Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History

Rating:
Summary: Mr. Prange, Don't Even Think of Practicing Law.
Review: I approached this book thinking that it would yield insights into how and why the United States was so poorly prepared for the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. It seemed appropriate in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, to see if the United States had failed to learn from the past and had thereby condenmed itself to a repeat.

What I found between the covers of "Verdict of History" was a thick skulled and fatuous account that, in a nutshell, said "this stuff just happens, and no one is to blame". As anyone who read "The Valor of Ignorance" (Homer Lea), "Strategy", by Lidell Hart, the writings of Thucydides (a successful ancient Greek General) or other books on military strategy and the nature of warfare realized, the Japanese attack on the US Pacific Fleet was predictable -- and in fact was first discussed in military and political circles as a likely event as early as 1905.

The author [...] asserts that Roosevelt's administration was not derelict in exercising its duty or responsibility to defend the United States, and then he provides hundreds of pages of text indicating that they were (At Dawn, They Slept ... and in the afternoon and evening as well, apparently). Mr. Prange seems to have done a great deal of research but learned absolutely nothing from it. Regrettably, that's par for the course with academic writers.

[...]

Rating:
Summary: Mr. Prange, Don't Even Think of Practicing Law.
Review: I approached this book thinking that it would yield insights into how the United States was so unprepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It seemed appropriate in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, to see if the United States had failed to learn from the past and condenmed itself to repeat it.

What I found between the covers of "Verdict of History" was a thick skulled and fatuous account that, in a nutshell, said "this stuff just happens, and no one is to blame". As anyone who read "The Valor of Ignorance" (Homer Lea), "Strategy", by Lidell hart, the writings of Thucydides (a successful ancient Greek General) or other books on military strategy and the nature of warfare realized, the Japanese attack on the US Pacific Fleet was predictable -- and in fact was first discussed in military and political circles as a likely event in 1905.

The author of "Verdict of History" impressed me only with his staggering and colossal stupidity: evidenced in the book by his complete lack of analytical skills, and his obtuse lakc of comprehension when it comes to strategy. In fact, I think the author is probably a candidate for most inept debator of the century: he asserts that Roosevelt's administration was not derelict in exercising its duty or responsibility to defend the United States, and then he provides hundreds of pages of text that indicates that they were (At Dawn, They Slept..and in the afternoon and evening as well, apparently). Mr. Prange seems to have done a great deal of research but learned absolutely nothing from it ... regrettably, that's par for the course with academic writers.

Throw this one into the rubbish can of history.

Rating:
Summary: Mr. Prange, Don't Even Think of Practicing Law.
Review: I approached this book thinking that it would yield insights into how the United States was so unprepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It seemed appropriate in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, to see if the United States had failed to learn from the past and condenmed itself to repeat it.

What I found between the covers of "Verdict of History" was a thick skulled and fatuous account that, in a nutshell, said "this stuff just happens, and no one is to blame". As anyone who read "The Valor of Ignorance" (Homer Lea), "Strategy", by Lidell hart, the writings of Thucydides (a successful ancient Greek General) or other books on military strategy and the nature of warfare realized, the Japanese attack on the US Pacific Fleet was predictable -- and in fact was first discussed in military and political circles as a likely event in 1905.

The author of "Verdict of History" impressed me only with his staggering and colossal stupidity: evidenced in the book by his complete lack of analytical skills, and his obtuse lakc of comprehension when it comes to strategy. In fact, I think the author is probably a candidate for most inept debator of the century: he asserts that Roosevelt's administration was not derelict in exercising its duty or responsibility to defend the United States, and then he provides hundreds of pages of text that indicates that they were (At Dawn, They Slept..and in the afternoon and evening as well, apparently). Mr. Prange seems to have done a great deal of research but learned absolutely nothing from it ... regrettably, that's par for the course with academic writers.

Throw this one into the rubbish can of history.

Rating:
Summary: Somewhat disappointing finish to the trilogy
Review: I'm a big fan of 'At Dawn We Slept' and 'December 7, 1941,' the first two books in Gordon W. Prange's Pearl Harbor trilogy. 'Verdict of History,' in which he shifts his focus from 'what happened' to 'why it happened,' however, is more troubling. Prange himself died before the publication of his trilogy. The work was finished by his two co-authors, Goldstein and Dillon, and so I'm tempted to hold them responsible for the things I find most disappointing in this volume.

Part of the problem is the title, which I hope Prange himself didn't have a hand in. As Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn sagely pointed out in 'Liberty or Equality,' the verdict of *history* and the verdict of *historians* are two (often very different) things. I would hope a historian of Prange's skill would not be so presumptuous as to claim to speak for all history. The opinions of talented historians are valuable. But relatively few judgments can ever be final (Henry Clausen's Pearl Harbor book has this problem in spades).

The larger issue seems to have been the release, after Prange's death, of John Toland's 'Infamy,' which breathed new life into the so-called 'revisionist' theory that Franklin Roosevelt knew of and/or deliberately provoked the attack. According to their introduction to this volume, Goldstein and Dillon deliberately expanded and refocused Prange's work in order to respond more thoroughly to the 'revisionist anti-Roosevelt thesis,' which they reject.

They concede that Roosevelt 'might have been ill-advised' or insufficiently 'dynamic' in his leadership. But their central thesis is the mainstream one that Pearl Harbor was due to sub-standard naval and military intelligence systems and failures by the on-scene commanders.

In the end, though, Prange is at pains to point out something that often is overlooked in the 'who do we blame' debate: the magnitude of the Japanese achievement. Pearl Harbor was a massive strategic undertaking -- one the Imperial Navy executed nearly to perfection. Students of the attack do well to remember that attention rightly focuses on the Japanese side of the equation as much as on the American.

I've read a lot of Pearl Harbor history, and recommend Stinnett's recent 'Day of Deceit,' which I think is the most important piece of new Pearl Harbor scholarship in some time. But I readily admit I don't believe anyone has all the answers yet. Prange's seminal work (the sum of his three volumes) is an important part of the dialectic that presents arguments and interpretations and helps us get a clearer picture of what really led up to the Day of Infamy.

Rating:
Summary: Totally Refutes the "Revisionist" Viewpoint
Review: Over the years, there has developed a "revisionist" group of historians who claimed FDR Knew in advance about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor and he did nothing to stop it. In this excellent book by Gordon Prange, this somewhat questionable viewpoint is thoroughly destroyed. One of the revisionists' claims is that the radio stations on the West Coast were able to track the Japanese fleet due to their radio signals. This is impossible, since the Japanese fleet NEVER broke radio silence, and, in fact, had their transmitters removed from thier radios all together. Mitsuo Fuchida, the pilot who led the attack, also said that "the force maintained the strictest radio silence throughout the cruise". Revisionists also believed, according to Prange, that if the Japanese task force would have been discovered, it would have turned back. Again, this is not true. The Japanese hoped to attain surprise, but if they were to have been discovered, they were prepared to fight all the way to Pearl Harbor to deliver their attack. What Prange attempts to achieve in this excellent book is who really was to blame? In this aspect, the War Department and the commanders, Kimmel and Short, are held responsible. Prange comes down hard on the War Department for failing to notify the commanders of the intercepted "bomb plot" message. This message, intercepted by "Magic", was transmitted to Japan by a Japanese spy. It broke Pearl Harbor into several sections, which, in effect, could be interpreted as a bombing grid. This information was not transmitted to Kimmel and Short, and could have proven invaluable. But the bulk of the blame appears to fall on Kimmel, Short, and the subordinate commanders. Kimmel and Short both grossly misinterpreted the "War Warning" message dated November 27, 1941, and sent to them by Washington. Short only alerted his troops against possible sabotage and maintained his training schedule. The War Department is also to blame here, because they failed to follow up to make sure Short understood the meaning of the message. Kimmel also failed to grasp the meaning of this message, and, unfortunately, communication between the army and navy was poor at best, so very little information was shared between the commands. One must also realize, and Prange makes excellent reference to this in the book, is that the Japanese placed tremendous amounts of time, thought, and training into this mission, and they must be credited with the success of the attack. America's belief of their huge superiority in both ships and personnel was totally destroyed. Prange also covers each of the resulting investigations fully and includes excellent testimony throughout the book. In summary, this is an excellent book about the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and does a good job of refuting the revisionists and acurately placing blame.

Rating:
Summary: Totally Refutes the "Revisionist" Viewpoint
Review: Over the years, there has developed a "revisionist" group of historians who claimed FDR Knew in advance about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor and he did nothing to stop it. In this excellent book by Gordon Prange, this somewhat questionable viewpoint is thoroughly destroyed. One of the revisionists' claims is that the radio stations on the West Coast were able to track the Japanese fleet due to their radio signals. This is impossible, since the Japanese fleet NEVER broke radio silence, and, in fact, had their transmitters removed from thier radios all together. Mitsuo Fuchida, the pilot who led the attack, also said that "the force maintained the strictest radio silence throughout the cruise". Revisionists also believed, according to Prange, that if the Japanese task force would have been discovered, it would have turned back. Again, this is not true. The Japanese hoped to attain surprise, but if they were to have been discovered, they were prepared to fight all the way to Pearl Harbor to deliver their attack. What Prange attempts to achieve in this excellent book is who really was to blame? In this aspect, the War Department and the commanders, Kimmel and Short, are held responsible. Prange comes down hard on the War Department for failing to notify the commanders of the intercepted "bomb plot" message. This message, intercepted by "Magic", was transmitted to Japan by a Japanese spy. It broke Pearl Harbor into several sections, which, in effect, could be interpreted as a bombing grid. This information was not transmitted to Kimmel and Short, and could have proven invaluable. But the bulk of the blame appears to fall on Kimmel, Short, and the subordinate commanders. Kimmel and Short both grossly misinterpreted the "War Warning" message dated November 27, 1941, and sent to them by Washington. Short only alerted his troops against possible sabotage and maintained his training schedule. The War Department is also to blame here, because they failed to follow up to make sure Short understood the meaning of the message. Kimmel also failed to grasp the meaning of this message, and, unfortunately, communication between the army and navy was poor at best, so very little information was shared between the commands. One must also realize, and Prange makes excellent reference to this in the book, is that the Japanese placed tremendous amounts of time, thought, and training into this mission, and they must be credited with the success of the attack. America's belief of their huge superiority in both ships and personnel was totally destroyed. Prange also covers each of the resulting investigations fully and includes excellent testimony throughout the book. In summary, this is an excellent book about the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and does a good job of refuting the revisionists and acurately placing blame.

Rating:
Summary: Roosevelt's "Wait and see" philosophy destroys Pearl Harbor
Review: The "Verdict of History" will leave you stunned and disappointed with the flustered attitude of the politicians in Washington. As Japan firmly commits to war, Roosevelt and his team of advisors remain divided on what to do. All the while, Kimmel and Short are placed on a "need to know basis" with regard to critical information. As a compliment to Prange's "At Dawn We Slept", "The Verdict of History" continues to paint an alarming picture of a divided America and it's militarily ignorant political leaders. In addition, Prange and his team of gifted writers had no way of knowing that many of the blunders that led to the attack on Pearl in 1941 would be repeated with Iraq in the 90's. Clinton's "Wait and see" philosophy with Saddam Hussein is dejavu in it's truest form. It's been said "When any society fails to learn from it's history, they are doomed to repeat it ten fold." "Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History" is being played out again. The Isolationist against the Revisionist. Like Japan, Iraq thinks only from a military perspective, with the understanding that loss of life in battle is to live forever. Once again, America and it's Isolated way of life are being challenged. The oceans can no longer protect us from the Saddam's of this world. The next step is to "wait and see." Read this book..... JJR, M.A.

Rating:
Summary: Roosevelt's "Wait and see" philosophy destroys Pearl Harbor
Review: The "Verdict of History" will leave you stunned and disappointed with the flustered attitude of the politicians in Washington. As Japan firmly commits to war, Roosevelt and his team of advisors remain divided on what to do. All the while, Kimmel and Short are placed on a "need to know basis" with regard to critical information. As a compliment to Prange's "At Dawn We Slept", "The Verdict of History" continues to paint an alarming picture of a divided America and it's militarily ignorant political leaders. In addition, Prange and his team of gifted writers had no way of knowing that many of the blunders that led to the attack on Pearl in 1941 would be repeated with Iraq in the 90's. Clinton's "Wait and see" philosophy with Saddam Hussein is dejavu in it's truest form. It's been said "When any society fails to learn from it's history, they are doomed to repeat it ten fold." "Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History" is being played out again. The Isolationist against the Revisionist. Like Japan, Iraq thinks only from a military perspective, with the understanding that loss of life in battle is to live forever. Once again, America and it's Isolated way of life are being challenged. The oceans can no longer protect us from the Saddam's of this world. The next step is to "wait and see." Read this book..... JJR, M.A.

Rating:
Summary: Background to the Attack
Review: This is an excellent book that examines the background to the Pearl Harbor attack, and does not detail the attack itself. This book takes an in depth look at the men and the assumptions that made Pearl Harbor. It searches out the flaws in the American communication system, and the flaws in the commander's thinking which determined the outcome at Pearl. The reader will be surprised at the bureaucratic stumbles that pleagued the American effort. And the reader will quickly recongnize that these same flaws exist in every government (and private) institution today. The authors take great care to quote from the hearings and documents to show their points and leave little room for argument about their conclusions. The research and the analysis are excellent in every way. And the Japanise side of the issue is examined as well. The Japanise pulled off a great feat in surprising the US at Pearl, and they managed it in large part because the US Navy recognized it would be so hard to do; thus, Kimmel and Short (the two US Commanders on the spot) thought it would not be attempted. They also thought it would not be a smart move for the Japanise, and so they assumed the Japanise would play it "smart". The Japanise, for their part, did not think the US would hesitate to fight once Japan moved toward Southeast Asia; however, they also thought the Americans would not fight for long being weak willed, and too comfortable to risk much. The interplay of this thinking makes the Pearl Harbor story compelling. What makes the book so good is the interplay between all the assumptions made by the US and its commanders and Japan and its commanders. How different the outlooks and assumptions were. It is also interesting to see how even within the US Army and Navy men of intelligence and candor could totally miscommunicate their intentions. Knowing about the details of how the attack took place is great, and one would want to read several books, including At Dawn We Slept, to discover this information - however, unless you know the information in this volume one would have missed the biggest part of the Pearl Harbor story. The "why" it happened. I highly recommend this book. AD2

Rating:
Summary: Assesses who was responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Review: This is the most scholarly and comprehensive work ever done on assessing who was responsible for the Pearl Harbor attack. It is based on 37 years of research by the late Gordon Prange and covers every conspiracy ever written about the Pearl Harbor attack. It concludes that no one person was responsible and that, in a way, everyone was responsible. This is a must for all serious students and should put to rest most of the myths and mysteries associated with this day.