Rating: 
Summary: VERY Disappointing for the Philosopher
Review: "And indeed, if the interested layman picks up any of a half a dozen standard text books on the brain, as I did, and approaches them in an effort to get the answers to sorts of question that would immediately occur to any curious person, he is likely to be disappointed." -John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Science" (1984)
This quote, more than any one I could think of, sums up my view on Dr. Antonio R. Damasio's "Descartes' Error." In preparation for a graduate seminar on the philosophy of mind (which kicked off by reading Descartes, by the way) I picked up this book so that I may glean a neurophysiologist's take on the mind-body problem. To say that this book was an amazingly unhelpful tool for this purpose would be the understatement of the century. While I don't agree (with another reviewer) that "a degree" is required to do philosophy (but one can't help but admit that the vast majority of good philosophy is produced by those who hold at least two of them), at least some grasp of the philosophical topic is prudent prior to writing a book even remotely advertising itself as having something to do with it. This is where Damasio falls short, and not by a little.
Because so many reviewers have summarized this book's substantive content, for the sake of avoiding duplicity, I decided to scour other reviews for the more egregious claims about this book. First of all, one common theme is that this book is stimulating philosophically, and that it is a "must read" for philosophers interested in the mind (see the NY Times Book Review above). In case it isn't obvious at this point, I don't think anything could be further from the truth. If you are a philosopher, don't waste your time or money with this book unless you've literally read everything else and want nothing but the science. Nowhere does Damasio mention any of the interesting paradoxes intertwined in this fantastically fascinating area of philosophy, other than occasional name dropping, not including the 5+ pages he devotes to actually discussing Descartes' "Error" (247-52). The only problem here, though, is that Damasio, while not getting Descartes entirely wrong, entirely misses the substantive point of Descartes' "dualism" and the point of the dream argument. Damasio repeats the cogito a couple times, and then moves on to dismiss the scientific inaccurracies of Descartes' philosophy (i.e., "errors" entirely beside the point of the current debate about dualism and the existence of phenomenal properties).
Damasio severely, severely underestimates the weight of Descartes' dualism, as well as naively assumes that all forms of it died with the dawn of science. The point isn't that Descartes was so wrong to assume that the mind/soul/spirit could survive the body - or that brains can't really exist in a vat (Damasio explains how this is impossible given current science - I'm serious) - the point is the epistemic value of inconceivability and the role of direct acquaintance of conscious, thinking experience. All of this is completely and utterly missed by Damasio, which is likely due, I'm afraid, to a severe underestimation and underappreciation for the relevant philosophical texts and the people who wrote them. We all know "that mind comes from the brain," the problem is explaining the connection in an unproblematic, coherent way.
Another common misconception about this book is its "readability." Here is one paragraph (that's right, paragraph) as a sample: "The minimal neural device capable of producing subjectivity thus requires early sensory cortices (including the somatosensory), sensory and motor cortical association regions, and subcortical nuclei (especially thalamus and basal ganglia) with convergence properties capable of acting as third-party ensembles." Now, if this is your idea of "readable," then by all means, go for it. The book is absolutely chok-full of neurophysiological terminology to the point of reading like a text book (see Searle's quote above). I consider myself a very active reader (in the sense that I virtually always have a dictionary nearby and virtually never skip over words I don't understand the meaning of), but this book is steeped in technical jargon. The writing itself is above average to average.
Damasio's effort should be commended, which is why I give this book two stars, based entirely on the book's scientific value alone. The mischaracterization of Descartes, as well as Damasio's own philosophical shortcomings, are, in my own opinion, errors far more egregious than any Descartes ever made.
Rating:
Summary: VERY Disappointing for the Philosopher
Review: "And indeed, if the interested layman picks up any of a half a dozen standard text books on the brain, as I did, and approaches them in an effort to get the answers to sorts of question that would immediately occur to any curious person, he is likely to be disappointed." -John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Science" (1984)This quote, more than any one I could think of, sums up my view on Dr. Antonio R. Damasio's "Descartes' Error." In preparation for a graduate seminar on the philosophy of mind (which kicked off by reading Descartes, by the way) I picked up this book so that I may glean a neurophysiologist's take on the mind-body problem. To say that this book was an amazingly unhelpful tool for this purpose would be the understatement of the century. While I don't agree (with another reviewer) that "a degree" is required to do philosophy (but one can help but admit that the vast majority of good philosophy is produced by those who hold at least two of them), at least some grasp of the philosophical topic is prudent prior to writing a book even remotely advertising itself as having something to do with it. This is where Damasio falls short, and not by a little. Because so many reviewers have summarized this book's substantive content, for the sake of avoiding duplicity, I decided to scour other reviews for the more egregious claims about this book. First of all, one common theme is that this book is stimulating philosophically, and that it is a "must read" for philosophers interested in the mind (see the NY Times Book Review above). In case it isn't obvious at this point, I don't think anything could be further from the truth. If you are a philosopher, don't waste your time or money with this book unless you've literally read everything else and want nothing but the science. Nowhere does Damasio mention any of the interesting paradoxes intertwined in this fantastically fascinating area of philosophy, other than occasional name dropping, not including the 5+ pages he devotes to actually discussing Descartes' "Error" (247-52). The only problem here, though, is that Damasio, while not getting Descartes entirely wrong, entirely misses the substantive point of Descartes' "dualism" and the point of the dream argument. Damasio repeats the cogito a couple times, and then moves on to dismiss the scientific inaccurracies of Descartes' philosophy (i.e., "errors" entirely beside the point of the current debate about dualism and the existence of phenomenal properties). Damasio severely, severely underestimates the weight of Descartes' dualism, as well as naively assumes that all forms of it died with the dawn of science. The point isn't that Descartes was so wrong to assume that the mind/soul/spirit could survive the body - or that brains can't really exist in a vat (Damasio explains how this is impossible given current science - I'm serious) - the point is the epistemic value of inconceivability and the role of direct acquaintance of conscious, thinking experience. All of this is completely and utterly missed by Damasio, which is likely due, I'm afraid, to a severe underestimation and underappreciation for the relevant philosophical texts and the people who wrote them. We all know "that mind comes from the brain," the problem is explaining the connection in an unproblematic, coherent way. Another common misconception about this book is its "readability." Here is one paragraph (that's right, paragraph) as a sample: "The minimal neural device capable of producing subjectivity thus requires early sensory cortices (including the somatosensory), sensory and motor cortical association regions, and subcortical nuclei (especially thalamus and basal ganglia) with convergence properties capable of acting as third-party ensembles." Now, if this is your idea of "readable," then by all means, go for it. The book is absolutely chalk-full of neurophysiological terminology to the point of reading like a text book (see Searle's quote above). I consider myself a very active reader (in the sense that I virtually always have a dictionary nearby and virtually never skip over words I don't understand the meaning of), but this book was just crazy-loaded with technical jargon. The writing itself is above average to average. Damasio's effort should be commended, which is why I give this book two stars, based entirely on the book's scientific value alone. The mischaracterization of Descartes, as well as Damasio's own philosophical shortcomings, are, in my own opinion, errors far more egregious than any Descartes ever made.
Rating: 
Summary: Challenging an old idea
Review: A "negative" title such as this carries unfortunate implications. The "error" must be identified, then explained and refuted. For newcomers to cognitive studies, Descartes "error" might seem an obscurity . Yet it has been the basic tenet of education and social thinking in the Western world for three centuries. "Cogito ergo sum" was translated into the belief that the mind and the remainder of the body were separate entities. Behaviour was controlled by the mind, while the body went about its own business. Damasio demolishes that long-standing mistake for good in this superbly written groundbreaking study. The first indication of the relationship of the mind and body was the bizarre penetration of a railway worker's skull in 1848. The worker lived, but the damage to his brain left him with severe personality changes. The case opened the door to research leading to mapping areas of the brain that reflected various personality traits. Damasio recounts the incident, matching it with numerous clinical studies of his own. Additional work, some of it strongly innovative led Damasio and his colleagues to a reformulation of how the mind and body interact. He reminds us that the brain is much more than a collection of electrically interacting cells. The body is sending information to the brain almost continuously, with the brain replying or initiating communication. These signals are both electrical and chemical. More importantly, Damasio reflects on the evolutionary origins of these conditions. For him, it is inevitable that the mind and body interact intimately. His proposed appellation for Emotions aren't separated from our reasoning processes, but are an integral part of them. The attempts by parents and educators to "train out" emotions in children are thus doomed to fail. Damasio's thesis hinges on what he calls "somatic markers." The markers are areas of the brain which continuously interact with the body, particularly those areas we associate with emotions. If confronted with emotionally charged choices, the stomach "knots," the face may "flush" warmly, and perspiration may increase markedly. These body/brain functions begin developing early in the embryo. Indeed, they have a long evolutionary history, which firmly establishes their roots. In humans, the brain not only controls/reacts with the body in addressing stressful circumstances, but retains some level of memory of the events causing the reactions. Hence, even thinking about such circumstances can lead to bodily reactions associated with them. You need not be confronting an emotional situation to be able to express the feelings associated with it. This, of course, is most notably seen in actors or other performers. Damasio offers the excellent example of orchestra conductor Herbert von Karajan, whose pulse rate was higher while conducting than when confronted with an emergency situation in an airplane. To Damasio, "Descartes' error" was that he placed all these controls in a central location of the "mind" where, in fact, they are scattered over much of the brain. The implications from this book will be far reaching. Besides impacting academic courses on behaviour, there will be changes in how we parent, how we deal with education, and even in the realm of law. Binding reason and emotion will revise uncountable long-standing ideas about how the mind deals with our surroundings. It is a work addressing fundamental questions about what make us human. Read it with care, aware that many preconceptions are likely to be challenged. The rewards for this effort will be great in years to come. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Rating:
Summary: Challenging an old idea
Review: A "negative" title such as this carries unfortunate implications. The "error" must be identified, then explained and refuted. For newcomers to cognitive studies, Descartes "error" might seem an obscurity . Yet it has been the basic tenet of education and social thinking in the Western world for three centuries. "Cogito ergo sum" was translated into the belief that the mind and the remainder of the body were separate entities. Behaviour was controlled by the mind, while the body went about its own business. Damasio demolishes that long-standing mistake for good in this superbly written groundbreaking study. The first indication of the relationship of the mind and body was the bizarre penetration of a railway worker's skull in 1848. The worker lived, but the damage to his brain left him with severe personality changes. The case opened the door to research leading to mapping areas of the brain that reflected various personality traits. Damasio recounts the incident, matching it with numerous clinical studies of his own. Additional work, some of it strongly innovative led Damasio and his colleagues to a reformulation of how the mind and body interact. He reminds us that the brain is much more than a collection of electrically interacting cells. The body is sending information to the brain almost continuously, with the brain replying or initiating communication. These signals are both electrical and chemical. More importantly, Damasio reflects on the evolutionary origins of these conditions. For him, it is inevitable that the mind and body interact intimately. His proposed appellation for Emotions aren't separated from our reasoning processes, but are an integral part of them. The attempts by parents and educators to "train out" emotions in children are thus doomed to fail. Damasio's thesis hinges on what he calls "somatic markers." The markers are areas of the brain which continuously interact with the body, particularly those areas we associate with emotions. If confronted with emotionally charged choices, the stomach "knots," the face may "flush" warmly, and perspiration may increase markedly. These body/brain functions begin developing early in the embryo. Indeed, they have a long evolutionary history, which firmly establishes their roots. In humans, the brain not only controls/reacts with the body in addressing stressful circumstances, but retains some level of memory of the events causing the reactions. Hence, even thinking about such circumstances can lead to bodily reactions associated with them. You need not be confronting an emotional situation to be able to express the feelings associated with it. This, of course, is most notably seen in actors or other performers. Damasio offers the excellent example of orchestra conductor Herbert von Karajan, whose pulse rate was higher while conducting than when confronted with an emergency situation in an airplane. To Damasio, "Descartes' error" was that he placed all these controls in a central location of the "mind" where, in fact, they are scattered over much of the brain. The implications from this book will be far reaching. Besides impacting academic courses on behaviour, there will be changes in how we parent, how we deal with education, and even in the realm of law. Binding reason and emotion will revise uncountable long-standing ideas about how the mind deals with our surroundings. It is a work addressing fundamental questions about what make us human. Read it with care, aware that many preconceptions are likely to be challenged. The rewards for this effort will be great in years to come. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Rating: 
Summary: Neuroscience's Error
Review: Antonio Damasio does a splendid job of pointing out the interdependence of mental experiences such as body sensations, emotions, and reason. But those searching for new ideas about how all of this comes together in the mind will need to look elsewhere. If nothing else, this book shows the limits of neuroscience. While neuroscience can explain how our brains receive sensory input from the environment (how the brain works), it is unable to explain how we have thoughts and opinions about the environment or where we get the motivation to study and change the environment (how the mind works). Neuroscientists like Damasio, who believe that scientific techniques will eventually explain the mind, show that the real error in the mind-brain debate may belong to the neuroscientists and not to Descartes.
Rating:
Summary: Fine work, but Ryle got there first.
Review: Damasio brings some some fascinating cases to bear on one of the oldest problems in philosophy and psychology. It's a good read and an important subject. It would be a mistake, however, to think that "Descartes' error" was just now being pointed out. In fact, practically no contemporary philosopher worth his or her salt subscribes to the Cartesian two-substance theory of body and mind. In his 1949 masterpiece, The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle argued that Descartes' view was fatally flawed (and he wasn't really the first to point this out, either), and called it the "ghost in the machine" view of the body/mind relationship. If you get right down to it, Descartes himself would agree with Damasio that the emotions are not radically different kinds of things from the reasoning faculties, since he believed that experiencing an emotion was simply another mode of thought, just as drawing an inference is a mode of thought. But Descartes must be used to being a whipping boy by now, 350 years after his death; and the historical perspective aside, Damasio's book is an excellent contribution to scholarship on the effects of emotion on rationality.
Rating:
Summary: Deescarte's Error
Review: Damasio has a fascinating style. I have quite an adequate background in neuropsychology and was able to follow Damasio's explantions of neural circuitry. However, I believe that a person without such a background, but with a keen interest in the subject, would still appreciate Descarte's Error.This book brings humanity to the structure and function of man's brain and the impact of this mysterious and fascinating organ on the individual and society. Many will concentrate on the author's attack on the mind/body dualism. Yes, he does a splendid job of this. But what was fascinating to this reader were the case histories he uses to gain the reader's attention and interest. I have read about Phinneas Cage in almost every psychology text I've read, but never had an indepth look at this man(Cage) and the impact of his impairment on our understanding of how the brain works. The other case histories are just as fascinating and effectively illustrate their contributions to the field of neuroscience.
Rating: 
Summary: This book is a terrible polemic
Review: Damasio's book received much attention in the philosophy of emotions literature, however, in my view, the argument presented in the book is very weak. The author presents himself as th "sensible scientist" and defends a biological theory of emotions "the somatic-marker hypothesis." Where the book is novel, it relies on speculative scientific theories (primarily from neuro-science), where the book is correct it is trivial. The worst part of the book is the final chapter, where Damasio engages in a polemic against what he calls "Descartes' Error." The view that he attacks is mind-body dualism, a view which is presented very uncharitably (it is questionable whether Descartes' would even fully endorse the view that Damasio presents) and in way that no reasonable person would adopt it. Overall, the book is philosophically and scientifically weak. It gains its force with ad hominem arguments and fanciful story telling. The book might be useful for a lower-level undergraduate university course or for fun reading, however, it is, in my view, inappropriate for an upper-level undergraduate or graduate course. For the latter, there are much better philosophical books available, e.g., by Panksepp, Griffiths, Nussbaum.
Rating:
Summary: Damasio's Error
Review: I don't recommend this book to anybody. It is the best way to deceive a reader about history of philosophy and particularly about Descartes. Not only his author does not have the academic qualifications in order to talk about Descartes but also whatever he says about him is a distortion and a over-simplification about Dualism and Descartes' philosophy of mind. To write a book about Philosophy or related issues one MUST HAVE a degree in Philosophy, in the same way if somebody decides to write about Neurology he/she needs to have the proper qulifications to do so. It is a shame this book was published and translated into 17 languages. Before bying this book along with his other book about Spinoza, you first and learn about the book reviews it did receive in the first place, but make sure the reviewers were PHILOSOPHERS and not Damasios' friends and colleages from thje biological and medical field, who do not have a clue about what the heck they are talking about either. Good luck in your reading--anyways.
Rating:
Summary: unreadable and boring
Review: I think, the author was not sure, whether he wanted to write a popular science book or a scholarly treatise. The first goal he clearly missed, I cannot judge the second one, being a layperson myself.
The book is full of neurotechnical jargon -one reviewer has quoted a very typical sentence. Credits are given over almost entire pages, certainly distracting, if you want to write a popular science book.
Authors like Steven Pinker prove, that this subject can also be addressed in an interesting manner.
In exasperation, I quit after about 150 pages.
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