Rating: Summary: Influences, Actions, Players, and Over-View Review: Halberstam is brilliant in the way he can narrate and explain events, and illustrate people's motivations and actions. We should not judge a book by its cover--or title--but: at risk of being a "stickler," I believe the title of the book doesn't reveal what it is about, and that it may appear to the non-Halberstam-knowing populace to be another "generic current event/recent poli-sci book" for the "new release" section of the book store. This, it is not. This is an interesting, nicely written piece from the first to last page. For the casual observer (me), or the policy wonk, this book provided ample amounts of refreshing and new information about he people, personalities, events, personal relationships, and domestic and foreign policy-making of the time period of the late 1980s and entire 1990s. As the relevant precursor--Vietnam--many of the military debacles of the 1970s influenced military policy makers and their subsequent decisions (obviously) in the 1990s, greatly influencing their decisions (American foreign policy) in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Why were we in Somalia? Why did we want to restore Aristide to the bottom-of-the-barrel garbage can of Haiti? You'll find out why from this book. The Rwandan genocide was more efficient than the Nazi exterminations if one looked at it from a per capita number killed - divided by - the time it took (to eradicate "the other" point of view.) Many policy makers and players from the past and recent present are noted: Zbignew Brzezenski, Cyrus Vance, Eagleburger, Reich, Les Aspin, "Wools", Rubin, Howe, "old Henry," Schultz, Tony Lake, Powell, Baker, Christopher, Stephanothingness, Holbrooke, Shalikashvili, Scowcroft and Milosivic among others. Lloyd Bentsen's life was interesting enough to have me looking for his biography. The Gulf War is covered, and the most influential person that brought the new technology mentality to the U.S. armed forces: Colonel John Warden. Schwarzkopf, and arrogant buffoon, got the credit for doing what? The Bosnian calamity and it's foreign and primarily domestic implications cover mammoth portions of this book. The acute and redundant details of: who thought what, said what where, that was not listened to by whom, can motivate the reader to speed read through the middle portion of this 500-pager. Most of the time, it was "what's our policy....uhh....we don't have one." And that's OK by me.....who cares? I didn't and still don't care about Bosnia. On the domestic front, the administrative policies of the 1980s, had an affect on the Clinton administration's transition in 1992. All of the "hot checks" that were written in the 1980s caused an annual budget deficit of 350 billion, which was constraining the economy, government operations, and policy initiatives. Clinton, following Greenspan, Bentsen, and other deficit hawks' advice took the initiative to reduce the deficit. This is something Clinton did that isn't noted by the mainstream media nor the public, but it was one of the most important things he did, and it alienated the spendy left. Interesting tid-bit: Les Aspin, when Secretary of Defense, had a bad heart and ill health. He liked to eat potato chips with mayonnaise for lunch (he's dies in '95 by the way). It would have been good to label the chapters in some way. A reader will not know if each new chapter is going to be about domestic or foreign policy, or the Balkans, until they begin reading it. There were also insights into the minds and thoughts of many policy makers, but how did this information get to Halberstam? He conducted many personal interviews with many key players, and did massive amounts of research, during the lengthy time he spent writing this book. Yes, he's a knowledgeable inside-the-beltway way journalist who know lots of folks and has been all over the world. But....does he have ESP or several inside sources whose information can be corroborated? Yet it's still another great one by Halberstam.
Rating: Summary: War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals Review: Thanks to David Halberstam once again for writing on American foreign policy and the types of people who run Washington, DC at the highest levels. Halberstam portrays these people who have somehow risen to the top after their civilian days bureaucraticaly involved with the Vietnam War. Mostly it scarred them instead of educating them. As a former helicopter pilot of that conflict, I hold them in as high a disdain as I did then. David Halberstam shows how these types proliferate around administrations such as Clinton's and cannot get off the dime making a decision. The book for me showed that even the news media sees no point in having war correspondents any more, and so the American public is kept in a high state of ambivalence while these post cold-war events play out. I have recommended reading this illlustrative book to any who are pondering our forthcoming possible war with Iraq. We cannot get "out of the box" following the Vietnam days. I am glad to be a veteran Army aviator instead--it has given me a much healthier stance upon life. Read my book OUTLAWS IN VIETNAM, and talk to a chopper pilot sometime....
Rating: Summary: Over-sympathetic study of US foreign policy establishment Review: This is a study of the US foreign policy establishment in the 1990s. It is based on interviews, which depend on interviewees' goodwill, so it says only what they would like said. It is a typical product of the self-regarding Washington culture, written by an insider who identifies completely with the US state, writing for instance, "We had this extraordinary instrument of power ..." Halberstam only briefly mentions Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, while dealing at length with Yugoslavia. He tells how in 1992 General Colin Powell backed the Somalia operation, claiming that he had a clear exit strategy when he hadn't. He weakly expanded the mission, contrary to his own professed beliefs, by sending a battalion of Rangers and a Delta Force Unit. Their gung-ho pursuit of General Aidid led to their humiliating defeat and withdrawal. Somalia was a defining example of the failure to 'nation-build' by the gun. Powell, ever the bureaucrat, saw his job as protecting his boss, right or wrong. In February 1990, Bush's deputy secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, gave Slovenia's leaders the green light to secede. The Slovenian and Croatian secessions destroyed Yugoslavia's integrity and independence, causing the Bosnian war. In 1993, the new Clinton administration's first action was to kill off the Vance-Owen peace plan that it "arrogantly disdained ... , which, had it gone through, might have saved hundreds of thousands of lives." Having unleashed the dogs of war, the Clinton administration launched a brutal airpower assault in 1999. This attack on a sovereign country, which had committed no aggression against any other country, was not authorised by the UN, and was therefore illegal under international law. After the war, the US government imposed the 1995 Dayton Accords, on almost exactly the same terms as the Vance-Owen plan. The only difference was that Dayton was to be implemented by NATO forces, in line with US government policy that "We must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO."
Rating: Summary: A must read Review: This is a wonderful book -- a comprehensive history of America's repsonse, and lack thereof, to the crisis in Yugoslavia. The book contains incisive biographies of the major players involved, and paints a clear picture of Clinton's hapless foreign policy and contemptible personality. The scope and level of detail is impressive. Well worth reading.
Rating: Summary: Disappointed, but still reading . . . Review: David Halberstam brings a lot of writing talent and insight to the table. I read the "Best and the Brightest" 20 plus years ago and still find it one of the very best history books ever written (and the best political history of the early American involvent in Vietnam) That Said, I have been disappointed in War in a Time of Peace. The book reads slow, the points he makes are often repetitious, often boring,too long,and sometimes unfocused. I was interested in Halberstam's astute recognition as to the interplay between the politics and the media which allowed Milosevic to commit a cruel genocide against virtually defenseless Bosnian muslims. Still, David Halberstam with his talent, could have done (and has done) a lot better
Rating: Summary: Must Read! America: The Troubled and Reluctant Superpower Review: David Halberstam's War in a Time of Peace is the intense story of American politics shaping the world. This pageturner-novelesque history reviews how America's political fears (another vietnam), America's domestic politics, America's bureuacratic politics, America's International politics, and individual American players (Prezs, generals, CNN, etc..) all clashed togething resulting into tragic inaction and then to reluctant action in dealing with the International crises of the 1990s. (Primarily the regarding the Balkans). Yes, Halberstam explores outside figures from the war criminals of the Balkans, to the Euros, to Russians, however it is clear that America is setting the pace. Halberstam explores all the levels of varying influences, from following the Presidential elections, to the inner workings of the politics involved in the American military. For example, Halberstam spent a few pages detailing the revolution of the use of Air power in the nineties and how it all spawned from one rebellious officer. I found it remarakable that from this one work, I got a glimpse of the multi-layered collage that is involved in decsion-making. Within are a number of minibiogaphies of the seen and unseen actors. To name a few: H.W. Bush, Clinton, Powell, Albright, Holbrooke, Lake, Gen. Clark, etc... War in a Time of Peace is a must read - especially for those interested in a review of the nineties, American military or diplomacy (turbulently hand-in-hand here) or current history. I have it on my bookshelf and will return to it in the years ahead.
Rating: Summary: A PEOPLE Magazine version of recent history Review: Have read most of Mr. Halberstam's work, and enjoyed them. However, this one has some problems: First, the title is misleading, as the book is almost exclusively about the Balkans. Nothing wrong with that, but there was a lot more going on in the world during this same period, as other reviewers have noted, including the US firing of Tomahawk missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan. Seems to me that there were a couple of confrontations with the Chinese, and some other foreign policy issues with the Middle East. Second, the editing was terrible! Many incorrect spellings, much repetition, a zillion acronyms, and a VERY brief bibliography, considering the sweep of the narrative. Third: the characterization of "the military attitude" toward the Clinton administration was generally very good, but did not go far enough to adequately convey the utter contempt with which Clinton was personally held by nearly every member of the military (including enlisted, and especially senior NCO's and Chief Petty Officers). Fourth: since much of this book was apparently based on interviews, I had the sense that the author was unwittingly repackaging some personal agendas, and this was most evident in the lengthy section on poor little General Clark, who was so misunderstood by his service. General Wesley Clark is a brilliant man who attained four-star rank: that's a pretty big success there. That he professed a lack of understanding about his reputation and why some didn't like him, is disingenuous: the best comment about him is that his personal style absolutely prohibited ANYONE from raising a criticism or counter-suggestion. Finally, I felt there was too much personality in the book. It seemed like every decision and action was solely because of the named players, with little institutional support. We all know that the State Department has a staff, as does the NSC, as does CINCEUR, as does the JCS, as does the Secretary of Defense, and so on, all of whom are continuously developing alternatives and worst-case scenarios, yet events are reported as "Clark's decision" or "Cohen's decision". They were indeed the decisions of these individuals, but there needs to be an understanding and expostion of the range of options and alternatives available AT THE TIME THE DECISIONS HAD TO BE MADE. The book falls short in that area. Overall, not one of Mr. Halberstam's best (he sets a high standard for himself), but certainly a good read, and worth the investment of the reader's time.
Rating: Summary: Impressive . . . Review: An essential overview of US foreign policy in the 1990s. Halberstam has crafted a well written, well researched account of the international policies and conflicts that shaped the 90s. He also deconstructs many of the major players -- Tony Lake, Dick Holbrooke, Colin Powell, Madeline Albright, Sandy Berger -- in great detail, exploring their particular leanings and, most importantly, the events that shaped their individual policies. For this group, shadows of the Cold War and of Vietnam are never far from the surface of their foreign policy. I agree with reviewers who thought that the author has a liberal bias -- Halberstam tends to view the Clinton administration and the Democratic liberals as kinder, gentler, "aw-shucks" foreign policy doves, i.e. the kind of people who just "happen" to get caught up in nasty little international conflicts. Meanwhile, Republicans are portrayed as significantly more trouble-friendly and hawkish, to use a much-bandied-about phrase. Still, despite Halberstam's leanings, he does not hide the Clinton administration's obvious failings in the foreign policy arena. He is quite brutal at times in his descriptions of Clinton as a petulant man-child who doesn't like to be wrong and, more importantly, doesn't like anyone else to be right either. The one flaw with this book, if it is a flaw, is simply that it was written before September 11. As such, it has a dated quality to it, like when you read about WWII or Vietnam. The world dynamic was significantly altered by 9/11 and it will be interesting to see if Halberstam picks up where he left off and writes the post-9/11 chapters of this book. Overall, though, a must read.
Rating: Summary: Okay but pre September 11 Review: This is a history of American foreign policy from the Bush Senior to just before September 11th. Bush Senior saw foreign policy as his main area of interest and he forged a close relationship with Gorbachov and supported the Russian leader through the break up of the old Soviet Union. After this he forged the coalition which defeated Iraq. Bush had a limited interest in domestic policy to his cost. Clinton was able to use the angst caused by Americas move from an Industrial economy to a Information economy to win the 1992 Presidential election. Clinton had no interest in foreign policy and he hoped to focus his administration on domestic reform. He was unable to do this because of Bush and Reagan?s legacy of budget deficits. Instead he had to adopt a policy of debt reduction hoping to have more freedom to move in his second term. Whilst Clinton had no interest in foreign policy it caught up with him. America had stationed a division in Somalia to protect United Nations Relief workers. This had been a big success. However The United States had agreed to withdraw their troops and have them replaced by United Nations peace keeping troops from Pakistan. The United Nations started to switch its policy from one of humanitarian relief to removing General Adid from the equation. This led to a conflict between peace keepers and the forces controlled by Adid. The remaining American forces changed tack and attempted to capture Aidid. This led to the disastrous Black Hawk Down incident and Clinton immediately pulled out the US forces. This book is partially about Clinton but it is more about America searching for a role in the post cold war world. After the disaster of Somalia the world was faced by the break up of Yugoslavia. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia decided to separate from the old Yugoslavia. This occurred despite the fact that these countries did not have any armed forces and Milosevic the Serbian leader had been able to make the Yugoslavia Army and almost exclusively Serbian force. What happed in response to the break up of Yugoslavia was a humanitarian crisis. The Serbian Army siezed areas of Croatia and Bosnia and started to murder Bosnians and to force others from their land in a process that became known as ethnic cleansing. England and France were largely pro Serb. This was helped by the fact that the Croatian leader seemed to be an anti Semite. Germany and Austria supported Croatia. America under Clinton was reluctant to intervene. Eventually Chirac was elected President of France. He was appalled by the fact that some French peace keepers had been taken prisoner and demanded stronger action. Croatia during the time that the Serbs had been attacking Bosnia has been able to obtain arms covertly and to use former American military personnel to train their army. They attacked and decisively defeated the Serbs. This coincided with a decision by France and the United States to use air attacks against Serbia. America was able to organise peace talks that led to an end to the conflict. America had been dragged into a conflict which they had been able to resolve. In Clinton?s second term a similar crisis errupted over Kosovo. America in conjunction with its NATO allies was able to use bombing with the threat of ground troops to again bring the crisis to an end. These foreign policy failures led to the fall of Milosovic and the creation of a democratic state in Serbia. The book shows clearly how Clinton was a very reluctant starter in these conflicts and the degree to which he bumbled through them. The suggestion of the book is that he started to get a grip on foreign policy in about the seventh year of his Presidency. Towards the end Clinton tried to broker a peace in the Middle East as a means of getting some cudos but this failed. The book was written before September 11 and suggests that America has still not developed a defined role. Instead of fighting against communism the choice that America has to make is whether to use it status as a superpower to solve the problems of disintegrating states such as Somalia, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia. Over the next 25 years this realistically looks as if it will be one of the big issues facing he world as large numbers of states in sub Sahara Africa and the South Pacific teeter along towards implosion. Of course since the book was written some events have occurred which have led US foreign policy having a rather crisper definition.
Rating: Summary: War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals Review: This book is very thorough, but extremely biased. Republicans are essentially bad guys. Reagan/Bush left a legacy of debt (overstated in the case of Reagan) -- and not a legacy of peace after 40 - 50 years of war and cold war. The Clinton scandals are of course mere sexual pecadillos -- the fault of those right wing Republicans again. The interventionistas are, of course, saints -- Albright, Gore Wes Clark, Holbrooke. Those who oppose this military adventure are isolationists or even worse -- right wing Republicans. This nasty little intervention: Allowed the Europeans to maintain their costly welfare states unimpeded by the cost of maintaining an adequate military (and, of course, bewail those cowboy capitalists who fight their wars.) Effectively put a war criminal, Milosevic, out-of-business. But put a moslem terrorist organization in power. Do we still celebrate that result after 9/11?
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