The Hitler/Hess Deception

Rating:
Summary: Did the British pull off the psyops coup of the century?
Review: In this thought provoking work, Martin Allen contends that British intelligence pulled off a psyops coup in luring Hess to fly to Britain in 1941 on false pretences.

Well actually, the author claims that Hess was the victim of a plot by SO1 to trick the Germans into believeing there was a faction in Westminster willing to depose Churchill and agree a peace treaty with the Axis powers. Hess was not the intended target of the operation, but so wholeheartedly believed this swindle that he flew to Britain with Hitler's blessing to meet with various British politicians and a representative of King George VI.

The author also goes on to argue that this deception was pivotal in convincing Hitler to attack Russia, mistakenly believing that peace with Britain could be achieved. This is perhaps even more sensational than the first half of the thesis.

Before considering the claims made by Allen, there are some important criticisms to be made of the work. The first is that, although the book seems well researched, there were some notable omissions from the bibliography. The first was Roy Jenkins' magnificent biography of Churchill, which complements Martin Gilbert's biography in a number of significant areas. This is critical to Allen's work because it contains somewhat contrary views of Churchill's relations with some of the actors in this plot.

Also missing was Denniston's work on the negotiations by which Churchill unsuccessfully attempted to bring Turkey into the war on Britain's side in 1940-41 and later. This is useful to understand to properly consider Allen's second claim about invasion of Russia.

It may be that these omissions from the source material are justifiable, but the book also has shortcomings in the course of its arguments themselves. Having read the book, I am entirely disposed to believe that there was a secret plot by SO1 to engage the German hierarchy in fake peace negotiations, and that this was the reason for Hess parachuting into Britain in May 1941. This should be enough to make the book an important contribution to the history of the second world war. This also makes it a important work on the black arts of the intelligence world.

Sadly, I am not convinced that this coup was critical in persuading Hitler to invade Russia. Hess landed in Britain over five weeks before the invasion of Russia. In the intervening period, it should have been patently obvious to Hitler that Britain would not sue for peace. How then could it be the basis for Hitler's fatal mistake in invading Russia? The best that Allen can come up with is that Hitler became deprived of his closest confidant, and needed to go ahead with the invasion lest he become vulnerable to a coup in 1941. To prove this the author needs to do much, much more, and he can't.

Incidentally, I think the book's most significant contirbution is in augmenting the growing body of work on how Britain carried out a psyops campaign to secure America's entry into the war. Churchill was living on a knife edge waiting for Rooseveldt, and the suggestion that Germany might have agreed a peace treaty in 1940-41 would have put paid to that conclusively. In spite of its shortcomings, this is a good book, and will advance our understanding of the events before America's entry into the war at the end of 1941.

Rating:
Summary: Did the British pull off the psyops coup of the century?
Review: In this thought provoking work, Martin Allen contends that British intelligence pulled off a psyops coup in luring Hess to fly to Britain in 1941 on false pretences.

Well actually, the author claims that Hess was the victim of a plot by SO1 to trick the Germans into believeing there was a faction in Westminster willing to depose Churchill and agree a peace treaty with the Axis powers. Hess was not the intended target of the operation, but so wholeheartedly believed this swindle that he flew to Britain with Hitler's blessing to meet with various British politicians and a representative of King George VI.

The author also goes on to argue that this deception was pivotal in convincing Hitler to attack Russia, mistakenly believing that peace with Britain could be achieved. This is perhaps even more sensational than the first half of the thesis.

Before considering the claims made by Allen, there are some important criticisms to be made of the work. The first is that, although the book seems well researched, there were some notable omissions from the bibliography. The first was Roy Jenkins' magnificent biography of Churchill, which complements Martin Gilbert's biography in a number of significant areas. This is critical to Allen's work because it contains somewhat contrary views of Churchill's relations with some of the actors in this plot.

Also missing was Denniston's work on the negotiations by which Churchill unsuccessfully attempted to bring Turkey into the war on Britain's side in 1940-41 and later. This is useful to understand to properly consider Allen's second claim about invasion of Russia.

It may be that these omissions from the source material are justifiable, but the book also has shortcomings in the course of its arguments themselves. Having read the book, I am entirely disposed to believe that there was a secret plot by SO1 to engage the German hierarchy in fake peace negotiations, and that this was the reason for Hess parachuting into Britain in May 1941. This should be enough to make the book an important contribution to the history of the second world war. This also makes it a important work on the black arts of the intelligence world.

Sadly, I am not convinced that this coup was critical in persuading Hitler to invade Russia. Hess landed in Britain over five weeks before the invasion of Russia. In the intervening period, it should have been patently obvious to Hitler that Britain would not sue for peace. How then could it be the basis for Hitler's fatal mistake in invading Russia? The best that Allen can come up with is that Hitler became deprived of his closest confidant, and needed to go ahead with the invasion lest he become vulnerable to a coup in 1941. To prove this the author needs to do much, much more, and he can't.

Incidentally, I think the book's most significant contirbution is in augmenting the growing body of work on how Britain carried out a psyops campaign to secure America's entry into the war. Churchill was living on a knife edge waiting for Rooseveldt, and the suggestion that Germany might have agreed a peace treaty in 1940-41 would have put paid to that conclusively. In spite of its shortcomings, this is a good book, and will advance our understanding of the events before America's entry into the war at the end of 1941.

Rating:
Summary: Good Overview of the History behind Hess's Flight
Review: Overall, I thought this was a well-written story about the flight of Hess to Scotland and the policy and bureaucratic machinations through which the British put themselves to fool Hitler into thinking an alternative, anti-Churchill peace faction existed that would do a deal with him. Mr. Albert can get a bit melodramatic at times, but I found his writing nonetheless to be quite solid in that it moved the story along quite well. Be forewarned - Mr. Albert engages in a good deal of speculation; for example, a recording of a key conversation may not exist, but Mr. Albert would have you believe that such and such "had" to be the topic of discussion. That doesn't necessarily make his theories or main thesis wrong, it's just something to keep in mind as more evidence becomes available over the next several years.

Having read many histories of the Third Reich and World War II, I'm convinced that Hitler was going to invade the Soviet Union in 1941 no matter what Britian or anyone else did. He had definite military and strategic reasons for attacking when he did, whether or not you think such reasons were strategically sound. (I do not believe they were.)

Rating:
Summary: The Man who knew too much
Review: The Man who knew too much

Martin Allen's book „The Hitler/Hess Deception" deals with the fate of Rudolf Hess who had been, at one time, Hitler's deputy and who, in his day, carried the epithet „the conscience of the party". He was condemned to life imprisonment and served time for half a century until he was found hanged in the prison at Spandau whose only remaining prisoner he then was.

He had left Germany in May, 1941, under mysterious circumstances, and was held essentially incommunicado ever since. At that time, the Nazis had instituted a number of antisemitic laws, they had instigated or at least tolerated a pogrom, and were following an expansionist and aggressive policy, but with some hindsight, one wonders why this man had to be shut up for the rest of his life, whereas other figures among Hitler's close associates who had played a more active role for a much longer time, were released from jail after a number of years that appear reasonable under normal legal aspects.

The author has gathered together the shreds of evidence that remained after the British in 1945 had collected and destroyed whatever pertinent files they were able to put their hands on and „neutralized" undesirable witnesses. He shows that the „Hess incident" - Hess' solo flight to Scotland in May, 1941, a month before Germany attacked the Soviet Union - was not at all the feat of a madman decided on at the spur of the moment that it was later made to appear by both the British and the German side. Even (nay, particularly!) Hitler's deputy could not just get into his personal Messerschmitt 110 and take off for the 1000 mile flight to Prestwick without major technical and logistic preparations in Germany, along the way, and at the other end.

The book explains that the flight as such was the result of a sting operation devised by Britain's Strategic Operations staff, aimed at making Hitler believe that the British government could be toppled, peace could be made in the West, and the Germans would be able to affront the Soviets without having to worry about their western flank.

According to Allen, in the year prior to Hess' flight, there had been numerous contacts, mainly in (neutral) Spain and Switzerland, between British representatives and German politicians and intellectuals. The talks in Scotland were to be, as it were, the touchstone of the matter. As time was getting short for the Germans, Hess convinced Hitler that the German delegate should not be a mere emissary acting under orders but a political figure able to take decisions on the spot - Rudolf Hess.

In the end, it makes little difference whether the British were thrown into complete disarray, as Allen asserts, when unexpectedly Hess turned up or whether a lower-grade delegate would have been able to fly safely back to Germany and report. The British sting operation was effective enough in getting Hitler to continue with his preparations for the war against the Soviet Union and thus remove pressure from Britain. To what extent the British actively encouraged the Germans in their plans or whether or not they went so far as to promise support cannot be ascertained at the present time - whatever files still exist seem to be under lock and key for another dozen years or so.

What is frightening about the events Allen describes is the apparent lack of scruple with which the British government went about setting the two dictatorships up against each other. The outcome of this duel was not at all certain, for if weather conditions in late 1941 had been just a little more favorable for the German side, the Soviet empire might well have toppled and Britain would then have had to face a Germany extending from the Channel coast to the Urals. This unpleasant but entirely possible risk for Britain is begging the question to what extent Churchill, in order to forestall such a potentially horrifying scenario, did not somehow play a double game by keeping the Soviets informed, and assured of future Allied aid.

In this connection, some US and a few Russian historians have recently argued that Stalin, in 1941, was himself preparing to attack Germany. Considering the recent revelations by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Motrokhin on the activities of the „Cambridge Five", it is entirely conceivable that, officially or unofficially, British sources kept Stalin informed of the negotiations. For a man like Stalin, whose distrust was legendary, the obvious reaction would have been to prepare against a German attack, possibly by a pre-emptive strike.

Regardless of who, Stalin or Hitler, would eventually win that confrontation, the only thing that was certain, even in 1941, is that such a war would spell the end of freedom for most of the still independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. The only foreseeable difference would have been that, under Soviet rule, the Slavic states might fare slightly better, whereas countries like Hungary or Romania would have found Hitler somewhat more accomodating. In any case, the fate of the lands in question should have been clear to the Western world when the Germans discovered, in 1943, the graves of thousands of Polish officers murdered by the Soviets two years earlier. However, by then it was too late, the Western powers preferred not to take too close a look at the implications, and chose to abandon those countries to the Soviets for the next half century.

Rating:
Summary: The Man who knew too much
Review: The Man who knew too much

Martin Allen`s book „The Hitler/Hess Deception" deals with the fate of Rudolf Hess who had been, at one time, Hitler`s deputy and who, in his day, carried the epithet „the conscience of the party". He was condemned to life imprisonment and served time for half a century until he was found hanged in the prison at Spandau whose only remaining prisoner he then was.

He had left Germany in May, 1941, under mysterious circumstances, and was held essentially incommunicado ever since. At that time, the Nazis had instituted a number of antisemitic laws, they had instigated or at least tolerated a pogrom, and were following an expansionist and aggressive policy, but with some hindsight, one wonders why this man had to be shut up for the rest of his life, whereas other figures among Hitler`s close associates who had played a more active role for a much longer time, were released from jail after a number of years that appear reasonable under normal legal aspects.

The author has gathered together the shreds of evidence that remained after the British in 1945 had collected and destroyed whatever pertinent files they were able to put their hands on and „neutralized" undesirable witnesses. He shows that the „Hess incident" - Hess` solo flight to Scotland in May, 1941, a month before Germany attacked the Soviet Union - was not at all the feat of a madman decided on at the spur of the moment that it was later made to appear by both the British and the German side. Even (nay, particularly!) Hitler`s deputy could not just get into his personal Messerschmitt 110 and take off for the 1000 mile flight to Prestwick without major technical and logistic preparations in Germany, along the way, and at the other end.

The book explains that the flight as such was the result of a sting operation devised by Britain`s Strategic Operations staff, aimed at making Hitler believe that the British government could be toppled, peace could be made in the West, and the Germans would be able to affront the Soviets without having to worry about their western flank.

According to Allen, in the year prior to Hess` flight, there had been numerous contacts, mainly in (neutral) Spain and Switzerland, between British representatives and German politicians and intellectuals. The talks in Scotland were to be, as it were, the touchstone of the matter. As time was getting short for the Germans, Hess convinced Hitler that the German delegate should not be a mere emissary acting under orders but a political figure able to take decisions on the spot - Rudolf Hess.

In the end, it makes little difference whether the British were thrown into complete disarray, as Allen asserts, when unexpectedly Hess turned up or whether a lower-grade delegate would have been able to fly safely back to Germany and report. The British sting operation was effective enough in getting Hitler to continue with his preparations for the war against the Soviet Union and thus remove pressure from Britain. To what extent the British actively encouraged the Germans in their plans or whether or not they went so far as to promise support cannot be ascertained at the present time - whatever files still exist seem to be under lock and key for another dozen years or so.

What is frightening about the events Allen describes is the apparent lack of scruple with which the British government went about setting the two dictatorships up against each other. The outcome of this duel was not at all certain, for if weather conditions in late 1941 had been just a little more favorable for the German side, the Soviet empire might well have toppled and Britain would then have had to face a Germany extending from the Channel coast to the Urals. This unpleasant but entirely possible risk for Britain is begging the question to what extent Churchill, in order to forestall such a potentially horrifying scenario, did not somehow play a double game by keeping the Soviets informed, and assured of future Allied aid.

In this connection, some US and a few Russian historians have recently argued that Stalin, in 1941, was himself preparing to attack Germany. Considering the recent revelations by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Motrokhin on the activities of the „Cambridge Five", it is entirely conceivable that, officially or unofficially, British sources kept Stalin informed of the negotiations. For a man like Stalin, whose distrust was legendary, the obvious reaction would have been to prepare against a German attack, possibly by a pre-emptive strike.

Regardless of who, Stalin or Hitler, would eventually win that confrontation, the only thing that was certain, even in 1941, is that such a war would spell the end of freedom for most of the still independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. The only foreseeable difference would have been that, under Soviet rule, the Slavic states might fare slightly better, whereas countries like Hungary or Romania would have found Hitler somewhat more accomodating. In any case, the fate of the lands in question should have been clear to the Western world when the Germans discovered, in 1943, the graves of thousands of Polish officers murdered by the Soviets two years earlier. However, by then it was too late, the Western powers preferred not to take too close a look at the implications, and chose to abandon those countries to the Soviets for the next half century.