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Rating: Summary: Does America need Henry Kissinger? Review: (excerpted from the full review)Across 288 pages of geopolitical analyses and reflections on national character, Henry Kissinger writes his state-of-the-political-world address for American readers and policymakers, with a special nod to the vanguard of American power. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? divides the world by continent, studies the political history of each region and proposes a direction for American foreign policy based on a synthesis of the two. It is a methodical study of minute and specific political realities set into broad frameworks of continental trend, national interest and historical parallel. It is sometimes insightful, always analytical, and easy to read. But Does America Need a Foreign Policy? is also frequently misleading and historically incorrect. It is the rushed work of an egoist, planned less than subtly to place the author as mediator in a debate between two imaginary ideological camps in American public discourse. While Kissinger hopes to convince readers that he is a thinker of clarity and unusual import, there are in fact few if any ideas here that one cannot draw from embassy cables or academic publications. A cautious read soon finds the book's more interesting message not within but rather between its lines: an authorial bias poorly veiled by the adoption of "human rights" language, a clear disdain for the "self-righteous" pursuit of international ethics, and a poorly played off fear of prosecution in international courts. Readers who've not had the chance to analyze international political developments of the last ten years will learn much from Kissinger's analysis of the factors that create the political will for the United States to act or take a certain position in the former Yugoslovia, China or Somalia. Other readers will find themselves debating and even conceding points to the poster boy for realpolitik. But the book's best contribution is the opportunity it affords us all to evaluate how a politician rises to a position of prominence, holds it for decades, and now tips his hand as to how he intends to stay there. After seven chapters of questionable sincerity and carefully crafted terms of debate, Americans ought to question why we and our government pay homage to and consult retired opportunists who use our government and abuse our trust to build and protect their legacy of personal power. We ought to pose in return a query of our own, "Does America need Henry Kissinger?" .... Kissinger seems to see "America's national interest" (he never expressly defines the term) as open markets for American goods, military security and a political climate equal to the values of the American people, the last of which is minimally clarified in a single reference to "human rights" (p.163) In a telling parallel, other nations pursuing their comparative national interest acquire from Kissinger the derogatory term "nationalist" (p.124). Kissinger asserts that policymakers cannot interact effectively with other nations without an understanding of each nation's history and geopolitical position. He merges these two factors into a sort of personality for each state in question. Kissinger writes about nations as a playwright would his characters. Britain, he says, is America's natural partner, born of a common history and a special friendship that Britain has guarded as the cornerstone of its foreign policy since World War II. France is a stubborn nation that prides itself on bucking the authority of the United States to the extent that it proves convenient. The "creeping expansionism" of Russia is a recurring theme the international community would do well to bear in mind (p.71). Though Kissinger evaluates the political landscape nation by nation with careful attention to history, he processes this information into the simplest of models. No complex problem is immune from allegory or short description. America and Europe make up "The World of Democracies." Asia is "The World of Equilibrium," the Middle East and Africa, "Worlds in Transition." As Kissinger points out, this sort of intellectual insight is preferable to the idea carried by some policymakers that the American context is applicable anywhere. But it is dangerous in its simplicity and ignores key factors not defined by the nation-state. Corporations are rarely mentioned in this book. Non-governmental organizations are non-existent. The transmission and control of information from governments to their people receives no treatment here, the mixing of populations across borders little. This barren analysis is painfully difficult to ignore in the book's final chapters, wherein Kissinger abandons geography to address 'The Politics of Globalization" and "Peace and Justice." .... Similarly, Kissinger wants to defend the American interest by stopping Mercosur, a trade agreement linking together a number of Latin American nations (p.95). "Like every new trading bloc, Mercosur affirms that its intentions are non-discriminatory; the reality is otherwise. It is the defining characteristic of a trading bloc that its internal barriers are lower than its external ones; its bargaining position depends on its ability to grant or withhold benefits that its own members enjoy as of right" (p.96). Of course by this definition the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Kissinger's own proposed TAFTA are also trading blocs, albeit trading blocs that benefit the United States. Cuba was not invited to Quebec City for negotiations on the FTAA. Its exclusion was a diplomatic method of denouncing Cuba's political system and as another step in isolating its economy. But rather than admitting to some idea of relative truth, Kissinger strangles the debate once more. "As an alibi for their reluctance to cooperate, the Latin American governments tend to cite US hypocrisy" (p. 93).
Rating: Summary: New Challenges in a Time of Preeminence Review: At the dawning of the new millennium, the United States faces a paradox. It finds itself basking in a success unrivaled by history's greatest empires. In popular culture, finance, weaponry, science, technology and education, the country dominates the worldview. The country considers itself both the source and the guarantor of global democratic institutions. Yet, Kissinger argues, the United States finds itself at a juncture with irrelevance to many of the issues affecting and changing the world order. Interest in foreign affairs, he notes judging from media coverage and congressional sentiment, is at an all time low. As a result the United States finds itself facing some of the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever witnessed, yet unwilling and uninterested in developing concepts relevant to the foreign policy reality. Our relations with Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East require subtle responses rendering the traditional American quest for an all-purpose, magic foreign relations formula irrelevant. Unfortunately, the former Secretary of State argues, three forces in domestic politics drives American foreign policy in the opposite direction. First, Congress legislates the tactics of foreign policy and seeks to impose a code of conduct on other nations by sanction. These legislative actions drive American foreign policy towards a unilateral and, what Kissinger describes as, occasionally bullying conduct. Second, coverage of these events by a ratings-driven media does not help. Their obsession with the crisis of the moment rarely fosters discussion of the long-range historical challenges. They prefer to portray today's crisis as a morality play with a specific outcome and then move on to the next new sensation. Even though the underlying trends continue, growing in their unmanageability on a daily basis, they receive little attention. Finally, the deepest reason for America's failure to develop a coherent strategy is the presence of three different generations, each with its own approach to foreign relations dominate the foreign policy debate - the Cold Warriors, Vietnam Protestors and Generation X, whose experience makes it hard for them to understand the perceptions of the previous two. The inability of these three groups to articulate an unapologetic statement of enlightened self-interest results in what Kissinger refers to as "Progressive Paralysis." Certainly the country must fashion a foreign policy consistent with its democratic heritage and concerned with the democracy's world wide vitality, he writes, but it must also translate these values into answers to difficult questions: What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What wrongs is it essential to right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity?
Rating: Summary: Nice primer - but nothing groundbreaking Review: Does the US Need Foreign Policy? Good question. Unfortunately you won't find the answer in this book. In this book, Kissinger takes the reader around the globe region by region reviewing Cold War history. I was quite disappointed. Not all is lost though. If you can make it through Kissinger's dense and entangling prose this book makes quite a good primer for world politics. Kissinger's well thought out attack on the International Court is the one redeeming aspect of the book. I disagree with Kissinger's reasoning, but he does give an excellent, intellectual case against the ICJ. His argument is predictable though - finding its roots in the peace of Westphalia - and he has good reason to argue against such a court - with old foreign pals from the Nixon administration finding themselves in hot water (e.g. Pinochet). Surprisingly, a new development has occurred in Kissinger's analysis. He has recently made a new acquaintance of "low politics" - namely economics. It's reassuring. I could only recommend this book to someone new to IR studies or someone that wants a quick review around the world - this book would make an excellent primer. But that's all.
Rating: Summary: Great overview of Foreign Policy Review: Kissinger provides a great analysis of US F. Policy, as well as in what direction it should be taken. I wish my International Relations teacher used this in class! He goes over the important events of 20th century analyzing (from a realist perspective) them. He gives an image of where American policy should be taken, as well as a historical overview of the major theoretical approaches in IR. Even if you don't agree with his positions, the book is packed with substantive accounts. I def. recommend this book no any1 interested in foreign police or 20th century history. .
Rating: Summary: Outlining the role of America in a single superpower world Review: Kissinger systematically analyzes each global region and the challenges that the United States faces in developing a coherent foreign policy towards each. He covers Europe, Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and (though somewhat grudgingly) Africa.
The coverage of the benefits and risks of Globalization is a must read for anyone interested in joining or opposing the current anti-Globalization movement that has caused havoc at many of the global leaders summits.
Though he does not say as much, Kissinger clearly disdained the manner in which Clinton's foreign policy was executed. Always the champion of Realpolitik, he finds many of the American excursions into foreign policy of the 90's reeking of bland Wilsonianism and to be ill-conceived and neither well thought-out nor well executed. Each reader will have to come to terms with his viewpoint in her own way.
There are many issues that America will have to deal with in the coming years and decades. South America is on the brink of either becoming an economic powerhouse or political morass. Asia is growing in economic strength and considers American hegemony distasteful. The Middle East continues to confound as it is both a gooey tarbaby and the supplier of fuel for the American economic engine. Africa remains a victim of the recent colonial period with no steady government save Nigeria. America, as the sole remaining superpower, must conduct itself so as to maximize peace and prosperity around the world. Whether we are able to do so well is the main question Kissinger poses.
Rating: Summary: Mediocre work from a brilliant mind Review: Whatever your views on Henry Kissinger as a practitioner of international relations, it is difficult to deny his genius as an academic in the field. One may disagree with his politics or with the ultra-realist approach he used in guiding U.S. foreign policy as Nixon's secretary of state, one may even go so far as to call him a war criminal. But as a chronicler of modern diplomatic history, he has few rivals. Having read his seminal work Diplomacy, a masterpiece in which he traces diplomatic relations from the time of the Treaty of Westphalia through present day, it was with eager anticipation that I awaited his most recent work, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? What could be more exciting for a student of international affairs than a prescription for 21st century American diplomacy from America's consummate diplomatist? The book, unfortunately, does not even live up to its own title, much less the expectations it inherits by virtue of its author's reputation. Kissinger does not truly attempt to answer the question implicit in the book's rhetorical title - namely, that assuming America does need a foreign policy, what should that foreign policy look like? Instead he traces historical developments and foreign policy trends, divided neatly into geographic regions, and ends each discussion with a brief, all-too-vague, and not-at-all bold prescription for how our country's leaders should proceed in the future. For instance, in his discussion of Europe and trans-Atlantic relations, his boldest assertion is that the U.S. should support the strengthening of the EU as a means of keeping Russia in check. In Asia, he argues that close relations with Japan will be more productive in preventing the emergence of a hostile, dominant China than the current course of inflammatory rhetoric and aggressive policies. And in his chapter on globalization, he focuses most of his attention on a thorough excoriation of the IMF and its failures in the Asian, Russian, and Latin American financial crises, without offering much in the way of solutions. It is ironic that his most opinionated chapter - the one on peace and justice - is also his most predictable. Is it any surprise that Kissinger, who in recent years has been accused by some of war crimes, would argue strongly against the authority of the International Criminal Court, and take up the legal crusade of Augusto Pinochet? In its favor, this book is certainly very readable. But don't we expect more than that from the likes of Henry Kissinger? When I read the work of such a brilliant mind, I almost feel disappointed if I don't feel a need at the end to go back and re-read passages or even entire chapters. In this case I felt neither the need, nor the desire, to do so.
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