Disarming Iraq

Rating:
Summary: Blix couldn't take the candy from a baby -- just too kind.
Review: "Disarming Iraq" is Hans Blix's thought-provoking and historically-important memoir of the few but critical months leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, during which he tried to paint a clear picture -- for the UN and the world -- of his inspection team's findings, claiming no need for urgency and lobbying for diplomacy.

The polarized atmosphere was palpably tense: while the U.S., the UK and Spain insisted that Iraq was not responding to inspections, France, Germany and Russia asserted with equal force that the inspection program had never been fully explored.

Parting the raging waters (for a few weeks, anyway) was the quintessential diplomat Hans Blix. As it reads, he was too diplomatic, unwilling to state his results confidently for fear that it might drive UN policy. It didn?t help that he had a few doubts of his own; that in spite of not finding any "smoking guns" in terms of banned weapons, he still sensed that Iraq was playing a cat-and-mouse game. Either the regime's odd narcissism allowed it to believe that it did not have to comply with the UN, or it was hiding something. Either way, Blix's hesitation was enough to set the stage for Colin Powell's historic February 5, 2003 presentation of evidence of WMD?s in Iraq, which was more or less the proverbial point of no return.

Apparently, what Mr. Blix was trying to tell us -- before he was drowned out by the noisy din of a fearful and overzealous media -- is now common knowledge about WMD?s in Iraq: Blix's commission failed to find anything not because the Iraqis succeeded at hiding the weapons, moving them ahead of inspections, but because the weapons really weren?t there. Iraq had disarmed at the end of the Gulf War in 1991, just as they?d claimed. The UN inspection program had worked -- without knowing it.

So how did the war move forward under false pretenses? According to Blix, "a deficit of critical thinking" was to blame. He speculates that our Congress would never affirm the use of force merely to end a reign of terror (even though Blix himself wishes for a UN resolution against brutal dictatorships). The Bush administration had to justify war in Iraq by linking it to terror, and since there was no real link, it had to capitalize on the "theoretical" link of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

This is as far as his speculation goes. Where the phrase "military industrial complex" would seem most natural and expected -- followed by a salacious tell-all about Bush, Cheney and nefarious links to Saudi oil -- Blix cleverly sidesteps the issue of America's impatient itch for war by feigning ignorance. Giving Blix the benefit of the doubt, perhaps he prefers to be thought of as naive and not sensational.

Needless to say, Dr. David Kelly's death (the British scientist who leaked to the BBC that the British government had "sexed up" a document alleging Iraq's nuclear capabilities) was an "unfortunate suicide" -- and not the work of a shadow government. (The entire document, by the way, turned out to be a forgery.)

At least Blix observed the "horse trading" ("intense economic and diplomatic pressures") our government used to obtain votes from other countries -- votes needed to pass the UN resolution authorizing the use of force -- as well as he disapproved the Bush administration?s spying on UN delegations while on their diplomatic visits to New York. Blix had other objections to U.S.-led efforts, but they are all based on facts and evidence, and are in defense of IAEA (a previous inspection organization, also headed by Blix) and UNMOVIC (the UN's Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission).

Interestingly, the largest setback to diplomacy was related to a 167-page "cluster" document released by Blix in early March of 2003, which summarized all the inspections for the three preceding months. Unfortunately for France and Germany, American and British members of UNMOVIC leaked pre-release draft copies of the document. In other words, France and Germany had much less time to prepare their official reactions to the cluster document than their British and American counterparts. Their positions, in favor of renewed inspections, were not as compelling.

While Blix?s passion is definitely enough to carry his memoirs, one can easily see why it was so difficult for Americans to take Mr. Blix seriously: he lacks that forcible personality that commands respect. Even so, he is gifted with an even temperament, a good sense of humor, and a deeply-imbued sense of integrity, all important qualities for diplomacy. Although he may have been the only individual capable of peaceably bridging the large gap between the UN and Iraq, in retrospect it may have been asking too much from some of our leaders to match Blix?s diplomatic efforts in their reasonableness and patience.

Rating:
Summary: Honest if slightly flawed
Review: A number of former inspectors have written accounts on Iraq. Among these have been Scott Ritter and Hans Blix, both of whom claimed that Iraq was not a threat and that America acted too soon, in the first case Clinton's "Desert Fox" and in the second case the recent invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The problem here is quite simple. The inspectors didn't find weapons. Does this mean they don't exist? No. The weapons did exist in the 80s and 90s. in 1982 even the Israelis had to bomb Iraq's nuclear facility. The Iraqi stockpiles and use of chemicals weapons in the 80s were widely documented. So What happened to all this contraband? Apparently it disappeared.

This account tells the story of the short lived and totally unsuccessful attempt by Hans Blix and his team in 2002-2003 to discover the banned Iraqi weapons. One must remember Hussein had kicked out the inspectors after Desert Fox, and rightfully so. The problem with the inspection, which this personal account doesn't explain, is that they were a charade and a failure from the start. The Inspection were set up to fail. In 'Resurrection of Saddam Hussein' the details of the inspectors desert hide-and-seek game is plainly explained. Here we have a case where the weapons they were looking for could be concealed in someone's basement. So in the end this book leaves the reader with cold feet. Clearly Blix feels that the inspections didn't find anything and probably never would have. But this doesn't really preclude the existence of weapons it simply means they were readily visible.

Seth J. Frantzman

Rating:
Summary: Clear and Factual
Review: An excellect recounting of the inspection process by the man who was there with no apparent bias. Makes very clear the problem he had with all of the political factions pushing for a particular outcome.

Rating:
Summary: sleeper
Review: As a reporter who has covered Dr Blix extensively, I found the book
disaappointing... No real news revealed in the book...Most are no more than recollections of well documented news stories.....In instances where personal recollections could make a difference, such as secret meetings with WH National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Blix says little.

As confirmed by the publsiher, the book was hastily written to capitalize on the US political election year....I would have preferred a more detailed book with more personal tones included even if that meant the book coming out several months later....

While interesting the book was disappointing.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting perspective-not exactly a page turner though
Review: Disarming Iraq by Hans Blix provides some interesting insights into the Iraqi WMD debate from the man in the vortex of that pre-war debate.

As one would suspect from a book written by a scientist cum international bureaucrat, the text is somewhat turgid and at times it takes a bit of slogging to get through the text.

That being said, the book is pretty interesting. The major thing that strikes one, especially given the post-war realization that WMD's weren't in Iraq, is Blix's pre-war conviction, based more on a gut feeling rather than any special insight, data or analysis, that WMD's probably did exist in some significant concentrations.

The other interesting conclusion of the book is Mr. Blix's assertion that the fault for the conflict rests, basically, with Saddam Hussein. Granted, Mr. Blix does have some very pointed, and not very complimentary remarks to make about the positions and actions of Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair. He definitely feels that the inspection process should have been accorded more time to do its work and is pretty critical of some of the timelines the Americans and British placed upon the process. On the other hand, he explicitly points to the fact that the Iraqi regime never, at any time, lived up to either the letter or the spirit of UN resolution 1441. He also agrees that, once the military buildup had reached a critical mass having it simple sit in lace indefinitely was not a viable option for anyone. The 1441 resolution was unanimous, the force was present, the decision to comply or defy rested with Saddam. It was, in effect, says Mr. Blix, Saddam' own obduracy that, in the end, did him in.

In the end what Mr. Blix communicates is an overwhelming sense of frustration. He truly believes that, given a reasonable continuation of proximate implied force and sufficient time, the inspection regime would have worked. The fundamental question, which Blix can present but not answer, is whether, in the final analysis, WMD's were the reason or the pretext for the war. If the former, his argument for more time is persuasive. If the latter, it's irrelevant, as any of a slew of other pretexts could have-and would have-- been concocted by the Americans and British to justify invading.

I doubt this book will change many minds--those who opposed the war will find fodder for their cause. UN haters will simply see evidence of the anti-US bias they always see at the UN. However, for the objective reader--if there are any out there--this is a uniquely informative read.

Rating:
Summary: One More Piece of the Puzzle
Review: Disarming Iraq is a clear and straightforward book. For a lifelong diplomat, Blix he doesn't pull many punches. There is a good deal of history here and some technical explanations for those who are interested. I wanted to get straight to the dirt, though.

After reading newspaper accounts of who met with whom in the months before March, 2003, I wanted to get the inside scoop on what Condoleezza Rice really said to Blix, what Blix said to Blair, and what Blix was thinking as Colin Powell made his presentation the U.N. in February, 2003.

Blix does not disappoint. Although his style is rather understated, he usually says what he thinks. There is no love lost between him and Dick Cheney or Paul Wolfowitz. He has a certain amount of respect, tinged with pity, for Colin Powell. He seems to admire Condoleezza Rice.

As for George W. Bush, Blix says little, but even that is revealing. "His manners contrasted sharply with the vice president's measured way of talking and moving. He makes a boyish impression, moves with agility, and frequently changes his posture in his chair. With some self-deprecation, he said that, contrary to what was being alleged, he was no wild, gung-ho Texan bent on dragging the U.S. into war. He would let the Security Council talk about a resolution--but not for long. He mentioned the League of Nations." I get a picture of a man fidgeting in his chair, impatient to get this short meeting over with and making a non-sequitur about the League of Nations to a puzzled Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei.

Disarming Iraq is one more piece of the puzzle that is slowly revealing how we came to invade and occupy an Iraq that evidently was not a threat to the West after all. This along with Ron Suskind's The Price of Loyalty, Richard Clarke's Against Our Enemies, and the many books to follow may eventually show what happened and why.

Rating:
Summary: Balanced account of the efforts to disarm Iraq
Review: Every time that Hans Blix, who was in charge of the UN team to disarm Iraq, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, both hawks and doves found material to support their positions. This book, which tells of his efforts to disarm Iraq from 1991 to 2003, is likely to do the same.

The initial impression is twofold: that the intelligence presented to support the war was questionable; and that Mr. Blix was unlikely to lead the aggressive inspections that the American administration claimed were necessary to find Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Soon, however, there is much more of the first and less of the second.

To be sure, Mr. Blix is a civil servant and not a politician. As such he tries to avoid getting into political discussions; when he does turn political, he is clearly at his weakest. His various jabs, usually aimed at the American government, and his interjections often distract from the narrative and even invite readers to wonder how much his views have colored his professional work (not much is my take).

All the same, Mr. Blix gives a very balanced assessment of the pre-war intelligence. He admits that his gut feeling was that Saddam Hussein did have weapons of mass destruction. But he argues that there was never any concrete evidence to support that hypothesis; and he goes point-by-point to the various facts claimed by the Americans, British, and his own team to substantiate his position.

In all, "Disarming Iraq" is neither an easy read nor burdensome. Much of the information in the book is in the public domain; yet the way that Mr. Blix has brought everything together, alongside with his commentary and perspective, is undoubtedly going to make "Disarming Iraq" an indispensable read on the war in Iraq.

Rating:
Summary: A very good account of the WMD debate
Review: For all of the distortion of facts, lying and obfuscation that occurred surrounding the Iraq war Hans Blix, along with Mahomed AlBaradei, were probably the only two central figures to come out of this debate with clean hands. These two men are truly great diplomats and statesmen.

This is book contains Blix's account of his experiences leading up to the war. He does so in a style that is unbiased and pluralistic. I suspect in times to come this book will be held as one of the authoritative accounts of the lead up to the war.

Without going into the details of this book there is really little else that I can say. Blix's account is a truthful relation of his experiences that he dealt with in a critical and unprejudiced frame of mind. This book is well suited to anyone who is interested in the politics leading up to the war. However informative, it is a bit dry and not the most entertaining read so it would not be appropriate for people who are interested in partisan rhetoric.

Rating:
Summary: Presents the Other View of Iraq's WMD Program
Review: For some reason this book did not generate a lot of interest but the book was actually a good read. I learned a few new things from a different perspective and would recommend the book to get an alternative viewpoint.

In summary his basic comments were that Iraq was not a threat and it was essentially contained and dis-armed since 1992, and the inspectors should have been allowed to complete their mission. Personally I found his arguments compelling and it seems to me that a month or two here or there would have made little difference since Iraq was not in compliance for almost 10 years or more and a few months more was not that important. The book can be read in one evening and it is mostly a good light read, and you will not be disappointed. Often I give away my books, but I kept the Blix book.

In any case, to check on Iraq and the WMD's the UN hired Hans Blix late in 2002. Dr. Blix is not the most dynamic guy but he is solid. He was a Swedish diplomat, US educated at Columbia where his son goes now, low key, highly competent, and he was the IAEA chief for twenty years - now just retired. On paper he is a world expert. Blix was subject to a lot of criticism in some US media and by Vice President Cheney who called the inspectors "useless" and Blix was portrayed as a bungling fool like the famous French detective Inspector Cluseau in a Peter Sellers movie. But really this is far from being an accurate portrayal. He was in fact head of the IAEA for 20 years and one of the world's experts on nuclear programs. This book is Blix's chance to answer his critics all in his own words, no media translation.

As a book it is an easy to read and surprisingly fast moving. It covers the inspectors, Resolution 1441, talks with the US and others, the spring deadline of 2003 and the start of the Iraq invasion - all from his perspective. I thought it might be a bit plodding but it is not. It is a quick light read of about 275 pages and very well written that can be mostly covered in one evening. In short it is a good book and deserves at least 4 stars.

The book is excellent but probably not as good as the book by Craig Unger - House of Bush, House of Saud. That is the best read of the current crop of books. Also the Richard Clarke book is better, but the Blix book is up near the top of the list and I think that it is a must read. I made a 25 book listmania list of the best books on the subject or closely related. But a book review is no substitute for reading the book.

Worth the buy and the read. Recommend.

Jack in Toronto


Rating:
Summary: Read Between the Lines
Review: Hans Blix has spent a lifetime as a diplomat, and you would expect him to couch his criticisms in pleasant-sounding phrases. Much of the time he does just that, but every now and then, he lets fly with a real, unadulterated opinion. Near the end of Disarming Iraq, he "suggests" that Tony Blair and George Bush and their advisors misled the public by asserting categorically that weapons of mass destruction existed. In the world of international diplomacy, I suppose that is what passes for a slap in the face.

In the run up to the war, there was a lot of behind-the-scenes maneuvering and endless analysis by pundits and the press. It is fascinating to be able to read one inside player's report on what was said in those private meetings. I was surprised to find that Blix has great regard and admiration for Condoleezza Rice. I was less surprised to find that he has respect and perhaps pity for Colin Powell, and no use at all for Dick Cheney or Paul Wolfowitz.

Blix is thorough in describing the history of arms inspection and the history of the U.N.'s dealings with Iraq. Certainly this is useful and important information, but for me the appeal of Disarming Iraq is the description of what was happening in the weeks and days before Iraq was invaded in 2003.

Blix's accounts of his meetings with Cheney and Wolfowitz are chilling. His meeting with Tony Blair less chilling (Blair offered him crumpets), and the meeting with Bush, revealing.

Blix, in ultra-diplomatic mode here, writes of how Bush's manner contrasted sharply with that of Cheney's, how he makes a "boyish impression" and "frequently changes his posture in his chair." He told Blix and ElBaradei that he was no wild Texan bent on war, that he would let the Security Council talk about a resolution, but not for long. Bush "mentioned the League of Nations." You get a picture here of Bush, impatient and fidgety, making non-sequiturs about the League of Nations, and eager to get this useless meeting out of the way.