Rating: 
Summary: As Thrilling to Read as it is Illuminating
Review: "All the Shah's Men" is a wonderfully constructed account of America's fateful decision to back Britain and it's principle Iranian oil interests by overthrowing Iran's popular, democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. Based on his extensive research into a variety of Iranian and American sources including now declassified CIA documents, veteran New York Times journalist, Stephen Kinzer, has produced a historical analysis that reads like a spy thriller. In addition to focusing on the fascinating details of the American-sponsored coup itself, Kinzer provides a vivid and objective portrait of the principle players including the coup's colorful mastermind, CIA operative, Kermit Roosevelt, Iran's enormously popular and passionately nationalistic Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, and a host of other individuals ranging from world leaders to the shadowy organizers of street mobs in Iran. Much to his credit, Kinzer examines an understandably controversial subject without employing a predictably judgmental perspective. For example, while Kinzer displays tremendous sympathy toward Mossadegh, he avoids characterizing him as completely virtuous, and competent leader who was overthrown by a rapacious world power. In many ways Mossadegh was a virtuous leader, and his decision to nationalize the deeply oppressive and intractable Anglo/Iranian Oil Company not only earned him tremendous popularity in Iran, but also generated tremendous sympathy in the anti-colonial Truman Administration (which invited him to the United States) and even within the conservative Eisenhower Administration, albeit to a lesser extent. But as just as Mossadegh's grievances against Britain may have been, Kinzer demonstrates that he lacked the shrewdness and the practicality to negotiate with Britain when he had the upper hand. While it was probably impossible for Mossadegh to fully understand the increasingly binary nature of America's global rivalry with the Soviet Union, and how the American government would come to view him in this context, one can't help but wonder how a more skilled and ruthlessly practical politician such as Ghandi or Ho Chi Minh would have handled the situation. Kinzer concludes that while Mossadegh was undoubtedly the victim of an American-sponsored coup, his own understandable, but deeply impractical political passions were partly to blame. Equally fascinating is the lens that Kinzer turns on the American leadership and on its gradual shift from sympathizing with Mossadegh to ultimately backing the British in their quest to regain control of their Iranian oil concessions. In part this resulted from changing political fortunes on both sides of the Atlantic. In roughly the same time frame Attlee's Labor Government in Britain, and the Democratic Truman Administration in America-both of which were largely sympathetic to Mossadegh-were replaced by the more deeply reactionary administrations of Churchill and Eisenhower. Churchill saw himself as the last bastion of the remaining British Empire, and Eisenhower had campaigned on a strong anti-Communist platform. In this context neither leader was willing to tolerate a nationalistic leader of Mossadegh's calibur in Iran. Despite its role in overthrowing the elected leader of a sovereign nation, the American government emerges from these pages in a surprisingly sympathetic manner by at first attempting to work with Mossadegh and then reluctantly helping the British to overthrow him. It is perhaps the British with their hidebound arrogance and total dismissal of Iranian interests who come across as the book's only villains. Finally there is the planning and execution of the coup itself, by CIA operative, Kermit Roosevelt. This part of the story contains so many fascinating and unbelievable twists that it even prompted President Eisenhower to compare it to a dime store novel after Roosevelt provided him with a subsequent intelligence briefing on the subject. One could argue that the Iranian coup formed the blueprint for so many subsequent right-wing coups in places like Nicaragua (1955), Vietnam (1963), Brazil (1964), Chile, (1973), Florida (2000), Venezuela (2002--which actually failed) and Haiti (2004). In most cases, the process of overthrowing a democratically elected government involved a strong man to replace the deposed leader, organizing and dispatching violent mobs to create chaos and to provide the veneer of popular rage toward the existing government, control and skillful application of the mass-media, at least minimal military and police cooperation, and some sort of legal or judicial process to vilify the outgoing leadership and legitimize the new one. Roosevelt skillfully assembled and deployed these elements in deposing Mossadegh and replacing his government with that of the deeply repressive Mohammad Reza Shah. Kinzer concludes his book with some practical questions and hypothetical examinations of other possible outcomes. Could Mossadegh have avoided the coup if he had been more flexible? Would America's long-term foreign policy aims have been better served by backing Mossadegh and by standing for democracy in practice as well as in rhetoric? Was the coup really necessary to counter the perceived Soviet threat? How might subsequent American foreign policy have differed if the coup actually failed, which it very nearly did? In examining these issues, Kinzer come to two sobering conclusions. First, he observes that having easily overturned an undesirable government in one country, American foreign policy makers, most notably the Dulles brothers, believed that "regime change", as we now call it, was a simple and practical approach to implementing America's global security requirements in potentially troubled regions. Kinzer also concludes that seemingly inexplicable events such as the humiliating American Hostage Crisis in 1979 and many subsequent terrorist attacks have origins in the coup that overthrew Mossadegh. Kinzer does not frame his conclusions in a manner that blames America or justifies terrorism. Instead, he provides a rational explanation of cause and effect and suggests that the blowback from the Iranian experience should be considered when making similar policy decisions.
Rating:
Summary: Great Book
Review: A very fast read for me that I had a hard time putting down. I feel that I have a better understanding of our relationship with the Middle East due to a better sense of the historical perspective beginning in the 1950's. Fear of the large Soviet superpower was the underlying theme to get our action- however the root cause was Western greed for Iran's oil resources and our inability to get Britain to offer them a fair compensatory arrangement. Mossadegh seems to have been a good leader despite his stubborn nature and thick headed actions. Highly recommend.
Rating:
Summary: A shameful episode in the history of American espionage
Review: Considering how desperately the current American administration claims to want to "grow democracy" in the Middle East, it is particular ironic and distressing that, fifty years ago, the U.S. moved to annihilate a suitably decent fledgling parliamentary government in Iran--and a friendly one at that. As Stephen Kinzer concludes in in his animated history--which reads like an espionage thriller--"few would deny that the 1953 coup in Iran set off a series of unintended consequences."
Why would the United States topple a regime that not only considered us an ally but also emulated our own form of government? The quick, but incomplete, answer is also the obvious one: oil. Certainly that's the only reason the British needed when Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The fading imperialists of the British government predictably screamed foul, arguing that the allegedly "private" oil company had a long-term agreement, signed in 1933, and Mossadegh had no right to renege on that agreement. As Kinzer's mountain of evidence shows, however, the Brits had conveniently ignored their own half of the deal: they had steadfastly refused to implement promised wage increases, build better housing, and construct hospitals and schools for the nearly enslaved and wholly impoverished native workers. Furthermore, London refused repeatedly to open the company's books to Iranian inspection, appropriated more than its contractual share of the profits, and supplemented the take by disguising large portions of the earnings as a corporate tax.
The Truman administration, wisely, would have nothing to do with British whining, but Churchill, inevitably, found two kindred spirits in the newly elected Eisenhower administration: Secretary of State John Dulles and intelligence director Allen Dulles. British oil wasn't enough bait for the Americans, but London knew that there was something that would make the Dulles brothers sit up and pay attention: the Red menace. British plans were thwarted, however, by an inconvenience: Mossadegh and his officials were not in the least interested in Communism and regarded the Soviets with undisguised contempt. So, instead, American ambassador Loy Henderson and British ambassador George Middleton invented the Communist canard in an unassailable if specious guise, arguing that Mossadegh's government was unstable and that it might someday fall to extreme leftists; "the longer Mossadegh remained in power, the likelier it was that Iran would fall to communism." In other words, the British convinced the Americans to meddle to prevent the off-chance that the Soviet Union might decide to meddle first (never mind the fact that the Soviets were then reeling from Stalin's death and were in no position to do anything of the sort).
This brief background summary doesn't evoke even a small part of the story, and Kinzer's book unveils many surprises that should frustrate and dismay Americans who believe that our government should be an ally to friendly democracies. The planning and execution of the coup (there were two attempts--the first one failed) that brought the tyrannical Shah back to power often resembles an episode of the Keystone Cops, but Mossadegh's trust and honor was no match for Western persistence and duplicity.
Kinzer's concluding chapter (as implied in his subtitle) goes too far, however, when he asserts that this shameful episode of American history is responsible in large part for Middle East terror. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the repressive Saudi monarchy, the Soviet-Afghan war, the rise of the Taliban (which was hardly friendly with the current Iranian regime)--these and many other factors have contributed to the region's turmoil. Still, it's irrefutable that our betrayal of Mossadegh insured that Middle East leaders and peoples would, in the future, be justifiably wary of ever again trusting us.
There are expatriates from the Shah's era who argue that his regime, while undeniably authoritarian, was better for Iran than what followed it and that the United States was correct in championing him. This weak attempt to tar Mossadegh's reputation by implicitly aligning him with the fundamentalists ignores the fact that Khomeini & Co. were also vocal enemies of the Mossadegh administration. By replacing a good (if imperfect) government--by getting involved at all--the United States insured that lingering resentment for our role in the first tyranny would be used against us by the leaders of the second tyranny--even if they despised Mossadegh himself. And, finally, it ignores the possibility that, if we had instead supported and encouraged Mossadegh and minded our own business, the Middle East might well be a friendlier and more peaceful place today.
Rating: 
Summary: a self-contradictory bone to pick
Review: Definitely Kinzer sides heavily with Mossadegh, depicting him almost as a Persian Thomas Jefferson. But, I note with approval, he makes no attempt to hide this.
I was bothered, however, by a subtle yet fatal contradiction in Kinzer's position, although I'm not sure if I can put it into words.
Throughout the book, Kinzer accuses the West of having had no respect for Iran -- for its culture, values, history, etc. Yet the nature of his argument -- and the strength of his scarcely-concealed moral outrage -- is predicated precisely on his having assumed that these same values are patently inferior, and that ours are naturally superior. I'll try to explain . . .
If one asserts, as Kinzer plainly does, that Britain and the CIA robbed Iran of a democratic, constitutional society by overthrowing Mossadegh, one is, knowingly or otherwise, imposing one's own values on a foreign culture; because, as Kinzer's praise of Mossadegh forces him to make clear, Iran itself (and certainly Islam) had no indigenous tradition of a democratic, constitutional society, whatever other cultural glories may have been theirs.
In other words, the intolerant government that now strangles Iran rings far truer to its character and history than did the consensual, rule-of-law-style government Mossadegh was building. Seen in this light, heck, the abusive Western petroleum companies actually did the country a favor by (unintentionally) bringing about a government far more representative of the ethos and "values" of the people. That these same values strike us as abhorrent is, strictly speaking, beside the point.
To clarify: taking Kinzer's cultural stance to its logical conclusion, one must view the democratic innovations of Mossadegh as an incongruous blip and conclude that it was only right that this aberration was overthrown and replaced with a government more squarely in consonance with the deepest convictions and traditions of the Persian people: i.e., a totalitarian religious state with scant recognition of human rights. That's the way they've lived for thousands of years, and that's obviously what the majority wanted in 1979.
Yes, it makes little sense to suggest that the Iranians are messing everything up and that they need to be more like us, while at the same time maintaining that such a culture of intolerance and absolutism is somehow sacrosanct and that the West should not presume to tamper with it. One cannot simultaneously hold both positions.
This, at any rate, is just a sketch of the unexamined silliness that underpins Kinzer's stance. You get the idea.
In other matters . . .
There's a reviewer elsewhere who says that if you just want to get the drift of what happened, all you need to do is to read the first three chapters, and the last one. That reviewer certainly hit the nail on the head. Everything that happens between these chapters is drama: well-crafted, certainly, but not vital. (The next couple of chapters, for example, treat of classical Persian history -- something which, at first blush, is unlikely to strike the reader as germane.)
If you only read those few chapters, however, you'll be robbing yourself of much of the disturbing but mesmerizing story of Kermit Roosevelt, the Nostromo par excellence who was determined to get the job done at any cost.
Other reviewers have asserted that the book was mistitled, surmising that perhaps this was deliberate on the publisher's part: a cynical ploy to sell more copies, given that Kinzer himself never even begins to make the claim that Mossadegh's overthrow is the "root" of contemporary Middle Eastern terrorism. (I do not even recall Palestine being mentioned.) Hence I would agree that the title is inaccurate, if not misleading.
These misgivings aside, Kinzer's book is well-written and a swift read.
Rating:
Summary: A JOB PRETTY WELL DONE, SORT OF
Review: I did give this one five stars as it is well written, well researched and certainly gives us some good background. It is quite a good thing to examin facts in relationship to how we got to where we are today. This work gives us a prespective of that process. On the other hand, I feel in reading this, we, the reader need to use some prespective ourselves and remember what the world was like during the time of the overthrow of the Iranian government, the mood of the country and the mood of our leaders. Times where quite different then, our view and knowledge of world events has been and was certainly influenced by many factors and we did not have the advantage of "time" to help us make decisions. The author, I do not feel, has done a very good job of this. This event happend well over fifty years ago. Looking at any event through hindsight is quite easy. The author indulges in good old American Bashing (is it just me, or is this a "thing" as to most New York Times Reporters?). This bashing is easy to do, any one can do it, but again, from the advantage of evaluating actions after fifty years. This should not distract from the work though. The author presents facts that we all need to be aware of. Bad things do happen and all countries do bad things. Learning from our past mistakes is a good thing, as long as we actually do it, i.e. learn. This is a period of time and a series of events that Americans should be more aware of. All in all, I recommend this one.
Rating:
Summary: Fast-paced and engaging, but occasionally shallow view
Review: I found this an engaging and entertaining read, although at times it really felt (1) like Kinzer was glossing over what I thought were events important enough to warrant more details (like the legislative maneuvering between the Shah and Mossadegh, etc.) and (2) that Kinzer was writing a hagiography of Mossadegh, and a rather undetailed one at that. The period when Mossadegh was in retreat was barely mentioned other than in passing via a quote, describing his behavior as mostly "carping" - I think more of what shaped his views during this period would have helped give a more rounded view of the man.
But the book is a good read, and it's an important series of events for Americans to understand, and on the whole, I thought this an excellent account.
Rating:
Summary: A history of the 1953 Iranian coup.
Review: I like Kinzer as an author. I have read his Turkey and Guatemala books, and found them to be objective. This book about the 1953 Iranian coup is also an enjoyable read. Kinzer tries to show both the Iranian, British, and American positions and what the result was. The summation jumps to conclusions when it states this coup as the reason for the terrorism in today's Middle East. The coup certainly fueled the terrorism, but it is not the total reason as other factors play into this. Kinzer does to this coup, what he and another author wrote about the 1954 Guatemala coup (Bitter Fruit). Corporate interests along with those of the British brought the CIA into overthrowing a legitimate government. Who were those corporate interests--the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, better known today as British Petroleum. Anglo Iranian poorly treated the Iranian workers and gave little of the profit to the Iranian government. They actually argued that Iran's oil was the property of their company. What arrogance? The Eisenhower administration defends the British and overthrows Mossadegh because of this. This is a good read. The reader should draw his own conclusions about today's Middle East.
Rating:
Summary: Very Important History - US Destabilization of Middle East
Review: I was given this book by a relative who had heard an interview of the author. Having lived through the Iran Hostage Crisis in my late teens, and Iran-Contra later, I assumed I understood that country well. This book really pinpointed my naivete' regarding my trust of US Govt policy and our intelligence services. The book is a quick read (I finished in 3 nights, while getting my kids to fall asleep), and it appears well supported by fact. It is enlightening to learn new perspectives on the motivations of Winston Churchill, British Petroleum, Harry Truman and Eisenhower on their decision making and competing interests with regard to Iran. These participants apparently conspired to destroy a young, vibrant democracy in Iran in 1953 whose chief result was the fostering of distrust and islamic extremism in the region that has led to our current tragic state of affairs. This is an important read, especially now that we have become more embroiled in middle east politics. It is essential that all americans understanding how destabilizing our administration's actions can be to a region. I highly recommend this work.
Rating:
Summary: British intransigence, American obtuseness
Review: It is impossible to read this book without feeling sympathy for the Iranians and their leader, Mossadegh Mohammad, for whom Stephen Kinzer has special affection, and without developing a sense of distaste first at the British, and then at their accomplices, the Americans. All the same, it is also impossible not to cast a doubt on the book's main conclusion-that the US-led coup in Iran in 1953 lies at the root of Middle East terror.
Stephen Kinzer, a veteran reporter for the New York Times, is no stranger to American coups, having contributed to the writing of the history of the CIA coup in Guatemala in 1954. In "All the Shah's Men," Mr. Kinzer chronicles another coup, one that preceded Guatemala and laid the foundation for America's thinking that coups can be a useful and effective tool of foreign policy.
The book narrates the history of foreign involvement in Iran that culminated in the toppling of Mossadegh Mohammad and the re-coronation of Reza Shah as Iran's leader. Mr. Kinzer goes back centuries to choreograph the details of foreign involvement in Iranian politics, and pays particular attention to the last century and a half: in 1872, for example, Nasir al-Din Shah offered a most sweeping concession to Baron Julius de Reuter to, among others, exploit Iran's natural resources, a privilege revoked a year later. After that came other concessions, extended and then revoked, agreed and then renegotiated, on oil and other business.
What made the landscape explosive was the resignation, in 1941, of Reza Shah, Iran's king, and the subsequent emergence of Mossadegh, and a person who rested much of his political fortune on the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Corporation (in 1951). His passionate belief that his country had been exploited by the British, and his unwillingness to compromise, coupled with the intransigence of the British created a perfect setting for confrontation.
Perfect, yes. But not inevitable. For that, one has to credit the re-election of Winston Churchill, an ardent Empire enthusiast, who was much keener on resolving the dispute between Iran and the AIOC, by force if necessary, than was his predecessor. Equally important was the election of Dwight Eisenhower, who replaced the skeptical and sympathetic to Iran Harry Truman, and adopted a more assertive pro-British line (courtesy of the Dulles brothers, Allen and John Foster, who ran the CIA and State Department, and who feared Iran might turn communist).
The narrative is eloquent, with enough attention on detail as to offer a vivid account of what happened and why. Mr. Kinzer has an eye for drama, building up the sequence of events with a novel-like quality (including the details of the coup, and Mossadegh's visit to the USA and UN). No doubt, the reader will feel rather conversant on the details of the foreign involvement in Iran leading up to the 1953 coup.
What is less obvious, however, is Mr. Kinzer grand conclusion: "It is not far-fetched," he writes, "to draw a line from Operation Ajax [the coup codename] through the Shah's repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York." As a history book, "All the Shah's" has many attractions; and, no doubt, there are lessons in 1953 to be learned today about meddling in other countries' businesses. But to link the 1953 with September 11 feels more like authoring overstretched, and should be best left at that.
Rating:
Summary: Kinzer tells us all we need to know about mucking in Iraq
Review: Kinzer not only tells the story of the 1953 coup against Mossadegh itself, but gives a very good historical review of the events in Iran leading up to the coup, and gives us all pause for thought as to how we should ... and should _not_ ... go mucking with other countries and trying to set them up in _our_ interests. The short term benefits to U.S. and British "national interests" (read: "oil companies") in installing the Shah as the ruler in Iran may have been beneficial (although it's not clear that Mossadegh would have been a whole lot worse), but the long term outcome was pretty much a foregone conclusion: The revolution, and a generation or two with deep distrust if not outright hatred for the Western powers. And we're reaping the whirlwind right now for it. Must reading. I'd say start at the White House. Rewrite it in small words with lots of pictures, and force Bush to put down the "Very Hungry Caterpillar" and take on something substantial for once in his life.
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