Rating: 
Summary: Excellent Overview of Iraq-al Qaida Relationship
Review: Stephen Hayes does not necessarily have better sources than most of his media counterparts. The reason that he still amasses more information on "the connection" than most other reporters is that he seems to ask the right questions. Hayes does an excellent job of acknowledging conventional wisdom on Baghdad's support for bin Laden's operations (that such a relationship never existed because of rigid ideological differences, Islamist v. Baathist). Indeed, such wisdom often comes from knowledgeable, exerienced intel vets. Nevertheless, as Hayes rightly notes, that doesn't necessarily mean it's true. Critics who charge that his entire thesis stems from the 2002 Pentagon "Feith memo" have either not read the book or missed large chunks of it which are based on other intelligence sources, mostly domestic, but also foreign, which have nothing to do with the memo in question--a memo, it's worth noting, which comes chock-full of acknowledged caveats all dutifully included in Hayes' work. DCI Tenet may have expressed the CIA's reservations about the memo, but anyone who disbelieves a bin Laden-Saddam link is disbelieving the Tenet CIA's repeated reporting on Saddam's weapons development with al Qaida (as the book documents) and, thus, has already discredited the soon-to-be-former CIA director, so his feelings on the memo should then be of little import to those who ignore the Feith memo on account of Mr. Tenet's comments. Regardless, Hayes lays out numerous pieces of intelligence and builds a convincing case for those who still have an open mind on the subject. Hayes' work is not all inclusive and does not represent a definitive text on al Qaida's cooperation with Iraq (for more on this, Yossef Bodansky's newly-released "The Secret History of the Iraq War" comes highly recommended). "The Connection" remains a valuable addition to the story of bin Laden, Islamist terror, and its state sponsors.
Rating: 
Summary: Preaches to choir with sound and fury proving nothing
Review: The Connection proves the old adage that one who starts with a conclusion firmly in mind is more than likely to arrive at that destination with evidence that appears conclusive to himself. In this case Hayes no doubt also profited selling to others who wanted similar conclusions argued for them. Reading the book carefully will convince only those with no independent perspective and wanting to believe.
The problem is that so much is contentious and unconvincing to an objective reader that the `evidence' is usually dubious and labeling those who would disagree becomes necessary. Not only has the bipartisan compromised and hardly radical 9-11 Commission discredited the thesis but a logical and well informed student of those involved (so rarely seen among ideologues and instant-expert pundits) would do so emphatically despite Hayes' attempt to trivialize the notion that Saddam and Osama would not agree because one is secular and the other Islamist.
Common sense is, well, uncommon. Saddam, as someone said, even if he had WMD would be like a virile man wanting thousands of children by as many women - he had not the delivery system. None of his neighbors were much afraid (perhaps Israel a little despite its substantial supply of Nukes and the means for delivery) but the U.S with perhaps 300 times or more the military budget, about 12 times the population, and qualitatively even more superior military capacity and WMD was led to shaking in its boots by those with ulterior motives.
Nor would Saddam trust Osama who as an ideologue could not be trusted to strike a deal (Hayes's argument) and might provide weapons to Saddam's Islamist domestic enemies. The Al Qaeda operatives in Iraq before the U.S. invasion were few and in areas not under Saddam's control. There is stronger evidence for U.S. complicity with two trips by a certain American, pictures of him shaking hands with Saddam, and records of as many as 20 or more U.S. companies supplying chemical and biological weapon materials. (Maybe this is why folks like Rummy and Cheney were so sure Saddam had WMD?)
Rating:
Summary: First-rate investigative reporting
Review: This book addresses one question and one question only: what evidence is there, if any, linking Saddam Hussein to the activities of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda? Author Stephen Hayes answers the question carefully and thoroughly, concluding that there is a great deal of strong evidence, although a lot of it is indirect and none of it is absolutely conclusive.
This evidence does not show that Saddam was connected with the events of 9/11 (nor, for that matter, that he wasn't). That's a different issue; both Hayes and (to its credit) the Bush Administration have kept these two issues more clearly separated than their critics sometimes have.
This evidence also does not necessarily provide a justification for launching a war against Iraq. (Indeed, after reading the passages in this book detailing al Qaeda's connections with Sudan and the role of Hassan al Tarabi in bringing about a rapprochement between the secularist Saddam and the radical-Islamist bin Laden, you may be wondering why Bush decided to hit Baghdad instead of Khartoum.) A possible, even likely, connection between Saddam and bin Laden may not provide full support for the Bush Administration's decisions, and Hayes doesn't claim otherwise.
What Hayes _does_ accomplish is to set out the evidence for that connection, intelligibly and cogently, and to reply to the most common arguments that such a connection is unlikely or impossible (e.g. that secularists and radical Islamists couldn't possibly work together). In the process he also debunks a number of 'urban legends' as to what the Bush Administration has and has not claimed with respect to Saddam, bin Laden, and 9/11.
And he correctly explains what everyone should already know: the decision to attack Iraq was not based on the belief that Saddam was involved in 9/11 or that bin Laden was hiding in Iraq; it was based on the view (whether right or wrong) that 9/11 demonstrated that the U.S. had better start dealing much more sternly with nations that encourage, aid, and/or harbor anti-U.S. terrorists.
It's still entirely possible to disagree with the Administration's decisions. But first let's at least be clear what those decisions were and what they were based on. Responsible public discourse isn't furthered by wild claims on _either_ side.
Highly recommended, especially (but not exclusively) to U.S. voters who want to weigh some actual evidence before the upcoming presidential election.
Rating: 
Summary: Iraq/Al-Qaeda: The Evidence
Review: This book is a good overview of the evidence regarding links that existed, or may have existed, between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda. The strength of the book is that it brings together evidence from a wide variety of sources which describe a relationship that began somewhere between 1992 and 1995 (it will be clear below why there is uncertainty) and ended only with the termination of Saddam's regime in 2003. The weakness of the book is the way Hayes cites his sources. Probably about half his key sources are anonymous intelligence officials, for the remainder he doesn't footnote them but just cites them in the text. Moreover, for a lot of background information that comes from open sources he gives no gives no source at all; there was some information I already knew because I had read it elsewhere, but which a less informed reader might conclude came from a secret source. Hayes is careful to make clear where he is depending on a human intelligence source and he can't give the chain of transmission. He recognizes that sources of human intelligence can lie, exaggerate or be honestly mistaken, so the fact that something comes from a "well-placed source" doesn't mean that it is sound. The fact that the book is endorsed by James Woolsey is reassuring; the former CIA director (1993-1995) knows his material and usually displays good judgment. Having studied the subject I can summarize what is verifiable here and what is not. There are three categories into which the evidence fits. First, there is undisputed evidence regarding Saddam's links to other terrorist organizations - other than Al-Qaeda - going back about 30 years. During the 1970s Saddam supported the most radical and militant of Palestinian terrorists; the infamous Abu Nidal was a client. Among those who killed Americans, Saddam gave refuse to the mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking (we captured him last year, in Iraq) and the guy who appears to have been the no. 2 in the 1993 World Trade Center attack. This category of evidence, almost entirely ignored by the media now, is important for two reasons. One, Al-Qaeda is merely the most important of the terrorist organizations that America faces. Two, the distinction between Al-Qaeda and other militant groups has often been murky; it affiliates with other groups, individuals pass from one to the other and Al-Qaeda itself merged with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad several years ago. For example, Iraq is known to have supported the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood following its expulsion from Syria in 1982. Many from the Syrian and Egyptian MB also went to Saudi Arabia, however, and ended up working with Al-Qaeda. Thus, Saddam and bin Laden were drawing off the same candidate pool. Second, there were fairly regular contacts between high-level Iraqi intelligence officers and Bin Laden during the 1990s, and the dispute is mainly over how many contacts and for what purpose. The 9/11 Commission, which concluded that there was not conclusive evidence of a "collaborative relationship," noted that such meetings took place while Bin Laden was in the Sudan. After he left in 1996, a number of Iraqi operatives were caught traveling to or from meetings with Al-Qaeda in western Pakistan. Hayes also mentions other contacts I have not read from any other source. Third, there are two specific indications that Iraq may have been "in on" the 9/11 operation in the sense that it at least knew about it. One, there is the purported meeting between Muhammad Atta, one of the 9/11 crew leaders, and an Iraqi intelligence officer in early 2001 in Prague. Some doubt the account because calls were made from Atta's cell phone in Florida at the same time, but the Czechs stand by their account. Two, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir was one of those present at the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which planned the 9/11 attacks. An Iraqi who got his job there through the Iraqi embassy, Shakir was arrested but then released by the Jordanians and then never heard from again several years ago. But in May 2004 we uncovered three documents of the Iraqi Fayedeen which listed him as a Lieutenant-Colonel. Unless these are two people with the same name, it looks like one of Saddam's high-ranking thugs may have been an early liaison to Al-Qaeda, and that he knew about it from the beginning. This latter piece of information came out after this book went to press, so Hayes' account is more complete if this fact is considered (for a source, search the Wall Street Journal). This is a good book and I recommend it. I have given it four stars because I believe that with more time a better book could be written; one gets the idea that Hayes was under pressure to get this book out now while it is timely.
Rating:
Summary: Fascinating book
Review: This book shows how dangerous Al-Queda was, and still is.
Read it if you are pro-Bush and you will be even more pro-Bush.
Read it if you are pro-Kerry and you will be pro-Bush.
Rating:
Summary: The Truth
Review: With the New York Times, Washington Post and CNN dominating the media landscape with their careful selection of what is "news," as well as their blatant anti-Bush commentary, and the news programs on ABC, CBS and NBC and other mainstream press being little more than echoes for the big dogs of media, you need to read a book like The Connection to get the story the media liberals aren't telling you.
I thank God for Stephen Hayes. He bothered to investigate the facts, lay them out and honestly analyze them, rather than taking the road of knee-jerk mainstream (i.e. liberal) reportage, which is: whatever you do, make Bush look bad.
Some people suggest the 9/11 Commission established once and for that there was no connection between Saddam and al Qaeda. Not so. The commission merely concluded that they could not link Saddam with 9/11, NOT that he had no relations with Osama. The 9/11 Commission was a big joke in any case. There were people on the commission who should have been the ones being questioned about their role in intelligence failure to prevent 9/11! I remember when they were trying to grill John Ashcroft, he pointed out that one of the very people questioning him had approved a Clinton-era memo to put up a wall between American intelligence agencies so they wouldn't have easy access to each other's intelligence. The lame-brained Democrat thinking behind this defies comprehension. And Janet Reno was such a farce, trying to deny she even knew of such a policy. This has been the Democrat strategy: blame Republicans for your own failures. Clinton had almost his whole two terms to do something about Osama, after al Qaeda was linked to one act of terrorism after another - the first WTC bombing, the embassy bombings in Africa, the bombing of the USS Cole. The best Slick Willy could do was to send cruise missiles into the Sudan, hopefully knocking out some terrorists. It was Clinton's stated policy to capture Bin Laden rather than capture OR kill him. And he even turned down twice the opportunity to have him in US custody when both Sudan and Qatar offered to hand Osama over! This is part of Clinton's legacy of shame that Democrats conveniently ignore and hope the rest of America forgets too.
Yet, when they were in power, even Clinton and Gore said Saddam was a continued threat, was possibly amassing WMD's and flouting UN inspections, though they took no decisive action against him. They also are on record as saying they believed Iraq was linked to anti-US terrorism. These jokers have now done a complete about-face, saying Bush had no justification for going to war in Iraq. They will be remembered as men of ignoble character, who play the music the ignorant masses want to hear.
Hayes demonstrates that it's not a stretch to link Saddam with Osama, even though one is secular Baathist and the other is fundamentalist Muslim. They may have distrusted each other, but "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." They both hate the US more than they might have hated each other, and it has already been established that Iraq sponsored terror, including Hamas suicide bombers. And Saddam was good at playing up the Islamic rhetoric when it was politically expedient. It was like squeezing blood from a stone to get a coalition of Arab nations to join the fight against Iraq in the first Gulf War. It's like, yeah he's done a bad thing to Kuwait, but he's still a Muslim and we'll look bad being allied with infidels.
I've no doubt that Saddam was a terror-sponsoring tyrant who needed to be toppled. It is very likely he had collaborations of some sort with al Qaeda, if not direct complicity in 9/11. He might even have sponsored the Oklahoma City bombing, but that story has yet to be fully revealed.
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