The 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich

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Summary: Great Book on understanding Nazi Propaganda
Review: In the late summer months of 1933 and 1934, groups of German citizens flocked to Berghof hoping to catch a glimpse of Adolf Hitler walking through the countryside . Filled with a zealous belief for the 'Hitler Myth', post World War I Germany surrendered itself to Nazi propaganda. Responding to the humiliating treaty of Versailles and the economically unstable Weimar Republic, Hitler took on the Weberian characteristics of charismatic leadership . Unconditional loyalty and unquestioned faith in the Fuhrer rekindled historical notions of charismatic authority within the German psyche. Only after millions of European deaths and an Allied imposed peace could Germany finally tear itself away from the spell of Adolf Hitler.
Unlike other chroniclers and scholars of the Nazi regime, Ian Kershaw in his book The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in The Third Reich, examined the subtle distinction World War II German citizens carried in their assessment of Hitler and the Nazi Party. According to Kershaw, Hitler realized that the personality cult constructed around him could be used to cement the integration of the Nazi Party and the German populace. Indeed, the spell of Hitler or the myth of Hitler did not always exactly correspond with the German populace's perception of the Nazi Party. Throughout his well documented work, Kershaw makes the case that the 'Hitler Myth' held a different form of allegiance within World War II Germany. The 'Hitler Myth' unlike the Nazi party, prevented the German citizen from abandoning the Fuhrer in his quest for European dominance . It was trust in Hitler not in allegiance to the Nazi Party that propelled many German citizens to fight through World War II, despite food shortages and mounting casualties. Only after the dropping of 1,202,000 tons of bombs in 1944 did the majority of the German populace awaken to the reality of the Third Reich and realize the linkage between the devastating policies of the Nazi party and 'The Hitler Myth'.
The separation of the Fuhrer from the Nazi party began with the incarceration of Adolf Hitler at Landsberg in 1924. Prior to his jailing, Hitler merely saw himself as an intrepid vanguard for a future National Socialist dictator . Only after a period of gestation when Hitler read voraciously, wrote Mein Kampf, and received countless party visitors did the future Fuhrer bloom to the realization that he could carry the mantle of National Socialism and assume the untapped potential of the 'Hitler Myth'. Only a year prior to Hitler's incarceration, the German populace viewed the Munich orator as little more than a "vulgar demagogue". With his Landsberg transformation, Hitler assumed the reigns of the Nazi Party.
Appealing to the German middle classes, Hitler promoted a message of anti-Marxism and strong authoritarian leadership. While assuming political power for the Nazi Party, Hitler subtly cultivated his own cult of personality and authority by issuing a 1933 directive through the Minister of the Interior calling for the compulsory greeting of 'Heil Hitler' for all governmental employees . More than jailings, beatings, and political sabotage, the greeting of 'Heil Hitler' provided the Fuhrer with a subtle tool for manufacturing German consent. This consent was needed in 1933-41 as the Nazi party failed to uphold promises of economic renewal and growth . Despite material dissatisfaction, the German populace did not reject the 'Hitler Myth' which was seen by many Germans inhabiting an allegiance outside the political and economic system.
Hitler realized that the continued allegiance of the German populace needed to be sustained by tangible triumphs. The growth of Lebensraum not GDP was an essential component in fostering the 'Hitler Myth'. In 1938 and 1939, Hitler created a mythos of 'Triumph without Bloodshed' by occupying the Sudentanland with a perceived skill and strong armed diplomacy. If Landsberg secured the 'Hitler Myth' within the Nazi Party structure, the Munich Crisis convinced a majority of the German citizens to unquestionably follow the charismatic and diplomatically agile leadership of Adolf Hitler. Following victories in Denmark, Norway, Poland, and France, the 'Hitler Myth' encapsulated all of Germany, since military action failed to make a serious dent in the living conditions of late 1930's Germany .
The growth of Lebensraum and 'Hitler Myth' met their fate in the Stalingrad winter of 1943. Despite claims of fighting a Valhallian death, Hitler and the Nazi propaganda machine of Joseph Goebells could not mask the defeat of General Paulas and the surrender of 90,000 German soldiers . In addition, the North African military reverses and the treatment of Germany's mentally ill, chipped away at the Hitler Myth . Though Hitler was losing his dream of Lebensraum, the Hitler myth still showed its tenacity through the Final Solution.
For Kershaw, the Hitler Myth provided the German populace with an excuse to disassociate themselves from the genocidal anti-Semitism taking place across the Eastern Front. In a 1942 survey of Nazi party members, 42% of those sampled which was the largest percentage of the opinion poll, indicated that they had no interest in the fate of the Jews. In fact, the German populace never heard Hitler speak of the Jewish question in any public speeches from 1933 to 1934. Clearly, Hitler promoted the Fuhrer myth to two different audiences with two different objectives. The 'Hitler Myth', which was promoted to the public, focused on a growth of Lebensraum and a linkage to the Nazi Party agenda. While the 'Hitler Myth' encapsulating the Nazi Party apparatus insured unyielding loyalty to the Fuhrer and a direct participation within the Final Solution .
Only after World War II could the world and many German citizens obtain an accurate picture of the Third Reich. The Final Solution and the irrational quest for Lebensraum were finally upheld to a public light. However, this awakening came in 1945, not in 1933 when Adolf Hitler obtained the Chancellorship. For almost twelve years, the majority of the German people never questioned the "Hitler Myth'. Only after an allied bombing campaign that directly affected 1 in 3 Germans did the Volk turn away from Hitler . By 1945, German citizens no longer found the "Hitler Myth' in the sunny garden of Berghof but could see it in the morbid bunker of Berlin.

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Summary: Professor Kershaw delivers once again
Review: Professor Kershaw's book describes the social impact of and reaction to the "Hitler Myth" created by the Nazi propaganda machine. It explains what the "Hitler Myth" was and the effect the Myth had in the German society. The book discusses the rise and development of the Myth during the pre-war years. It also explores the fall and final bankruptcy of the empty Myth. Generally, it is an excellent book on German society during the Nazi Era.

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Summary: The construction of Hitler's image
Review: This book explores the development of Hitler's image by Nazi propagandists and the relationship of this image with the German voting public and with German society. It is a fascinating study of the era, contrasting the carefully constructed and manipulated public persona of Hitler with the reality of his rule and hold over Nazi Germany.

Ian Kershaw researched this book primarily by looking at numerous historical reports on the attitudes and morale of the German public. These included those written for the Gestapo and other Nazi state security organisations and also those by the anti-Nazi SPD socialist party. The results illustrate the perceptions and attitudes of various sections of German society towards Hitler and the Nazis and are a fascinating insight into the Third Reich years. Mr Kershaw's thesis is that Hitler, as a model of charismatic leadership, was the dominant factor behind the Nazi vote. One voted not for the Nazi party as such and for whatever policies it stood for, but for Adolf Hitler himself. Hence, it was necessary to mould his public persona to exploit this appeal. Once the image collapsed in the later war years, so did the regime, as its public support was reliant on the image.

It is amazing in this day and age to think of Hitler as a moderate, rational figure. Yet the book clearly shows how this was largely the perception of him held by the German electorate, an image deliberately created by Hitler himself and the Nazi propaganda machine. To garner the mainstream support needed to secure power, Hitler needed to appear as a figure of national unity, above petty party politics and prejudices and separate and distinct from the excesses and evils of the Nazi movement, which were apportioned exclusively to extremist, radical elements in the party. These bad elements would eventually be brought to heel by Hitler, who as a figure of sacred purity, was anyway probably unaware of the abuses being committed in his name. At least such was the fantasy cleverly dreamt up by Goebbels. This manipulation of public perceptions is exemplified by the Nazi attempt to ban crucifixes and other religious imagery in schools in Bavaria during the war years. This action was reversed due to public outcry, with Hitler publicly appearing to amend matters after he became aware of them, fixing the blame on lower party officials. In reality, the decision would have been Hitler's from the beginning. This incident highlights how reliant the Nazis always were on public support, even after the consolidation of power and the extension of the Nazi police and terror apparatus over Germany.

Likewise, Hitler's image was also of a man of peace, interested only in protecting Germany from external Communist and Anglo-French aggression. The foreign policy coups over the Rheinland, Austria and the Sudetenland helped to sustain the regime's at times shaky popularity, as it is failed to deal completely with the Depression era economic problems afflicting the Third Reich. Once war came, it was naturally time to rally around the Fuhrer, the alternative of capitulation, defeat and possible occupation being too bitter to contemplate. The Hitler myth therefore died a slow death during the war years, wrapping up together as it did so many prejudicial strands in German society which had been exploited and which were tough to dispense with overnight.

The final section of the book deals with public attitudes towards the Jews and Nazi Jewish policy. It is Mr Kershaw's contention, and here he admits some inference from the available evidence is required, that while anti-Semitism was widespread in Germany, it was not necessarily a motivating factor in voting for Hitler and the Nazis. Contemporary motivational theory would therefore describe anti-Semitism as a "hygiene" factor in voting for Hitler, it would not deter someone from voting for him yet it would not be the primary motivating factor. Indeed, many of Hitler's speeches in the early thirties stayed clear of specific anti-semitic sentiment or at least minimised it, the Jewish question only being brought to the fore towards the onset of war. In this context, the Nazis again were sensitive to public disquiet. It is interesting to note that their policy of euthanasia involving the mentally ill was reversed in Germany due to the level of protest encountered. With this in mind it is easier to appreciate why the Nazis went to such lengths to preserve the secrecy of the death camps and the Final Solution.