Rating: 
Summary: Keegan is Unqualified to Write on this Subject
Review: John Keegan is unqualified to write a book on the role of intelligence in warfare. It's true, he is a renowned military historian, but how can a person without a security clearance and access to classified operations write on a subject shrouded in government secrecy? According to Newsweek magazine, Keegan, as a military historian, is prohibited from contacting British intelligence. If that is true (recognizing the news media's shaky credibility), then his information is all open source. Only a person who has long held high level security clearances and who has had very broad access to classified intelligence data as applied to warfare over many years, could write a meaningful document on the role of intelligence in warfare. Such persons are comparatively very few, and John Keegan is apparently not one of them. Such a document, however, would be classified Top Secret, and not be releasable to the public, as doing so would warrant arrest, prosecution and lengthy incarceration upon conviction. Consequently, the writing of a book or even the discussion of the subject is virtually futile except in very limited terms. But even if discussed in limited scope and based on open sources, Keegan's claim that the use of intelligence information on the battlefield has been of questionable value can be challenged. It's not just brute force that wins battles. There have been several significant events affected by espionage and intelligence. In the days leading to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the FBI did a magnificent job of arresting bank robbers, but completely missed a spy ring operating in Hawaii. That ring monitored ship traffic, made drawings of the harbor and collected other information that was used in planning the bombing of Pearl Harbor. After breaking the Japanese encryption code, we learned that the very brilliant Admiral Yamamoto would be flying from one island in the Pacific to another island to conduct an inspection. We had P-38s waiting for him in the air, and his death was significant, not only to the Japanese Navy, but to the country of Japan. Historians still debate the value of "purple" and "magic", the terms for the Japanese codes during the Battle of Midway, but because we had broken their codes, we knew when they were putting bombs on their planes and when they were loading torpedoes, and that told us what kinds of targets they were going after. Along with the English, we also broke the German encryption code. The encryption device was referred to as "enigma." As a consequence, we knew the Germans were going to launch a massive bombing raid against the English city of Coventry. Churchill could evacuate the city and save lives, and very probably give away the fact that we had broken the German code, or he could remain silent, let the citizens of Coventry die, and protect the fact that we had broken the code, on the gamble that having done so would be beneficial one day in the future. Churchill opted for the later decision. Also because of enigma, we were able to defeat the great German General Erwin Rommel in North Africa. Without enigma, how else could the overly cautious British General Montgomery, the most overrated general of the war, defeat Rommel, the greatest general of the war of all sides? We knew when ships were going to sail to supply Rommel and would send a plane into the air. The German sailors would see the plane and think they had been observed. Later, when they were being sunk by allied submarines, they attributed their demise to having been spotted, but the plane was just a cover for enigma. On or just preceeding the D-Day landing, a Spaniard by the name of Juan Pujol Garcia, told the Germans that the landing at Normandy was not the actual landing, that it was just a diversionary landing and that the actual landing would be at Calais. The Germans thought Garcia was working for them, but he was actually working for the English as a double agent. At one point, Rommel, who by now was back in Europe charged with its continental defense, correctly believed that the landing at Normandy was the actual landing and dispatched his crack panzer divisions. Hitler called them back. By the time the Germans realized they had been hoodwinked, it was too late, as we had established a beachhead. Rommel had always said the war would be won or lost on the beaches.
Disinformation may not be the dissemination of intelligence gathering, but it has always been a function of intelligence services. When the North Koreans took the USS Pueblo, we thought it was because they objected to our own intelligence gathering. Almost two decades later, we learned that they actually took it at the behest of the Russians, who were receiving encryption keys from Naval Chief Warrant Officer, John Walker, a Russian spy. The North Koreans took the ship so fast the sailors did not have time to destroy their encryption devices in accordance with procedure. With encryption devices captured intact and keying material, the Russians now say that if we had gone to war with them in the 1970s, they would have won because they had broken our Navy's encryption code. Fortunately for us the Navy has enhanced its security procedures since then. It's true, intelligence data does not guarantee success in war, but that is also true for superiority in men, weaponry, materiel, or the element of surprise, or anything else. But I disagree with Keegan, the results in war are not just an affair of physical force. Intelligence and espionage can have significant effects as noted above. Christopher Andrew, Professor of Modern and Contemporary History and Chair of the History Department at Cambridge University, and author of THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE KGB says that historians have customarily ignored the enormous role of Soviet and Russian intelligence in shaping Russia's foreign policy and in manipulating world opinion of Russian affairs. I agree, and in fact, historians often have not recorded the role of intelligence and espionage in warfare, principally because much of it is not releasable to the public. I possess some of Keegan's excellent works. The truth is, I have not read Keegan's book, Intelligence In War. I prefer to spend my time reading books written by authors knowledgeable of their subjects.
Rating: 
Summary: Great author, poorly formed topic
Review: John Keegan's mastery of the material is obvious. However, he picked an amorphous topic: whether Military Intelligence "helps". Keegan uses historical vignettes through the ages to prove his point, that Military Intelligence is usually not decisive. However, the question seems poorly formed. Military Intelligence means different things in different epochs, and in different situations in the same timeframe. Also, the manner in which it may or may not be decisive is also situation specific. Worse, not all of Keegan's historical vignettes prove his point. The result is a book full of interesting tales, but lacking clear synthesis. This great historian's talent and our time are wasted on a poorly formed topic.
Rating:
Summary: Great author, poorly formed topic
Review: John Keegan's mastery of the material is obvious. However, he picked an amorphous topic: whether Military Intelligence "helps". Keegan uses historical vignettes through the ages to prove his point, that Military Intelligence is usually not decisive. However, the question seems poorly formed. Military Intelligence means different things in different epochs, and in different situations in the same timeframe. Also, the manner in which it may or may not be decisive is also situation specific. Worse, not all of Keegan's historical vignettes prove his point. The result is a book full of interesting tales, but lacking clear synthesis. This great historian's talent and our time are wasted on a poorly formed topic.
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Summary: John Keegan really knows his stuff - this is brilliant
Review: John Keegan, deservedly one of the world's most respected military historians, has done it again with this simply outstanding, magnificent book. For it is not just a fascinating history of the ways in which intelligence has been used down the centuries - though for intelligence buffs it is that. But he also shows how human insight on the battlefield itself makes all the difference to the success or failure of a battle. You can have all the intelligence you need and still lose, you can have none at all and be lucky and still win. It is this vital insight - plus the fact that he is an effortlessly superb, readable and fluent writer - that makes this particular book so unique in the plethora of books coming out at the moment on intelligence related subjects. Buy this book yourself, then buy it for all your friends interested in history and the fate of battle. Christopher Catherwood, the author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003) --This text refers to the Hardcover edition
Rating:
Summary: Average at Best
Review: Keegan was once regarded as the top of the military history profession. In the last several years, however, his star has begun to fall. Intelligence, as other reviewers have pointed out, is a difficult concept to write a concise history of. Keegan makes the attempt, and the result is an average book, repetitive and lacking in a definate thesis. In essence, all Keegan proves with his research is that the commanders of any given battle play far more of a role than any intelligence they receive. Their use of the infomation gathered means more than anything else. Yet Keegan never admits that, through the entire tome. Instead, at the beginning of a conclusion which drones on and on about topics never touched in the rest of the book, he states that force, not intelligence, always wins war. Furthermore, the author overuses naval examples. One would think that ninty percent of the entire history of warfare was fought at sea. Also, utilizing three battles from the Second World War, and then lumping all post-WWII into one chapter seems a bit on the cheap side. Too much extra info to research? We have come to expect more from someone as world reknown as Keegan. Keegan's writing is also slightly transparent throughout the book. Some phrasing is jumbled and the repetition wracks the nerves. Certainly not his finest work. Keegan remains better than most, but this would not be a book I would recomend to many folks.
Rating: 
Summary: Good analysis and fair prognosis
Review: Keegan's book 'Intelligence in War' has well written chapters. The stories of Graf Spree and high sea pursuits are my kind of reading. The context of intelligence evolution is a nice introduction, however there are shortcomings.
The chapters in the book are well done but they don't mesh together like you would expect from a author of this caliber. I felt these were individual articles that were sewn together with minimal editing. The result has a bit to much repetition, and leans on the particularly interesting segments: eg. Lord Nelson before the Battle of the Nile is very overdone.
I shouldn't critize the book too heavily because I really enjoyed it, as did the number of people to whom I recommended it. Keegan's overview of the current direction of intelligence and it's value was very good, even if too brief.
I am ready to read more of Keegan's works and recommend this book to those who enjoy military history coupled with a keen intelligence perspective.
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Summary: Intelligence and the Battle of Midway
Review: Keegan's choice of the Battle of Midway to support his thesis ("intelligence doesn't win battles") is utterly preposterous. Without the codebreaking and signal analysis successes of Commander Rochefort's Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, plus the work of related CIUs at Corregidor and Melbourne, there IS no Battle of Midway! Had Rochefort & co. not achieved their intelligence coups prior to the battle, Midway would have been a cakewalk for the massive Japanese strike force and invasion fleet that descended upon the atoll on 4 June 1942. As another reviewer pointed out, the warriors on scene were the ones that dropped the bombs and made four IJN carriers burn at Midway. But without a prior victory in INTELLIGENCE, those warriors wouldn't even have been there in the first place!
Keegan's book may or may not contain valid points with regard to certain other battles, but his attempt to trivialize the contribution of intelligence to the "Incredible Victory" at Midway makes the entire work suspect. Indeed, since on-scene warriors are obviously the ones who bring any battle to its conclusion, you have to wonder what Keegan was really trying to do with this book besides sell it.
--Ron Russell, Moderator, Battle of Midway Roundtable, www.midway42.org.
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Summary: Seems haphazard
Review: Not Keegan's best effort. It felt like I was reading parts and pieces from other works that may or may not be turned into full books. Love his work but this is for completists only.
Rating:
Summary: Seems haphazard
Review: Not Keegan's best effort. It felt like I was reading parts and pieces from other works that may or may not be turned into full books. Love his work but this is for completists only.
Rating:
Summary: Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to
Review: Noted military historian Keegan (The Face of Battle; The Mask of Command) examines several military campaigns to show how intelligence affected the outcome. Admiral Nelson had to chase Napoleon to Egypt with few intelligence resources yet achieved a great naval victory. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's local knowledge enabled him to beat superior Union forces consistently in the Shenandoah valley. At Midway the U.S. Navy had the intelligence advantage, but the outcome still depended on chance. Use of human resources proved most important in the Allied campaign against Hitler's vengeance weapons. The British defeat at Crete and the Falklands War are also analyzed. As Keegan persuasively shows, the keystone to victory was not formal military intelligence but the human factor. Intelligence organizations are now dominated by huge technical systems with lots of expensive equipment, but timeliness, completeness, effective evaluation of the material, and proper use of the knowledge gained are always vital. Only the application of sufficient force, not the quantity of intelligence data, can lead to success. Suitable for all military history collections.
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