Rating: 
Summary: Excellent!
Review: 2004 marks the 50th anniversary of the epic battle of Dien Bien Phu, easily one of the most significant military engagements of the 20th Century. It marked the end of French dominance in Indochina and the French Empire itself; propelled the aggressive USSR/Red Chinese backed Viet Minh into power in North Vietnam, then into conflict with the U.S. and its South Vietnamese ally; on to conflict with Cambodia and its former ally, China; and contributed to generally increased Cold War tensions from Korea to Germany; North Africans who fought for the French in Viet Nam were soon fighting against them back in Algeria. I read the entire book, which is something of a challenge since there is arguably too much information in this 500 page, small type face work. The days of the pre-battle preparation and the 58-day siege itself are told in great detail and with dozens of similar-sounding small unit abbreviations and difficult-for-most-Americans to remember French and other foreign names. It's almost overwhelming and one is tempted to skip a lot of it, but the hundreds of details and vignettes give the reader a cumulative impression of the thousands of actual details and vignettes experienced by the combatants (from the French forces' perspective) that actually comprised the unimaginable, for anyone without infantry experience, hellish experience. The approximately 20,000 men in the French Forces' represent a startling diversity of nationalities. It was, after all, a colonial French force. The initial garrison had only 13% French Mainland troops, although since a third of the volunteers who jumped in as replacements during the siege were French the total French Mainland representation was about 18%. The largest number of troops were Foreign Legion (26%, mostly German, Eastern European and Spanish) and Vietnamese Regulars (27%), followed by North Africans (18% of the initial garrison, almost none of the volunteer replacements, mostly Algerian and Moroccan) and the remainder were Vietnamese "auxiliaries" (upcountry ethnic groups, 10%) and less than 2% sub-Saharan Africans. The North Africans sustained the highest casualty rate, 68% of their numbers were killed, missing or wounded and the Foreign Legion casualty rate was nearly 60%. French Mainlanders who were only 18% of the battle force comprised 25% of those killed. There were about 12,000 total casualties before the 360 mile death march to POW camps and many more deaths. Clearly, the besieged troops fought gallantly and fearsomely - Viet Minh casualties were perhaps four times higher - but the initial French strategy, if you can call it that, of drawing the Viet Minh to a remote battlefield with little strategic importance seems idiotic and the logistical execution was, at best, mediocre. French fortifications were pathetically inadequate and only after the battle began did officers request instruction manuals for building fortified trenches! The initial Viet Minh artillery barrage was so unexpectedly overwhelming, despite surprisingly accurate pre-battle intelligence about Viet Minh capabilities, that the French artillery colonel who bragged Viet Minh guns would never touch French Forces committed suicide shortly after the battle started. A few French idiosyncrasies will astound American veterans. Within the fortress throughout the battle were two official French Army Mobile Brothels, one with Vietnamese women and the other with Algerians. Although they couldn't bring in enough engineering materials to properly fortify their positions the French made room on pre-battle supply flights for 45,000 gallons of wine, and then airdropped additional French Army-developed wine concentrate during the battle itself, causing troops to mount aggressive missions into Viet Minh lines to liberate wine concentrate that fell outside the fort! Both sides fought with American equipment. Most of the French artillery, radios, vehicles, aircraft and even one aircraft carrier that supported the garrison came from the U.S. The Viet Minh got lots of American artillery and other supplies the Chinese had captured in Korea, where a cease fire occurred less than nine months before the battle started. During the battle about 10% of the Viet Minh ammunition came from air drops that fell into Viet Minh lines, often from C-119s piloted by American civilians. As the situation deteriorated the French begged the United States to unleash B-29s to carpet bomb the Viet Minh. More than 60 bombers plus jet escorts staged on Okinawa and in the Philippines (some reportedly repainted in French colors), USAF officers made planning flights over the battlefield, and two U.S. carriers deployed to what 10 years later would be called Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf. In the end Eisenhower, as well as the British, declined to intervene in support of the French, a fact that contributed to France all but dropping out of NATO. In a section about the French forces' experience in Communist POW camps Fall describes how during the battle Viet Minh political commissars gathered prisoners every morning to tell them details about how badly the battle had gone the prior day for French Forces. POWs who agreed to sit in a special section and cheer each time a piece of bad news or casualty count regarding the French forces was read got extra food and medicine and did not have to work so hard. The Communist captors awarded such prisoners who cheered their own side's losses with the title of "progressives." It reminds me a little too mcuh of some self-styled "progressives" in the U.S. in 2004. The grainy black and white photo reproductions are interesting, especially seeing the pictures of some of the warriors - man, some of those French generals had big noses! Sketch maps throughout the book supposedly illustrate the battlefield and how the lines evolved over time but I found them incomprehensible. Highly recommended for military history and Cold War buffs or military veterans. Anyone who thinks things aren't going so well in Afghanistan or Iraq needs to read this for a sense of perspective.
Rating:
Summary: This Epic Battle Ended 50 Years Ago
Review: 2004 marks the 50th anniversary of the epic battle of Dien Bien Phu, easily one of the most significant military engagements of the 20th Century. It marked the end of French dominance in Indochina and the French Empire itself; propelled the aggressive USSR/Red Chinese backed Viet Minh into power in North Vietnam, then into conflict with the U.S. and its South Vietnamese ally; on to conflict with Cambodia and its former ally, China; and contributed to generally increased Cold War tensions from Korea to Germany; North Africans who fought for the French in Viet Nam were soon fighting against them back in Algeria. I read the entire book, which is something of a challenge since there is arguably too much information in this 500 page, small type face work. The days of the pre-battle preparation and the 58-day siege itself are told in great detail and with dozens of similar-sounding small unit abbreviations and difficult-for-most-Americans to remember French and other foreign names. It's almost overwhelming and one is tempted to skip a lot of it, but the hundreds of details and vignettes give the reader a cumulative impression of the thousands of actual details and vignettes experienced by the combatants (from the French forces' perspective) that actually comprised the unimaginable, for anyone without infantry experience, hellish experience. The approximately 20,000 men in the French Forces' represent a startling diversity of nationalities. It was, after all, a colonial French force. The initial garrison had only 13% French Mainland troops, although since a third of the volunteers who jumped in as replacements during the siege were French the total French Mainland representation was about 18%. The largest number of troops were Foreign Legion (26%, mostly German, Eastern European and Spanish) and Vietnamese Regulars (27%), followed by North Africans (18% of the initial garrison, almost none of the volunteer replacements, mostly Algerian and Moroccan) and the remainder were Vietnamese "auxiliaries" (upcountry ethnic groups, 10%) and less than 2% sub-Saharan Africans. The North Africans sustained the highest casualty rate, 68% of their numbers were killed, missing or wounded and the Foreign Legion casualty rate was nearly 60%. French Mainlanders who were only 18% of the battle force comprised 25% of those killed. There were about 12,000 total casualties before the 360 mile death march to POW camps and many more deaths. Clearly, the besieged troops fought gallantly and fearsomely - Viet Minh casualties were perhaps four times higher - but the initial French strategy, if you can call it that, of drawing the Viet Minh to a remote battlefield with little strategic importance seems idiotic and the logistical execution was, at best, mediocre. French fortifications were pathetically inadequate and only after the battle began did officers request instruction manuals for building fortified trenches! The initial Viet Minh artillery barrage was so unexpectedly overwhelming, despite surprisingly accurate pre-battle intelligence about Viet Minh capabilities, that the French artillery colonel who bragged Viet Minh guns would never touch French Forces committed suicide shortly after the battle started. A few French idiosyncrasies will astound American veterans. Within the fortress throughout the battle were two official French Army Mobile Brothels, one with Vietnamese women and the other with Algerians. Although they couldn't bring in enough engineering materials to properly fortify their positions the French made room on pre-battle supply flights for 45,000 gallons of wine, and then airdropped additional French Army-developed wine concentrate during the battle itself, causing troops to mount aggressive missions into Viet Minh lines to liberate wine concentrate that fell outside the fort! Both sides fought with American equipment. Most of the French artillery, radios, vehicles, aircraft and even one aircraft carrier that supported the garrison came from the U.S. The Viet Minh got lots of American artillery and other supplies the Chinese had captured in Korea, where a cease fire occurred less than nine months before the battle started. During the battle about 10% of the Viet Minh ammunition came from air drops that fell into Viet Minh lines, often from C-119s piloted by American civilians. As the situation deteriorated the French begged the United States to unleash B-29s to carpet bomb the Viet Minh. More than 60 bombers plus jet escorts staged on Okinawa and in the Philippines (some reportedly repainted in French colors), USAF officers made planning flights over the battlefield, and two U.S. carriers deployed to what 10 years later would be called Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf. In the end Eisenhower, as well as the British, declined to intervene in support of the French, a fact that contributed to France all but dropping out of NATO. In a section about the French forces' experience in Communist POW camps Fall describes how during the battle Viet Minh political commissars gathered prisoners every morning to tell them details about how badly the battle had gone the prior day for French Forces. POWs who agreed to sit in a special section and cheer each time a piece of bad news or casualty count regarding the French forces was read got extra food and medicine and did not have to work so hard. The Communist captors awarded such prisoners who cheered their own side's losses with the title of "progressives." It reminds me a little too mcuh of some self-styled "progressives" in the U.S. in 2004. The grainy black and white photo reproductions are interesting, especially seeing the pictures of some of the warriors - man, some of those French generals had big noses! Sketch maps throughout the book supposedly illustrate the battlefield and how the lines evolved over time but I found them incomprehensible. Highly recommended for military history and Cold War buffs or military veterans. Anyone who thinks things aren't going so well in Afghanistan or Iraq needs to read this for a sense of perspective.
Rating:
Summary: A Classic of Military History
Review: Bernard B. Fall's 'Hell in a Very Small Place" is undeniably a classic of military history. It has at one time or another been an assigned text at the U.S. Naval War College and West Point. Fall had an unusual career as an academic who conducted field research by accompanying first French forces and later Americans into combat in Indochina. Such dedication to his work eventually cost him his life.
"Hell in a Very Small Place" is the definitive account of the battle at Dienbienphu -- a debacle that ended the French empire in Indochina. It is a sad tale of folly. The arrogance and stupidity of French political and military leaders are only partially redeemed by the valor and esprit of their soldiers -- French, Vietnamese, and Legionaires. They made a mistake fatal to many throughout history by underestimating the enemy. French generals believed their firepower, air support, and professional soldiery would allow them to annihilate the Viet Minh in open combat. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap displayed the strategic vision, logistical flexibility, and the tactical determination to turn the tables and instead destroy the French Union's elite forces.
Fall's book is not only well written and readable, but also authoritative. His research is thorough, using both primary and secondary sources. In 1966 David Schoenbrun said of "Hell in a Very Small Place" that "future historians will be using Fall's book as their main source material." Thirty six years after publication, that statement is still true.
Rating:
Summary: "Those Who Fail To Learn From The Mistakes of the Past. . ."
Review: Bernard Fall's book, HELL IN A VERY SMALL PLACE is the definitive history of the battle of Dien Bien Phu, a battle that had serious implications for generations to follow. In it, he recounts in detail the planning and execution of the battle at all levels. The possibility that a small, preindustrial state like Vietnam could defeat a modern army never entered the minds of the French, until it was too late.
The Communists were adept at waging war at the military and political levels simultaneously. In order for the political, main attack to succeed, Dien Bien Phu had to be in Communist hands prior to the Geneva Convention. The number of casualties the North Viets had to sustain was irrelevant so long as they got what they wanted: a strong bargaining position at Geneva. After France left, if Communism was going to be contained in Indochina, America was going to have to do it.
Communist tactics such as moving artillery pieces and the tons of ammunition to support them down seemingly impassable roads and digging anaconda-like trenches around French positions slowly choking the life out of the garrison would soon be seen again by American soldiers. Western planning books said this could not be done. The books were wrong. They would still be wrong a few years later when the Americans arrived.
On the political front, France was reduced to begging for American air support to save the beleagured garrison and with it, their entire position in Indochina. The question of whether the U.S. could or should intervene and if so, how, was debated at the highest levels for weeks. As the politicians and diplomats bickered, the garrison slowly suffered, bled, and died.
HELL IN A VERY SMALL PLACE is a manual for communist political and military tactics used in Vietnam. Our failure to heed the lessons learned there cost many Americans their lives. We indeed failed to learn from the mistakes of the past. As usual, it was the soldiers on the ground who paid the price for those mistakes with their lives.
Rating:
Summary: Essential reading for all Vietnam scholars.
Review: Dien Bien Phu was one of this century's few truly decisive battles. Fall conveys the scope of the tragedy as it unfolded, in the appalling trenches and deadly skies above Dien Bien Phu, the jungle bases of the Viet Minh, the airconditioned offices of the French generals in Hanoi and Saigon and in the political arenas of Paris and Washington. The incredible bravery of the French forces in an impossible situation on the ground is brilliantly contrasted with the incompetence of their political and military leaders.
Rating:
Summary: A tremendous read.
Review: Fall has given an impressive amount of detail; enough to satisfy an historian. At the same time, the book is emotionally engaging and conveys the drama of this long struggle.
Rating: 
Summary: America should've learnt the lesson...
Review: For any fan of military history, and particularly for those interested in America's involvement in South-East Asia, "Hell In A Very Small Place" is crucial reading. It is long and it is packed with enormous detail, but it tells a fateful story very well. After having read most of the literature on 60's Vietnam and the `American War' it was an eye-opener to learn of the role that the then US administration played in the French war of the 50's. 20/20 hindsight's a dangerous thing but after having read Fall's book one does wonder why the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and France's experience in Indo-China were not taken on board to a greater degree by subsequent American governments.
Rating:
Summary: A Seminal Work on a Watershed Event
Review: French colonialism in Indochina has a long and entangled past.
Having first arrived as Jesuit missionaries in the 17th century, and rising as colonial powers in the mid-19th century, the French were established on the Indochinese peninsula for nearly three-hundred years when the Second World War brought forth Japanese expansion into South East Asia. With Europe attempting to stem the blitzkrieg, and France soon to fall to Nazi Germany, the French colonies in Indochina were quickly consumed by the Japanese war machine.
Following the Japanese defeat in WW II, a power-vacuum emerged in South East Asia. In order to fill the vacuum, the nationalist Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, attempted to create a sovereign nation. France, attempting to regain control of its lost colonies quickly sent troops to re-establish control. Thus began the First Indochina war.
Rather than concentrating on the entire conflict, Dr. Fall discusses in depth, perhaps the most defining moment of the war, the siege and fall of Dien Bien Phu.
Based upon countless interviews with active participants and careful analysis of innumerable government documents, Dr. Fall pieces together an amazing history of the battle in nearly minute by minute description. Not only does he discuss the actual battle but also the subsequent political implications that made Dien Bien Phu one of the most decisive events of mid-20th century, comparable to the Cuban Missle Crisis or the end of the Korean War.
Dr. Fall's account is highly readable, dividing the work between strategical analysis and an extensive description of the myriad and strikingly unique men participating in the battle, from the Commander-In-Chief of French forces, to the individual strong point commanders.
Indeed, Fall has produced a seminal work of a watershed event that will remain for sometime the peerless account of Dien Bien Phu and the resulting end to French colonialism in Indochina.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting Battle
Review: Great book by all accounts. Gripping alright, and I couldn't put it down even through the "build-up" stage which some readers (I gather from the reviews here I've read) find boring. Once the battle starts you just won't go to sleep. It also (and this is very important) stays true to the facts and I find Fall an honest historian, which is rare and refreshing. I recomend some further reading on some of the main protagonists in the battle like Dr.Grauwin (wrote a book himself), Godard, Giap, but aspecially Bigeard who went on to greater things in Algeria and elsewhere and ended up a full general. The man is still alive.
I found the book interesting for other reasons too. I'm not French, American or Vietnamese. I spend six months each year in the United States and observed the last year's anti-French campaign there. I found it destasteful. I hope Americans who read this book will reject the portrayal of the French as cowards, for what the French paratroopers did at Dien Bien Phu and how they fought was nothing short of heroic. I also hope that these readers will go on to read other books on history of France and study them carefully. They will find that the French are not just good soldiers (in fact, just as good as anybody), but a truly interesting and great nation too, perhaps closer to you, Americans, than it would appear. After all, they fought for your independence too.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting Battle
Review: Great book by all accounts. Gripping alright, and I couldn't put it down even through the "build-up" stage which some readers (I gather from the reviews here I've read) find boring. Once the battle starts you just won't go to sleep. It also (and this is very important) stays true to the facts and I find Fall an honest historian, which is rare and refreshing. I recomend some further reading on some of the main protagonists in the battle like Dr.Grauwin (wrote a book himself), Godard, Giap, but aspecially Bigeard who went on to greater things in Algeria and elsewhere and ended up a full general. The man is still alive.
I found the book interesting for other reasons too. I'm not French, American or Vietnamese. I spend six months each year in the United States and observed the last year's anti-French campaign there. I found it destasteful. I hope Americans who read this book will reject the portrayal of the French as cowards, for what the French paratroopers did at Dien Bien Phu and how they fought was nothing short of heroic. I also hope that these readers will go on to read other books on history of France and study them carefully. They will find that the French are not just good soldiers (in fact, just as good as anybody), but a truly interesting and great nation too, perhaps closer to you, Americans, than it would appear. After all, they fought for your independence too.
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