Rating: Summary: Does America need Henry Kissinger? Review: (excerpted from the full review)Across 288 pages of geopolitical analyses and reflections on national character, Henry Kissinger writes his state-of-the-political-world address for American readers and policymakers, with a special nod to the vanguard of American power. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? divides the world by continent, studies the political history of each region and proposes a direction for American foreign policy based on a synthesis of the two. It is a methodical study of minute and specific political realities set into broad frameworks of continental trend, national interest and historical parallel. It is sometimes insightful, always analytical, and easy to read. But Does America Need a Foreign Policy? is also frequently misleading and historically incorrect. It is the rushed work of an egoist, planned less than subtly to place the author as mediator in a debate between two imaginary ideological camps in American public discourse. While Kissinger hopes to convince readers that he is a thinker of clarity and unusual import, there are in fact few if any ideas here that one cannot draw from embassy cables or academic publications. A cautious read soon finds the book's more interesting message not within but rather between its lines: an authorial bias poorly veiled by the adoption of "human rights" language, a clear disdain for the "self-righteous" pursuit of international ethics, and a poorly played off fear of prosecution in international courts. Readers who've not had the chance to analyze international political developments of the last ten years will learn much from Kissinger's analysis of the factors that create the political will for the United States to act or take a certain position in the former Yugoslovia, China or Somalia. Other readers will find themselves debating and even conceding points to the poster boy for realpolitik. But the book's best contribution is the opportunity it affords us all to evaluate how a politician rises to a position of prominence, holds it for decades, and now tips his hand as to how he intends to stay there. After seven chapters of questionable sincerity and carefully crafted terms of debate, Americans ought to question why we and our government pay homage to and consult retired opportunists who use our government and abuse our trust to build and protect their legacy of personal power. We ought to pose in return a query of our own, "Does America need Henry Kissinger?" .... Kissinger seems to see "America's national interest" (he never expressly defines the term) as open markets for American goods, military security and a political climate equal to the values of the American people, the last of which is minimally clarified in a single reference to "human rights" (p.163) In a telling parallel, other nations pursuing their comparative national interest acquire from Kissinger the derogatory term "nationalist" (p.124). Kissinger asserts that policymakers cannot interact effectively with other nations without an understanding of each nation's history and geopolitical position. He merges these two factors into a sort of personality for each state in question. Kissinger writes about nations as a playwright would his characters. Britain, he says, is America's natural partner, born of a common history and a special friendship that Britain has guarded as the cornerstone of its foreign policy since World War II. France is a stubborn nation that prides itself on bucking the authority of the United States to the extent that it proves convenient. The "creeping expansionism" of Russia is a recurring theme the international community would do well to bear in mind (p.71). Though Kissinger evaluates the political landscape nation by nation with careful attention to history, he processes this information into the simplest of models. No complex problem is immune from allegory or short description. America and Europe make up "The World of Democracies." Asia is "The World of Equilibrium," the Middle East and Africa, "Worlds in Transition." As Kissinger points out, this sort of intellectual insight is preferable to the idea carried by some policymakers that the American context is applicable anywhere. But it is dangerous in its simplicity and ignores key factors not defined by the nation-state. Corporations are rarely mentioned in this book. Non-governmental organizations are non-existent. The transmission and control of information from governments to their people receives no treatment here, the mixing of populations across borders little. This barren analysis is painfully difficult to ignore in the book's final chapters, wherein Kissinger abandons geography to address 'The Politics of Globalization" and "Peace and Justice." .... Similarly, Kissinger wants to defend the American interest by stopping Mercosur, a trade agreement linking together a number of Latin American nations (p.95). "Like every new trading bloc, Mercosur affirms that its intentions are non-discriminatory; the reality is otherwise. It is the defining characteristic of a trading bloc that its internal barriers are lower than its external ones; its bargaining position depends on its ability to grant or withhold benefits that its own members enjoy as of right" (p.96). Of course by this definition the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Kissinger's own proposed TAFTA are also trading blocs, albeit trading blocs that benefit the United States. Cuba was not invited to Quebec City for negotiations on the FTAA. Its exclusion was a diplomatic method of denouncing Cuba's political system and as another step in isolating its economy. But rather than admitting to some idea of relative truth, Kissinger strangles the debate once more. "As an alibi for their reluctance to cooperate, the Latin American governments tend to cite US hypocrisy" (p. 93).
Rating: Summary: A smart man .... Review: ...this school teacher, Mr Kissinger"..thats a quote from my father after one of the several sober television statements Mr. Kissinger baritoned on the issue of the Nixon administrations' explanation the status of the USA in Vietnam in late 1960's. A generation later I am repeating my fathers assessment to my son "This guy is not just smart he is clever! Mr Kissinger has turned a life time of first hand information and knowledge into insightful wisdom...." Mr. Kissinger was once call 'the master of negotiations' he was able to absorb massive amounts of collected information on his rivals and use it to control the process. One of his traits was to speak for hours on end until the others would virtually agree to anything just to get out of the room. Not a good tactic to employ in authoring a book. In fact he applies the opposite in these concisely written pages. A quick, clear thought inspiring read. You have to admire the focus on the subject that Mr. Kissinger has maintained for the past thirty years. His global grasp of the role the USA will have in future international affairs makes this a must read. If you read nothing but the chapters and reference to the future of the United States in the emerging Europe Union you will have gotten value. Mr. Kissinger raises more questions then he attempts to answer. A refreshing approach from the 'all knowing' pundits of the talk shows and daily new paper editioials. Will the USA continue to maintain a Super Power dominate role in this arena? Or will they develop a policy more passive and lead by example. Is the USA trying to police the free world by shear super power dominance? Are they in the process alienating 40% of the non-political adult population and inadvertently aiding in the growing demonstrative anti-globalization movement. A (call it by another name) repackaged 'new and improved' Nationalistic driven 'peoples political party'? Remember the consequences of the German government's movement when it imposed its super power idealism on it weaker neighboring countries under Hitler? Can this happen again? Will the USA repeat the errors of Empires through out history, by creating an disenfranchised unrepresented minority and then fuel their vehicle of discontent by attempting to dominate and control instead of lead by example? Will our foreign policy (or lack of) be the atomic catalyst in the formation of this anti globalization political party at home and in our partner nations? The words "Yankee go home" is nothing new.... Mr. Kissinger just reminds us that its chant is getting louder by put some new music to it in his latest book: Does America Need A Foreign Policy? Personalities and politics aside this book is a 'wisdom' waiting to be read.
Rating: Summary: History, Politics, Vacuums, and Discretion Review: The book begins with a lamentation that foreign policy has been neglected in the last three Presidential campaigns; that the American public is terribly apathetic about foreign affairs; and that Congress is overly interventionist--he refrains from adding the obvious caveat regarding most Members lack of knowledge of the world. In brief, we have a long way to go as a Nation before we can devise and sustain a credible foreign policy. The core point in this entire work is that both economics and technologies, including Internet and communications technologies, have so out-paced politics that the world is at risk. Globalization, terrorism, and other threats cannot be addressed with our existing international, regional, and national political constructs, and new means must be found--new political solutions must be found--if we are to foster security and prosperity in the age of complexity, discontinuity, and fragmentation. There are some useful sub-themes: 1) Each region must be understood in its full complexity, with special attention to both emerging powers and to the subtleties of relations between regional actors--we should not confine ourselves to simply addressing each actor's relationship to the United States. 2) We must take great care to never interpose ourself or allow ourselves to become a substitute for a regional power, e.g. in the dialog between North and South Korea, or India and Pakistan. 3) We must strive at all times to ensure that the historic context is clearly appreciated and underlying every policy formulation, at the same time that we must recognize and define the vast cultural differences between US approaches to foreign policy, and the approaches of others, such as China. 4) Military compromise, whether in the Gulf War, Bosnia, or Kosovo, leaves a strategic vacuum that will inevitably require attention. 5) Africa is the true test for whether a world community can be devised and new solutions found for addressing the severe conditions in Africa that ultimately threaten the well-being of the rest of the world. 6) Our foreign service officers and the political leaders they serve must have history and philosophy restored to their diets, or they will fail to devise long-range concepts, global strategies, and sustainable policies. Dr. Kissinger ends with what some might overlook and what I found to be absolutely core: no economic system can be sustained without a political basis. However much major multinational corporations may care to buy their comforts and their arrangements of convenience, at root, they prosper only because some set of political arrangements among great nations is providing a safety net, including the financial system with one major node in New York. The books ends with an appeal for American humility and discretion as it makes it way forward--we must act as if we are one of many co-equal nation-states, while recognizing that our pre-eminence demands more of us than might be expected from others. There is one major gap in this book, and I suspect it was deliberate: there is no discussion at all of the means by which American foreign policy is to be devised. As America moves into the early months of the "war on terrorism", it would have been helpful to have a really well-qualified rant on how it is impossible for this great Nation to have a foreign policy when we have gutted almost into extinction what passes for a Department of State today. Our Foreign Service, our Embassies, our foreign assistance programs, our Peace Corps, our external research, our sponsorship of international conferences on topics of vital importance to the US, have all faded into decrepitude. If ever there was a time when Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Powell should come together and champion a major restoration--at least a $10 billion a year increase--in Program 150 (our soft power), this is that time. That they have all failed to do so troubles me--that Senator Biden was castigated publicly for speaking the plain truth about how the world perceives us--troubles me. The attacks of 11 September represent, primarily, a failure of our ability to monitor and understand the world. That failure must lie heavily--and equally--on the shoulders of the foreign service (State), the clandestine service (CIA), and the counterintelligence service (FBI). --This text refers to the Hardcover edition
Rating: Summary: Oh henry! Review: A response to the enigmatica question:why do they hate us? Henry, oh henry you are very,very bad man!
Rating: Summary: New Challenges in a Time of Preeminence Review: At the dawning of the new millennium, the United States faces a paradox. It finds itself basking in a success unrivaled by history's greatest empires. In popular culture, finance, weaponry, science, technology and education, the country dominates the worldview. The country considers itself both the source and the guarantor of global democratic institutions. Yet, Kissinger argues, the United States finds itself at a juncture with irrelevance to many of the issues affecting and changing the world order. Interest in foreign affairs, he notes judging from media coverage and congressional sentiment, is at an all time low. As a result the United States finds itself facing some of the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever witnessed, yet unwilling and uninterested in developing concepts relevant to the foreign policy reality. Our relations with Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East require subtle responses rendering the traditional American quest for an all-purpose, magic foreign relations formula irrelevant. Unfortunately, the former Secretary of State argues, three forces in domestic politics drives American foreign policy in the opposite direction. First, Congress legislates the tactics of foreign policy and seeks to impose a code of conduct on other nations by sanction. These legislative actions drive American foreign policy towards a unilateral and, what Kissinger describes as, occasionally bullying conduct. Second, coverage of these events by a ratings-driven media does not help. Their obsession with the crisis of the moment rarely fosters discussion of the long-range historical challenges. They prefer to portray today's crisis as a morality play with a specific outcome and then move on to the next new sensation. Even though the underlying trends continue, growing in their unmanageability on a daily basis, they receive little attention. Finally, the deepest reason for America's failure to develop a coherent strategy is the presence of three different generations, each with its own approach to foreign relations dominate the foreign policy debate - the Cold Warriors, Vietnam Protestors and Generation X, whose experience makes it hard for them to understand the perceptions of the previous two. The inability of these three groups to articulate an unapologetic statement of enlightened self-interest results in what Kissinger refers to as "Progressive Paralysis." Certainly the country must fashion a foreign policy consistent with its democratic heritage and concerned with the democracy's world wide vitality, he writes, but it must also translate these values into answers to difficult questions: What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What wrongs is it essential to right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity?
Rating: Summary: no apologies from a mass murderer Review: Before reading this book read The Trial of Henry Kissinger by Christopher Hitchens. Kissinger assumes the modern foreign policymaker needs his advice. For example, he opposes the entra-terriorality of international courts...for good reason: he would be one of the first people tried by a real ICC. This book is a self-serving realist attempt to justify his (and others') past actions (e.g., illegal bombing of Cambodia).
Rating: Summary: Nice primer - but nothing groundbreaking Review: Does the US Need Foreign Policy? Good question. Unfortunately you won't find the answer in this book. In this book, Kissinger takes the reader around the globe region by region reviewing Cold War history. I was quite disappointed. Not all is lost though. If you can make it through Kissinger's dense and entangling prose this book makes quite a good primer for world politics. Kissinger's well thought out attack on the International Court is the one redeeming aspect of the book. I disagree with Kissinger's reasoning, but he does give an excellent, intellectual case against the ICJ. His argument is predictable though - finding its roots in the peace of Westphalia - and he has good reason to argue against such a court - with old foreign pals from the Nixon administration finding themselves in hot water (e.g. Pinochet). Surprisingly, a new development has occurred in Kissinger's analysis. He has recently made a new acquaintance of "low politics" - namely economics. It's reassuring. I could only recommend this book to someone new to IR studies or someone that wants a quick review around the world - this book would make an excellent primer. But that's all.
Rating: Summary: Too Much for so Short a Book Review: Dr. Kissinger covers too much in this relatively short book. There is not a region or conflict about which he does not have an opinion; and although his assesments leave the reader wanting more, they make for interesting reading. He points out diplomatic realities that few Americans would ever consider: For instance, that it makes sense for the US to maintain a divided Korea, or that there is no more natural ally of the US than Iran. Although these statement may seem counter-intuitive, Kissinger explains his reasoning thoughtfully, and in clear prose.
Rating: Summary: Tour de Force? Review: Dr. Kissinger describes a United States that is militarily and economically ascendant, uninterested in foreign policy, directed by domestic concerns . . . yet drawn into global peace-keeping and humanitarian activities. What should we be doing? The book is a virtual country-by-country look at the historical foreign policy issues, current situation, and potential future economic and security concerns of the United States. Most people will find the historical references helpful. Many more will disagree on the prescriptions for tomorrow. The book's overall theme is how to combine idealism and realism in a consistent way that foreign countries can rely on. The tests he suggests are: (1) Should be universally applicable (2) Should be sustainable by American public opinion (3) Resonates with the international community (4) Has some relationship to the historical context. Reasonable people can differ on how to apply these points, so I'm not sure how helpful they will be. Where most can agree with in the book is that the United States cannot act without listening to and responding to the concerns of other nations in its international relations. Act like we are king of the hill, and everyone else will gang up to topple us from that spot. It's also counter to our principles, more importantly. Dr. Kissinger is skeptical about tracking down those who have violated human rights and trying them. In that and many other ways, he seems more comfortable with pragmatism than with idealism. If we believe in democracy, peace, fairness, and prosperity, why shouldn't we lobby for, encourage and invest behind those aims? The more the world operates in those ways, the safer and more economically successful the United States will be. Would leaders who do great harm try so hard if they knew the United States would lead coalitions to see justice done. Isn't the problem with Iraq that the leader was not held accountable for his many murderous activities? If we look back on the history of the 20th century, few would argue that more short-term pragmatism and less idealism would have worked better. Heading off abusive governments is easier done before they do the bulk of their harm. Obviously, the United States cannot do everything for everybody everywhere. And I think few want us to. Our example and encouragement can, however, help us get some company from other nations in moving towards a better, more humanitarian world. Isn't that kind of idealism more pragmatic than falling back on the old balance-of-power game that has failed so often in the past? Who can write on a clean slate of what we can and should accomplish with foreign policy? I don't know the answer, but I do not think it is Dr. Kissinger. Learn from the past, what not to repeat in the future!
Rating: Summary: 666: The Beast Is Kissinger? Review: Every word in this book, "Does America Need A Foreign Policy?" is a lie, meant to beguile you into seeing things in such a distorted way that you approve of the ideas Kissinger is proposing, ideas that he has in the past, and will in the future, go through with whether you like it or not. Henry the Beast? doesn't want you to hate him; he'd rather be your friend, (or at least pretend to be) but if not, he goes both ways, so children, be on your best behaviour, lest Henry- SNAP, went the dragons!
An interesting aside...Hey kids, I've got something fun for you today! You can try this experiment at home if you want. The only danger is the implied one. Henry's last name is Kissinger. If we assigned multiples of 6 to every letter of the alphabet, starting with A=6, B=12, C=18, and so on and then add up the total values in the surname Kissinger, we'll get six-hundred and sixty-six right on the money: the mark of the beast. Make of that what you will. Have a nice day!
|