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Intelligence in War : Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Quaeda

Intelligence in War : Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Quaeda

List Price: $37.95
Your Price: $25.81
Product Info Reviews

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Rating: 2 stars
Summary: BORING!
Review: I'm sorry to say this is one boring book. It just seems to go on and on. I couldn't wait until it was done so I could move on to something that wouldn't put me to sleep every time I started to read it.

Rating: 1 stars
Summary: Don't Buy It - Read this to learn what you get!
Review: If you buy this book you are getting a "rough" print. A rough print is apparently a cheap edition with uneven width and lengths of pages, not even fit for a paperback edition.

I truly wanted to read this book and hear what John Keegan had to say, but instead I promptly returned the book for a refund, appalled at the condition I received it. Initially I exchanged the book, believing that the first book they sent me was simply an error in the manufacturing process, I was surprised to see the "same" book come back to me in exchange, and decided to return it.

The publishing on this book is completely laughable for a title that retails at $30. Proper publishing of a book gives the book the respect it deserves. These rough prints cheapen the book and the reading experience.

There is no warning on this page that you are getting a "rough" edition. So consider this a warning, know that if you decide to buy this book you now at least know what you are in for, the publishing business at its worse.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: A good, if repetitive, read.
Review: In this post-9/11 world of Islamic terrorists, satellite surveillance & intense technological changes in spying, there still is no substitute for "eyes on the ground."

Almost everyday we hear about yet another "failure" in intelligence gathering. The media go into frenzies lobbing accusations about, & the terribly serious craft of espionage is exposed for all to see. People have "the right to know" modernday reporters screech.

How has military intelligence gathering come to this sad condition? John Keegan has set about giving us that history. From Alexander The Great to today's conflicts, this learned author walks us through the evolution of military intel, with maps & precise developments of historical battles, the progression of tools & some of the major wartime blunders.

However, the subtitle is misleading, there are only a few pages about intel gathering in this post-9/11 world. John Keegan has bowed to the seriousness of current events & left well enough alone. As the old saying goes: Loose Lips Sink Ships. I for one, don't need to know if it means my brothers & sisters are going to get killed because the enemy knows our sources!

Rebeccasreads recommends INTELLIGENCE IN WAR for the thinking reader who wants a glimpse into the history of military intel as well as learning why what we know when we know it isn't always what we thought it was or what we'd like to know! Military intel is not what wins battles, the lack of it however, is what loses them!

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: A good, if repetitive, read.
Review: In this post-9/11 world of Islamic terrorists, satellite surveillance & intense technological changes in spying, there still is no substitute for "eyes on the ground."

Almost everyday we hear about yet another "failure" in intelligence gathering. The media go into frenzies lobbing accusations about, & the terribly serious craft of espionage is exposed for all to see. People have "the right to know" modernday reporters screech.

How has military intelligence gathering come to this sad condition? John Keegan has set about giving us that history. From Alexander The Great to today's conflicts, this learned author walks us through the evolution of military intel, with maps & precise developments of historical battles, the progression of tools & some of the major wartime blunders.

However, the subtitle is misleading, there are only a few pages about intel gathering in this post-9/11 world. John Keegan has bowed to the seriousness of current events & left well enough alone. As the old saying goes: Loose Lips Sink Ships. I for one, don't need to know if it means my brothers & sisters are going to get killed because the enemy knows our sources!

Rebeccasreads recommends INTELLIGENCE IN WAR for the thinking reader who wants a glimpse into the history of military intel as well as learning why what we know when we know it isn't always what we thought it was or what we'd like to know! Military intel is not what wins battles, the lack of it however, is what loses them!

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: An analysis of intelligence and how it affects war
Review: In war, if you know what the enemy is going to do, you've won. Right? That's not necessarily so, as the British showed in the German invasion of Crete. John Keegan's Intelligence in War uses this as just one example of how intelligence is used in wartime and how it's not always the end-all and be-all of how a battle is won. Keegan explores the entire gamut of intelligence and how it's been gathered and used in modern warfare, using examples ranging from Admiral Nelson's chase of Napoleon's fleet on its way to Egypt in 1799 to some World War II examples. He finishes the book by discussing modern techniques that range from Vietnam to the war on terrorism. Put it all together and you have a fascinating book that turns the historical stereotypes on their head.

"Its theme is that intelligence in war, however good, does not point out unerringly the path to victory. Victory is an elusive prize, bought with blood rather than brains. Intelligence is the handmaiden not the mistress of the warrior." Pg 5

Methods of intelligence acquisition range anywhere from "humint" (the acquisition of intelligence through human means, usually spying but also including local knowledge of the area) and "sigint" (the interception of signals, whether radio satellite, or just seeing the semaphore flags). As technology has increased, the use of humint has decreased as more signals, and more ways of intercepting those signals, have been developed. The problem in the past has always been conveying the intelligence found to your superiors before it becomes outdated. The first case study, Nelson and Napoleon, demonstrates this completely, with Nelson getting increasingly outdated information, making some choices based on false assumptions of what he knew, but ultimately prevailing because of a decisive mind willing to take a chance on suppositions based on that intelligence. Keegan does an excellent job here showing the troubles Nelson had to go through to even get what he had.

Other case studies include Stonewall Jackson and his Shenandoah Valley campaign (demonstrating local area knowledge), the chasing of the German surface fleet in World War I (the interception and use of wireless signals), the battle of Crete (how intelligence doesn't always win the battle), the battle of Midway (the breaking of Japanese codes), the battle of the Atlantic (how intelligence was just one part of the defeat of the German submarine fleet), the German V-1 and V-2 rocket campaign against Britain (how human intelligence became very important) and then an evaluation of military intelligence from 1945 to today. He finishes with a conclusion that sums the whole thing up, that war is not won just by intelligence, but by brute force.

The broad examples Keegan uses to illustrate his point takes the reader gently along the path to understanding. He first shows some instances where intelligence was instrumental in helping the winning side succeed in their action (Nelson surprised the French fleet at Alexandria and destroyed it). He then shows us Crete, and how the British knew almost the entire German plan, but misinterpretation of parts of it kept the local commander from deploying his forces correctly, causing the loss of the island even though the Germans lost 40% of their paratroopers. This brutally enforces Keegan's notion that intelligence is nothing without the blood and sweat necessary to make use of it, or how that same blood and sweat given by the enemy can overwhelm even a prepared force.

Even without the intelligence theme running through the case studies, they are fascinating history. Keegan tells the story completely even as he uses the chapter to illustrate his point. While at times the entire chapter is illustration (the Nelson chapter continually refers to the intelligence that Nelson had received and figured out), other times he seems to abandon the theme and just tell the history (the Jackson chapter and the Battle of the Atlantic). Doing this in the Atlantic chapter reinforces the fact that, while intelligence was important in the fight against the submarine wolf packs, it was the sailors who were the most important in winning this particular battle.

Keegan's research is top-notch, though there are times you wonder about the variety (or lack thereof) of sources he uses for a particular chapter. The number of "ibid" notations can be quite alarming sometimes, though he always uses at least five or six sources for any one chapter. I do notice that there aren't any primary sources (though some of the notes say "quoted in..." so the text he is using as a source may have been using a primary source). While this is an issue, I don't think it's a major one in this case, however. He is not trying to tell a definitive history with his case studies, but instead to use them as support of his thesis about intelligence. Thus, he's not trying to get into the heads of parties involved. Some people may have a problem with that, however.

Keegan's style is very easy for the layman to read. The chapters flow effortlessly, and if you have any interest in the subject whatsoever, you should find yourself intrigued. You may not agree with him, but you will not have any trouble getting through the book. It is not dense at all. It's a thick book, at almost 400 pages before notes and bibliography. However, you will find yourself breezing through it so it doesn't feel that long. Personally, I couldn't put it down, but Keegan always entrances me with his writing. It's no different from any of his other books that I've read, so if you've found that you can't stand his writing, this book won't be any different and you should probably pass on it.

Read this book, and discover just how important intelligence is in warfare, and how sometimes it just isn't enough.

David Roy

Rating: 1 stars
Summary: A phoney!
Review: John Keegan is a phoney. His book is filled with unsupported conclusions, outright falsehoods and macho posturing. Does anyone stop to ask how he got his credentials?

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: Point of the book
Review: John Keegan is a well known military historian, and the defence editor for a major UK newspaper. In this particular book, he tackles the broad topic of intelligence and war. He uses case studies to help illustrate his points. (These include the 1942 Midway campaign, Nelson's pursuit of the French fleet leading to the Battle of the Nile, and Jackson's Shenandoah valley campaign). As some of the other reviewers have noted, these examples are not new, and some of the points he makes may be quite familiar. But I think in fairness, it should be remembered that while his work may be used to comment upon current policy, the roots of the work is as a history. It is not meant to be a polemic about how defence budgets may be better spent or the ultimate folly of war. While he does offer insights - and perhaps the best observation is that even if one has a great intelligence advantage, that advantage to be decisive must still be converted in some concrete way. The US knowing that the target was Midway was a great intelligence coup, but it still needed a big break when the Enterprise and Hornet's dive bombers managed to find the Japanese carriers while they were in the midst of re-arming. Of note in the later battles, the Japanese were able to determine US intentions (Phillipine Sea, Leyte Invasion) but the disparity in carriers and battle fleets was so great that the insight was almost irrelevant. Intelligence because it often has a short 'shelf life' unless it is acted upon or can be converted into some other tangible advantage can be transient and illusory. A very interesting work, and worth a read - more aimed at history buffs and not for ultra serious academics (who want more details) nor for policy pundits and mavens who are looking for historical 'evidence' to support their particular political and policy positions.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: I wish to argue the point...
Review: John Keegan is an amazing writer who makes history accessible and fun to read. He uses careful and exacting research then creates a living world of history into which a reader is thrust. There is no argument in me that this is a fine read. However, as has been pointed out, the case study system makes a great book but a very weak argument. Keegan would have us believe that Intelligence in War has little impact on the actual outcome of the battle, whether it be plethora or dearth. I had a bit of trouble believing that.

Now if that was all of my review, everyone could just tell me to bug off. But I wish to explain exactly why I had trouble with Keegan's argument. As of right now I am a college student studying Military History. So I know my field pretty well. I can think of a few case studies where Keegan would be proved wrong...Case in point! The use of the Navajos language as a code by the American forces in the Pacific Theater gave us a distinct strategic and tactical advantage over our enemy, translating directly into lowered casualties and surprise (I think...I am after all a student still and absolute sentences like this are bad bad bad...). While Keegan would point out that armed force was still required to complete objectives, this event was an intelligence coup of some proportion and should not be ignored. I would also have liked to see an explanation of how Cold War Intelligence, especially that collected by nuclear subs, could be explained as being useless.

Keegan could not have included all of this...so its basically silly for me to demand it. But when a writer makes a thesis, he or she should be careful about how certain they are. I think Keegan would have benefited from someone giving him a counter argument, even if it would have weakened his argument...

But I have a thesis of my own. I make it for all of Keegans books, although I have only read two, this one and The Face of Battle. Keegan's supposedly faulty arguments aside, read these books for the amazing descriptions and analysis of war...you will not be sorry.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: I wish to argue the point...
Review: John Keegan is an amazing writer who makes history accessible and fun to read. He uses careful and exacting research then creates a living world of history into which a reader is thrust. There is no argument in me that this is a fine read. However, as has been pointed out, the case study system makes a great book but a very weak argument. Keegan would have us believe that Intelligence in War has little impact on the actual outcome of the battle, whether it be plethora or dearth. I had a bit of trouble believing that.

Now if that was all of my review, everyone could just tell me to bug off. But I wish to explain exactly why I had trouble with Keegan's argument. As of right now I am a college student studying Military History. So I know my field pretty well. I can think of a few case studies where Keegan would be proved wrong...Case in point! The use of the Navajos language as a code by the American forces in the Pacific Theater gave us a distinct strategic and tactical advantage over our enemy, translating directly into lowered casualties and surprise (I think...I am after all a student still and absolute sentences like this are bad bad bad...). While Keegan would point out that armed force was still required to complete objectives, this event was an intelligence coup of some proportion and should not be ignored. I would also have liked to see an explanation of how Cold War Intelligence, especially that collected by nuclear subs, could be explained as being useless.

Keegan could not have included all of this...so its basically silly for me to demand it. But when a writer makes a thesis, he or she should be careful about how certain they are. I think Keegan would have benefited from someone giving him a counter argument, even if it would have weakened his argument...

But I have a thesis of my own. I make it for all of Keegans books, although I have only read two, this one and The Face of Battle. Keegan's supposedly faulty arguments aside, read these books for the amazing descriptions and analysis of war...you will not be sorry.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: Keegan should stick to history
Review: John Keegan is the dean of military historians and when he sticks to history, his books are simply the best. However, he has strayed into new territory with "Intelligence and War," in which he puts forward a simplistic thesis that intelligence is of little or no value to battlefield commanders. The literal legion of such commanders who disagree should be enough to disprove the hypothesis. If not, Keegan's somewhat loose definition of 'intelligence' makes it hard to test the hypothesis one way or the other.
Keegan is a great writer and has an impressive command of the facts. But one closes the book saying, "huh? and? really?" rather than agreeing.
I know from experience as a former Foreign Service Officer, that there is a big difference between 'intelligence' and 'news.' I also know that most of the success stories that come from applying intelligence to a field situation can never be made public. Alas, that's Keegan's connundrum. He has put forward an assertion that cannot be publically refuted because most of the information that would do so is classified.
He should have known that!
In short, this is a well-written book with some interesting history, but with a fundamentally flawed hypothesis. Up to you if you want to read it anyway!


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