Rating: 
Summary: Another CIA-coup causes 50 years plus of Trouble
Review: I couldn¡¯t understand the desire of a suicide bomber. But I was ignorant. This book is a great read. It's told fast and personally. The reader feels the author's genuine interest in the subject. What is sad is how little I knew about Iran or Western influence in Iran. This book is a must read for anybody like me that wants to know more of the background to today's political climate. The sections on the ancient history of Persia are particularly fascinating and told in a quick, clear way. As far as the connections between terror and the coup I think it's easy to see that the 50s, while marking the end of the British colonial era, established the US as a new Imperial power. This, is at the heart of every terrorist act. If you read this book you will come closer to understanding the fear of foreigner powers meddling with your country or the feeling that at any moment a missile can blast through your apartment window. Seems to me that most Americans, or Westerners, still have not grasped the fundamental realities of the psychology of terrorism. What dignity is there being killed by a satellite guided bomb? There¡¯s not even any personal interaction with the enemy. Of course there are going to be suicide bombers. People who have a history of suffering and place honor in death during rebellion will revolt. This is made clear. The strength of the book lies in the facts being pulled out in different themes. One reviewer said the book is poorly organized. This was an interesting review but I disagree. The book is organized thematically so things overlap but give the reader a richer idea of how one event affected another. I think Mr. Kizner has a firm grip on the difference in cultures, the lives of the people involved, both Asian and Western, and the resonance this event in history is having today.
Rating: 
Summary: Another arrogant westerner thinks he can comment on Iran...
Review: I read Mr. Kinzer's book and frankly I'm not surprised that YET ANOTHER arrogant Westerner, especially one from the New York Times coterie of fabricators exaggerates facts based on HIS ideological stance. Characters like Kinzer think that they can neatly juxtapose their views and ideologies on a culture, a people, a mentality that is entirely different from the one they themselves hail from! This book is nothing more than fashionable posturing!
Rating:
Summary: Kinzer tells us all we need to know about mucking in Iraq
Review: Kinzer not only tells the story of the 1953 coup against Mossadegh itself, but gives a very good historical review of the events in Iran leading up to the coup, and gives us all pause for thought as to how we should ... and should _not_ ... go mucking with other countries and trying to set them up in _our_ interests. The short term benefits to U.S. and British "national interests" (read: "oil companies") in installing the Shah as the ruler in Iran may have been beneficial (although it's not clear that Mossadegh would have been a whole lot worse), but the long term outcome was pretty much a foregone conclusion: The revolution, and a generation or two with deep distrust if not outright hatred for the Western powers. And we're reaping the whirlwind right now for it. Must reading. I'd say start at the White House. Rewrite it in small words with lots of pictures, and force Bush to put down the "Very Hungry Caterpillar" and take on something substantial for once in his life.
Rating: 
Summary: Get It
Review: This book should be required reading in every US high school. I wonder if, in 50 years, there will be a book written in a similar vein regarding today's events in Lebanon. Coincidence? I think not....
Rating:
Summary: Fascinating.
Review: This is a fascinating book. It reviews the cycle of interference in the affairs of Iran by Britain and the U.S.A. and how these activities, and the response of the Shah ultimately helped shape the events in Iran of the late 1970's and thereafter. It also helped show how weak the Shah was as far as a leader. As someone without a lot of baseline knowledge of Iran, I learned as lot and one wonders what type of country Iran would have been now had there been better planning both inside and outside of Iran in the 1950's.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting story, a bit too black and white
Review: This is an easy read which provides a good deal of information about the history of U.S. involvement in Iran, some of which is important to understanding recent mideast politics. The book's claim that the U.S. role in the 1953 coup contributed to bin Laden's hatred of the U.S. seems plausible.
I suspect it exaggerates the extent to which Mosaddegh was noble and the Shah evil. And despite its argument that no Soviet-backed coup was imminent, the book provides plenty of reason to suspect that the Soviets could have overthrown a government as weak as Mosaddegh's and that they might have tried once they chose a clear successor to Stalin.
Rating:
Summary: Fast-paced and engaging, but occasionally shallow view
Review: I found this an engaging and entertaining read, although at times it really felt (1) like Kinzer was glossing over what I thought were events important enough to warrant more details (like the legislative maneuvering between the Shah and Mossadegh, etc.) and (2) that Kinzer was writing a hagiography of Mossadegh, and a rather undetailed one at that. The period when Mossadegh was in retreat was barely mentioned other than in passing via a quote, describing his behavior as mostly "carping" - I think more of what shaped his views during this period would have helped give a more rounded view of the man.
But the book is a good read, and it's an important series of events for Americans to understand, and on the whole, I thought this an excellent account.
Rating:
Summary: What happend to Mossadegh?
Review: The topline in this book is quite simple, how does Kermit Roosevelt, working for the CIA, execute the role model regime change operation in Iran in 1953, replacing the Time Man of the Year, Mohammed Mossadegh, with Mohammed Reza Shah.
I usually like Kinzer's writing style, having read his columns for years in the New York Times. He uses the same Graham Greene model of fast narration, time shifts and strong characterization to build the suspense in this novel.
The couple of negative points are that he has not drawn much inference from this episode to other geopolitical events of the world and what are the cause-effects of this incident. Hopefully, we will wait for the sequel.
All in all, well worth a read.
Fred G. Sanford
Rating:
Summary: A JOB PRETTY WELL DONE, SORT OF
Review: I did give this one five stars as it is well written, well researched and certainly gives us some good background. It is quite a good thing to examin facts in relationship to how we got to where we are today. This work gives us a prespective of that process. On the other hand, I feel in reading this, we, the reader need to use some prespective ourselves and remember what the world was like during the time of the overthrow of the Iranian government, the mood of the country and the mood of our leaders. Times where quite different then, our view and knowledge of world events has been and was certainly influenced by many factors and we did not have the advantage of "time" to help us make decisions. The author, I do not feel, has done a very good job of this. This event happend well over fifty years ago. Looking at any event through hindsight is quite easy. The author indulges in good old American Bashing (is it just me, or is this a "thing" as to most New York Times Reporters?). This bashing is easy to do, any one can do it, but again, from the advantage of evaluating actions after fifty years. This should not distract from the work though. The author presents facts that we all need to be aware of. Bad things do happen and all countries do bad things. Learning from our past mistakes is a good thing, as long as we actually do it, i.e. learn. This is a period of time and a series of events that Americans should be more aware of. All in all, I recommend this one.
Rating:
Summary: A shameful episode in the history of American espionage
Review: Considering how desperately the current American administration claims to want to "grow democracy" in the Middle East, it is particular ironic and distressing that, fifty years ago, the U.S. moved to annihilate a suitably decent fledgling parliamentary government in Iran--and a friendly one at that. As Stephen Kinzer concludes in in his animated history--which reads like an espionage thriller--"few would deny that the 1953 coup in Iran set off a series of unintended consequences."
Why would the United States topple a regime that not only considered us an ally but also emulated our own form of government? The quick, but incomplete, answer is also the obvious one: oil. Certainly that's the only reason the British needed when Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The fading imperialists of the British government predictably screamed foul, arguing that the allegedly "private" oil company had a long-term agreement, signed in 1933, and Mossadegh had no right to renege on that agreement. As Kinzer's mountain of evidence shows, however, the Brits had conveniently ignored their own half of the deal: they had steadfastly refused to implement promised wage increases, build better housing, and construct hospitals and schools for the nearly enslaved and wholly impoverished native workers. Furthermore, London refused repeatedly to open the company's books to Iranian inspection, appropriated more than its contractual share of the profits, and supplemented the take by disguising large portions of the earnings as a corporate tax.
The Truman administration, wisely, would have nothing to do with British whining, but Churchill, inevitably, found two kindred spirits in the newly elected Eisenhower administration: Secretary of State John Dulles and intelligence director Allen Dulles. British oil wasn't enough bait for the Americans, but London knew that there was something that would make the Dulles brothers sit up and pay attention: the Red menace. British plans were thwarted, however, by an inconvenience: Mossadegh and his officials were not in the least interested in Communism and regarded the Soviets with undisguised contempt. So, instead, American ambassador Loy Henderson and British ambassador George Middleton invented the Communist canard in an unassailable if specious guise, arguing that Mossadegh's government was unstable and that it might someday fall to extreme leftists; "the longer Mossadegh remained in power, the likelier it was that Iran would fall to communism." In other words, the British convinced the Americans to meddle to prevent the off-chance that the Soviet Union might decide to meddle first (never mind the fact that the Soviets were then reeling from Stalin's death and were in no position to do anything of the sort).
This brief background summary doesn't evoke even a small part of the story, and Kinzer's book unveils many surprises that should frustrate and dismay Americans who believe that our government should be an ally to friendly democracies. The planning and execution of the coup (there were two attempts--the first one failed) that brought the tyrannical Shah back to power often resembles an episode of the Keystone Cops, but Mossadegh's trust and honor was no match for Western persistence and duplicity.
Kinzer's concluding chapter (as implied in his subtitle) goes too far, however, when he asserts that this shameful episode of American history is responsible in large part for Middle East terror. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the repressive Saudi monarchy, the Soviet-Afghan war, the rise of the Taliban (which was hardly friendly with the current Iranian regime)--these and many other factors have contributed to the region's turmoil. Still, it's irrefutable that our betrayal of Mossadegh insured that Middle East leaders and peoples would, in the future, be justifiably wary of ever again trusting us.
There are expatriates from the Shah's era who argue that his regime, while undeniably authoritarian, was better for Iran than what followed it and that the United States was correct in championing him. This weak attempt to tar Mossadegh's reputation by implicitly aligning him with the fundamentalists ignores the fact that Khomeini & Co. were also vocal enemies of the Mossadegh administration. By replacing a good (if imperfect) government--by getting involved at all--the United States insured that lingering resentment for our role in the first tyranny would be used against us by the leaders of the second tyranny--even if they despised Mossadegh himself. And, finally, it ignores the possibility that, if we had instead supported and encouraged Mossadegh and minded our own business, the Middle East might well be a friendlier and more peaceful place today.
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