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Summary: Foremost Military Historian Critiques Role of Intelligence
Review: Sir John Keegan, the world's foremost living military historian, has written a book which thoroughly examines the role of intelligence in warfare, reaching a conclusion that is sure to tick off the intelligence community: even the best military intelligence on an enemy's forces and plans is secondary to having adequate military forces and planning with which to defeat the enemy. Keegan gives a number of case studies, including the World War II submarine Battle of the Atlantic, Stonewall Jackson's 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign, Admiral Nelson's hunt for the French fleet in the Mediterranean, and the battle of Crete, to show the effect of various degrees of knowledge of the enemy's forces and plans on the outcome of battle. The battle of Crete contributes most to Keegan's conclusion on the usefulness of military intelligence: the commander had a high degree of knowledge of German forces and plans for the batttle, so much so that when the first German paratroopers began to land while he was eating breakfast, he looked up and said: "they're on time." Yet the British lost this battle despite this high degree of foreknowledge of the German invasion plans. Keegan would not deny the importance of military intelligence in future military operations. With the satellite intelligence and codebreaking available today, much can be learned about enemy forces. However despite this foreknowledge, the intention of the potential enemy's command structure can still be unknown: witness the beginning of the first Iraq War, when Iraqi forces were massing on the Kuwait border, yet U.S. intelligence did not believe Saddam would cross the border and invade Kuwait. Technological intelligence capabilities have been overemphasized by the U.S. intelligence community since Carter's Stansfield Turner headed the CIA, to the detriment of even more valuable human intelligence. Keegan's book, as all his books, reaches a reasoned balance: good intelligence is vital, but ultimately the outcome of military conflicts is determined by the skillful deployment of superior military forces--superior not necessarily in numbers, but in training, tactics, weaponry, and most of all, fighting spirit and leadership. Keegan has produced another masterpiece, which all military historians and commanders, and historians of the mysterious arts of espionage, must read--and heed, to their peril if they do not.
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Summary: Nice work
Review: The English praise their John Keegan as the world's greatest military historian. This is funny for a mono-lingual people. Two-thirds of all military history books are by "foreigners" and are not written in English!!!!!! Even despite the English chauvinism I do think that Mr Keegan is an excellent writer. While he does little research in archivs he is good at synthesis; at pulling together good arguments from other writers' books. He has done this here, and very well I must say. His thesis that intelligence determines successes and failures, but has not won wars by itself, is really stating the obvious, but he states it forcefully enough that no military officer reading the book will feel comfortable without developing an obsesion for knowledge. Nice book. Yes
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Summary: Well reasoned explanation
Review: This history is well timed in the sense that it appeared at a time when certain people were attempting to spread a myth that the United States should have been able to avoid the tragedy of 9/11. Keegan, a military historian of the first tier, examines the full scope of military intelligence and its ramifications. He convincingly demonstrates that accurate intelligence has almost always been unavailable - and even in the few instances it was available, its impact has not been the decisive element. Keegan examine Lord Nelson's 73 day quest for the French fleet, relying upon merchants, captured sailors, ambassadors and just about everyone else for information. In the end, it was Nelson's experience and intuition that brought his fleet to battle with the French. Perhaps his most telling example concerns the Battle of Midway. The Americans had exceptional intelligence and yet, as Keegan shows, the American victory resolved itself to four minutes of good fortune. So it goes in war. Yes, some governments spend millions and billions on gathering intelligence. No, it is very rare for that intelligence gathering process to produce sucessful results as a norm. War is a business where secrets are not given up easily and are difficult to ferret out. Keegan maintains that in the end, intelligence isn't a handmaiden to victory in battle, but perhaps a cousin once removed. Jerry
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Summary: A new and interesting subject
Review: This is a very interesting and original account of Intelligence and its affects on Military actions and war. Mr. Keegan explores many essential battles and conflicts. He looks at Nelson's pursuit of Napoleon in the Mediterranean. He looks at the battle of the Atlantic, Stonewalls Shenandoah campaign, the battle of Midway, the V-1/V-2 crises and the battle of the Falkland islands. He also looks into the gulf war and the war in Afghanistan. This is a professional account by an eminent historian and his analysis is infallible. The subject matter is very interesting and the author has a great grip on his studies. A wonderful account.
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Summary: Good Case Studies but a Weak Structure
Review: With "Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to al-Qaeda" John Keegan steps into the dark and mysterious world of military intelligence. Keegan attempts to discern the level of importance that intelligence operations have on the outcome of battle. Keegan's final assessment appears to be: not much. Keegan uses seven case studies from history to back up his point. In each case, intelligence played a major preliminary role to the battle but offered little to know help during the course of it. This certainly fits with Keegan's assessment that battles are won on the field not in the intelligence lair. Keegan seems to believe that our fascination with covert operations has more to do with popular literature than with real world experiences. While I mostly agree with Keegan's findings, I do not agree with the structure of his book. Using case studies is fine when discussing a topic that is viewed almost entirely one way; but, using them for such a controversial topic as this is not a good way to do it. An equally skilled historian could very well pick seven different historical episodes and prove his point that intelligence networks are as important to winning as fighting is. The weakness of the case study method aside though, each case that Keegan has selected for his book is an interesting historical story in its own right. There in lies the contradiction of "Intelligence in War". Keegan's chosen method of proving his point is fundamentally flawed; however, he imbues each case study with enough life to make them readable on their own merits. But, since this is a book that is supposed to prove the overemphasis that intelligence activities have been given over the years, I have to say that "Intelligence in War" is a less than average book.
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Summary: Good Case Studies but a Weak Structure
Review: With "Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to al-Qaeda" John Keegan steps into the dark and mysterious world of military intelligence. Keegan attempts to discern the level of importance that intelligence operations have on the outcome of battle. Keegan's final assessment appears to be: not much. Keegan uses seven case studies from history to back up his point. In each case, intelligence played a major preliminary role to the battle but offered little to know help during the course of it. This certainly fits with Keegan's assessment that battles are won on the field not in the intelligence lair. Keegan seems to believe that our fascination with covert operations has more to do with popular literature than with real world experiences. While I mostly agree with Keegan's findings, I do not agree with the structure of his book. Using case studies is fine when discussing a topic that is viewed almost entirely one way; but, using them for such a controversial topic as this is not a good way to do it. An equally skilled historian could very well pick seven different historical episodes and prove his point that intelligence networks are as important to winning as fighting is. The weakness of the case study method aside though, each case that Keegan has selected for his book is an interesting historical story in its own right. There in lies the contradiction of "Intelligence in War". Keegan's chosen method of proving his point is fundamentally flawed; however, he imbues each case study with enough life to make them readable on their own merits. But, since this is a book that is supposed to prove the overemphasis that intelligence activities have been given over the years, I have to say that "Intelligence in War" is a less than average book.
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