Rating: Summary: Informative, Fascinating, Gripping Review: David Halberstam, a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist, has again managed to write an outstanding book! I have read several books by Halberstam, and the red thread through all his books is the amazing talent he has for transporting the readers into the world he is writing about. "War in a time of Peace" gives a good overview/understanding of America's foreign policy in the 1990'ies. It is interesting to read how the Clinton administration planned to (and did to a large extent) keep focus on domestic issues, but was more or less forced to take action internationally, as different conflicts (Haiti, Somalia, Balkans) caught up with America. The Vietnam War had made many decision-makers in America unwilling to use American soldiers to take action internationally. For example, initially, no serious attention was given to Slobodan Milosevic and his men. In fact, for a long time the Clinton administration chose to ignore all reports from the Balkans. Clinton's Admin staff deliberately used expressions such as "act of genocide" and equal omitting expressions, to avoid acknowledging that genocide in fact took place. The failure of using forces against Milosevic, gave him the opportunity to set out on an ethnic cleansing spree, bordering to what happened to Jews during WWII. I said that this book covers the foreign policy of the 1990'ies.. To be fair, 30 pages or so to cover Bush Sr., and the rest to Clinton. The title "War in a time of Peace" is slightly misleading, although Somalia and Haiti are covered, this really is a book mostly on the Balkans. Nevertheless, I really enjoyed this book. Reading this book made me understand what really happened in the Balkans and why. As usual, Halberstam's book is very well researched, with fascinating insights. The pages describing how technological advanced US is compared to other countries, and its abilities (missiles hitting only a few feet off target), must fascinate every reader! Highly recommended! After reading "War in a time of Peace" I've picked up that this book is more or less a sequel to Halberstam's book on the Vietnam War "The best and the brightest". I am doing this the other way around.. "The best and the brightest" is my next book to read..
Rating: Summary: Important Piece of the Puzzle Review: I look for three things in a book on national security in the information age: 1) does it offer deep insights into specific personalities or situations not available from any other book; 2) does it highlight deficiencies in the process or substance that are not well understood by the public; 3) and finally, does it add anything to the larger discussion of war and peace in the 21st Century. On all these counts, Halberstam satisfies. Indeed, having read his book several months ago, I have put off reviewing it because I wanted to spend more time pulling the nuggets out--as those who follow my reviews know, they are both evaluative and summative.
This book validates most of what General Wes Clark says in his own memoir, "Waging Modern War," and thus in that sense alone it has great value: the Army was unwilling to trust the US General walking in Eisenhower's shoes with either ground troops or helicopters, and also unwilling to fight in mountains. This is such a terrible self-condemnation of America's most important Armed Service that every citizen should be shuddering. The second major theme I drew from this book was one that the author highlights toward the end of the book when he quotes Madeline Albright, then Secretary of State, as saying (on page 409), "We're just gerbils running on a wheel." For this the U.S. taxpayer pays $500 billion dollars a year? For gerbils? In combination with Pentagon deception of the President in railroading General Clark out of NATO early, and a wide variety of other practices between personalities in Washington that would get you fired in any serious corporation, the overall impression that one draws of the Washington foreign policy and national security establishment is one of inattention alternating with craven back-stabbing. This is not an environment that is operating at peak efficiency, nor can it be trusted to act in the best interests of the voter and taxpayer. A third theme, and this impressed/depressed me tremendously, is that of journalism and open sources of information getting it right early, only to be ignored. The author--Halberstam--takes great care to tell a story of respect for the accomplishments of another journalist, Roy Gutman of Newsday, whose headline on 21 November 1991, "Yugoslavs Need West's Intervention," was the beginning of a series of insightful articles that had little impact at the time. Joining the insights of journalists was the ignorance of history by politicians--Halberstam comments particularly on the lack of European understanding of just how recognition of Croatia was the opening of a Pandora's Box of genocide. I was especially struck, throughout Halberstam's accounting, as to how crafty the Balkan players were, how able they were at deception and distraction, and how inept the Americans and the Europeans were at interpreting the situation and the ploys--with massive genocidal consequences. A fourth theme that was not emphasized by the book, but which I would highlight based on a passing observation by the author with regard to the lack of television coverage, has to do with the absolute imperative for America and Europe to have both a strong television industry that can go into the dark places where today only adventurers like Robert Young Pelton ("World's Most Dangerous Places") dare go--while at the same time governments need a "ground truth" cadre of observers who are accustomed to and can survive instability and combat, and are not trapped like rats in Embassies, reporting reality second or third hand. We simply don't know. We simply do not have trusted observers--or TV cameras--in 80% of the places where we most need to have reliable independent observation. Finally, there were a number of recurring points across the whole book, points where I ended up making annotations: 1) Civilian-military relationships are not marked by trust 2) Presidential teams tend to lack depth, have no bench 3) Washington promotes the least offensive, not the most talented 4) Bush Sr. got no bounce from Gulf War--this is suggestive today, as the son follows the father's path. 5) Satellite imagery was used to detect Haitians building boats--this struck me as so symbolic of all that is wrong with the US intelligence community--rather than someone walking the beaches and seeing and sensing directly, we use satellites in outer space, at great cost, to do remote viewing... 6) Trust, Truth, and Morality--Halberstam may not mean to say this, but my reading of his book, influenced by Joe Nye's book on "The Paradox of American Power," was just this: all the money and all the military hardware in the world will not win a conflict in the absence of trust among the civilian-military players; truth about the fundamentals on the ground; and a morality that empowers tough decisions early enough to prevent genocide. The book ends on a mixed note--on the one hand, observing that prior to 9-11 (and many would say, even after 9-11) America has distanced itself from the world; and on the other, noting that this is a very strong country, slow to anger, slow to rouse, but when roused, capable of miracles. More upbeat than I expected, I was almost charmed by the author's optimism, especially in light of the many books he has written about the corridors of power and the pitfalls of American adventures overseas.
Rating: Summary: About as exhaustive as you can get in five hundred pages Review: I became a fan of David Halberstam's through his sportswriting, but since I have a longstanding interest in history and current events, I decided to check out some of his political writing as well. Having read this book, I'm glad I did. In "War In a Time of Peace" Halberstam attempts to summarize and analyze the key components of American foreign policy from 1989 to 2001 in a (relatively) brief and user-friendly five hundred pages. And it's a rousing success. Halberstam obviously has a profound understanding of the vast array of forces that shape modern-day politics, and he has an engaging writing style that keeps things moving right along. The main thrust of the book is an examination of the effect the end of the Cold War had on U.S. foreign policy. Much of Halberstam's discussion focuses on two related themes: first, the decline in importance of foreign policy in American politics following the removal of the Communist threat; and second, the loss of clear-cut foreign-policy philosophies and objectives without the Soviets as an enemy. Halberstam proves his first thesis quickly enough with this fact: the first President Bush, despite his successes in the Cold War and the Gulf War, couldn't get himself reelected in 1992 in the face of the Clinton campaign's "It's the economy, stupid" logic because the American public didn't care as much about foreign affairs as it had even five years ago. The second theme of the book, regarding the ambiguity that accompanied foreign policy in the nineties, is reflected in the debates over just how and how much the U.S. should get involved in battles in faraway places like Somalia and (especially) the former Yugoslavia. Central to these debates was a fundamental question: should America, with its overwhelming military might, use its military as a police force in areas in which it lacked a vital national interest? In the wake of Vietnam, this was not an easy question to answer, and it loomed large over many of the Clinton administration's important foreign-policy decisions. Halberstam goes to great lengths to discuss the complex mix of factors that influenced these decisions in the Clinton years: American electoral politics, international politics, the internal machinations of the military, American public opinion, changes in journalistic practices, advances in military technology, Bill Clinton's personal problems, the legacy of Vietnam, and much more. Halberstam also gives the reader biographical sketches of many of the major American political and military players, as if to try to explain the impact their own experiences had on their views. He's sympathetic to these people, but at the same time Halberstam has a keen understanding of their weaknesses and how they worked against them. I'm not really what you'd call a foreign politics or current events aficionado, but I think that may be why I found this book such a good read. It has enough detail to provide a comprehensive overview of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, without getting too bogged down in minutiae. At the same time, Halberstam demonstrates a remarkable perceptiveness in tracing the links between events and personalities that shaped America's actions. Highly recommended.
Rating: Summary: Best Explanation of the Balkans War and US Anxiety Review: The author of the Best and he Brightest about Viet Nam unglues the complications of the war in the Balkans and makes the cause of the war and the US's hesitance to become involved much more straight forward to understand than any other publication I have read. The US government reluctantly gets involved due to a myriad of reasons that include the post Vietnam paranoia of over extended involvement, the effect of TV exploiting military failures and the politicians fearing of the polls and loss of votes. The book starts with Bush Sr.'s abrupt victory over Iraq that is so quick that his boost in the polls becomes both dramatic in its height as it was immediate in its plunge. His failure to grasp the impact of the failing economy along with the inability to over come an uncoordinated campaign that even Jim Baker cannot glue together in the late hour after his reluctant step down as Secretary of State. The author notes that Clinton's limited interest and experience in world affairs contributes greatly to a latent understanding of the Balkan's war. As Bush held a limited understanding of the divisive elements of the Balkan war in its early phase with the political fear of risking another foreign involvement too soon, the Clinton administration avoided the issue as long as possible letting the Europeans deal with the war as much as possible until Tony Blair and Chirac begin to become aggressively involved. The US reluctantly participated to limit the Serbs butchery of the Croatia and Muslims. Milosevic chameleon abilities to represent himself early on a communist supporter, to a potential western leader to his real role as a dictator willing to commit ethnic cleansing to rival Hitler outrage the American Military commander in Europe Wesley Clark who strangely has little support by the Joints Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense William Cohen and the Clinton team. Halberstam describes the Powell Doctrine of limited involvement that evolves into Clinton's Mogadishu failures colored by Clinton's inability to consult with either the CIA Director or his Secretary of Defense or the US staff on the ground in Mogadishu. Frustrating account of officials in the Clinton administration struggling over what to do, what would be right and what would be politically acceptable. Halberstam covers a number of personnel issues such as the jealous and suspicious military superiors who weaken those with bright ideas and motivation to take on the horns of the devil in the Balkans. An example is the Air Force Colonel who advanced precision bombing on multiple targets and whose ideas were reluctantly adopted but yet after success he was pushed aside after the Gulf War. The sad split between the NSC's Anthony Lake and his former best friend Holbrooke who breaks out and eventually coordinates the Dayton accords. How sad that at the end the author describes how General Wes Clark who worked hard to successfully stop the war in the Balkans but was replaced by the distrustful and jealous Joint Chiefs who forced his retirement through the alleged ignorant approval of Clinton. Halberstam also covers the quiet role of the Vice-President whose active role in outside the limelight while Clinton and Albright basked in the attention may have become President had he not ironically had been as modest as the senior Bush. The author covers the complexity of the Balkans and the divisive elements and split loyalties between the European countries along the same lines as WWI and WWII. Milosovic even takes advantage of Clinton's polarization during the Lewinski affair. It's evident at the end that in the administration Clinton was a powerful public force that lived for public contact while Gore was the quiet and efficient Statesman that was hurt more by Clinton's personnel failures and indecision on foreign affairs. At the end Halberstam notes that Clinton left office so full of himself that he imploded with confidence leading to his poorly researched and unsavory pardons making the worst exit of the White House with the exception of Nixon. The book does become exhausting due to the repeated inter personnel conflicts and the seemingly constant starting over with new officials. Cohen seems to have to go back to the starting line on the Balkans after he arrives in the middle of the second Balkans crisis. The other frustrating end is the Joints Chiefs who have the most sophisticated weaponry but who are more afraid to lose an Apache helicopter than to use it to quickly reduce the length of the war on civilians. After all, Halberstam notes, the US public's short attention span on foreign affairs combined with politician's fear of the polls reduces the effectiveness of the US in global affairs today, even for peace.
Rating: Summary: Lots of good info about the U.S policy in the last 10 yrs Review: Altough ý have doubts about whether this book is all useful for an american who is keeping an eye on politics, it is surely for a foreigner like me who has limited info about what is going on in the White House, behind the curtains. This book not only enlightens you about the decisions given in foreign affairs in U.s why they are given, but also the american political system, the way things are handled there, and the personalities of famous figures of 1990s such as George Bush, Bill clinton. One thing ý didn't like is that emphasis is mainly put on Bosnian conflict. Of course ý strongly believe that it was very important, but how comes u.s did not intervene while it was such an important issue for the White House if author is right. Maybe since this book was written at the time when nato forces invaded yugoslavia, author put an emphasis on this issue rather than other equally important foreign issues. One other thing ý complain is that there are some repetitions throughout the book and you get bored.Other than this ý am really pleased with the information this book provides me about the last 10 yrs of american politics
Rating: Summary: Smart Weapon Technology and Air power would prevail Review: Listen Software Solutions: Halberstam was brillant. "War in time of Peace" opens the door into a power literary work of incredible detail, insight, and thought. Halberstam brings the reader - first person into the thoughts and intents of some of the most powerful men and women in the world. This book is definately one of the great books of our time. Surprise, would characterize William Clintons introduction to Washington Politics and Clinton would be immediately recognized as brillant, with the singular capability, to focus on issues. Other politicians liked the Arkansas governor becaused he represented the south, work class ideals, and change. Halberstam compliments Clinton esteeming him as the scholar, natural politican, self-interest driven individual who constantly wanted to win people to his side. Clinton was told and believed, if he reduced the budget deficeit the economy would improve. Clinton's administration would be characterized as the greatest economy of the century with more new millionares and billionares being recognized than any other time in history. Clinton's political views would focus on the new economy. On the other hand, Halberstam would protray Bush's political campaign as conservative: focused on Gulf war victory, tax breaks for the rich, and general under estimation of Clintons ability. No other president had lost a presidental campaign after a major military victory, but people were experiencing 8 percent unemployment and domestic issues were pressing interest. Bush was not responding fast enough and address domestic problems during his campaign. On the other hand, Clinton would be characterized as an candidate focusing on the budget spending, economy, and welfare. Clinton sounded good. Clinton's intelligence, focus, desire to win other to his side, and understanding of the common person helped him win a Presidency. Halberstam thought of Clinton as competitive, inquistive, and brilliant. Talking about Oxford, Halberstam states, Clinton attended Oxford to see how good they really were and if we could beat them. Washington view the new President and his smart wife as a desired couple. Celebrities and people of wealth and power thought highly of the Clintons' On a darker note, Halberstam does not drag the read through the Monica Lewinski details; instead he discusses public response to a private indiscretion and Paula Jones, the lies, betrayal, tolerance of infidality, and role of the media. This is interesting reading as Halberstam discusses Clintons managment of a possible impeachment, foreign policy weakenness, and eventual involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somolia. Can you trust a liar. Milosvec aimed to buy time, continue a campaign of ethnic cleansing, and testing Nato, UN, and the United States. Eagleburger realized Europe and especially Yugoslavia was not where the United Stated wanted to be involved. US foreign policy would not immediately draw the US into serious crimes against humanity occurring in Europe. Serbs would become the hunters. Hunting from community to community killing Muslims is the worst crimes since Hitler. Yet Europe did not want US military intervention. Clinton's cabinet would be fustrated by the ineptiness to respond and clearly dictate the U.S foreign policy in Europe. Holbrooke, Baker, Albright, Lake, and Powell struggled during the formation of a strong foreign policy. The Powell doctrine encouraged a detailed design of the campaign with clear objectives and uninhibited ability to act; finalizing with an understandable exist plan. Despite the hugh about of discussion about internal political power struggles with the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was clear NATO could not stop the ethnic cleansing and the UN did not have the power to act. Holbrooke, Lake, Powell, Clark, and Short thought highly of the smart bomb, the stealth fighter, and the B2. However the UN didn't want any US intervention because of ground troops. Literally years passed with no US military intervention in one of the grosses crimes against humanity in the century. Cyrus Vance a reminant of the Bush Administration foreign policy rejection lacking high tech one two punches. Yugoslavia became place of iron and clay. Halberstam stresses the important of war time reporters putting pressure for Military and political action. Albanians were defenseless and the death counts rose daily. No weapons from the US could be sent to improve the defensive capability. Reporters showed the inhuman treatment by the Serbs and would bring the crimes to the publics attention. Clintons Generals would rise to the occassion. Viet Nam would keep the military apprehensive about US military campaigns without clearly defined objects. The equation for war fare had changed. Technology and Air power would soon become the dominate military force. Great loss of life could be circumvented with high tech survillence, precision bombing, and stealth technology. General Clark and Short would become the heros of the Bosnian campaign. In the early part of the campaign the target list was very limited. Clark was extremely fustrated which created reservation from the Pentagon about his controllability. The B2 was the high tech savior for Clark. Smart weapons could pin point a target using satelite feed. An eight fold increase in weapon efficient since desert storm. The B2 drop efficient increase a 1000 fold over world war II. Clark campaigned for Apache helicoper support and received half of the requested numbers. Clark target list was increased and Milosvec could feel the full fury of the US military capability. Clark realized a war could be won in days instead of years. The Bosian campaign worked, but Clark would be surprised at his immediate replacement. The Clinton administration would claim it got duked. General Clark was amazing. Halberstam would cover lightly Clintons near impeachment and Clintons exist from power in the book. Halberstam would leave the reader remorsing the way Clinton would exist from power. Halberstam claims the Clinton legacy would be the lest glorious of all presidents. In some ways an American tradegy. Halberstam claims the Clinton legacy would be the lest glorious of all presidents. In some ways an American tradegy.
Rating: Summary: Good review of the characters and events Review: This book appears to have been thoroughly researched with regard the various personalities and events covered. We come away with a rather clear picture of what happened. At times the book jumped around too much. One moment you are in 1995, on to 1996, and regress to 1993 (in major passages of the book, not just little comments). In that sense, the book can be hard to follow, since it is not entirely chronological, yet not divided merely by subject matter, either. But thanks to the extensive research and the large number of interviews granted to the well-known author, the book is complete.
Rating: Summary: Lottsa Stuff Review: Halberstam is brilliant in the way he can narrate and explain events, and illustrate people's motivations and actions. We should not judge a book by its cover--or title--but: I believe the title of the book doesn't reveal what it is about, and that it may appear to the non-Halberstam-knowing populace to be another generic current event or recent poli-sci book for the new release section of the book store. This, it is not. This is an interesting, nicely written piece from the first to last page. The concept of how foreign policy issues can occur overnight for an administration and can help or hurt it is logically and "politically" enumerated. The imagery behind certain foreign policy stances is often more important than if the outcome was indeed successful or not. An administration doesn't have very much control over post-cold-war foreign policy dilemmas because of the numerous foreign factors that exist that are beyond an administrations control. Foreign policy can be a helper or a killer, and a lot of the issues that confront us in the post-cold war are less-definable, obviously. For the casual observer (me) or the policy wonk, this book provided ample amounts of refreshing and new information about he people, personalities, events, personal relationships, and domestic and foreign policy-making of the of the late 1980s and entire 1990s. As the relevant precursor--Vietnam--many of the military debacles of the 1970s influenced military and civilian policy makers and their subsequent decisions (obviously) in the 1990s, greatly influencing their decisions (American foreign policy) in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Why were we in Somalia? Why did we want to restore Aristide to the bottom-of-the-barrel garbage can of Haiti? You'll find out why from this book. The Rwandan genocide was more efficient than the Nazi exterminations if one looked at it from a per capita number killed - divided by - the time it took (to eradicate "the other" point of view.) Many policy makers and players from the past and recent present are noted. Many "mini-biographies" on the following people in this book examen their personal lives and professional careers, which are very interesting. Zbignew Brzezenski, Cyrus Vance, Eagleburger, Reich, Les Aspin, "Wools", Rubin, Howe, "old Henry," Schultz, Tony Lake, Powell, Baker, Christopher, Stephanothingness, Albreight, Holbrooke, Shalikashvili, Scowcroft and Milosivic among others. Lloyd Bentsen's life was interesting enough to have me looking for his biography. The Gulf War is covered, and the most influential person that brought the new technology mentality to the U.S. armed forces: Colonel John Warden. Schwarzkopf and Powell, who swooned typically ignorant Americans on T.V. got the credit for doing what in this 4-day campaign? Then Schwarzkopf writes a book entitled "It Doesn't Take A hero." The book should have been titled, "It Didn't Need A General." The Bosnian calamity and it's foreign and domestic political implications for the Clinton administration cover mammoth portions of this book. The acute and redundant details of: who thought what, said what where, that was not listened to by whom, can motivate the reader to speed read through the middle portion of this 500-pager. Most of the time, it was "what's our policy....uhh....we don't have one." And that's OK by me....I didn't then, and still don't care now about Bosnia. And most people didn't and still don't either. On the domestic front, the administrative policies of the 1980s, had an affect on the Clinton administration's transition in 1992. All of the "hot checks" that were written in the 1980s caused an annual budget deficit of 350 billion, which was constraining the economy, government operations, and policy initiatives. Clinton, following Greenspan, Bentsen, and other deficit hawks' advice took the belt-tightening initiative to reduce the deficit. This is something Clinton did that isn't noted by the mainstream media nor the public, but it was one of the most important things he did, and it alienated the spendy left. Interesting tid-bit: Les Aspin, when Secretary of Defense, had a bad heart and ill health. He liked to eat potato chips with mayonnaise for lunch (he's dies in '95 by the way). It would have been good to label the chapters in some way. A reader will not know if each new chapter is going to be about domestic or foreign policy, or the Balkans, until they begin reading it. There were also insights into the minds and thoughts of many policy makers, but how did this information get to Halberstam? He conducted many personal interviews with many key players, and did massive amounts of research, during the lengthy time he spent writing this book. Yes, he's a knowledgeable inside-the-beltway way journalist who know lots of folks and has been all over the world. But....does he have ESP or several inside sources whose information can be corroborated? Yet, it's still another nicely written and informative book by Halberstam.
Rating: Summary: The Strange World of Foreign Policy and Politics Review: David Halberstam's War in a Time of Peace is a massive look at American foregin policy in the 1990s, through the presidencies of Bush and Clinton. Bosnia and Kosovo are the centerpieces but the book also touches meaningfully on Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. The thumbnail biographical portraits of all the leading American figures is a great joy and asset of this book. Foreign policy can be a confusing issue, not least of all because of its lack of intelligible coverage in the media or on campaign trails. Halberstam makes all these complex issues and myriad personalities shine through clearly. His critiques of the media are particularly important and compelling and this book is a refreshing antidote to the sort of journalism television has thrust to the fore. This is a valuable book but, most of all, it is a enjoyable and fascinating read.
Rating: Summary: Influences, Actions, Players, and Over-View Review: Halberstam is brilliant in the way he can narrate and explain events, and illustrate people's motivations and actions. We should not judge a book by its cover--or title--but: at risk of being a "stickler," I believe the title of the book doesn't reveal what it is about, and that it may appear to the non-Halberstam-knowing populace to be another "generic current event/recent poli-sci book" for the "new release" section of the book store. This, it is not. This is an interesting, nicely written piece from the first to last page. For the casual observer (me), or the policy wonk, this book provided ample amounts of refreshing and new information about he people, personalities, events, personal relationships, and domestic and foreign policy-making of the time period of the late 1980s and entire 1990s. As the relevant precursor--Vietnam--many of the military debacles of the 1970s influenced military policy makers and their subsequent decisions (obviously) in the 1990s, greatly influencing their decisions (American foreign policy) in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Why were we in Somalia? Why did we want to restore Aristide to the bottom-of-the-barrel garbage can of Haiti? You'll find out why from this book. The Rwandan genocide was more efficient than the Nazi exterminations if one looked at it from a per capita number killed - divided by - the time it took (to eradicate "the other" point of view.) Many policy makers and players from the past and recent present are noted: Zbignew Brzezenski, Cyrus Vance, Eagleburger, Reich, Les Aspin, "Wools", Rubin, Howe, "old Henry," Schultz, Tony Lake, Powell, Baker, Christopher, Stephanothingness, Holbrooke, Shalikashvili, Scowcroft and Milosivic among others. Lloyd Bentsen's life was interesting enough to have me looking for his biography. The Gulf War is covered, and the most influential person that brought the new technology mentality to the U.S. armed forces: Colonel John Warden. Schwarzkopf, and arrogant buffoon, got the credit for doing what? The Bosnian calamity and it's foreign and primarily domestic implications cover mammoth portions of this book. The acute and redundant details of: who thought what, said what where, that was not listened to by whom, can motivate the reader to speed read through the middle portion of this 500-pager. Most of the time, it was "what's our policy....uhh....we don't have one." And that's OK by me.....who cares? I didn't and still don't care about Bosnia. On the domestic front, the administrative policies of the 1980s, had an affect on the Clinton administration's transition in 1992. All of the "hot checks" that were written in the 1980s caused an annual budget deficit of 350 billion, which was constraining the economy, government operations, and policy initiatives. Clinton, following Greenspan, Bentsen, and other deficit hawks' advice took the initiative to reduce the deficit. This is something Clinton did that isn't noted by the mainstream media nor the public, but it was one of the most important things he did, and it alienated the spendy left. Interesting tid-bit: Les Aspin, when Secretary of Defense, had a bad heart and ill health. He liked to eat potato chips with mayonnaise for lunch (he's dies in '95 by the way). It would have been good to label the chapters in some way. A reader will not know if each new chapter is going to be about domestic or foreign policy, or the Balkans, until they begin reading it. There were also insights into the minds and thoughts of many policy makers, but how did this information get to Halberstam? He conducted many personal interviews with many key players, and did massive amounts of research, during the lengthy time he spent writing this book. Yes, he's a knowledgeable inside-the-beltway way journalist who know lots of folks and has been all over the world. But....does he have ESP or several inside sources whose information can be corroborated? Yet it's still another great one by Halberstam.
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