Rating: 
Summary: The Number
Review: A book about accounting written by a nonaccountant. A waste of your time and money. My copy went into the trash.
Rating: 
Summary: Very good
Review: Concise and crisply written. Shows in a way how the 1990s were an inevitable outcome of prior history
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Summary: A Century of Sleazy Stock Market Manipulations Chronicled
Review: How do the financial markets work? How good are the information flows? How far can you trust what you read and hear? Where are there conflicts of interest? Why are these conflicts dangerous? Those are the fundamental questions that Mr. Alex Berenson addresses in his century-long look at how the government, companies, investment banks, brokers and investors have interacted. Unlike other books about the need for reform in the financial markets, this one also looks thoroughly at thoughtful commentary by market experts, academics and regulators over the years. The book is enlivened by entertaining writing, a willingness to say "shame on you" to those who have done wrong and insights into the work that short sellers do to make the market more rational when it isn't. If you just want to read about the current market or you know a lot about the market history, you can skip over the first 70 pages. If you are new to the market, you may find the first 70 pages to be the most interesting. Stock promotion and trading have always been corrupt. Over time, that corruption finds new ways to manifest itself. What's new now is that the potential financial stakes are so large that they would blow the mind of an ancient Egyptian pharaoh. At the same time, the social cost of corruption is equally large. I found the book to be quite thorough when it came to the recent market bubble (and partial bursting in 2000-2002). The main area that did not receive enough attention was pointing out why boards go wild with options and CEO pay (even for lousy performance). The book has two technical weaknesses in its observations that deserve note. First, like almost all financial writers, Mr. Berenson assumes that the current way companies employ stock options is unfixable except through accounting changes. Actually, the current use of stock options (although excessive in many cases for senior management) could easily be made into a major source of profits for companies. If companies bought back shares equivalent to the options they grant at lower prices than the option exercise price, any options that were later exercised would generate real cash and real earnings for the company. That's because Uncle Sam provides tax deductions for these options (as the author thoughtfully points out). Companies could achieve this positive result simply by granting options at exercise prices well above the current market while simultaneously purchasing the equivalent shares. The premium on the exercise price would have to account for the cost of capital on the money tied up in the meantime. If a company couldn't afford to do this, then it has a real cost of issuing options that should be recognized. Actually, that cost is recognized now through an increase in shares outstanding. Option grants are disclosed. If investors ignore these points, they deserve to bear the consequences. There's no real need to change accounting in this situation . . . just to improve financial management and board behavior. The other problem is that Mr. Berenson doesn't quite understand accounting, and says things that are "almost" right . . . but not quite right in several places. Take his accounting comments with a grain of salt as exposing an issue . . . but don't quote him literally. The book would have been much improved if Mr. Berenson had also examined those who managed their companies well. How did they avoid the evils portrayed in the book? What clues do those companies provide for the future? I hope that in the future Mr. Berenson will write a book about the government numbers that mislead companies, investors and consumers about what's going on in the economy. The political propaganda that is disguised as economic information also plays a large role in stock market problems . . . and has an even larger social cost. This book makes an eloquent piece of evidence for only investing in stocks through index funds. When you do that, you reduce your risk of being tricked by any particular corrupt company or person. You will also outperform 90 percent of all professionally managed portfolios (and a higher percentage of individually managed portfolios) when you do. Keep that in mind as you invest. As I finished the book, I realized that the lack of practical economic education in high schools and colleges leaves each new generation exposed to the con men and women in the securities industry and those they use to weave their schemes and scams. Be sure that your children and grandchildren don't have to learn Enron-type lessons the hard way. Teach them what you know!
Rating:
Summary: Insightful and easy to understand
Review: I am a professor of finance and economics and must recommend this book for anyone with even a basic interest in corporate markets. I've asked my students to read The Number largely because it presents a fair and in-depth perspective on this fascinating economic fallout without ignoring the historical context. Berenson writes clearly and perceptively while analyzing from both top to bottom as well as left to right the market growth and its subsequent implosion.
Rating: 
Summary: Solid introduction for the financial novice
Review: I can see why Berenson is touted as one of the top authors under 30. His writing is great. Crisp, clear, well researched and understandable. However, if you have kept up with all the shenanigans going on in the market over the past years, there is very little new here. Folks who are not as in touch with the details behind the financial chincary that has gone on will find this a quick, enlightening and enjoyable read. I would love to see the author tackle another topic in the future.
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Summary: Every investor should be forced to read this book
Review: I get asked all the time to write a book about business and investing. Fortunately, I dont have to or want to any longer. The Number is the book about investing I would write. Its not a how too book, its a book that pulls back the covers on Wall Street and shows once and for all that it is not an efficient market, and that indivudal investors and fund managers need to know that they are walking into a world that is far more ponzi scheme than a source of capital for growing companies and returns for investors. If you buy stocks without reading this book first, you are putting yourself at a disadvantage
Rating:
Summary: I've got your number, sunshine
Review: In the last few months I have read four accounts of the tech bubble. Glutton for punishment, aren't I. I've just got through Alex Berenson's "The Number". I was sent a free copy by the publisher. Alex Berenson himself emailed me to arrange this. So first up, in the spirit of full and fair disclosure, I disclose that I was given this book to review. I feel the need to say that especially in this case because I thought this was rather a good book. By some margin the best of the bunch, actually. Where Roger Lowenstein's "Origins of the Crash" had the air of being something of an aggregation of newspaper clippings, and Frank Partnoy's "Infectious Greed" was less focussed, less penetrating, and in no real sense dispassionate, Mr. Berenson clearly sets out his stall with an interesting (and relevant) history of the regulation of corporate governance and reporting since the 1920s, and an analysis of the issues associated with accounting of any sort. In two short but clear appendices, Berenson explains in lay terms the difference between (and pros and cons of) accrual and sale accounting, and then balance sheets as opposed to income statements. These are fundamentals that one needs to understand what was going on, and not all of the authors who have written on the subject necessarily have a grasp of them. Where as other authors have targeted (with varying degrees of persuasiveness) bodies such as ISDA, the SEC and the credit rating agencies as the main culprit, Berenson's focus stays very much with the auditing accountants and the corporate executives. A number of sectors in the financial system (in fact pretty much all of them) took their eye off the ball at the critical stages of the bubble, but were it not for the vagaries and flexibilities of accounting policy and sheer out-and-out greed of executives, this might not have happened, at least perhaps not quite so dreadfully. Berenson is convincing on both these scores. That said, I don't subscribe to all Berenson's views. While the actions of some auditors (notably Andersen) are indefensible, Berenson supplies a pretty solid excuse for the profession generally: the preparation of company accounts, he notes, necessarily involves hundreds of assumptions, approximations and best guesses, and as even with the best will in the world these can be wrong, and "those who want to cheat have an almost infinite number of ways to do so". Given that the auditing function can only cost so much before it drives a company out of business by itself, there must be limits to what any auditor can be expected to detect. But Berenson still holds the profession to book. This isn't always consistent with Berenson's other view, which he expresses convincingly, that the "number" is intrinsically unreliable and should be much less of a determinant for market sentiment than it currently is. On the other hand, as he notes in his conclusion, even this view has its limits: the stagnation of the Japanese markets in the last five or so years is testament to the perils of ignoring the "number" altogether. Like most financial authors (with the exception of Michael Lewis, for whom he has considerably less respect than I have) Berenson favours more government regulation as part of the solution to the problem: Congress could limit the number of options companies could grant their CEOs or put restrictions on executive pay, he suggests. Perhaps accountants could be required to bid for audit work to a federal board. With respect, this is silly: Irrespective of how ridiculous executive compensation may be (and Berenson is certainly convincing that it is), such a Soviet technique is absolutely the last thing that is required. The market has to learn these lessons and discount the stock of profligate companies itself: the government has no means (let alone resources: Berenson is similarly persuasive as to the lack of funding for the SEC) for ascertaining what is reasonable, whereas the market - albeit eventually - will find the charlatans out. I dare say Michael Eisner is finding this out to his discomfort at the moment. At some point short sellers will be able to exploit the arbitrage opportunity. Investors may lose in the short term, but if you aren't able to take a short term loss, you shouldn't be in the market. Like Partnoy does, Berenson concludes his book with recognition of this. Caveat Emptor, indeed. In some ways having the SEC as a comfort blanket for investors in itself fuelled the boom. Elsewhere Berenson is occasionally guilty of sophistry. He points out the irony of price regulation of the commissions charged for trading on the NYSE, perhaps the most potent symbol of the free market on the planet. But then mixes his examples: "Wall Street has always loved free markets, except when they might cut into its fees. Today, when even real estate agents are being forced to compete on price, the 7 percent commissions charged by big investment banks for initial public offerings are sacrosanct." This is naughty, and I suspect Berenson knows it. Commissions for underwriting IPOs are quite a different thing to commissions for brokering stock sales across the exchange. They have never been subject to any regulation, and if the fees tend to stick at a certain level, that not so much to do with price fixing, as the inherent risks and huge amount of work and expense required to get an IPO away. That is the market level. Given the dearth of IPOs in the last three years, the pitching for them will have been feverish. I am prattling on. These quibbles are largely that: just quibbles, and in the round this would be the book I would recommend out of the four on the subject I have recently read.
Rating:
Summary: Equity investors out to know this material (and then some)
Review: Mr. Berenson takes a very interesting approach to explaining the rise of the 90s bubble economy. The book opens with a wonderfully apt quote from Upton Sinclair: "It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it." The drive for Earnings Per Share (EPS) by analysts and investors guided by them, according to the author, leads them astray because the number is inherently imprecise. Earnings are stated by the company as an exact figure and EPS is simply that number divided by the number of outstanding shares of common stock. However, earnings depend a great deal on the methods of accounting used by the firm. In the 90s we saw a rise in very aggressive accounting. Any system of rules that is intended to be applied generally over a wide range differing conditions is going to have gaps and unintended effects that distort the intention of the rules. General rules rely upon the good will and integrity of the participants to keep the intention or spirit of the rules in tact in order for the rules to have any real meaning in application. In sports we also have referees to keep the game fair, but both teams still have to intend to follow the rules completely. No game could be played if the participants tried to push every rule to an extreme interpretation. Aggressive accounting uses extreme interpretations of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to present as favorable earnings number as possible. This results in a higher (and therefore more pleasing) EPS number. Analysts started giving forecasts of coming EPS reports for firms and those that met or slightly exceeded that forecast were rewarded with higher share prices because investors competed for their shares. Those that missed the forecast by even a penny per share were punished as investors abandoned their stock. Mr. Berenson demonstrates that many companies had reserves and other accounting tricks to make sure their EPS forecasts were always met. However, as companies grow this becomes harder to do. And for companies such as Tyco, Enron, Adelphia, and even the mighty General Electric, it finally became impossible. The most aggressive companies had presented such a distorted picture of reality that they collapsed. Those that were still within shouting distance of reality remained solvent, but still suffered a significant depression in their stock price. Since the EPS is inherently inexact it seems strange that the markets would react so strongly to that single measure. Mr. Berenson calls the number a lie. I think he does that for rhetorical effect and one time he does admit it is a white lie. I think he has a very strong point for those companies using aggressive interpretations of GAAP. The author also provides a history of the SEC and calls for stronger enforcement powers and the staff to provide that enforcement. While there is certainly a good case to have an effective SEC with sufficient resources (there will be a debate on what this level is), Mr. Berenson has more faith in regulation than I do. Even if I fully concede his point and support an SEC of enormous size, it still could not provide the necessary enforcement to keep companies in line if the market keeps rewarding companies for fudging the numbers. The market will provide what people want to buy even if they want to buy lies. I agree with Mr. Berenson that INVESTORS need to become better educated and make more demands of the management of the companies in which they invest. Investors, by NOT investing in companies who use very aggressive accounting, could affect the way finances are reported than any regulatory body. Not every company can be a growth company. Heck, even Microsoft isn't a Microsoft anymore. Investors have to demand that financial statements actually present a real picture of the financial state of the firm rather then providing a manufactured dream of ever expanding growth. One of the strengths of this book is the compelling evidence Mr. Berenson provides of management spinning these euphoric visions just long enough to cash out and then let the bad news (read reality) come to light on someone else's watch. This is a fine book. I think that anyone who has investments in public companies ought to read it and better educated themselves on the realities of the equities marketplace. I think Mr. Berenson's recommendations for public policy are measured and good for debate even if I don't personally agree with all of them. There are a few minor quibbles I have with some of his explanations, but they don't affect my recommendation. The book has a couple of short appendices to help the reader understand the accounting issues involved. There are helpful notes for sources and an index.
Rating:
Summary: Equity investors out to know this material (and then some)
Review: Mr. Berenson takes a very interesting approach to explaining the rise of the 90s bubble economy. The book opens with a wonderfully apt quote from Upton Sinclair: "It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it." The drive for Earnings Per Share (EPS) by analysts and investors guided by them, according to the author, leads them astray because the number is inherently imprecise. Earnings are stated by the company as an exact figure and EPS is simply that number divided by the number of outstanding shares of common stock. However, earnings depend a great deal on the methods of accounting used by the firm. In the 90s we saw a rise in very aggressive accounting. Any system of rules that is intended to be applied generally over a wide range differing conditions is going to have gaps and unintended effects that distort the intention of the rules. General rules rely upon the good will and integrity of the participants to keep the intention or spirit of the rules in tact in order for the rules to have any real meaning in application. In sports we also have referees to keep the game fair, but both teams still have to intend to follow the rules completely. No game could be played if the participants tried to push every rule to an extreme interpretation. Aggressive accounting uses extreme interpretations of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to present as favorable earnings number as possible. This results in a higher (and therefore more pleasing) EPS number. Analysts started giving forecasts of coming EPS reports for firms and those that met or slightly exceeded that forecast were rewarded with higher share prices because investors competed for their shares. Those that missed the forecast by even a penny per share were punished as investors abandoned their stock. Mr. Berenson demonstrates that many companies had reserves and other accounting tricks to make sure their EPS forecasts were always met. However, as companies grow this becomes harder to do. And for companies such as Tyco, Enron, Adelphia, and even the mighty General Electric, it finally became impossible. The most aggressive companies had presented such a distorted picture of reality that they collapsed. Those that were still within shouting distance of reality remained solvent, but still suffered a significant depression in their stock price. Since the EPS is inherently inexact it seems strange that the markets would react so strongly to that single measure. Mr. Berenson calls the number a lie. I think he does that for rhetorical effect and one time he does admit it is a white lie. I think he has a very strong point for those companies using aggressive interpretations of GAAP. The author also provides a history of the SEC and calls for stronger enforcement powers and the staff to provide that enforcement. While there is certainly a good case to have an effective SEC with sufficient resources (there will be a debate on what this level is), Mr. Berenson has more faith in regulation than I do. Even if I fully concede his point and support an SEC of enormous size, it still could not provide the necessary enforcement to keep companies in line if the market keeps rewarding companies for fudging the numbers. The market will provide what people want to buy even if they want to buy lies. I agree with Mr. Berenson that INVESTORS need to become better educated and make more demands of the management of the companies in which they invest. Investors, by NOT investing in companies who use very aggressive accounting, could affect the way finances are reported than any regulatory body. Not every company can be a growth company. Heck, even Microsoft isn't a Microsoft anymore. Investors have to demand that financial statements actually present a real picture of the financial state of the firm rather then providing a manufactured dream of ever expanding growth. One of the strengths of this book is the compelling evidence Mr. Berenson provides of management spinning these euphoric visions just long enough to cash out and then let the bad news (read reality) come to light on someone else's watch. This is a fine book. I think that anyone who has investments in public companies ought to read it and better educated themselves on the realities of the equities marketplace. I think Mr. Berenson's recommendations for public policy are measured and good for debate even if I don't personally agree with all of them. There are a few minor quibbles I have with some of his explanations, but they don't affect my recommendation. The book has a couple of short appendices to help the reader understand the accounting issues involved. There are helpful notes for sources and an index.
Rating:
Summary: What Might Those Quarterly Earnings Mean?
Review: New York Times business reporter Alex Berenson has written a book that every investor should read. "The Number" traces the history of Wall Street trends, bubbles, busts, and the accounting fashions that accompanied them from the 1920s to the present day. He explains how the cult of The Number was born, making quarterly earnings reports the last word on any company's health, and how this facilitated the chicanery at Enron, Tyco, and the scandalously large paydays for incompetent corporate executives that have made headlines across the nation in recent years. "The Number"'s primary focus is actually on the evolution of accounting practices over the past 80 years. Berenson asserts that a disintegration of standards and an increase in conflicts of interest in the accounting profession prevent potential and current shareholders from understanding any company's health or its stock's true value. In other words, accounting slight of hand is such that it would take a detective to figure out if a company is making money or losing it. In explaining how and why, "The Number" gives us a fascinating, very readable history of the numbers and the people behind the trends since this nation first went crazy over the stock market in the 1920s. Mr. Berenson definitely has a viewpoint. He is in favor of stricter regulation for the accounting industry, perhaps more than is necessary or practical. But he makes some good points. And "The Number"'s chronicle of how things are on Wall Street and how they got that way is invaluable for any investor. Alex Berenson's writing is interesting, easy for anyone to understand, and his insights are essential to understanding what quarterly earnings reports do and don't mean, whether they be for big corporations that are the backbone of our economy, or little ones that may make or break your nest egg.
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