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Rating: 
Summary: American shortcomings
Review: As just another digger I found this book to be most worthy.
Having been through the training regimes as recommended by Ted Serong in Australia and having the understanding of the type of war we were involved in I could never understand the manner in which the Americans fought the war.
After reading this book I now understand it to have been a distrust of non American ideas and arrogance of the"we know better" type and impatience, thinking always that bigger is better rather than looking at quality.
Rating:
Summary: Should be studied closely by military strategists
Review: The Vietnam War, and especially the reasons for its loss, from both military and political standpoints, will continue to be a matter of importance for those who are concerned with the survival of democracies. Much has been written on political considerations, but military questions have been more neglected. Hence this book, which examines the role of Brigadier Ted Serong in the conflict, will be of great interest to a variety of readers. Anne Blair is a research associate with the National Centre for Australian Studies at Monash University. Her interest in Serong is well-based. He had a central role in the development of military strategy and tactics, although to a large extent his views conflicted with those ultimately applied by the United States in Vietnam. Early during his time in Vietnam, Serong concluded that the American forces were not properly directed, and that the South Vietnamese Army also should have directed its efforts in different ways. He was involved in the development of the Police Field Force (PFF), with the aim of destroying the structures of the Vietnamese Communists in rural and mountain areas, and also the networks by which guerrillas obtained weapons, food, information and recruits. Serong's concept (which is particularly persuasive in retrospect) was that the PFF would clear areas of Viet Cong influence, thus freeing the South Vietnamese Army (the AVRN) for combat against the North Vietnamese regiments that were operating in the border areas. Unfortunately the United States forces showed a lack of patience, and were not prepared to support adequately the gradual advance of the program. The PFF was absorbed by other US mission programs in 1966-67, but Serong himself remained invaluable and was consulted constantly by government advisers and by military commanders at the highest level. At all times, his perceptions of the strategic position were sound. For example, he was one of the first to appreciate that the 1968 Tet Offensive constituted, contrary to media reports, a militarily disastrous loss by the Communists. This book is very valuable. It is well researched. The author had the advantage of numerous conversations with Serong, and her account is expressed carefully, with much detail and appropriate references. It is impossible to read it without concluding that Serong is a great Australian, and a great man in any context, a figure of enormous importance whose advice, had it been followed properly, would probably have led to a different result in Vietnam. It is therefore a book which, in addition to its general readership, should be studied closely by military strategists and tacticians, and by the various academics, think-tanks and institutes which are so influential in the application of political and military policy. - I.C.F. Spry, News Weekly book review, Melbourne, Australia
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