The War over Iraq

Rating:
Summary: understand the origins of the Iraq war planning
Review: I picked up this book because as the title states I wanted to learn how people in government or at least associated with some people in the government (Wolfowitz is a close friend of Kristol) justify this preemptive war.
Whether you agree with the war or not, this book is probably as close as you can get to have an extensive conversation with Wolfowitz about his reasoning for pushing the removal of Saddam through military means. If you think that oil is the reason for the Iraq war and every action by this government is regulated through the Halliburton front office, every page in this book will get your blood boiling. Just as in the official hearings or speeches by government officials, oil is not given as a reason for the war.
But if you are against the war and look for weaknesses in the political justification for the war, this book is a reference manual for building your arguments. It details the historical roots of the current government's foreign policy and cites the best examples (in their opinion) why Saddam has to be removed now and not 5 years later.
If you support the war, this book may give you additional arguments to support your case or will simply reinforce your opinion.
Written by Kristol, who has previously taught political science, and Kaplan, who is senior editor of The New Republic, this book is overall well referenced (contrast that to Ann Coulter's books) and an easy read for people interested in political sciences.

Rating:
Summary: A blueprint for future foreign policy
Review: In "The War Over Iraq", Kristol & Kaplan present an excellent case for the use of pre-emptive force not only against Iraq but also against other nations that threaten American ideals and interests, both at home and overseas. They highlight the grievous actions of Hussein's regime and then proceed to detail the shortcomings of both George H.W. Bush's ("narrow realism") and Bill Clinton's ("wishful liberalism") foreign policy paradigms in dealing with Iraq.

The crux of the book is their compelling argument, using the (George W.) Bush Doctrine ("American internationalism"), that the United States should pre-emptively strike Iraq. They fully explain the tenets of the Bush Doctrine, which is a viable model for dealing with threats in the post-9/11 world.

Though the war with Iraq is already underway, do not be dissuaded from reading this work simply for that reason. The Iraqi situation is a real-world case study that helps explain the Bush Doctrine. This new paradigm is being tested right now and will be the method of engagement for US foreign policy for the forseeable future.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting if flawed
Review: Kaplan and Kristol add an interesting perspective to the debate over the war in Iraq. Their argument is that this war is definitely not about oil, and not just or even mainly about weapons of mass destruction. It is about liberating Iraq and making the world both more democratic and a safer place for democracy. It's a breezy, argumentative book, not really so much an attempt to convince opponents of the war as an attempt to stake a theoretical claim that something they call a distinctly American internationalism is what informs the Bush Administration's action against Iraq. Naturally, Clinton's Administration is targetted for particular contempt, but interestingly enough Bush I and even Reagan are also criticised as narrow realists.

What's missing from this analysis is any sense of history and of how the US is perceived outside its borders--and even outside the Beltway. Not everyone is going to be able to accept the notion that the US should simply be trusted to do the right thing. The book's authors clearly have either no idea or--scarier still--no interest in how a book like this will be read by people who have either watched or experienced first-hand a less-than-idealistic USA in action.

At the precise time of writing (Baghdad seems to have fallen today) and for the next few months, the Kristol/Kaplan theory will be riding high. But whatever this book claims, what they charitably consider to be activist idealism is not going to turn into doctrine. It won't because the US is always going to feel the need for the moral flexibility that realism offers. "Operation Iraqi Freedom" is a catchy slogan, but will it be followed by, say, "Operation Uzbeki Freedom", aimed at liberating Uzbeks from a brutal and corrupt dictatorship in Tashkent that happens to be allied with Washington against radical Islam? Of course not. Nor is it going to be followed by "Operation Pakistani Freedom" or "Operation Zimbabwean Freedom".

My own conclusion is that Kaplan and Kristol either do not really believe what they are arguing, or they are dangerously naive utopians, not unlike the dogmatists who steered the Kremlin into wild Third World adventures in the 1960s and 1970s. I suspect it's the former, and this book is mainly about raising the authors' own profiles for the next few months. Otherwise, someone as ideologically pure as Kristol claims to be would have resigned several times over in protest during the Reagan Administration (e.g. over Iran-Contra) and refused to serve under a realist such as George H W Bush.

It's fascinating to watch just how far Kristol and Kaplan will go to make the evidence fit their theory. They ask us to believe, for example, that attacking Iraq today is akin to Kennedy's decision to quarantine Cuba. The fact that Kennedy was faced with a nuclear threat that could have unfolded in a matter of weeks, not years or decades as in the case of Iraq, seems lost on Kaplan and Kristol, who instead conclude that war on Iraq is further justified because Kennedy did consider a military option for a while. Amazing stuff.

This book will naturally appeal to ignorant ideologues who seek confirmation of their reflexive militaristic instincts, but it is actually quite worthwhile for others to read too. Just keep asking yourself questions while you read it.

Rating:
Summary: A Somewhat Revisionist History
Review: On a positive note, Authors Kristol and Kaplan do an admirable job of addressing the Iraq problem in the larger context of retracing the evolution of American foreign policy since the end of World War II. The authors discuss, albeit cursorily, the tension that existed throughout ten presidential administrations between the appropriate projection of American military power and the appropriate definition of an American "interest." The Realpolitik School, represented by the Carter, Nixon and first Bush Administrations' foreign policy conceptions, advocated that American power should only be used only when American interests are directly compromised; the Internationalist School, represented by the Kennedy, Truman and Reagan Administrations' foreign policies, defined "American interests" more broadly which resulted in American military intervention in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama to name a few.

The 'Iraq Problem' since Saddam Hussein's ascent to power, as the book explains, has been treated differently by each administration depending upon its respective World view. Interestingly, the book delicately side-steps the Reagan Administration's complicity in Iraq's development of WMD during its 1980-88 war with Iran, although the authors do recognize the Reagan Administration attitude toward Iraq/Hussein as an enabling element in the 'Iraq Problem' that began with the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The authors do a nice job of chronicalling Saddam's crimes beginning in 1979. The authors remind us of Saddam's brutality, his genocide of the Kurds, and the panoply of reasons why Saddam is a horrible human being. The authors also remind us of the role played by several American administrations to enable Saddam, including that certain elements of the Bush I administration had advocated constructive engagement up the eve of the first Gulf War.

This work's biggest failing is in its attempt to convince us that the present Bush Administration's policy towards Iraq culminating in the war that is currently winding to its conclusion as I write this was anything other than sheer opportunism produced by 9/11. The authors would have us believe that the Bush administration's post-9/11 foreign policy - a hybrid of classic Wilsonian internationalism with a moral focus, to paraphrase the authors - is the process of learned evolution rather than simply that certain neoconservative elements of the administration - Wolfowitz, Cheney and Rumsfeld - seized upon an impotent opposition to advance their foreign policy agenda.

While the authors recognize that the present administration's pre-9/11 foreign policy - to the extent one existed - was based upon the realpolitik view of American foreign policy (rather than neo-isolationism if anyone recalls Bush's criticisms of the Clinton foreign policy during the presidential debates), the authors' argument about its post-9/11 evolution is less-than convincing.

The authors do nothing to prove that Iraq actually had WMD or that it actively abetted Al Qaeda which were the principle justifications for the war in the first place. Rather, the authors simply accept these as "facts" and proceed to justify the war based upon these accepted facts.

With the military phase of the Iraq War drawing to a successful conclusion and the post-War administrative phase just beginning, we will witness the practical effect of the present Bush Administration's "noble" application of American military power. We forget that then-candidate Bush criticized the Clinton Administration for "national building" in former Yugoslavia and in Somalia. Now we face the task of effective administration of and 'national building' in post-Saddam Iraq. History will be the judge.

Rating:
Summary: The neoconservatives demonstrate an unpalatable arrogance
Review: The book does a good job of articulating neoconservative views, and explaining the rationale behind those views. Kaplan and Kristol always take the moral high ground. They argue that their foreign policy perspective is based on extending American ideals of freedom and democracy while making the world safer. The book makes periodic weak attempts to present other viewpoints. Those opposing views are highlighted for the sole purpose of refuting them. While very little credit can be given to Kaplan and Kristol for presenting a balanced view they are even worse as psychics. Their predictions for Iraq war and its aftermath were wildly off the mark. In the book the writers asserted with great conviction that Iraq maintained a massive stockpile of WMD (there were none). They attacked critics who suggested that Iraq would descend into chaos after the war (it did). Kaplan and Kristol suggested that the occupation would require just several thousand troops after year when the number was near 150,000 trrops. They pegged the price of the war at $16 billion with a true cost is more like ten times that amount. Contrary to the concept that attacking Iraq would make United States safer most Americans believe that it has not. While we might give Kaplan and Kristol credit for high ideals the idea that the United States should militarily dominate the world and impose its brand of democracy on rogue states seems just a neoconservative pipe dream. The neoconservatives demonstrate an unpalatable arrogance to suppose that they know what is best for other nations and that American ideals are superior to any others in the world. The real problem is created when neoconservative ideas are put into action by the government. Preemptive wars, unilateralism, the employment of military strength in imposing democracy will prove costly in treasure and lives. While Americans generally do feel that their system of government is superior, it is likely that the use of military force to impose these systems will backfire creating more enemies not less, making America less safe, not more.
The application of neoconservative doctrine in Iraq seems to be a complete disaster. While the fat lady has yet to sing, she is warming up, just offstage. Ironically, in the unlikely event that Iraq does become a liberal democracy it will not be because of American military might, but due to genuine leadership on the part of the Iraqis.