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Summary: 2 War Warnings sent to Army, & Navy Late Nov. 1941
Review: Two war warnings were sent from Washington to Hawaii late November 1941, one to the Navy and one to the Army:The author contradicts himself: ... The book documents TWO "WAR WARNING" MESSAGES!!! (from Washington) on pages 292 and 293 in the appendix C of the paperback edition. The War Warning on page 292 is dated November 27, 1941 and signed Marshall. It is directed to Lt. Gen. Walter Short, Hawaii Dept., Ft Shafter. It says in part: Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defenses stop Is this not a clear warning that there might be war with Japan??? And to take defensive action??? The other War Warning on page 293 is a Navy message dated November 27, 1941 from Rear Admiral Ingersoll to CINCAP and CINCPAC. It says in part: This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x Negotiations with Japan..... have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected with the next few days Is this not a clear warning to the Navy that there might be a war started by Japan in the Pacific?...
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Summary: This changes everything
Review: Whether or not you accept all Stinnett's conclusions, there's no question his research has opened important new doors. And for that, he deserves our thanks. 'The heart of this book,' Stinnett writes on page 258, is the assertion 'that a systematic plan had been in place long before Pearl Harbor that would climax with the attack.' As soon as the smoking ruins of the Pacific Fleet were extinguished in December, 1941, and ever since, many observers (Beard, Russett, Toland, etc.) have questioned whether FDR deliberately adopted a stance designed to provoke Japan into making the first 'overt act of war.' This aspect of Stinnett's argument is nothing new. What *is* new is Stinnett's discovery of a memorandum by Arthur McCollum, a Navy lieutenant commander and Japan expert, outlining an eight-point scheme to back the Japanese into a corner and provoke an attack. Stinnet tracks the memo from McCollum to a naval strategist in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) named Knox. From there, the trail goes cold, although Stinnett has circumstantial evidence that it traveled from Knox to ONI chief Captain Walter Anderson, USN, and thence to FDR himself. Stinnett's argument is that FDR adopted McCollum's policy recommendations, thus setting America on the road to war with Japan. He can't prove this irrefutably, but you don't need the smoking gun to know there's a trout in the milk (to cruelly mix metaphors). Whether he needed McCollum to outline them for him or not, FDR unquestionably adopted policies, most significantly an embargo on trade with Japan, that any knowledgeable person should have seen would dramatically increase the likelihood of war. I wonder, therefore, whether McCollum's memo is as significant as Stinnett believes it is. What is unquestionably significant, however, is the enormous volume of intercepted Japanese message traffic that Stinnett reports. For one reason or another (declassification of previously classified files, incomplete research, military cover-ups, etc.), much of the signal intelligence information in this book was previously unreported. And it is this mass of information that will have to be addressed, pro or con, by every serious writer on Pearl Harbor from now on. Prior to 'Day of Deceit,' it was possible to argue that Roosevelt wanted to provoke Japan into striking the first blow, but that even he was surprised by the sudden, ferocious attack on Pearl Harbor. That position is much less tenable today. Accepting this fact does not require you to believe that American participation in the war was therefore unjustified. But it should lead us to a much more clear-eyed view of American foreign policy in the months and years leading up to the Day of Infamy.
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