Rating: 
Summary: Star Wars and a Lot (Too Much) More
Review: Frances FitzGerald's Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam, which won the Pulitzer Prize, was one of the best books written about the Vietnam War during the conflict, and her America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century was a splendid study of how Americans think and write about the past. So I was, quite frankly, a bit disappointed by this book about President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"). I am, quite frankly, inclined to agree with what I perceive to be FitzGerald's main premises: Reagan never had a clue about the technical difficulties involved in devising and implementing a ballistic-missile defense system; the cost of the program would have been astronomical, even by American defense-spending standards; and, even if S.D.I. had been deployed, it never would have accomplished the one thing Reagan promised: Protecting the American people from the threat posed by nuclear weapons. But FitzGerald meanders. In an "Author's Note" at the beginning of the book, FitzGerald writes: "This book began with my interest in the appeal Reagan had for the American public and the direct connection he made to the American imagination." Well enough. But FitzGerald then asserts that she chose to focus on S.D.I. because "it was surely his greatest rhetorical triumph." FitzGerald never establishes the validity of that premise. Preparing to write a book about public policy requires the author to ask herself: How much context is necessary? In this instance, I believe most readers would have accepted as given "Reagan's ignorance of policy issues, his disengagement from the work of government, his distance from other people." She could, therefore, have started with chapter four, entitled, "Space Defense Enthusiasts." The 1980 Republican national campaign's defense platform called for the U.S. "to achieve overall military and technical superiority over the Soviet Union" and "to create a strategic and civil defense which would protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is protected." But missile defense was deliberately kept out of Reagan's speeches during the campaign. In October 1981, the White House announced that it was pursuing research and development of ground- and space based defenses "but today ballistic missile defense technology is not at the state where it could provide an adequate defense against Soviet missiles." That official policy statement, which was reported in the national media, is the effective starting point of FitzGerald's study and establishes the principal issue for the remainder of the book: Between October 1981 and the end of the Reagan administration in January 1989, did ballistic missile defense technology advance to the where point where it could have provided an adequate defense against Soviet missiles? Reagan had been long convinced, perhaps in defiance of the facts, that the Soviets had achieved nuclear-weapons superiority. In January 1982, a small group of missile-defense advocates met with the president. According to FitzGerald, some participants believed Reagan was committed to, at the very least, a research program, while others were of the opinion that the "White House response to their work was distinctly and surprisingly cool." One concern might have been cost: During the campaign, Reagan had promised tax cuts, a balanced budget, and higher defense spending. The administration was planning to spend almost $1.5 trillion in five years for its defense build-up. But, according to FitzGerald: "Reagan had taken to saying, 'Defense is not a budget item. You spend what you need.'" Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in a speech on March 23, 1983. In FitzGerald's view, Reagan never gave the technical issues much personal consideration; "his job, as he saw it, was to sell [his administration's] policies to the public." The concept apparently simmered for most of the next one and one-half years. The Pentagon created an independent entity to study missile defense early in 1984, but, according to FitzGerald, "many in the Pentagon, and in particular the [research and development] chiefs, had voiced considerable skepticism about the President's project." What followed was a period of technical controversies known as the "science wars." FitzGerald writes that, during the 1984 presidential campaign, Democrat Walter Mondale "condemned Star Wars as a dangerous hoax that would cost untold billions, speed up the arms race and fail to provide any real protection." But S.D.I. was not a major issue in that election, and Reagan, of course, crushed Mondale to win a second term. The technical debate continued, and opponents of S.D.I. were denounced by Reagan administration officials as "traditional thinkers" and people "congenitally opposed to new ideas." One of the traditionalists was former President Nixon who expressed the essential problem in a nutshell: "With 10,000 of those damned things [nuclear warheads] there is no defense." The director of the Pentagon's S.D.I. office was forced to concede that "though Reagan's vision was the goal 'we may well find it unachievable," and, according to FitzGerald, the chairman of the Defense Technologies Study Team concluded that no missile defense stem could defend the total U.S. population: "There is no such thing as a nuclear umbrella." If, as FitzGerald puts it, "an umbrella defense of the United States was a virtual impossibility," what accounts for S.D.I.'s continuing vitality through the end of the Reagan administration? Reagan apparently believed that, even if significant reductions of offensive weapons could be negotiated, missile defense was necessary "as a safety valve against cheating." Others wanted to have S.D.I. available as a bargaining chip to be used in those negotiations. And others supported it simply as a research program. FitzGerald asserts that S.D.I. was the first military program Congress ever funded "knowing full well that what the public expected from it could not possibly be achieved." The annual cost for research alone was $3 billion. In arms-control discussions in the mid-1980s, missile defense was a contentious issue. The official Soviet position was that a missile-defense system in space might, in fact, be used for offensive purposes, to launch a first strike. It is equally clear that the Soviets did not want to be pressured to undertake the expense of researching the enormously complicated technical issues. (During one summit meeting, Gorbachev told Reagan: "I think you're wasting money. I don't think it will work. But if that's what you want to do, go ahead....We're moving in another direction....And we think we can do it less expensively and with greater effectiveness.") After the end of the Cold War, Reaganites took the position that the challenges created by the Reagan defense build-up, including research into S.D.I., had pushed the Soviet economy into crisis. There does not appear to have been any real possibility of developing and deploying an effective missile defense system in the 1980s. Whether one accepts or rejects FitzGerald's main premise probably depends upon the reader's ideology. Reagan admirers, who believe that his efforts to rebuild American defenses helped end of the Cold War, will energetically reject FitzGerald's perspective. Those who believe that S.D.I. was a costly exercise in futility probably will be embrace her indictment. If I had been FitzGerald's editor, I would have encouraged her to reduce the length of the text from about 500 pages to under 350 and to focus on the following questions: (1) Was effective ballistic missile defense technologically feasible in the mid-1980s? (2) What would have been the cost of development and deployment? and (3) If deployed, what would S.D.I. have protected? FitzGerald suggests that the short answers to those questions were: (1) Probably no; (2) At least $1 trillion; and (3) At best, S.D.I. would have offered some protection for American strategic forces, but it never would have provided population defense. According to FitzGerald, the Reagan administration was not honest with the American people about any of those essential points. That, in my opinion, should have been the narrow theme of her book.
Rating: 
Summary: Yes, he was "way out there..."
Review: It is interesting to see how people have tried to make Reagan into the greatest president when he was in fact the luckiest. Nothing really bad happened while he was president and the great events that did take place occurred when he was safely back in California. Then his legion of spin doctors could either credit Reagan with all of the good things (fall of communism) and blame others (rising deficit, poor record on terrorism) on others. Surely there must come a day in which the truth can be explored and this book is fine step in the right direction. Here is the real Reagan, stage directions and all ready to defeat the tottering mess that the USSR actually was. It is interesting that those who were most alarmed by communism actually gave it greater credit for resiliancy than was actually there. But I suppose such a point might be considered inapproprate in the circles likely to despise this book, which destroys many of the myths of the Reagan presidency. Three cheers for Frances Fitzgerald for performing such a noble act of public service.
Rating: 
Summary: Terrible Book
Review: It what amounts to nothing more then an attack by a leftist writer, Fitzgeralds focus is to demean the charcater of a great president. Weather he was a bumbling ... or was just acting, like in his movies, fitzgerald argument does not deal with the fact that when Ronald Reagan entered office the Cold War had never been colder, and by the time he left office it was essentialy over. Was it a matter of luck that the collapse of the Soviet Empire occured on the watch of the most anti-communist president in the history of the country? Fitzgerald can theorize anything she/he pleases, but ask the Russians what impact Star Wars had on their demise.
Rating:
Summary: Me think Book good
Review: Me think book good. LIberals smart, conservatives dumb, me think liberals better then Regan, stoopid Regan, not smart like liBarels, Francies Fitsjerald smart, jest like cuzzin in Arkansaw who maried sister, liBiarals smart.
Rating:
Summary: Poorly written and ideologically biased
Review: Of all the books written on the Reagan administration, this one may be one of the worst. Poorly written with excessive attention to detail that makes the story plod, it makes one wonder if Frances Fitzgerald was a one hit wonder. Fitzgerald's portrayal of Reagan as out of step with reality - starting with the book title and included throughout its content - is less of a description of reality and more, I suspect, the blowing off of ideological steam. If you despise Reagan and think he was a dunderhead this book will do more than reinforce those beliefs. If you want an intelligent and useful discussion of the Reagan Administration and its foreign policy walk right past this one.
Rating: 
Summary: Thank God for the US Congress!
Review: Reading this book, my overriding thought was, "Thank God for the Balance of Powers!" It is not a big national security secret that Ronald Reagan is a likeable guy. Despite what other reviewers imply, I did not get the impression that FitzGerald dislikes the former president or is out to belittle or poke fun at him. In places, her portrait of the man is even endearing. Where she does point out his shortcomings, she uses documented quotations from those who worked in the Reagan White House or on his campaigns. I can't see how that is controversial, especially since all of the critical comments she relates are from conservatives. Reagan may have had a hands-off management style, but clearly he was a shrewd politician. As an actor, he knew the power of image, and how to use it. Reagan also had a genius for making the small move that gave big returns, like the "impromptu" fireside chat at Geneva with Gorbachev. FitzGerald relates these events but underplays Reagan's good moves and emphasizes his disinterest in policy and micromanagment. Carter micromanaged and I can't say America was better for it. It's interesting to me that the reviews here are of a piece with the on going debate over military and nuclear strategy. Some claim that FitzGerald doesn't know the subject. FitzGerald herself often claims that many of the principal policy makers in the story didn't know the subject. The game rule seems to be that anyone who doesn't share your opinion doesn't know what he or she is talking about and is a radical of the opposite camp. Of the cast of characters, the US Congress, particularly Sen. Sam Nunn and Rep. Les Apin come off best. On the White House team, George Shultz appears as a reasonable and decent man, probably the best of the bunch. Cap Weinberger seems an insecure bulldog who doesn't think much for himself. Paul Nitze is more human than I remember him. Richard Perle, well, is Richard Perle; and Bill Casey is the American Brezhnev: an old Cold Warrior who was not keeping up with the times. Lastly, George Bush is largely quiet and off camera (doing God knows what). In retrospect all this blather about arms control came to naught. The Soviet Union imploded from its own dead economic weight. It had nothing to do with the arms race. SDI would have been no help on September 11th. Nor would it be any help against chemical or biological weapons. (Ironically, Reagan gave $300 million, arms and training to the dogs that returned to bite America's hand: the Afghan mujaheddin, and their leader Osama Bin Laden. So much for defense.) My opinion (fwiw): SDI is a boondoggle. Still is. It will never stop a terrorist. It will only stop domestic programs, create budget deficits and (listen up you conservatives!) cause Congress to raise our taxes to pay for it (for which Bush, Sr. was denied re-election). The only real reason I can see to support SDI is if you are a defense contractor. Profit is good, but let's be honest about our motives. The book is timely for today, as the Bush Jr. administration replays Reagan's best scenes. Despite all the naysayers, I give this book 5 stars, as a well researched, respectful, thought-provoking rehash of the Reagan years and how a nation had its chain pulled in the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Rating:
Summary: Disillusionment
Review: The JCS would never accept an arms reduction without a space defense program. The JCS goal was keep SDI in research avoiding deployment and increase interceptor missile deployment. The doctrine of deterrence would could through the twenth century. The Reagan administration gave the Bush administration an unique opportunity to reduce arms. The Bush administration did not continue the Reagan administrations views on foreign policy with Gorbachev. The Bush administration would stop and the continuation of the Reagan summits ceased and Bush would contemplate the previous administrations philosophy and direction with disagreement. The Bush administration would take a broad interpretation of the ABM. The transition between the Reagan and the Bush administration would treat the ARM reduction opportunity like a hostile take over, replacing Shultz and Weinberger with Bush people, and resume deterrence buildup policy. Bush's differed in his view of foreign policy, not willing to take Reagan's hardline position. Bush felt Reagan's hardline rhethoric was offensive to the Soviet leadership. Reagan had openly challenged Gorbachev on issues of human rights condemning the violence. Reagan called the Soviet Union the "evil empire". Reagan's hardline position postured the United States as one of military strength, 3 to 4 percent increases for SDI, and a estimated cost of 1.6 trillion dollars to deploy SDI; inconsistency in reporting and engineering feasiblity of the chemical and X-Ray laser brightness (Daniel Graham and Teller) as a military weapon; economic drives to reduce military spending, balance the budget, and reduce inflation. Reagan's NORAD vision prompted his to dream of a defensive system capable of making the Soviet ICBM impotent eliminating the potential of first strike. Reagan realized "Mutal Assured Destruction" did not stop a first strike response, it only deterred; and with the Soviets considering the possiblity of winning a nuclear war, defensive missile systems needed to be engineered and deployed immediately. Moscow media was warning of the possiblity of U.S first strike. The fear was caused more by a pattern of military buildup than an particular doctrine. The nuclear arms races of the cold war positioned the U.S in a potential first strike position. ARM reduction talks were a mandatory must. Gorbachev as General Secretary was considered trustworthy, known as "incorruptable and courageous", by Soviet leadership too secure Soviet communist interests and start reform leading too social and economic structural revolution of the soviet union paving a pathway for Marxist views of property rights, freedom of press and speech, primary elections, openings for foreign investment and transplating of foreign companies, free markets and free trade, and the arms reduction. Gorbachev would raise to the status and power of President. Boris Yeltsin was critical of Gorbachev. Gorbachev would not be able to break from Russia's totalitarian past. Yeltsin would be eventually elected as president. Yeltsin would struggle with reform against the hardliners and failing expectations of previous era's. Yeltsin would face the struggle to a market economy: failure of taxation, hyper inflation shock to lifting price controls, and problems with stablizing privatization.
Gorbachev received a standing obviation from the U.N. after a fifteen year soviet absence caused by Brezhnev condemning speech against the U.N. Gorbachev seemed different from other Soviet leadership and Margret Thatcher seemed to agree. Gorbachev return to the U.N signals a change in Soviet strategy. The strategy did not deviate from the goal of world domination.
Gorbachev proposed an unique idea, "the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons by 2000" and social change for the Soviet Union. This vision would make Gorbachev, man of the year, according to Times news. The reduction of 50,000 missiles. Was the offer pragmatic and realistic? Reagan never did buy into a 100 percent arms reduction nor believe in negotiate from a position of weakness. Reagan had forced the confrontation by building up the NATO missile arsenal.
The soviet military economy was bankrupt and the financial drain at a crisis level, social change was inevitable: the actual missile growth rate was lower than Soviet Analyst had originally reported, Soviet satelite terrorities conflicts could not be assured intervention, and Gorbachev would start Perestroika changing the face of communism. "Perestroika stimulate human initiative and creativity within the Leninist/Stalinist paradigm." Reagan exploited this weakeness and put the U.S in an unique negotiating position.
Reagan spoke to students at the Moscow University telling them they were part of a great change in their country and had the responsibility to ensure the change was successful. The U.S Soviet talks started at the same time: the Iran-Contra scandal with North and Ponidexter (arms/drugs for hostages); and the Chernobyl disaster forcing the evacuation of a hundred thousand people.
Reagan, Collin Powell, and Shultz formed a tight negiotating team advising Reagan on tactics and strategy during talks with Gorbachev. Shultz work with Sheverdnadze opened up allowed talks to open between the two countries. Powell was very aware of Gorbachev's skill in debate and couched Reagan on counter tactics: more one on one private discussion, type double space notes for Reagan to follow, and maintaining control of the conversation. Gorbachev was a tough negiotator, who knew his facts and Soviet interests and he came prepared and should not be under-estimated. Reagan hardline rhetoric, love for America, and empathy put him one of the most unique negotiating positions in the world history: the position of achieve a realistic arms reduction. Eventually, Gorbachev would propose over a 1400 soviet missile and 429 U.S missile reduction and the beginning of START and condition SDI to stay in research phase only. The proposal could not be accepted. SDI research would continue through the Bush administration into the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration would provide the greatest chances for SDI deployment. Other deteriant missile types were conceived, such as small and light smart missile providing a defensive shield from space that cost hundreds of thousand of dollars rather than millions. The greatest challenge to the ABM technology was that Soviets missile changed from liquid fuel to solid fuel causing and increased variance in speed, obsoleting missile interceptor technology. Continual adaptions in Soviet missile technology threaten the security confidence. The nuclear threat has not gone away. Topol M under the ABM treaty again challenges our perception of a defensive shield against an adaptive missile technology capable of confusing satelite tracking and mid flight navigational variation designed to avoid destruction by ground interceptor missiles. The need for defensive missile is as real today as in Reagan's era. Other personality discussed in the Book were Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Weinberger, Meese, and Baker.
Rating:
Summary: First-rate scholarship and second-rate understanding
Review: The major merits of Fitzgreald's dense tome is that it undeniably calls to attention perhaps the most blatantly misguided policy of the Reagan years--SDI, "Star Wars", the anti-nuclear missile defense system that cost the taxpayers billions and failed to deliver. Reagan partially concieved and spearheaded the admirable goal of breaking the deadlock MAD [mutually assured destruction] had on U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite Reagan's vision, or maybe because of it, SDI was an unmitigated failure. Fitzgerald highlights Reagan's hands-off approach to his cabinet, which lead to massive problems and came close to destroying his reputation when Iran-Contra broke. Why, then, with such a tight grasp of these particular concepts and the researched facts to back them up, is Fitzgerald's book less than perfect?
For one thing, the reader doesn't get the whole story on a number of points. Had Fitzgerald restricted her focus entirely to SDI the book would be nearly flawless. However, she's intent on showing how Reagan's dedication to SDI is related to other less-than-perfect incidents in his administration. And so we get the financial wiz-kid and architect of the miserable supply-side "Reaganomics" David Stockman being portrayed as a hapless bystander to Reagan's barrage of indifference (Lou Cannon demonstrates otherwise). Don Regen is shown to be screwed over by Reagan's indifference (Edmund Morris sets the record straight in this regard). Sure, Reagan did often give off the impression of indifference, whether or not he was so. It is simplifaction to say that Reagan just didn't care, though.
The intense, limited scope of Fitzgerald's research shows through in other areas. Henry Kissinger's seemingly irrational support of SDI makes no sense without knowledge of Nixon's Safeguard plan in the 70s, where Nixon and Kissinger--much like some of Reagan's aids hoped to do with SDI--started an ABM system program in order to bargain it away with the Soviets. Fitzgerald's work is valuable but only in context with other works studying Reagan and his legacy. The casual reader interested in the how and why of Reagan should look elsewhere and come back here only after learning more background.
Rating:
Summary: Marvelous
Review: This book is based on a premise that Ronald Reagan duped America into spending billions on his "impossible" idea, the Space Defense Initiative. Among other criticisms at the time - some found to be valid with experimentation, some not - pundits claimed an anti-missile missile shield would be impossible as it was equivalent to hitting a bullet with a bullet. Though inaccurate - as bullets do not have onboard active radars, nor do they travel at such elevated velocities. Fitzgerald uses such predictive claims as those made shortly after the initial announcement to support her theme, then fails to include what really happened, and during the Reagan administration itself, not ten years after. Fourteen years before this book was published in 1986 (not 1999) the possibility of a Star Wars defense system was proven at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico when an anti-missile missile hit its target in the first test of its kind. The highest priority system among all armed forces research at that time, it was envisioned to represent a last line of defense against incoming ICBMs that escaped space based weapons aimed at the boost and mid-course phase. The program was called SR-HIT (Small Radar - Homing Interceptor Technology) and was built by LTV Aerospace And Defense (now Lockheed Martin). With SR-HIT's next four-in-a-row successful intercepts of simulated ICBMs and tactical ballistic missiles the Army stopped further testing such that development schedules could be advanced and, at least for some length of time, due to questions concerning the validity of testing anti-ballistic missiles given the ABM treaty. SR-HIT has now entered production (3/2002) as PAC-3 (see Lockheed's website), after fourteen-in-a-row successful launch/intercepts in its last phase of development. Reporting outcomes of fresh technologies as "impossible" is a bit like palm reading but missing, or ignoring, what has been reported for over a decade (and to build a book around it) is a sin authors like Fitzgerald should make every effort to avoid if they seek credibility.
Rating:
Summary: While Reagan Slept
Review: This book is way too long in coming to 'light'. Why it doesn't hit a best seller rating like 'Slander' or 'Let Freedom Ring' by Sean Hannity is a mystery to me.
Tell a European that Ronald Reagan ended the Cold War and defeated the Soviet Union and they would laugh in your face. The Polish Pope John, Polish Union Leader Lech Walensa and Solidarity, and Gorbechev refusing to act when the Poles went on strike, set up a domino effect that ended the Cold War and "tore down that wall." As Gore Vidal said when asked, recently on CSpan, What part did Ronald Reagan play in the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall?, answered, "None!" Someone needs to sit Sean Hannity and Peggy Noonan down and read them a history book. In fact, the LASAR Reagan wanted to use in space for his idiot SDI program, was powered by an atomic explosion, and there are many universal agreements that atomic explosions will never be used in space, by any country, for any reason. So that was the end of that idea, before it even started, at least by any informed scientist, but not Ronald Reagan. He took Carter's... budget and exploded it... the biggest waste of taxpayer's hard earned dollar in history. Reagan spent more money on his nutty ideas (or, was it his advisors ideas) than all of the presidents since George Washington, combined, and that included the money spent on the first and second World Wars and Viet Nam. I sure hope this book gets some others interested in writing history the way it happened, and not the way a few conservatives have twisted it to their liking. If I hear one more 'right-wing nut' brag how Ronald Reagan stood up to the Soviet Union, ended the Cold War one more time, I fear I will puke!
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