C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason

Rating:
Summary: A Limited Scope, But Helpful to its Intended Audience
Review: After opening with a discussion that dispels an apparent urban legend in philosophical circles -- that C.S. Lewis's apologetic foundations were dismantled during an exchange with Elisabeth Anscombe - Reppert states the main thesis he sets out to prove [p.45]:

"Does our very thinking provide evidence that theism is true?"

"The argument I will be presenting in this book will attempt to answer that question in the affirmative."

From this point, Reppert takes this argument ("the argument from reason") and runs it against the rival worldview of naturalism (or the view that nature is the end of all things) with this contradiction: in order to affirm that there is nothing transcendent above nature, one must employ transcendent principles. It gives pure naturalism an unwarranted title of absolute certainty.

In order to combat the specific arguments in favor of naturalism, Reppert engages in a thorough exegesis of formal logical arguments , which may not be legible to the layman reader seeking an apostolic tool, but will be of service to philosophy students trying to connect with the avenues of thought that confront their belief system. Reppert's book provides a reminder of the limits of pure philosophy in addressing the higher questions of life and the existence of a transcendent power.

Rating:
Summary: Thought provoking argument against naturalism
Review: Although oft neglected in many philosophical circles, the writings of C.S. Lewis still have something to teach us about reason, human nature, and human existence. Reppert defends Lewis' argument against naturalism which simply states that mankind's reasoning abilities cannot be trusted if they are a product of Darwinian evolution; In other words, if the human brain is nothing more than a complex conglomeration of atoms and energy, then we have no reason to trust our reasoning abilities because it is the product of nothing more than a chaotic collision of atoms. Furthermore, since natural selection is completely blind in it's selective process evolution does not necessarily favor an advanced reasoning capacity. Natural selection could have just as easily favored a mutation that makes us perceive the world contrary to the way it is if this facilitated the survival of human beings. Since we cannot trust reason itself under the naturalist/Darwinian paradigm then the scientific enterprise becomes totally superfluous and meaningless.

Although short, only 132 pages, I must admit Reppert's arguments are quite through and engaging. The only possible defense the Darwinist has against this argument is to say that advanced reasoning abilities favor man's survival and would thus be selected by nature. Yet, this argument doesn't necessarily have to be true and only begs the question since assumes what it is attempting to establish. In a discussion I recently had with an individual who studied psyhcolinguistics, I employed this argument against a materialist argument in favor of mind equating with brain. When I discussed Lewis' argument the individual I was talking with conceeded the point that relying on reason in the naturalist paradigm was tenuous and could not be relied upon.

This compact book also delves into the issue of dualism vs. materialism, or the argument over mind is synonomous with brain or whether mind and brain are dichotomous entities. I personally favor the dualist view since it meshes with my views as a theist and safeguards human integrity. The materialist view must necessarily deny free will since our brains are ruled by natural laws and therefore the atoms in the brain operate according to fixed laws that can be studied and accurately predicted. If free will is denied, then this has serious implications for our society in areas such as law, education, and religion. Although Reppert's arguments for dualism are not as deep as they could be, he does an admirable job arguing in favor of the dualist position. For further study in favor of the dualist position I would recommend reading J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig.

Rating:
Summary: Thought provoking argument against naturalism
Review: Although oft neglected in many philosophical circles, the writings of C.S. Lewis still have something to teach us about reason, human nature, and human existence. Reppert defends Lewis' argument against naturalism which simply states that mankind's reasoning abilities cannot be trusted if they are a product of Darwinian evolution; In other words, if the human brain is nothing more than a complex conglomeration of atoms and energy, then we have no reason to trust our reasoning abilities because it is the product of nothing more than a chaotic collision of atoms. Furthermore, since natural selection is completely blind in it's selective process evolution does not necessarily favor an advanced reasoning capacity. Natural selection could have just as easily favored a mutation that makes us perceive the world contrary to the way it is if this facilitated the survival of human beings. Since we cannot trust reason itself under the naturalist/Darwinian paradigm then the scientific enterprise becomes totally superfluous and meaningless.

Although short, only 132 pages, I must admit Reppert's arguments are quite through and engaging. The only possible defense the Darwinist has against this argument is to say that advanced reasoning abilities favor man's survival and would thus be selected by nature. Yet, this argument doesn't necessarily have to be true and only begs the question since assumes what it is attempting to establish. In a discussion I recently had with an individual who studied psyhcolinguistics, I employed this argument against a materialist argument in favor of mind equating with brain. When I discussed Lewis' argument the individual I was talking with conceeded the point that relying on reason in the naturalist paradigm was tenuous and could not be relied upon.

This compact book also delves into the issue of dualism vs. materialism, or the argument over mind is synonomous with brain or whether mind and brain are dichotomous entities. I personally favor the dualist view since it meshes with my views as a theist and safeguards human integrity. The materialist view must necessarily deny free will since our brains are ruled by natural laws and therefore the atoms in the brain operate according to fixed laws that can be studied and accurately predicted. If free will is denied, then this has serious implications for our society in areas such as law, education, and religion. Although Reppert's arguments for dualism are not as deep as they could be, he does an admirable job arguing in favor of the dualist position. For further study in favor of the dualist position I would recommend reading J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig.

Rating:
Summary: What Lewis scholarship should be
Review: Far too many books on C. S. Lewis are really just commentaries full of quotations, or extended biographies, treating Lewis as a luminary whose views are so obviously true as not to require defense. This approach may be encouraging to the choir, but is hopeless as outreach and does a disservice to Lewis himself, who was trying with all his might to get Christians to think for themselves.

Reppert's wonderful book goes the extra mile and shows how Lewis's powerful intuitions can be developed into strong philosophical arguments that engage the contemporary academic scene, and makes a case that is persuasive for those outside the faith. He shows that one can isolate not one, but many distinct arguments from reason. These arguments all aim to show that there are characteristics of rationality which cannot be explained if we limit ourselves to the resources of scientific materialism, but point instead to some transcendent entity who many would identify as God.

Inevitably a book like this, which challenges contemporary naturalism at its very foundation, will receive some hostile responses, but do read the book for yourself, and if you agree with my assessment of it, do recommend it to those who are searching for meaning and ultimate answers (whether believers or unbelievers).

This is easily the best new popular book on C. S. Lewis's philosophy and sets the standard for Lewis scholarship to follow.

Rating:
Summary: Not _too_ 'dangerous'; but that may be a good thing... {g}
Review: Good concise introduction and overview to the theistic Argument from Reason, set in context of its most famous 20th century defender, C. S. Lewis.

Dr. Reppert begins by covering the history of Lewis' use of the argument, with particular emphasis on how Lewis developed it (in the 2nd edition of _Miracles: A Preliminary Study_) in response to criticisms. (Some of the first chapters are an apology, not so much for the AfR, as for Lewis being a useful philosophical resource for scholars other than popular apologists.)

Having developed, in parallel, a variety of standard critical (and uncritical!) responses to Lewis' AfR, Dr. Reppert then traces the idea through its more modern developments by recent philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and William Hasker, although Reppert provides a generous spread of other commenters as well, both pro and con. From these developments, Reppert derives and presents six 'Best Explanation' variations of the AfR (along with some other varieties which don't receive his critical approval); and then (somewhat like Lewis himself) proceeds to field some expected initial ripostes.

One interesting feature, is Dr. Reppert's relatively widespread use of publicly available internet articles published. Visitors and members of the Secular Web (aka infidels.org), for instance, may be pleased to see some of this site's materials made use of in CSLDI (not always in an oppositional manner, either.)

Ironically, I think the Argument from Reason (especially Lewis' version, with some tweaks not strictly covered by Dr. Reppert) ends up being a lot more dangerous than the results of this book would indicate. The colorful title notwithstanding, Reppert doesn't really present the argument (any variety of it) as being nearly as 'threatening' to atheism, as atheists (Daniel Dennett, for instance, from whose book the title is borrowed) have commonly presented Darwin's ideas being threatening to supernaturalistic theism.

On the other hand, this may help the book be more readable by opponents, as Dr. Reppert routinely minimizes claims for the argument (properly so, too, as far as he goes with it). Plus, he's certainly far more polite and charitable to his opponents than Dennett. Readers who insist on a deductive use of the argument, however, should find another book (such as Lewis' _Miracles: A Preliminary Study_ itself).

Meanwhile, this book is broad enough in scope, and yet short enough in length, to be a good choice for use in various college courses; especially as a springboard for discussion, and to help bring students more up-to-date on a promising field of apologetic work.

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Summary: Is Fritz different from Microsoft Word?
Review: On page 64 , Victor writes ' But if naturalism is true, then this type of relationship, according to Lewis, is impossible.Events in nature are determined by the previous position of material particles, the laws of nature, and (perhaps) a chance factor.'

I don't understand this view of naturalism that Mr. Reppert and C.S.Lewis are attacking.

Computers are totally natural objects, and yet their workings are governed by software objects (print queues, variables, binary trees, indexes etc etc)

How does a print queue affect how a physical computer works, when there is no collection of atoms that you can point at and say 'That is the print queue'?

Surely , regardless of how Lewis commanded the universe to behave, it is just not true that logical relationships cannot be implemented by physical objects.

A computer is a counter-example.

Of course, Victor says computers were designed by humans.

But how did humans design computers unless physical objects like computers can be affected by logical relationships, something Victor and Lewis said was impossible.

Victor's whole book is based on a fallacy.

On page 79, Victor writes ''Whether a computer's activity is interpreted as a chess game or as a word-processing program will not affect the actual output of the computer, though no doubt it will affect the input that its users generate.'

Surely we cannot interpret Fritz to be a word-processing program, or Word to be a chess playing program, and Fritz and Word *do* behave differently, precisely because they are physically implementing different abstract rules.

Victor's logic is full of holes