Rating: 
Summary: Two wars or one? Two books or one?
Review: Having just recently read Fromkin's "A Peace to End All Peace," I was chomping at the bit to read this book. As I got farther into it I became more and more puzzled. Maybe that's because like WWI, which Fromkin contends started as two wars, this book is really two books.
The first book, which I have no trouble recommending, is one of popular history. It does presuppose a knowledge of late 19th and early 20th century history, but presumably the interested reader has that. Some reviewers prefer Tuchman's "Guns of August" here, but Fromkin's book shows that her analysis is now dated. This is a revisionist text.
The second book, coexisting uneasily with the first, is a work by a major historian. This is the problem, at least for someone trained as an historian. Fromkin's documentation is skeletal at the best. Granted that many of his chapters are extremely short, but even his longer ones rate only three or four end notes. These are a strange adaption of the Modern Language Association's rules (which I hate anyway); the end note cites the page number, the year of the publication, and the author's name. But to find the title of the publication one must look back still farther to the Bibliography. Talk about cumbersome!
Beyond this, the end notes and the Bibliography are incomplete: on p. 138 Fromkin refers to a writing of Rebecca West "...whose account of Balkan affairs is still considered classic...", but he doesn't cite this "classic" work in the endnotes, let alone in the Bibliography. Furthermore, on pp. 267 and 273 Fromkin cites two different German historians. Once again he does not include these citations in the end notes nor the Bibliography. The only reason I can imagine for this oversight is that their works have not been translated, but I don't know this for sure. Certainly the citations and the Bibliography are only to books (few articles) available in English. At any rate, these omissions (and there may be others I didn't catch), are unacceptable in an historian of Fromkin's stature.
Rating: 
Summary: A new & important book.
Review: You will enoy this book if you're interested in Europe's political history just before the war that changed everything. To this day, we are living with the consequences of World War I.
We all know, in broad terms the events & attitudes leading up to the war.The heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, Francis Ferdinand & his wife Sophia, were assassinated in Serbia by anarchists. Austria needed to punish Serbia & prepared for war. They sought assurances from Germany that they would support them in the event of Russian intervention. Russia was an ally of Serbia. Germany, led by Kaiser Wilhelm was only too happy to oblige. But these things are never as cut & dried as they may seem. At the time, several of the royal heads of Europe were related. Czar Nicholas II of Russia, the kaiser & King George V of Great Britain were cousins. Althogh friendly, they were suspicious of each other especially Kaiser Wilheim. Communications lagged. When Russia mobilized it did not mean the same as it did in Germany, that war was immenent. It simply was a heighten sense of readiness, nothing more. But all the eventual combatants had their own issues, which Mr. Fromkin explains in great detail. Germany felt that a general war was inevetable. They wanted to control the where & when. Europe had been at relative peace for 100 years. There had been localized skirmishes & minor wars such as the Franco-Prussian War, but nothing major. It was probably the longest period of peace Europe had in may centuries. So Austria wanted to wipe Serbia off the map of Europe & Germany would faciltate that. Even so, Austria wavered, delaying an invasion for many weeks. When it came it was weak & ineffectual. The Austria-Hungarian Empire was dying & everybody knew it. Eventually the dominoes fell & we had what is still known as the Great War.
Rating:
Summary: Well Organized, But Not Necessarily Original
Review: David Fromkin has produced a convenient summary of the events of the summer of 1914. If you want to know what happened on one particular day during those fateful July and August weeks, this book is particularly suitable in that it covers events day by day and almost hour by hour. The short, choppy chapters tend to be repetitive at times, and Fromkin's tendency to refer to other authors' ideas can be annoying if, like most of us, one is not familiar with their writings. Fromkin's most interesting point is that the war was actually two conflicts: one a local Austrian-Serbian conflict that was quickly forgotten by everyone else, and the second a long planned move by the Germans to prevent what they saw as their inevitable decline in Europe. In light of recent events in Iraq, Fromkin also does a good job of explaining how carefully laid plans can spin out of control and turn what was planned to be a short war into a long drawn out quagmire. This is a short summary of a very complex subject. It will be satisfactory for those who want or need a quick look at the beginning of the Great War. Those who desire a more indepth study should refer to the classic: Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August.
Rating: 
Summary: One of the best books available on WWI
Review: Destined to be the definitive account of the causes of this conflict for years to come. The text is a concise 300 pages, broken into very short chapters of between three and ten pages each, making it a quick read. The form makes it an enjoyable history as well as lending to the clarity of the author's argument. This is not a history of the war itself but of the background and events leading to the start of hostilities. It provides an excellent analysis of the 37 days between the assassination in Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the declarations of war. A must read for those who have been confused by or have trouble remembering why exactly the catastrophe took place. The main thesis is that much of what has been accepted as conventional wisdom regarding the war's causes for the last century is misguided. High officials in the German and Austrian governments conspired to wage two wars of aggression - Austria against Serbia, Germany against Russia. These officials bear sole responsibility for the "Great War". This plot was formed well before June 28th, 1914. The date served only as a pretext for the violence previously planned by these two powers. The author disproves several myths. One - that the war came as a complete surprise to a peaceful Europe. Two - there actually was no Schlieffen Plan. Three - that a rigid structure of alliances coupled with railway schedules and irreversible mobilization plans caused the war. Much of the criticism of Mr. Fromkin's book from other reviewers on this site is, in the opinion of this reader, unfounded. This topic is too important and complex and encompasses too much history to be covered in a magazine article. Fromkin's research is complete. His A Peace to End All Peace should attest to his mastery of the era. Far from boring, the form only accentuates the author's case and reduces the confusing nature of the subject. Also, I'm not sure originality should be a goal in history writing - rather truth and clarity. A simple map at the beginning and a highly useful index of all the players at the end make this a great history as well as reference. This was a long-needed book. David Fromkin is a great historian.
Rating:
Summary: A complete and well written mosaic of the causes of WWI
Review: EUROPE'S LAST SUMMER: WHO STARTED THE GREAT WAR IN 1914? by David Fromkin is an accessible, complete narrative of the various factions, individuals and national situations that contributed to the beginning of Austria's war on Serbia and World War I in 1914.
Yes, I distinguish two different wars, as that is part of Fromkin's thesis, that it wasn't one war, but two, based on two separate agendas, and Fromkin goes so far in the final chapters to lay the blame for the war on the doorsteps of specific individuals in Austria and Germany, based on recently discovered documents and other historical records.
This book, which deals only with what (who) started the war, seeks to refute the idea that the Great War broke out of nowhere in a clear and pleasant European summer, and/or was the result of war plans that once begun could not be stopped. Fromkin follows issues from the Franco-Prussian war in the 1870s and the unification of Germany under Bismarck, also in the later 1800s, to the declarations of war in the summer of 1914 among Germany, Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria, Serbia, Italy, Belgium, etc., etc.
I love the way Fromkin depicts the mosaic of economic, political, social and xenophobic issues that cause the blaze of war in August 1914. While the assasination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand is the oft-cited reason for the war (that's what I learned in 7th grade social studies with Mrs. Johnson), his death (by a "lucky"
Gavrilo Princip, whose coconspirators missed or pulled out with their bombs and guns) was the pretense for Austria to start its much desired war against Serbia in an effort to quash Russian influence in the Balkans, where it had just annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina from the Ottoman Empire. Ironically, according to Fromkin, Princip shot one of the two men who didn't want war against Serbia. By shooting Franz Ferdinand, Princip made it more likely that Austria would attack.
The other person who originally consistently came down on the side of peace was the German ruler, Kaiser Wilhelm II. But he was increasingly marginalized by his civil and military government administrators, and his reluctance to go to war was put aside by his emotional reaction to the death of Franz Ferdinand. (The Kaiser seems to have been the only person in Europe who had any affection for the unlikeable archduke.) With these two influential parties out of the way, Austria-Hungary was free to proceed with its plan to wipe Serbia off the map, and Germany was free to declare the war it had wanted for years -- with
Russia and France.
Ironically, the German military establishment knew, based on a situation in Morocco shortly before, that Austria would not be there for them, should they go to war against Russia, so strategists there were waiting for a scenario in which Austria was the wronged party, so that Germany could go to war in her favor, as her ally. When the archduke was assasinated, the situation presented itself, but according to Fromkin, Germany
expected Austria to subvert its own war with Serbia -- because Austria was to have squashed Serbia one-on-one ASAP after the June 28 assasination, and didn't -- and send its troops to the Russian front so that Germany could invade France through Belgium and Luxembourg. In fact, it was Germany's invasion of neutral Belgium that pulled Great Britain into the war, which shortly
before sw itself as removed from all issues.
Fromkin's position that WWI shaped world politics for the entire 20th century (an idea I first read by him in KOSOVO CROSSING) is born out by his work here, and this book makes me want to read his best-known work, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. This book is accessible, clearly laid-out, rational, set well in
context and fascinating. I highly recommend this book.
Rating:
Summary: Finally something original on an old topic!
Review: Fans of the "slippery slope" view of the origins of the Great War, which has run rampant in this country since Sidney Fay made it popular in the 1920s, will not like his book, which places the responsibility for the war as it happened squarely on the shoulders of Germans and Austrians. However, not necessarily for the war as such, which, according to Fromkin, could have resulted from any of a number of crises and might have resulted from another one later anyway, but the specific circumstances in which it broke out and the form it took. His description of two wars, although unlikely to have been as clear to the participants as in hindsight, makes eminent sense as an analytical tool.
Many historians fall into the habit of talking about "the Germans" as if they were one homogeneous group; one of Fromkin's merits is to clearly point out the policy differences and rivalries within the German government. Most surprising is his convincing rehabilitation of Kaiser Wilhelm, who, far from being the imperialist martinet as whom he was portrayed in the Allied propaganda and in many later histories, emerges as the one factor consistently wanting peace, and is outmaneuvered by his general staff and sabotaged by his own appointed chancellor and foreign minister in a period of grief and outrage over the murder of his friend Franz-Ferdinand.
Rating:
Summary: Finally something original on an old topic!
Review: Fans of the "slippery slope" view of the origins of the Great War, which has run rampant in this country since Sidney Fay made it popular in the 1920s, will not like his book, which places the responsibility for the war as it happened squarely on the shoulders of Germans and Austrians. However, not necessarily for the war as such, which, according to Fromkin, could have resulted from any of a number of crises and might have resulted from another one later anyway, but the specific circumstances in which it broke out and the form it took. His description of two wars, although unlikely to have been as clear to the participants as in hindsight, makes eminent sense as an analytical tool.
Many historians fall into the habit of talking about "the Germans" as if they were one homogeneous group; one of Fromkin's merits is to clearly point out the policy differences and rivalries within the German government. Most surprising is his convincing rehabilitation of Kaiser Wilhelm, who, far from being the imperialist martinet as whom he was portrayed in the Allied propaganda and in many later histories, emerges as the one factor consistently wanting peace, and is outmaneuvered by his general staff and sabotaged by his own appointed chancellor and foreign minister in a period of grief and outrage over the murder of his friend Franz-Ferdinand.
Rating:
Summary: The start of World War One.
Review: First off, let me say that Fromkin's A Peace to End All Peace is one of the best books about why there are still problems in the Middle East. It should top anybody's list of great historical works. I really enjoyed it. I was expecting the same with this work, but unfortunately this book comes up short. Fromkin's thesis is that there were two wars comprising World War One. The first one dealt with Serbia and Austria and the second one dealt with Germany versus Russia and France. It generally paints the Serbs and Russians as peaceful people with just a few bad apples among them. The Germans are depicted as warmongers and military supremecists. I am not sure I agree with this depiction. The Serbs were engaged in some very disturbing activities not just in Bosnia but elsewhere. Half the Serb population wanted to dissolve Austria-Hungary and pick up pieces to reconstiture a great Serb Empire. Russia wanted to support its ally in the Balkans after its ruin in the Russian-Japanese War. Both these nations were not babes in the wood looking for a peaceful solution. They actively participated in starting the war and that is why I can't accept Fromkin's thesis.
I was interested in the politics of the blank check. It does add color to what is generally understood about the treaty situation in WWI. Germany needed to back Austria, even though Austria would never back Germany in a similar crisis. I think that part is believable. This book gives an interesting theory, but it is the same samo. Blame the Germans and Austrians because they started it.
Rating:
Summary: Dense, detailed, disturbing new perspective on an old war
Review: Forget or at least set aside much of what you think you know about the onset of the First World War. David Fromkin has some `new' ideas. And three hundred dense if not overwhelming pages of analysis of old and new records, makes for a pretty compelling case. He uses new studies and records, some previously unavailable or hidden, to make his case.
Prior to the start of the war, the seemingly quiet period among the great powers of Europe was mostly a charade, a shadow dance, while behind the scenes most of those great powers were trying to determine when - not if - the next war would commence. Better, each thought, that they commence it, less they be caught unawares.
Those twenty-five years before the war were also a period of almost regular assassinations. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Serbia, while often singled out as the event that precipitated the war, was not a singular event and, as Fromkin shows, did not really bring about the war. At least not the "great" war.
As Fromkin notes, "It takes at least two to keep the peace, but it only takes one to start a war. (282-3) Germany especially, fearing the development of Russia and the Slavs, with industrialization financed by France, saw war with Russia to be inevitable. This was a racial struggle, the Teutonic race against the Slavic. Germany even imagined England as an ally in this crusade; some of this assumption was reasonable, based on blood ties. Germany had plans for war before Sarajevo. But after Sarajevo, Germany also thought that Austria-Hungary could quickly declare war on Serbia, wipe out resistance, and immobilize the Russian forces before they moved against Germany or Austria-Hungary. And all the while, Austria-Hungary saw Germany as their insurance against a Russian attack. Both sides counted on the other to thwart Russian intentions. It is almost ironic that Germany invaded France, through Belgium, to stop Russia. And that Britain, facing civil war at home in Ireland and looking for peace on the continent, turned almost overnight when Germany violated Belgian neutrality. Fromkin notes that Britain would not have been so upset had France done this to Belgium; Britain's concerns were with balance, including keeping French power, not Belgian sovereignty or neutrality.
And it was not a German appetite for colonies that drove the war. Fromkin notes, "[I]t was not imperialism that caused the war; it was the war that produced a new wave of imperialism." (278) This was a period when wealth meant taking it by conquest. But much of that grwoth in colonial imperialism had run its course. Nearby, European lands offered more tempting targets and insurance against invasion. 'Invade or be invaded' seemed to be a prevailing credo of the time, and no colonies were likely to be doing the invading.
Besides, there were two wars. Fromkin writes: "Two wars, not one; that is the key." (274) Adding, "Germany instigated the war against Russia on its own account." Serbia was almost an afterthought, a diversion. Expected to be quickly crushed by Austria-Hungary, it offered Germany an excuse for a initiatives against enemies, real or imagined, current or future.
War, in the time before the "great" war, came to be accepted as the natural course of human and national events. Some of these problems of war remain with us today: Pre-emptive attack, misguided assumptions, bad intelligence on the enemy, subterfuge, distrust, racism, greed, paranoia. It may be both comforting and disconcerting to realize that our problems are not recent. Perhaps they are timeless, inevitable. Let's hope not.
Rating: 
Summary: History for the uninitiated
Review: Fromkin is very much like Robert Massie, a lazy, popular historian who does, and writes nothing original. No insights, revelations or conclusions that other historians have not reached decades ago.
Save your money for more worthwhile works.
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