Hume, Holism, and Miracles (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion)

Rating:
Summary: Hume's Miracle of Rhetoric
Review: Johnson's bottom line is that insofar as Hume's argument against miracles is persuasive, it's a triumph of rhetoric over reason. What's surprising, in Johnson's view, is just how wide the triumph has been. Nonetheless, Johnson argues convincingly, when Hume and his followers argue that no testimony could ever establish a miracle, they invariably end up begging one question or another. For example, Flew argues that in interpreting the "detritus of the past" -- including reports of miracles -- the "critical historian" must always give priority to the stock of natural laws we take ourselves to have established. The upshot is supposed to be that in any contest between science and history, history is bound to lose. But as Johhson points out, the experimental reports underlying our beliefs about the laws of nature are themselves part of this "detritus of the past." That means our belief in laws of nature depends on our belief that certain historical events have actually occurred -- a belief based on testimony.

Johnson himself accepts that various biblical miracles actually occurred, but one need not be a believer to take his point. And his point is that if we are allowed to take all our knowledge into account (that's the bit about holism), it would be very strange if a purely philosophical argument could show that NO testimony could possibly make it reasonable to believe in a miracle.

When you think about it, this is a rather modest conclusion. It's similar to the conclusion that John Earman arrives at in _Hume's Abject Failure_, though Earman's issues and arguments are more technical. Indeed, one is inclined to apply Hume's own slogan and say that a those who accept the Humean view ought to be conscious of a continuing miracle in their own persons, persuading them to accept something contrary to philosophical good sense, if not to custom and experience.