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Rating: 
Summary: Disappointing
Review: After being reasonably impressed with Dennett's thoroughly researched treatise supporting evolution in his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea, I was motivated to read Kinds of Minds. Sadly, I am left with the impression Dennett had a book contract to honor and filled 168 pages with off the cuff rhetoric rather than substantive, concrete science. For most, it will be no great surprise that the development of complex language and our use of symbols and tools to help us arrange and "offload" data that might otherwise saturate our brains, gives us humans a great advantage over this planet's other inhabitants. Even here I was disappointed, finding not even speculation as to the evolutionary forces driving such advantage. If Dennett tells us anything, it is that our search to explain consciousness raises far more questions than answers. It is fortunate that Kinds of Minds was not my first exposure to Dennett. Otherwise, I would have had no reason to undertake his considerably longer offering, Darwins Dangerous Idea.
Rating: 
Summary: Smart Talking Heads
Review: All around, I'd say this was a pretty good book. I learned a few things, listening to what Dennett has to say. In a nutshell, the quandry of "How can I tell if a dog is intelligent if he can't talk to me and tell me one way or the other?" is answered with, "A vast amount of what we consider intelligence is bound up in the that very speech issue." I don't know why it took a whole book to get around to that, although the discussions on what comprises intelligence were interesting at times. Perhaps I'm just not used to looking at the world through the eyes of a philosopher.My deepest criticism of this book lies in way the term "design" was used, over and over, to explain the evolution of the body and mind. Maybe I failed to truly grasp the "Intentional Stance", as Dennett puts it, but I cannot fathom how DNA strings as a genotype can possibly know the larger characteristics of the resulting body (holotype). The success of a particular genotype is dependent on the survivability of the holotype, but the connection ends there. There is no strategy on any level or "stance", as far as I can tell. Conscious adaptions made by one creature must also be made by subsequent generations of offspring, as long as a more survivable mutation fails to arrive. There is no connection between these two physical acts, other than the capacity of a certain genotype to permit flexibility in the behavior of its holotype. Here's a quote from Chapter 4, talking about a baby not wanting to crawl across a glass floor, overlooking what appears to be a great abyss: "Even though the mother beckons it from a few feet away..., the infant hangs back fearfully, despite never having suffered a fall in its life. The experience of its ancestors is making it err on the side of safety." Unless Dennett is refering to the death of potential ancestors that failed to fear heights at an early age, I can't see how experience relates in the slightest to the behavior the baby is exhibiting. Metaphorically, though, I can make some sense of it. And despite this systemic error, the book is a good, relatively easy read. There are things to be learned here. The language, however, makes this book vulnerable to the same attacks by fundamentalists that I have described in my reviews of books by Richard Dawkins. (This criticism doesn't count for much in my overall rating - as I'm not exactly certain what kind of langauge it would take to resolve that issue.) I'm looking forward to taking in some of Dennett's recommended reading, and I give this manuscript a solid thumbs up.
Rating: 
Summary: Consciousness still not explained
Review: Dennett makes excellent points throughout this little book, especially from an evolutionary standpoint. But at the end, it appears that Dennett holds that nothing is a mind untill someone adds language, as if a brain was kool-aid and language water. Things are not so simple. For example, Dennett tries to conclude that since minds are made up of what he calls little "machines" then a mind is just a machine until proven otherwise. His proof seems to be language. But I fail to see if that is the logical conclusion from his early arguments. Isn't language at the end also made up of "machines"? Dennett does not only use an emergent theory in support of his conclusions, but I doubt that would make a difference.
So at the end, humans are conscious because of language and direct evidence for individuals, but animals are not because thay do not have language and we cannot directly see what is like to bo one. There are times in the book where Dennett even puts into question wether deaf-mutes would really have a true human mind! There is a trend among theorists that holds that language tranforms inert matter into conscious matter. Now, truly, language separates human consicousness from other kinds of minds, but it does not follow that language is a necesary condition for consciousness itself. Dennett, who is a strong A.I supporter, should know this. I mean, does a computer has to have language to be conscious? Or for that matter is language then also a sufficient condition for consciousness?
Dennett also fails to discuss many important things that should be considered when talking about animal minds- language studies in higher primates, working memory in animals, etc...- Granted, these are all inconclusive, but should not be ignored. I think Dennets view of consciousness is really strange and confused...He once denied the existence of qualia! But this is no argument. I can confidently say that one does not emerge knowing much about minds after readind this book.
Rating:
Summary: Know your mind . . .
Review: I got started on Dennett's many books when a friend recommended Consciousness Explained and I haven't been able to put the topic down ever since. Dennett continues his clear, straightforward style in this book which is much more readable than Consciousness Explained, but still provides ample challenge for the reader. Dennett starts with the statement, "I am a philosopher, not a scientist," yet his command of what is going on in the sciences is most impressive. His ability to make incredibly complex ideas of evolution understandable to the lay person is amazing and consistent. Through the use of words and diagrams, we are brought up to date on the latest thinking on what mind is and how it is evolving. Kinds of Minds tackles very emotional and controversial topics such as "are we so sure that all humans have minds? . . . Could it be that all animals and even plants and even bacteria have minds?. . . What kinds of minds are there?" The reader is then lead through a series of logical steps, replete with information on the latest scientific and philosophical thought, and left to finally decide these big questions on his or her own. This is definitely a must read book for those interested in the human mind, consciousness, and ethical treatment of our fellow beings in this interconnected web of all existence.
Rating: 
Summary: From this point forward
Review: If you aren't familiar with the works of Daniel Dennett, this is the starting point of choice. This American philosopher's ability to pose thought-provoking questions is unmatched. In this collection, the focus is on "what is a mind?" How do we define "the mind" and are humans the sole possessors of it? Dennett is not only deft at posing these posers, he presents the questions and his explanations with philosophy's finest prose and wit. His other advantage over his fellow cognitive scientists is his use of Darwin's "dangerous idea," evolution by natural selection. As products of that process, humans are not exempt from its rules. That framework raises the issue of whether other creatures can be said to have "minds." Dennett explores this issue with skillfully chosen examples. These are part of the list of "kinds of minds." Dennett is famous among philosophers for devising the concept of "the intentional stance." The intentional stance is interpreting the behaviour of an entity." The range of entities is extensive - a simple thermostat has predictable behaviour - when the room is cool, the device closes a circuit turning on the heat. According to Dennett, the simplest creatures exhibited similar "robotic" behaviour, but as life evolved, more complex patterns developed. Dennett argues that "adopting the intentional stance is not just a good idea but the key to unraveling the mysteries of the mind - all kinds of minds." In his view, intentional systems have progressed along the course of evolution in ever complex steps. Humans, with the development of language, have achieved the highest level of cognitive abilities. Dennett addresses what many philosophers call the "mind-body" question. Those who feel the mind and body must be considered separately will face some challenging assertions here. Perhaps more importantly, those who may not feel disposed to read philosophy, will find much stimulate thinking about who they really are. Dennett keeps his presentation clearly formulated and easily readable. Quick, simple answers to questions about thinking are not Dennett's style. This is a slim tome, but the few pages are packed with rigorously conceived concepts. The words flow easily, but the content will bear repeated readings. As Dennett reminds us, there are countless questions about what a mind is, with many answers remaining to be derived. This book provides the starting point for that quest.
Rating:
Summary: From this point forward
Review: If you aren't familiar with the works of Daniel Dennett, this is the starting point of choice. This American philosopher's ability to pose thought-provoking questions is unmatched. In this collection, the focus is on "what is a mind?" How do we define "the mind" and are humans the sole possessors of it? Dennett is not only deft at posing these posers, he presents the questions and his explanations with philosophy's finest prose and wit. His other advantage over his fellow cognitive scientists is his use of Darwin's "dangerous idea," evolution by natural selection. As products of that process, humans are not exempt from its rules. That framework raises the issue of whether other creatures can be said to have "minds." Dennett explores this issue with skillfully chosen examples. These are part of the list of "kinds of minds." Dennett is famous among philosophers for devising the concept of "the intentional stance." The intentional stance is interpreting the behaviour of an entity." The range of entities is extensive - a simple thermostat has predictable behaviour - when the room is cool, the device closes a circuit turning on the heat. According to Dennett, the simplest creatures exhibited similar "robotic" behaviour, but as life evolved, more complex patterns developed. Dennett argues that "adopting the intentional stance is not just a good idea but the key to unraveling the mysteries of the mind - all kinds of minds." In his view, intentional systems have progressed along the course of evolution in ever complex steps. Humans, with the development of language, have achieved the highest level of cognitive abilities. Dennett addresses what many philosophers call the "mind-body" question. Those who feel the mind and body must be considered separately will face some challenging assertions here. Perhaps more importantly, those who may not feel disposed to read philosophy, will find much stimulate thinking about who they really are. Dennett keeps his presentation clearly formulated and easily readable. Quick, simple answers to questions about thinking are not Dennett's style. This is a slim tome, but the few pages are packed with rigorously conceived concepts. The words flow easily, but the content will bear repeated readings. As Dennett reminds us, there are countless questions about what a mind is, with many answers remaining to be derived. This book provides the starting point for that quest.
Rating: 
Summary: The Robots' Carnival
Review: What is mind? Prof. Dennett explains in evolutionary terms (at least I think that's what they're meant to be): "...we are made of robots--or what comes to the same thing, we are each a collection of trillions of macromolecular machines." (p.24) He means cells, I believe. Equating a cell with a robot strikes me as drawing rather a long bow, but the assertion is made, flatly, and repeatedly: "...a billion years after the first appearance of simple cells, our ancestors were already complex machines (made of machines made of machines)..." (p. 25) At times I have to stop reading and look at the cover to be sure I haven't inadvertently picked up some Stanislaw Lem science fiction by mistake. (But I haven't, although I think I could use the refreshment!). To our (so far, mindless) robots, we next add something called "intentionality," which Dennett defines as "aboutness" (p. 35) and thence comes is mind. The semantic gyrations performed to never once fall into the trap of using the word "purpose" in association with this "intentionality" are dazzling. Page after page is devoted to trying to describe what any normal mind would think of as "purpose" without using the term. So the "intentionality" of a key goes with" a lock, its "crude aboutness" is (crudely) "about" a lock...but heaven forbid we would make the (apparently grave) error of saying the gosh-darned *purpose* of a key is to open or close a lock. You see, it's all just so much more...mindless... than that, really. Dennett has managed, I suspect only through holding his nose tightly and shutting his eyes firmly, to avoid slipping into the tarpit of any mention of religion (which may possibly explain the preference for "intentionality" over the "p" word, which might easily have awakened the slumbering horror). He leaves off at saying that where "intentionality" comes from makes no never-mind. What matters is this and only this: "We are descended from robots, and composed of robots, and all the intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of these billions of crude intentional systems. I don't have it backwards, I have it forwards." (p. 55) It must be true, because earlier Dennett shows that "derived intentionality can be derived from derived intentionality" (p. 54) (You know, sort of like how universes beget universes beget universes.) And then by George, he ends up reminding the reader that he's not wrong, he's right (assuming that these are the, umm, intentional derivations of "backwards" and "forwards")....so there! I'm sure Prof. Dennett has ample reason to be as pleased with himself as he appears to be in this book, but if being repeatedly hit over the head with all this ham-handed insistences that everything's all robots doesn't altogether persuade you that nothing important might possibly be missing from this world-view (like, well, life itself, to name one thing), then you may not be overly taken with the rest of the book, either. In any case, there's no surprises in the remainder, given the general drift of these quotations. And animal minds? Well, as we robots go, probably not really all that intentional, except maybe dogs, a little. Descartes' admiring followers are well documented for dissecting living animals without the slightest reservations, claiming that their howls of "pain" were merely the squeaking of little springs, only, as the lower life forms were, after all, merely mechanical beings. Not such a terribly great leap from this book to that position. And don't forget, it's forwards, not backwards. I note that Prof. Dennett professes great admiration for Richard Dawkins.
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