We Were Soldiers Once..and Young

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Summary: This book is a must for any military leader
Review: It's hard to describe and comment upon a book which is so emotive to a soldier. I read this at the beginning of company command, and it gripped me very powerfully to the point of where I've given several copies of it to other leaders who worked for me. It is especially relevant and poignant for leaders that are down doing "muddy boots" jobs, and is very contemporary in that it chronicles the perilous combat of the first air assault operation.

LTG (ret) Harold Mooreimpresses both in his recollection, his frankness, and his connection with his soldiers. He remembers everyone's name, their character, what made them tick, and truly painted an exquisite picture of the uniquely bonded community that is formed in a combat arms unit. He did not shuck the responsibility of telling it like it was when it came to human failure, which is all too often a problem in today's military.

Anyone who is dedicated to being the best they can be (and not the Army of One) will benefit from taking on the experience that is this story.

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Summary: a chilling story
Review: Many first hand accounts of young men fighting for their lives and the lives of their comrads. Every chapter detailing each of the battles with the VC and the NVA. Chilling accounts of young men growing up and loosing their innocence. Excellent book, I could not put it down.

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Summary: 1965 -- The First Cav's First Year.
Review: Believe it. Before I was assigned to the 1st US Cavalry (Airmobile) in September 1966, the after action reports of battles in the Ia Drang Valley were being used at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, as instructional material for new officer and non-commissioned officer students.

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Summary: In the Ia Drang, they did the impossible routinely....
Review: Having served 27 months in Pleiku Province in 1968-1970, I was always mindful of that dark valley on the lower left of the province map marked Ia Drang, where very bad things had happened to the 1st Cav Division years before. This is the book that makes those bad things come alive for all to see, to understand, and even to experience in some remote way. This book is moving beyond comprehension.

Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway are owed a debt of gratitude by every veteran for recording these events. Certainly the men who walked in, flew in, and supported LZs X-Ray and Albany are owed an even larger debt for what they endured. But their due would have no measure without this book--this tribute of love--having given form to their days in hell. Not since Bernard B. Fall's "Hell in a Very Small Place" has any book captured the courage, fear and grime of battle so completely as "We Were Soldiers Once, and Young."

Many things stand out in my mind about this book's account, but three head the list.

First and foremost, one simply must stand in awe of the courage and brotherhood of the common soldier under fire. He did uncommon things with uncommon valor, and Hal Moore and Joe Galloway captured that essence with vivid clarity--on page after page after page.

Secondly, like the men on the ground, the Huey pilots loom larger than the lives they touched. They did what had to be done under the most horrifying of circumstances, and they did it because brothers out there needed it done. In the Ia Drang, they did the impossible routinely and set the standard for those who followed them.

Thirdly, I was deeply moved by the tribute the authors paid in the book's Prologue to the enemy they faced in the Ia Drang. I faced the 66th PAVN Regiment for two years. They were highly motivated and as courageous as any soldiers who ever took the field of battle. The Ia Drang was their introduction to South Vietnam, and yes, they were a worthy enemy.

To all of these men, friend and foe, I salute you and thank you for your sacrifices. You are owed more than you can ever be paid. To Hal Moore and Joe Galloway, I owe you my sincerest thanks for your service and for this book--and a tall cool one on demand.

If none of this makes sense to you, read the book. Then it will.

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Summary: I never knew....
Review: I had always thought I knew a lot about the Vietnam War. However, after reading this book I realized that I might know some dates, facts, names, and generalizations but I did not know the human cost of the war.

I think for many of us, we know why our guys were there, we know that many Americans had different opinions about the war, we know about the Tet Offensive and maybe the Tonkin Gulf incident but I never realized that I did not know about the many battles fought over there and I certainly did not know how bloody they were.

In graphic and moving detail the authors of this book use personal experiences and the voices of others who were there to tell the story of Ia Drang.

We can debate the politics of the war for ages. We can debate how the war was fought forever. One thing we can not debate is how brave the soldiers who fought there were. And this book clearly shows that.

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Summary: what is lzalbany babbling about...my god
Review: i didnt read the book yet, but i tell you, it can't be worse than whoever wrote the rediculous review, [e-mail]. a couple of reviews down...was it as hot as they said, or just a little hot. or how about hot only on fridays. awful..just awful

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Summary: Little Big Horn and LZ X-Ray history repeating its self?
Review: Leadership Principle 1 Be Technically and Tactically Proficent To know you job thoroughly, you must posses not only specific knowledge of its details but also a broad general knowledge concerning its area of intrest. you should be competent in combat operations and training as well as in the technical and admimistrative aspects of your duties. If you demonstrate deficincies in these functions,your subordinates will lose confidance in you as a leader.

But Col. Moore under the delusion he has come up with a new Air Assault tatic would doom his men. And for the want of a nail, The 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry. As the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray would grind up, The Troops, Helicopters and Artillary. Making the unavalible for other units. Leading to the walk to Landing Zone Albany by the 2/7

What happend. It would appear Col. Moore would be the first one chosen by Kinnard for the 11 AIr Assault test, When it started up in 1963 but he wasnt, He had, To write a letter to Major General Kinnard ( His Old Boss ) begging for a Infantry Battalion in the 11 air Assault Division.

It wasent till 1964, 1 year after it started he got the call. He didnt get one with the 11 Air Assault but instead was given a Infantry Battalion in the 2 infantry Division. The 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry

Was the 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry was detached from the 2nd Infantry Division and then assinged to the 11 Air Assualt Division in 1964?

If they were assinged to the 11 Air Assault. Why did they wear their 11 Air Assault patch on their right shirt pocket, and not on the left shirt sleeve? The unit you were assinged to, You wore that patch on the left sleeve.

Was it becouse they wore the 2nd Infantry Division Patch there?

Were they Attached or Assinged? To the 11 Air Assault.

Attachents: is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is ( Relatively Temporary.) Subject to limitations imposed by the attachment order, The commander of formation, unit, or organization receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of command and control over it as he does over units and persons organic to his command. However, The responsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel normally will be retained by the parent formation, unit or organization.

ASSINGMENT: is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is ( Relativley Permanent ) and / or where such oraganization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the function, of the unit or personnel.

Col. Moore, Had never commanded a Infantry Battalion before.

But one of the hand picked officers by Kinnard in 1963 was Col McDade, He was chosen for the G-1 spot,

He would be given command of the 2nd Battilion 7th Cavalry around November 7,1965 aproximately 10 days before the battle of Landing Zone Albany.

Col. McDade, Had never Commanded a Infantry Battalion before.

AND THERE WAS ANOTHER FACTOR, COL. MOORE AND COL. MCDADE WERE HAVING A POWER STRUGGLE.

Keep abreast of current military devolopements.

Col. Moore "I thought up a new technique for the inital lift."

There are only two types of Air assaults. Col. Moore under the delusion he had come up with a new technique,

The ground Commander must concider two general types of Airmobile assault when preparing the ground tatical plan. These types of assaults differ primarily in the proximity of the LZ to the assault objective

The first and preferred type is the landing of the assault ehelons immediately on, or adjacent to, the objective

The secound type of assault involves landing a distance from the objective in a secure LZ, and requires assembly, reorganization, and movement to an attack position prior to the assault on the objective.

Some simulare characteristics of Col. Moore and Custer.

Both were considered to Flamboyent, by fellow officers. And not well liked.

George Armstrong Custer ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of the Little Bighorn. The Indians would wipe the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry out to a man.

Starting the Indian wars, The UNITED STATES would unite and almost wipe out all the Indians taking their lands and putting them on Reservations

LT.Col. Harold G. Moore ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of Landing Zone X-Ray November the 14,1965 Pleiku Provance of South Vietnam.

Col. Moore's men with help from the reinforcement's saves Landing Zone X-RAY, Starting the Vietnam war. Which almost tears the United States apart.

Both Battles ( The Little Bighorn ) and ( Landing Zone X-Ray ) were fought by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. On a Sunday, In a Valley, By a River, In tall Grass and near a Large Mountian or Hill top.

Both Commanders were told the size of the enemy troops. By their Scouts.But didnt belive them.

Scout to Custer "There is a very very large Indian camp down there."

Custer "Where I dont see any camp".

Intelligence Lieutenant to Col. Moore "There is the possibiy of a PAVN Regiment near the Chu Pong mountain.

Col. Moore that didn't really bother me.

Both the Commanders wanted to force the Enemy to stand and fight. As the enemy's tatics were hit and run.

Custer in the lead charges into the valley his troops behind. to cut off the Indians, So they couldn't escape on to the plains.

COL. Moore would be the first one on Landing Zone X-Ray, hopeing the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong wouldn't excape in to the mountians and into Cambodia.

The Indians and North Vietnamese would send 1,000 or more men out to meet the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry

The Commanders then realized that the size of the enemy forces was true. their scouts were right They were out numbered.

Both battles were defensive. After the initial charge by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry

They would pull back, Circle the wagons and let the enemy throw them selves at their defense's.

Custer didn't have renforcements, It would take weeks to get them. The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was wiped out to the man.

Col. Moore didnt have that problem "I had something Custer didn't, Reinforcements with in Hours.

Col. Moore's Men with the help of the Reinforcements save Landing Zone X-Ray. starting the Vietrnam War,.It would almost destroy the United States.

The Troops FOUGHT VALIANTLY.

What happend to the H-hour. H-hour is difined as the time the lead helicopter touches down on the Landing Zone.

Col.Moore puts the H-hour at H+1030, He then gets word the Artillary cant fire until H-1017. H-hour get delayed. 1 incremint? ( usually 15 minutes ), So that should make H-hour, H+1045. But Col. Moore ( who is in the lead Huey ) dosent set foot on LZ X-Ray until H+1048, 3 minutes late.

Leadership Principle 9

Develop a sense of Responsibility in you subordianates

Delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility developes mutual confidenece and respect between senior and subordinates. It also encourages the subordinate to exercise initiative and to give wholeharted cooperation. The leaderwho, by properly delegating authority, demomstrates faith in his subordinates will increse their desire to accept greater responsibility.

FAILURE TO DELEGATE NECESSARY AUTHORITY IS POOR LEADERSHIP

Col. Moore "I went to school on Kinnard authority must be pushed down to the man on the spot."

Col. Moore I personally to influence the action would be in the 1st Huey to land on X-Ray.

Col. Moore leading his command group clear a sector of X-Ray, on the way back to the LZ, meet the troops who were suppose to clear that sector.

Col. Moore "I was tempted to join A or C company's men"

who would be in charge of the company? what would the company commanders do?

Col. Moore Matt and Mickey had controlled all flights into X-Ray, I then took control, every Huey coming to X-Ray must radio me for landing instructions.

Crandall " Col. Moore now a signalman at the far end of the LZ was standing up, directing us to land."

The Brigade Commander ( Col. Brown ) had given Col. Moore pathfinders

Col. Moore I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company Commander of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job and to look for my Missing Troops.

Col. Moore didnt bring in his execuitive Officer Wirth ( 2nd in command )to help run the battalion command post.

Col. Moore The Battalion rear command post run by my Executive Officer Major Wirth

The Excuitive Officer's location is normally in the Battalion Command Post.

INTEGRITY Integerity, the uprightness of character and soundness of moral principles, the quality of absolute truthfulness and honesty, is an indespensable trait od a leader. On the Armed Forces team the stakes are to hight to place the lives of its members in the hands of men with questionable Integerty. Unless a man be honest, he cannot be relied upon at all. there is no compromise, The military proffession does not pernit the slightest deviation from the higest standards of

Rating:
Summary: Unique and moving
Review: I am not a professional historian but simply have a deep interest in learning more of history and, in particular, American military history. But, I like most the historical narratives that have a story to tell. Ones that include the impact on the human spirit. Real life stories of the horror and heroism of war. Moore, in "We Were Soldiers Once...and Young," does a masterful job providing enough technical detail to paint the images in your mind while not bogging the reader down in so much techical stuff to overwhelm and bore. At the same time, he tells a very poignant and moving story. I particularly liked the closing chapter in which the stories of the families back home and the impact the loss of loved ones had on their lives. I intend to visit the Vietnam War Memorial again on my next visit to Washington and find some of the names of the brave men who lost their lives at LZ X-ray and LZ Albany those fateful days. This is a unique chronicle of war and a must read for anyone striving to have a greater understanding of the complex and political conflict we call the Vietnam War.

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Summary: Soon to be a major Motion Picture...
Review: This narrative is script for a movie in production, starring Mel Gibson,that may be released by 2002....see also on legacy of Vietnam..."Home to War", 2001 by Gerry Nicosia.

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Summary: An Exciting Battle Account that Must be Viewed With Caution
Review: This is the story of the Battle of Ia Drang, Vietnam, in November 1965. It strength lies in great first-person battle accounts. There is also good background information on the US 1st CAV Division, commanders and North Vietnamese units and commanders. The 1-7th CAV fight at LZ X-RAY under LTC Moore is portrayed as heroic stand against the odds, but their are a number of troubling issues. Despite intelligence that there was at least one or more NVA battalions near the Landing Zone, Moore landed without much of a ground tactical plan. Moore seems to hedge whether his mission was merely to find the enemy on the Chu Phong Massif or to assault and seize the terrain. If reconnaissance was the intent, why was the scout platoon not sent in first? If assault was the intent, did Moore honestly think he could assault a larger force atop a mountain with only part of his battalion? Old Apache motto: one man sees as many as ten men; Moore took too many in for recon and too few for an assault.

Initially, brigade HQ did not designate any follow-on forces if contact was achieved and allocated only 16 UH-1s and 3 CH-47s to the operation (less than 5% of the division's helicopters). This was a poorly-conceived operation that begged for trouble. Moore surrendered the initiative immediately when he decided to defend the LZ and suffered 40% casualties in the process. Readers should note that the highest ranking casualty was the battalion S-2 (intelligence officer), who was killed while firing at the enemy - not his job. Moore also made the typical mistake of using the battalion scouts as a reserve force, instead of for reconnaissance or security; when the NVA almost flanked his hard-pressed battalion, the scouts might have given some early warning. The 1st CAV division commander should have piled all or most of the division on this effort and new LZs could have been created with engineers. Very little imagination in the infantry community here - no way to win, since the enemy would withdraw into the Chu Phong hills as soon as he had had enough.

The 2-7th CAV debacle on LZ ALBANY is presented as a command failure by LTC McDade but brigade again appears culpable with vague orders to march overland to a one-bird LZ. What was the point? Certainly 2-7th CAV was a new unblooded unit that got tired and sloppy and walked straight into a battalion-size ambush. Maps are fair but could be better. Junior officers and soldiers who read this should be careful not to get snowed by heroic visions of glory in this account; the US soldiers fought well but their commanders were new to battle and made significant mistakes that contributed to the casualty rate.