Rating: 
Summary: Kaplan paints with a broad brush -- too broad
Review: Again Kaplan does what he does best -- he gets to the heart of a matter by talking to individuals who have experienced it. The flip side of that is as glaring here as in his other works -- he uses the experiences of a few individuals to draw broad conclusions which he presents as the unquestioned truth. The truth about the Arabists is that Kaplan presents a "truth" that is HIGHLY contested by many ex-state department officials who were not interviewed, but who were every bit as involved. I found Google searching the title of this book yielded some interesting refutations of it.I found this book very informative both in what it said and what it left out. I learned a great deal reading it, not least of all because I was inspired to find out more about the issues he presents from other sources. I would definitely recommend this book, as it brings to light the history of our country's diplomatic dealings with the Middle East -- about which none of us can afford to be ignorant. Read it, but read it as one man's side of a very complicated, politicised, and polarized story. Then start reading the books he cites.
Rating:
Summary: Very good - not as great as his "Balkan Ghosts" but good.
Review: Kaplan really does a good job in this book - I found the discussion of the Americans who lived in Lebanon at that time and who had relatives kidnapped or did not want American intervention interesting. I lived there during that time frame and understand what he seeemed to find as ironic.
Rating: 
Summary: History of a State Department Clique
Review: Kaplan strings together pearls of biography to create a historical review of an interesting segment of the State Department's Foreign Service. Beginning with T.E. Lawrence and several other well-known British, the author weaves together a story of diplomatic intrigue in the Middle East. I found two particular segments especially fascinating - the rescue of Jewish Falashas from Sudan and the history leading up to the Gulf War with Iraq, in light of a potential repeat in world affairs. Although Kaplan does highlight the tensions between Arabists and those with pro-Israeli sympathies, the work serves to demonstrate through historical biography the evolution of western influence in the region. He makes the case that the Palestinian-Israeli issue has not strictly defined the Middle East. Kaplan doesn't write from personal recollection, however, as he did with Balkan Ghosts. This book is research based through reading and extensive interviews with many from the State Department and elsewhere. The last portion of the book focuses on events in the State Department leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kaplan blasts many of the Arabists, former ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie foremost among them, for attempting to appease Saddam. Although he qualifies his critique by portraying a lack of policy emphasis from Washington leaving the embassy staffs in the Middle East to find their own way forward, Kaplan claims the Arabists continued to view Iraq and other totalitarian regimes through rose colored glasses. Had they represented U.S. interests instead of romanticizing from within embassy walls, he argues that our diplomats could have sent Saddam the signal that the U.S. would respond to aggression. Overall, I found the book provided an interesting historical background on the Middle East region through the eyes of the diplomats that have served there. Kaplan provides good background reading up to Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Given the current tension surrounding the Iraqi regime, I found much of the book relevant to contemporary affairs. Well worth the read!
Rating:
Summary: History of a State Department Clique
Review: Kaplan strings together pearls of biography to create a historical review of an interesting segment of the State Department's Foreign Service. Beginning with T.E. Lawrence and several other well-known British, the author weaves together a story of diplomatic intrigue in the Middle East. I found two particular segments especially fascinating - the rescue of Jewish Falashas from Sudan and the history leading up to the Gulf War with Iraq, in light of a potential repeat in world affairs. Although Kaplan does highlight the tensions between Arabists and those with pro-Israeli sympathies, the work serves to demonstrate through historical biography the evolution of western influence in the region. He makes the case that the Palestinian-Israeli issue has not strictly defined the Middle East. Kaplan doesn't write from personal recollection, however, as he did with Balkan Ghosts. This book is research based through reading and extensive interviews with many from the State Department and elsewhere. The last portion of the book focuses on events in the State Department leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kaplan blasts many of the Arabists, former ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie foremost among them, for attempting to appease Saddam. Although he qualifies his critique by portraying a lack of policy emphasis from Washington leaving the embassy staffs in the Middle East to find their own way forward, Kaplan claims the Arabists continued to view Iraq and other totalitarian regimes through rose colored glasses. Had they represented U.S. interests instead of romanticizing from within embassy walls, he argues that our diplomats could have sent Saddam the signal that the U.S. would respond to aggression. Overall, I found the book provided an interesting historical background on the Middle East region through the eyes of the diplomats that have served there. Kaplan provides good background reading up to Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Given the current tension surrounding the Iraqi regime, I found much of the book relevant to contemporary affairs. Well worth the read!
Rating:
Summary: A must read for anyone interested in the middle east
Review: Mr. Kaplan does an excellent job of pulling together information, quotations, and raw data from numerous sources to paint a compelling picture of the forces that shaped this mysterious, interesting, and oft-misunderstood region. More balanced than one would expect for a book with this title, Mr. Kaplan nicely straddles the line between fact and commentary, with only a couple times succumbing to interjections of personal opinion. However, without such points, a rather dry, far less thought-provoking, piece of academia would have resulted. A book guaranteed to broaden the knowledge of anyone interested in this fascinating part of the world.
Rating:
Summary: Fascinating insight into elite State Department cadre
Review: Mr. Kaplan, always a stimulating and perceptive observer of human affairs, might have asked himself the question; "Why did the Gulf War take place?". If this was his intention, then he has come up with a highly original thesis. On the way he has also uncovered the very human stories of some interesting, highly intelligent, sometimes colourful, brave and dedicted government employees. This is where the book is at its most effective in revealing the lineage of the elite NEA within the State Department and in describing the inner workings/politicking of the State Department. I reserve giving the book a 10 rating, on account of Mr. Kaplan's somewhat harsh treatment April Glaspie, the last US ambassador to serve in Iraq, before the war.
Rating: 
Summary: Fictional, Entertaining, but Mistaken
Review: The book is beautfully written and a joy to read. It should be read like a novel, not a scholarly source. The author does not cross-reference the material, and very frequently uses anonymous quotations. More importantly it is based on a mistaken premise: that the 'Arabists' worked, in opposition to the Israelists in the State Department, to promote the Arab interests, especially the Palestinian cause. The fact of the matter is that those depolomats called Arabists genuinely worked for the momentary interests of the United States government in their broadest sense and carried out policies that they were convinced would soon jeopardise the interests of the United States and put it on a collision course with the Arab and Muslim worlds. While Israelists (not only the Kissinger camp) staunchingly promoted the interests of Israel and were very successful at that, the Arabists never mustered the courage to go against an adminstration's dangerous policies in the Middle East and their enthusiasm for the Arabs did not go beyond collecting rugs and trikets.
Rating:
Summary: Kaplan paints with a broad brush -- too broad
Review: This book describes in detail the exotic lives of American Foreign Service officers. The amount of research and related firsthand interviews is unprecedented. These characters are truly interesting. Kaplan categorizes them in two groups that can be simply referred as the old breed and the new breed. In Part I and II of the book, Kaplan describes the old breed as a true intellectual and academic elite. They graduated near the top of their class from Ivy League universities. They were fluent in several languages including Arabic. Thus, they were able to confer with the locals, read the local press, listen to the local radio. They often lived for decades in Arab countries. From this experience, these individuals developed an unparalleled understanding of the Middle East. But, their recommendations were at odds with the government hierarchy. These "Arabists" had a deepened bias to maintain diplomatic relations no matter how dire the situation. Such a vision was self-serving. For them, the potential of their embassy closing meant a devastating blow to their own careers. They had no intention to recycle themselves as Washington DC bureaucrats. In Part III, Kaplan describes the spectacular failings of these old breed Arabists blinded by their self-interest (maintain their foreign assignment jobs) and idealism. The most egregious case is with April Glaspie, one of the more formidable Arabists, yet one who made the gravest error of judgment. She met with Saddam Hussein in 1991 a week before Iraq invaded Kuwait. According to confirmed reports, Hussein shared his intent to attack Kuwait to Glaspie, and she responded that she would recommend that the U.S. stays out of this conflict, and maintain relationship with Iraq under any circumstances. As they say, the rest is history. And, history has not been kind to Glaspie. Additionally, because of their perceived leniency towards Arab dictators and totalitarian regimes, these "Arabists" were also perceived as anti-Israel and anti-Semitic. Some "Arabists" did state that the formation of the state of Israel ruined everything, as related tension throughout the entire Middle East disrupted the continuity in many of their careers. As described in Part IV, the new breed of Arabists is different. They are more likely to have graduated from a state university than an Ivy League. But, they are much more pragmatic than their predecessors. This is for three reasons. First, their language skills now typically include not only Arabic but also Hebrew. Second, they don't view a temporary post in Washington D.C. as a demotion. Thus, they are a lot more mobile back and forth between country assignments and Washington assignments. Third, they are most entrepreneurial from a street sense perspective. Many of them have graduated from long and successful stint with the Peace Corps where they honed their survival skills so to speak. The mix of their language skills and career mobility makes them a lot more pragmatic and objective in their judgment of the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. As a result, their judgment is better trusted in Washington D.C. than their predecessors. If the old breed was much like Indiana Jones, advantureous and brilliant individuals with a romantic view of the Arab World; the new breed is more like "The Recruit" much less affected by ideals, and better able to handle policy ambiguity. Throughout the descriptions of these colorful characters, Kaplan imparts a fascinating history of the Middle East that is now more relevant than ever to understand current events.
Rating:
Summary: A collection of fascinating lives.
Review: This book describes in detail the exotic lives of American Foreign Service officers. The amount of research and related firsthand interviews is unprecedented. These characters are truly interesting. Kaplan categorizes them in two groups that can be simply referred as the old breed and the new breed. In Part I and II of the book, Kaplan describes the old breed as a true intellectual and academic elite. They graduated near the top of their class from Ivy League universities. They were fluent in several languages including Arabic. Thus, they were able to confer with the locals, read the local press, listen to the local radio. They often lived for decades in Arab countries. From this experience, these individuals developed an unparalleled understanding of the Middle East. But, their recommendations were at odds with the government hierarchy. These "Arabists" had a deepened bias to maintain diplomatic relations no matter how dire the situation. Such a vision was self-serving. For them, the potential of their embassy closing meant a devastating blow to their own careers. They had no intention to recycle themselves as Washington DC bureaucrats. In Part III, Kaplan describes the spectacular failings of these old breed Arabists blinded by their self-interest (maintain their foreign assignment jobs) and idealism. The most egregious case is with April Glaspie, one of the more formidable Arabists, yet one who made the gravest error of judgment. She met with Saddam Hussein in 1991 a week before Iraq invaded Kuwait. According to confirmed reports, Hussein shared his intent to attack Kuwait to Glaspie, and she responded that she would recommend that the U.S. stays out of this conflict, and maintain relationship with Iraq under any circumstances. As they say, the rest is history. And, history has not been kind to Glaspie. Additionally, because of their perceived leniency towards Arab dictators and totalitarian regimes, these "Arabists" were also perceived as anti-Israel and anti-Semitic. Some "Arabists" did state that the formation of the state of Israel ruined everything, as related tension throughout the entire Middle East disrupted the continuity in many of their careers. As described in Part IV, the new breed of Arabists is different. They are more likely to have graduated from a state university than an Ivy League. But, they are much more pragmatic than their predecessors. This is for three reasons. First, their language skills now typically include not only Arabic but also Hebrew. Second, they don't view a temporary post in Washington D.C. as a demotion. Thus, they are a lot more mobile back and forth between country assignments and Washington assignments. Third, they are most entrepreneurial from a street sense perspective. Many of them have graduated from long and successful stint with the Peace Corps where they honed their survival skills so to speak. The mix of their language skills and career mobility makes them a lot more pragmatic and objective in their judgment of the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. As a result, their judgment is better trusted in Washington D.C. than their predecessors. If the old breed was much like Indiana Jones, advantureous and brilliant individuals with a romantic view of the Arab World; the new breed is more like "The Recruit" much less affected by ideals, and better able to handle policy ambiguity. Throughout the descriptions of these colorful characters, Kaplan imparts a fascinating history of the Middle East that is now more relevant than ever to understand current events.
Rating:
Summary: Great History of the Foreign Service and Middle East Policy
Review: This is a fascinating history of one of the State Department's most oft-discussed branches. Particularly among American Jewish circles and those who study the Middle East, "Arabist" has a particular connotation of unjustified anti-Israel bias and a flavor of anti-Semitism. Kaplan's work identifies the origins of the Arabists and, more importantly, tests the level of their bias through analysis of their record on Middle East policy and diplomatic reporting. Kaplan traces the development of American Arabists (those who learn Arabic and study Arabs, like Sinologists or Sovietologists) beginning with Protestant missionaries in the 19th Century through the development of the Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) Bureau at State. Kaplan, a journalist, tells his story with engaging portraits of the principal actors. He begins with the American view of the Middle East as fertile ground for missionary work and follows the missionaries' children and grandchildren who go on to develop American foreign policy towards the region. Kaplan's protagonists are the quintessential upper-crust (male, mostly) WASP diplomats who went to Deerfield Academy and Princeton and Amherst before returning to their childhood haunts in Lebanon and Syria as missionaries or diplomats. But Kaplan is not out to paint the Foreign Service in a negative light. Rather, he skillfully exposes how the clique of WASP missionary Arabists goes on to become the core of the NEA bureau and how their perspectives shape American foreign policy for good and ill throughout the 20th Century. For obvious reasons, the majority of the book focuses on the past, when the Foreign Service was the purview of the Ivy League boys' club. But he also notes the State Department's efforts to modernize and the growing participation of a diverse middle-class America in the foreign policy debate. In fact, his synthesis of this process, beaurocratic maneuvers and the effects of the Gulf War lead to an analysis of the NEA bureau today and the direction of American foreign policy planning that is likely to be well regarded for years to come. Being a Middle East hand myself (and an Amherst graduate), I was particularly interested in The Arabists, so perhaps my perspective is skewed. Nonetheless, this book is a must-read for anyone considering the Foreign Service as a career. Kaplan does a good job with the stories of some of State's big names. Their biographies as well as their career arcs are illustrative for FSO's today. As the book draws to a close, it is clear that the FSO's of today will be less area-focused than the old-school Arabists. This will be a mixed blessing, however, allowing us to avoid the "localitis" that leads to some missteps, but denying us the deep cultural insight that lead to some of the Arabists' greatest foreign policy triumphs.
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