The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks)

Rating:
Summary: This dude is haggard!
Review: I was totaly blown away by the awsomness of this book. the way the guy says things makes you want to scream yeah go ahead! I'm not a expert on reference books or anything, but I think that by the way he writes the book it is just killin' to the reader!!!!!buy this book, light up a big blunt, and chill to the deepness.

Rating:
Summary: Basic Concepts in Varieties of Reference
Review: In Varieties of Reference (hereafter, Varieties), Evans sets out a modified Fregean theory of sense for singular terms in language, and their counterpart constituents in thoughts (singular thoughts). Russell's Principle (RP) is an initial formulation of what thinking about an object (grasping its sense) requires. The central thesis of Varieties is that RP applies to all cases of understanding singular reference. Evans distinguishes what counts as satisfying RP for different kinds of objects (e.g., numbers, colors, shapes, spatio-temporal objects). These are the fundamental grounds of difference for those kinds of objects. And there are multiple modes of satisfying RP: demonstrative identification, recognition-based identification, and information-based descriptions. Evans has chapters dedicated to demonstrative and recognition-based modes.

Varieties is dense and difficult material (in the early eighties, Hilary Putnam wrote a surprisingly negative review where he blasts Evans for writing a book that is overly technical; John McDowell wrote several letters responding to Putnam's criticism). But Varieties is packed with awesome thought and is deeply satisfying to read. Also enjoyable are Evans's odd examples, like the coughing sheep, the spinning steel balls, and the hands feeling velvet.

To grasp the motivation for Evans's theory, it is helpful to have some feeling for Dummett's theory of sense, and the attacks on sense made by proponents of the new theory of reference like Kripke. Evans criticizes these positions early in the book, but he also wants to salvage elements of both. Strawson's Individuals and Geach's Mental Acts are also a big influence on Varieties. For example, reading the first couple chapters of Individuals are very helpful for getting a general sense of what is going on when Evans talks about the "fundamental ground of difference" for spatio-temporal objects.

Some of the most important technical concepts in Varieties are the following:

1.Russell's Principle: "The principle is that a subject cannot make a judgment about something unless he knows which object his judgment is about.... In order to make Russell's Principle a substantial principle, I shall suppose that the knowledge which it requires is what might be called discriminating knowledge: the subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of his judgment from all other things.... We have the idea of certain sufficient conditions for being able to discriminate an object from all other things: for example, when one can perceive it at the present time; when one can recognize it if presented with it; and when one knows distinguishing facts about it" (89).

2.The Generality Constraint: "It seems to me that there must be a sense in which thoughts are structured.... I should prefer to explain the sense in which thoughts are structured, not in terms of their being composed of several distinct elements, but in terms of their being a complex of the exercise of several distinct conceptual abilities.... Thus if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he has a conception" (100-104).

3.Idea (capitalized): "I shall speak of the Ideas a subject has, of this or that particular object, on the model of the way we speak of the concepts a subject has, of this or that property". Combined with the Generality Constraint, this yields the notion that "An Idea of an object, then, is something which makes it possible for a subject to think of an object in a series of indefinitely many thoughts, in each of which he will be thinking of the object in the same way" (104).

4.Fundamental Ground of Difference: "An Idea of an object is part of a conception of a world of such objects, distinguished from one another in certain fundamental ways. For every kind of object, there is a general answer to the question, 'What makes it the case that there are two objects of this kind rather than one (or three rather than two)?' For example, we may say that shades of color are distinguished from one another by their phenomenal properties, that shapes are distinguished from one another by their geometrical properties, that sets are differentiated from one another by their possessing different members, that numbers are differentiated from one another by their position in an infinite ordering, and that chess positions are distinguished from one another by the positions of pieces upon the board" (106-107).

5.The Fundamental Ground of Difference for Spatio-Temporal Objects: "In the case of temporal objects-objects which exist in time and which change-we must replace the absolute notion of what differentiates an object from others with the notion of what differentiates an object from others at a time.... The answer to the question what differentiates a statue from every other thing at a time is given by citing (i) the position which it occupies at that time and (ii) the fact that it is a statue" (107). The fundamental ground of difference is that which knowledge of suffices to distinguish an object from all other objects (of its kind), that is, knowledge of which satisfies Russell's Principle.

6.Fundamental Idea: "Let us say that one has a fundamental Idea of an object if one thinks of it as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference which it in fact possesses" (107).

7.Information-based Thought: "An [information-based thought] is governed by a conception of its object which is the result neither of fancy...nor of linguistic stipulation...but rather is the result of a belief about how the world is which the subject has because he has received information (or misinformation) from the object" (121). Information is meant to capture our causal involvement with the world around us.