to ancient Greece.
How many stars ? It depends from your political view : one if you're radical, two if you're liberal, three if you're moderate, four if you're conservative...
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