Rating: 
Summary: Excellent Case for Emotions as Cognitive Judgments of Value
Review: "Upheaval of Thought" is a wonderful, interdisciplinary tome on the human emotions. Approaching them primarily from a philosophical perspective, particularly a neo-Stoic view, of what the emotions are, how they function cognitively, and what problems they cause and purposes they serve, Nussbaum incorporates animal behavioralism, evolutionary psychology, philosophical paradoxes, and the humanities' expression of the emotions to (1) evaluate how they both serve and disserve the individual, and (2) how which emotions are appropriate for the person to function well in society.
She begins with the Stoic's account of the emotions, how emotions are cognitive judgment of value and neither appetitive nor a separate function of the passions (sui generis), and challenges the Stoic raison d'etre to extirpate all of them from life. She believes the Stoic view is too severe, which she became cognizant of during the death of, and the grief over, her mother. The Stoic extirpation (i.e., apathy) of the emotions may satisfy one's personal life in some limited sense, but at the expense of perverting one's personal commitments and one's social and civic life. She then proceeds to show how one's individual development, starting from infancy and advancing through adulthood, serve and disserve the individual personally and socially, arguing that emotions are appropriate to given situations in life. Her principal concern is to not extirpate the emotions, but how one ought to develop them as intrinsically given, especially the emotions of love and compassion, so that they contribute to human flourishing (i.e., eudaimonia) in a very dynamic way. Love, properly ordered, is one such emotion (cognitive judgment of value) that involves our most intimate and personal commitments and projects, while compassion (also a cognitive judgment of value) is another essential emotion to the order of our political, economic, and social commitments and projects.
Then, in a most interdisciplinary fashion, she takes the historical development of the emotions through their hermeneutic history. Using the arts, philosophy, theology, music, economics, and literature, she explores the historical development and refinement of emotions, particularly of love and compassion, as expressed and developed in such figures as Plato, Spinoza, Augustine, Dante, Adam Smith, Mahler, Bronte, Proust, and Joyce among others. Each figure contributes either positively or negatively to our ultimate understanding of how the emotions figure into our cognitive judgment of values for human flourishing in both our personal and civic lives.
This book is a rich, invigorating, multifaceted, and very satisfying exploration into a very critical aspect of the human behavior, particularly the emotions of love and compassion, in order to harness these judgments of value for our ultimate happiness (again, eduaimonia). The book's 700 pages are by no means exhaustive, which she frequently restates, nor tightly as argued as it could be. The problem, and there is one, is that the book flows much more like a lecture (which it originally was), and less like highly-disciplined argument. The argument is unquestionably made, it is simply not as concise, precise, nor as rigorous as I would have liked. There are too many extraneous diversions that distract us from her central arguments. A good editor and clearer and more ostensive articulation of her arguments would certainly be welcome in a revised edition.
Rating:
Summary: Again proving philosophy is the place to learn about minds
Review: As a philosopher, psychotherapist, and writer, I think I know the "state of the art" in current research on emotions, and I know a fair amount about current thinking in ethics and about the research linking development, ethics, and emotions. I heartily endorse this book as an extraordinary, careful, encyclopedic work. In the last twenty years, psychologists have finally learned something philosphers proved fifty years ago (at least): that one cannot understand human action without taking into account subjective experience--including emotion. Nussbaum--contra some previous reviewer who for-who-knows-what-reason says her psychology is "misguided"--knows well the cognitive research on emotions, current psychoanalytic thinking and developmental research, and cutting edge, research-guiding theories. She is quite clear on exactly what kind of evidence each can boast or not. She puts them all together and shows us some things about emotion and ethics that, perhaps, psychologists will get around to knowing in a decade or so. (So why only four stars? The book really needed a ruthless editor. I frequently found myself saying, "Enough already--you've made your point, so get on with it.) Caution, though: This is a book for intellectuals--in the best sense of the word, namely, those who care to know the best that has been thought or said. If you're looking for feel-good self-help or goofy metaphysics, go elsewhere.
Rating: 
Summary: PHILOSOPHY OR MISGUIDED PSYCHOLOGY?
Review: By some, this book might be considered a scholarly work of genius filled with philosophical wonder; however, there is nothing Earth-shaking or moving about this book that would lead me to believe it is a major achievement. In my opinion, the author tried to combine philosophy with an overdose of often misguided psychology and the objective failed miserably. There were parts of the book one was tempted to skim over very quickly because the same thought held for pages at a time and the writing became extremely monotonous. The book lacked sufficient interest to hold the reader's interest and at best, the book could have been shortened by 500 pages and nothing would have been missed. There is no question the author is still grieving over the loss of her mother and, I think the reader should respect that; however, the main purpose for writing of this book seemed to be a therapeutic attempt at coming to terms with her own mother's death. The writing might best have been placed in a private diary or journal, simply because it lacked sufficient interest to hold the reader's attention through all 760 pages. At best, the book could have been shortened by 500 pages and nothing would have been missed. It is not a book I could honestly recommend.
Rating:
Summary: I Think, Therefore I Feel
Review: Drawing on her vast knowledge of philosophy, psychology and literature, Martha Nussbaum takes us on a tour of the emotional landscape that ranges from the agora in Athens to the world of lab rats and electrodes. Her goal is to convince us that our emotions are cognitive appraisals of the world around us. If we master this idea, we improve our chances of building a life that's ethical, passionate and compassionate. The argument unfolds in three sections. In Need and Recognition, Nussbaum defines emotions as evaluative judgements about the world based on our ideas of what we deem important for our own flourishing. After elaborating on this definition, she refines it by sparring with the -ologists who argue for the physiological origins of emotion. She addresses in a convincing way the question of how pre-verbal beings such as infants and non-verbal beings such as animals can make sophisticated evaluative judgements. The section on infant emotions plunges the reader back into those wild storms of bliss and rage that come from having all that you need to survive exist beyond your direct control. Part II, Compassion, describes the process of extending one's definition of self-interest beyond the boundaries of one's own skin. She is particulary good on how shame and disgust, if not mastered, distance you from other people and prevent you from being imaginatively connected to a larger world. Ascents of Love, the third part, traces evolving views of erotic love and it's here that Nussbaum's arguments start to soar. She demonstrates how the Platonic and Christian ascents of love solve the "problem" of loving specific individuals: you render the human irrelevant by ascending to the abstractions of ideal form or love of god. Nussbaum argues brilliantly for a view of erotic love that encompasses the ideal and real people as well. Her writing peaks in the chapters on Mahler and Joyce. She depicts Mahler's second symphony as a paean to human striving as a reward in itself, and Joyce's Ulysses as a heroic reclamation of the body in all its waywardness and fecundity from the life-denying clutch of the Catholic Church. This book is important because it convincingly places control of our emotions within our own cognitive grasp. As masters of our emotions, we just might live a better life. One wishes the prose was less plodding in places, and the text less bristly with footnotes, but persevere. The views from the peaks are magnificent.
Rating: 
Summary: the intelligence of emotions
Review: I read "Upheavals of Thought," by leading social philosopher Martha Nussbaum, several months ago and I have to say that this book was one of the most intellectually stimulating and life-changing books I have ever read, if not the most. I was going through a period of emotional crisis in my own personal life at the time I read it and I had also confered with other books of similar nature, such as "Noonday Demon," in an effort to understand the emotions I was experiencing. However, "Upheavals of Thought" seemed right on target as far as explaining why I felt the way I felt and also how I can use what I was feeling to make ethically-informed decisions in the future and live a more self-aware and enlighthened life. The range of topics that Prof Nussbaum covers in "Upheavals of Thought" are too expansive and detail-laden for me to give any completely informed synopsis here. Suffice to say, however, that the reader will find rigorous but clearly-written discussions of, among others, music, film, literature, classics, psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, ethics and, more importantly, how these subjects illuminate our understanding of the emotions, particularly our capacities for compassion and love. There are even revealing discussions about Martha's personal life and, specifically, her relationship with her mother. At a time when the nation is grappling with feelings of sorrow and uncertainty, this truly groundbreaking book is both timely and invaluable.
Rating:
Summary: Good -- but sometimes light
Review: I read this book over the course of a few months. It's very dense, but gripping at the same time -- you're wading through lots of text and digression, but are still drawn on. I think her account of emotions is in the main correct, and it's wonderful to watch her argue her point carefully and fairly against various counterpositions. It's rare to read a book where the writer does anything other than take a few potshots at opposing ideas before retiring to safety; Nussbaum really engages. My criticism is that the book can be very light on philosophy sometimes, and that it sometime degenerates into a review article on psychology. There are pages and pages where Nussbaum basically gives a good undergraduate-level account of psychotherapy. I found the account interesting, but unconvicing in many ways -- it is, fortunately, ancillary to the book's argument, and could be dropped. At bad points, Nussbaum forgets to argue for a position, and tells us debateable things as if they came "proven" from the experts in psychology. So -- how to read this book? Read the early chapters carefully -- they contain the argument (and a beautiful account of Nussbaum's reaction to her own mother's death.) You can then walk around in life for a while and see if she's right. Read on for a clever account of emotion in music (with a recommended recording), and then to dip into psychotherapy and somewhat dubious stories about early childhood development. Wrap it up (if you have the energy) with readings of Proust and others. The early chapters alone, however, are worth the price of the book.
Rating:
Summary: o miseras hominum mentes, o pectora caeca
Review: In the grand tradition of Alain de Botton, Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel de Montaigne, and Socrates himself, M.C. Nussbaum reminds us that philosophy can be seen as a way of life--as a way to look for answers about how to best live our lives... for those who've lost their way in the distractions of logic, rigor, obfuscation, and bloviation, this might be a useful tonic.
Rating:
Summary: A Favorable Review
Review: Look, the fact of the matter is that good philosophy is not always synonymous with formal proofs and technical language. Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought is a discussion of how emotions and moral psychology connect. Some recent work has been done in this area by others in the field, such as Wollheim, Neu, and Goldie. OK, so her recent work is not hard-core analytic philosophy. But it is informed by a breadth of research on various theories of emotion, and it does engage various philosophical treatments of the emotions. The most interesting material in this book is in Part Three. Nussbaum explicates various texts to illustrate how they contain specific moral concepts central to human experience and action, such that the emotions are treated in an overlapping literary and philosophical manner. This section is not particularly philosophical, however that is taken to be, but is rather careful music and literary criticism. This is a bold move on Nussbaum's part. Her readings on Mahler, Bronte, Joyce, Dante, Augustine, etc. are valuable because she offers sensitive readings of literary texts that do not fall into the usual discourse one finds in or from literature depts. And why would we expect literary criticism in an Anglo-American philosophy dept.?? But Nussbaum's criticism and careful readings demonstrate how literary texts can be morally relevant and philosophical--in ways that are appealing to philosophers and literary folks at the same time. In a way, Upheavals of Thought is a continuation of her work in Love's Knowledge, Therapy of Desire, and the Fragility of Goodness. So one could nearly always claim that a text which is similar to this one is "hot air" or "misguided psychology," but that sort of view undermines further critical thinking. It is simply too easy to take such a position. Nussbaum's Upheaval is a subtle text. It is deeply evocative and insightful. Yes, problematic claims are made. Logical rigor is often absent. However, it is nice once and a while to hear from a genuine philosophical scholar on current issues in eloquent and sophisticated prose. Is it philosophy? I'm sure that question misses the point--at least Nussbaum's point in this text, which are actually several points. Her point seems more to take into account how literature, music, and diverse human contexts can be treated philosophically, which, it seems to me, valuable to those readers both in literature and philosophy.
Rating: 
Summary: Ivory tower drivel
Review: One must hope that writing this book was part of Martha Craven Nussbaum's healing process following the death of her mother. Apart from this, "Upheavals of Thought" is 714 pages spent over-analyzing basic human experience. What is the point? I'll go back to reading Alan Watts, thank you very much. At least that has some practical value.
Rating:
Summary: RE: A Wide-Reaching and Novel Philosophical Exploration
Review: Philosopher Nussbaum argues in this book, the product of her Gifford Lectures, that emotions shape who we are, and they must form part of a system of ethical reasoning as intelligent responses to the perception of value. Emotions include in their content judgments that can be true or false and good or bad, and they act as guides for ethical choice. "A central part of developing an adequate ethical theory," claims Nussbaum, "will be to develop an adequate theory of the emotions, including their cultural sources, their history in infancy and childhood, and their sometimes unpredictable and disorderly operation in the daily life of human beings who are attached to things outside themselves" (2). Emotions have a complicated cognitive structure in relation to objects that we cherish and this relationship extends over time. And this means that without emotional development, a part of our reasoning capacity's political creatures will be missing.
Nussbaum's Neo-Stoic inspired project is to construct an analytic framework for thinking about emotions in general. Emotions "involve judgment about important things, judgments in which, appraising external objects are salient for our own well being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully control" (19).
In her first chapter, "Emotions as Judgments of Value," Nussbaum sets out the basis for her argument about the intelligence of emotions. Emotions view the world from the perspective of one's own scheme of goals, the things to which one attaches value for what it means to live well. In short, emotions are valuative appraisals of the world.
Continuity exists between humans and non-humans in that both display emotions. Studies of animal emotions underscore Nussbaum's claim that cognitive appraisals need not all be objects of reflexive self-consciousness. Although all individuals feel emotions, both human and non-human, this does not mean that individual histories and social norms do not shape emotions. In fact, they do. A path should be steered between those at one extreme who argue that emotions are totally constructed by society and those at the other extreme who argue that society plays no role in the shaping of emotions.
Emotions "bear the traces of a history that is at once commonly human, socially constructed, and idiosyncratic" (177). This means that adult human emotions cannot be understood without understanding their history in infancy and childhood. Nussbaum rejects theories calling individuals to bring every emotion into line with the dictates of reason, or the dictates of one's ideals, whatever they may be.
In the second part of this 700 page book, Nussbaum focuses upon the emotion of compassion. She defines compassion as "a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person's undeserved misfortune" (301). Compassion includes cognitive aspects, including (1) the belief or appraisal that the suffering one encounters is serious rather than trivial, (2) the belief that the person does not deserve the suffering, and (3) the belief that the possibilities of the person who experiences the emotion are similar to those of the sufferer.
Compassion involves a significant quasi-ethical achievement in that it values another person as part of one's own circle of concern. One should not depend upon the vicissitudes of personal emotion, but should build emotion's insights into the structures of ethical rules and institutions. Furthermore, the relationships between compassion and social institutions is that compassionate individuals construct institutions that embody what they imagine and institutions influence the development of compassion in individuals.
In the third part of the book, Nussbaum addresses various traditions of erotic love. She does so hoping to show that erotic love can be part of morally acceptable life. Erotic love "involves an opening of the self toward an object, a conception of the self that pictures the self as incomplete and reaching out for something valued" (460). This means that erotic love is based on unequal concern not explained by reason alone. It is love that is partial.
The literature that Nussbaum explores in section three is part of the ascent tradition of love in that the authors who write of this love offer ways to reform or educate erotic love "so as to keep its creative force while purifying it of ambivalence and excess, and making it more friendly to general social aims" (469). The authors that Nussbaum addresses in the final part of the book include Plato, Spinoza, Proust, Augustine, Dante, Emily Bronte, Mahler, Walt Whitman, and James Joyce. This literature presents (1) a tradition that sees eros love as fundamentally the contemplation of the good and beautiful, (2) Christian account of the ascent that investigates the role of humility, longing and grace, (3) a romantic account that strives for love's transcendence, and (4) the reverse ascent or the descent of love in which human desire sets out its task of embracing the imperfect human world with love.
The Neo-Stoic theory of emotions that Nussbaum develops entails that while love is an emotion, it is also a relationship. Given this, Nussbaum critiques the authors' writings in the third section of her book using three normative criteria. The first criteria is compassion by which she asks, "Does this view of love y the constituent features of compassion, including the seriousness of various human predicaments, one's responsibility for these predicaments, and the proper extent of concern." The second criteria is reciprocity. By reciprocity Nussbaum means the idea that relationships of concern are established in which people treat one another as agents and ends, not as things. The third criteria, individuality, means that love recognizes that human beings are separate and qualitatively distinct individuals.
Thomas Jay Oord
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