Rating: 
Summary: Seriously Flawed, Superficial Look at Greenspan's Leadership
Review: Before commenting on the book, let me state that Dr. Alan Greenspan has been the best chairman of the Federal Reserve that we have had. He has risen well to every challenge and the current record-setting economic expansion is partly a testament to his skill both as an economist and as a government leader. I give Dr. Greenspan far more than five stars for his handling of the market meltdown in October 1987, persuading the Clinton administration to lead on cutting the budget deficit, nursing sick banks back to health, in keeping a sharp focus on inflation fighting, for being vigilant about the frothy levels of stock prices, getting us through the Mexican, Asian, and Russian financial crises, and for vastly improving the methods used to track the economy.To the potential reader of this book, let me give you two cautions. If you like exciting reading, go elsewhere. Economics and monetary policy are pretty boring stuff, and the way they are treated here makes them more boring than they have to be. Second, if you want to learn about the significance of Dr. Greenspan's role at the Federal Reserve, skip this book. It misses the target in that area. Mr. Woodward, by comparison, is lucky I gave him 3 stars. The man treats biography as though he is uncovering the Watergate scandal, and the end justifies the means. For example, he does not cite sources. This means that the reader cannot judge for her- or himself what bias may be present in the material being quoted. For example, the first pages of the book slam James Baker in every possible way short of accusing him of being a pedophile. Who is this source (or sources) who is (are) providing the dirt? What do they have to gain by blackening Mr. Baker's reputation? I would like to know before I take the information seriously. Any other biographer or historian would tell you. The second problem is that Mr. Woodward does not seem to know very much about economics or the Federal Reserve System. For there is little about either subject in a book that primarily focuses on Dr. Greenspan's role at the Fed. For example, the book does not even describe all of the legislative objectives that have been set for the Federal Reserve by Congress. The Humphrey-Hawkins legislation about encouraging full employment is first mentioned more than half-way through the book. Those who are not familiar with the subject wouldn't have guessed that Dr. Greenspan was supposed to be addressing this subject and was reporting to Congress regularly on it as Mr. Woodward reports on what Dr. Greenspan was doing to fight inflation. Now, most will agree with me that economics is a pretty difficult subject to write about. But Mr. Woodward could have written about someone else rather than Dr. Greenspan. In this book, economic events, thoughts, and analyses are usually treated as either minor background events or as gossip items to reflect on personal qualities. As such, the economic events and implications are greatly oversimplified. For example, I doubt if many readers can understand the obscure references in the book to Dr. Greenspan's successful search for the missing service productivity measurements. At a minimum, Mr. Woodward needed a coauthor who is an economist to add some depth related to the book's treatment of Dr. Greenspan's work. A third major problem with the book is that Mr. Woodward makes a great deal out of unused contingency planning in crises. These are dropped on the reader to suggest we were a hairs-breadth away from financial Armaggedon. That is like reporting the fact that we always had bombers in the air with nuclear weapons during the Cold War as suggesting that we were always about to bomb the USSR. All government agencies are always preparing for contingencies that will never occur. That doesn't mean that the contingencies are imminent. Mr. Woodward, for example, tries to make a case for having us think that President Reagan might have closed down the New York Stock Exchange in 1987 and that it could have taken a week to reopen. This is pure sensationalism in my view. It probably helps sell books. The strength of the book is based on the fact that the Federal Reserve releases the transcripts of its deliberations. Mr. Woodward has liberally used these transcripts to give you a flavor of the consensus-building process he uses to lead in creating policy and interest rate decisions by the Fed. This raw material in interesting, even if Mr. Woodward's characterizations of these transcripts frequently are not. He makes a great deal about differences between Alan Blinder and Dr. Greenspan. That is much ado about nothing, and simply makes the book longer. Achieving consensus in Dr. Greenspan's Fed is a lot like the EDS television commercial about cowboys herding cats, especially after President Clinton began making appointments to the Fed. One of Dr. Greenspan's great strengths is his approach to preparing for decisions. He is unusually open-minded, willing to listen, and eager to get better information. This makes others more willing to listen to him, and to pay attention to this views. It also allows him to improve his own views in useful ways. The book does a reasonably good job of exposing the benefits of this approach. In two other minor areas, the book is clearly deficient. Mr. Woodward fails to discern the usefulness of Dr. Greenspan's complicated communications. You can read whatever you want into them. The Federal Reserve chairman is required to make more speeches, deliver more testimony, and to answer more questions than just about any other public official. Usually, the best result is to have to no impact on the financial markets. Dr. Greenspan is brilliant in performing these tasks in a neutral way. To listen to Mr. Woodward, you get a sense that Dr. Greenspan's convoluted communications are solely some sort of genetic defect acquired from his father. Mr. Woodward does notice that stock price levels are high, but fails to fully appreciate how much the surging markets reflect a failure of Fed policy. Clearly, the interest rate raises we have going on now have been aimed more at the stock market (in a preemptive strike against future inflation) than against anything else. How will it all turn out? Much of Dr. Greenspan's final reputation will be determined by this open chapter in the story. I wish him well. After you have finished reading this book, I suggest you consider the next biography you plan to read. Ask yourself these questions: What does the biographer have to know about to be competent in this area? Who would be an ideal biographer? How much time needs to pass before a reasonably objective and complete biography can be done? As a result, you may find your choice of subjects more limited than you like. Certainly, this book would fail these tests. As for Mr. Woodward, please go back and write about crooked politics. You do that well, and your methods and skills are more appropriate there.
Rating:
Summary: Far too superficial for its topic
Review: Bob Woodward will probably go down in history as one of America's most influential journalists. In collaboration with Carl Bernstein, Woodward publicized the Watergate scandal and helped to bring down the Nixon presidency. His efforts to reveal the truth may have single-handedly changed the relationship between the media and politics. Woodward has already been blessed with his 15 minutes of fame. His latest work, "Maestro: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom," represents neither earth-shattering importance nor an erudite treatment of his subject, Alan Greenspan and his reign over the Federal Reserve. To its merit, "Maestro" does shed a surprising amount of light on a once mysterious and self-consciously secretive organization. The inner-workings of the Fed and its policy-making are depicted with excellent detail, as Woodward takes the reader through the bumpy rides of setting interest rates from 1987-2000. And for non-economic types, Woodward does a pretty decent job explaining how monetary policy works and what the implications are for increasing interest rates or expanding the money supply. Yet it is a shame Woodward is not an economist himself because his book suffers from a lack of depth on certain issues. The work's treatment of developments over the last decade, including the savings and loan scandals of the late '80s and the Asian financial crises of the '90s, is rather superficial. What is most bothersome about Woodward's work is its failure to point out many of the negative conclusions the details of the work might necessitate. The author's editorial on his subject is one of pure praise, as he attempts to elevate the status of Greenspan to that of a modern hero. The truth is far more complicated than the rose-colored picture Woodward would like to paint. One of the scariest points Woodward's book fails to make is that the position of chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is perhaps the most powerful seat of economic policymaking in the United States. Many students of the Fed's operations grow up believing that interest rates are set by the democratic vote of a committee of economists. In reality, the monetary power of the last 13 years has rested in the judgement of one man. Greenspan's career epitomized the struggle to push the envelope on limitations to power. The chairman was the master of the FOMC, and before each meeting, he polled and called every member to figure out each one's stance on whether to raise or lower interest rates. Since the chairman always speaks last at an FOMC meeting, Greenspan often could plea for the universal support of his decisions, and his careful rhetoric frequently was enough to achieve the policy outcomes he desired. There were even times from 1988-1999, when the committee voted to allow Greenspan to make minor adjustments in the Fed Funds rate between meetings, giving him complete monetary control. We are all lucky that Greenspan has handled the responsibility of his power with such sobriety. What if Greenspan had not been so judicious? An America where the sovereign economic policymaker was a bumbling idiot would resemble the despair of 1929, when interest rates were raised even after the stock markets crashed. The very idea that determining the Fed Funds rate could rest in the hands of a moron is a scary thought. Another frightening notion Woodward doesn't elucidate is the number of problems with the way our system allocates its human capital. Many of those on the FOMC were there simply because they had political ties and connections. If Greenspan were to resign tomorrow, party friendships and political allies could influence the new appointment. Often when economic policymaking is submerged in politics, short-run prosperity is prioritized, and little thought is given to where things will head five or 10 years down the road. If we had a Fed chairman who - because he was a pawn of politics - strove for break-neck growth without regard to price stability, disaster could occur. Woodward strives to make the point that Greenspan always has tried to put his job above factionalism, but Woodward fails to recognize that future Fed chairmen may not behave the same way. Overall, Woodward's "Maestro" gives a decent overview of the history of economic developments and monetary policy in the last decade. The book's flaws lie not in the display of facts but rather in its pure, unquestioning praise of its central figure, Alan Greenspan. I would not disagree with statements that Greenspan has done his job especially well. He, however, has been fortunate, as circumstances beyond his control contributed to the record expansion of our economy and our subsequent prosperity. Greenspan's ability as Fed chairman surely will be tested as our economy slows, and whether we continue to prosper will determine if he really has, as Woodward says, a "mastery of process."
Rating: 
Summary: Engaging, Surprising, and Informative
Review: I read this book wanting to be better informed about how The Fed and Greenspan operate, and wound up being thoroughly educated and entertained understanding how banks, the White House and Washington DC political appointments work. I never thought I would ever use the phrase "hard-to-put-down" in connection with an economics/banking book but this one did it. It was a real page turner and definitely one of Bob Woodward's most underrated and under-discussed books. (No caller mentioned this work during his 3-hour C-Span interview a few months back.) Get your hands on a copy of this book and prepare for an interesting and enjoyable ride. My one complaint: I wish it were longer. Although this book answered all my "Fed" questions, I wished its time track would continue to the present, or perhaps delve a little deeper into the past. But this complaint notwithstanding, the book was still an excellent and engaging read.
Rating:
Summary: Greenspan Primer
Review: This book has taken a lot of heat for, among other things, Greenspan worship, bad economics, and more. Concededly, you won't get a deep understanding of what the Fed is or does from this book. If want a good intro to the Fed and it's role as chief manipulator of our monetary plumbing, then I would suggest "Secrets of the Temple" by William Greider. On the other hand, if you're curious about the politics within and without the Fed, then this book is a good source. Though written when Clinton was still President, you can get a feel of what kind of internal debates must be raging right now as the equity markets head into the tank and people clamor for further rate cuts. Although Greenspan's tenure could be characterized by an "American Boom", this book reminds us that it began with the 1987 crash and was punctuated by the Mexico crisis in '94, LTCM in '98. Greenspan deserves a lot of credit, but I have to ask the question: Where have you gone Bob Rubin?
Rating:
Summary: Maestro, Greenspan's "Biography"
Review: This book was basically a miniature biography on the life of Alan Greenspan. Except this book does not really go into Greenspan's personal life, the only feature of this book that is not included about Alan Greenspan is his personal life. Although once or twice Greenspan's girlfriend, Andrea Mitchel was mentioned. For the most part this entire book solely focusses on Greenspan's work as an economist for the United States government. In my personal opinion Bob Woodward basically just stated facts and had no criticism whatsoever throughout this entire book this is the only part that bugged me. Woodward basically just wrote straight facts and tried a little too hard to make Greenspan look incredibly good in the end.
Rating: 
Summary: Clinton worship
Review: The book is ostensibly a look at the inner workings of Greenspan's Fed, and it does provide an interesting perspective. However, it quickly turns into a paean to Bill Clinton, the economic genius. Woodward doesn't miss an opportunity to celebrate Clinton, skewer Republicans, or praise tax increases. His obvious bias makes it difficult to take the book seriously.
Rating:
Summary: Woodward fails to deliver
Review: I had a lot of respect for Woodward and have read most of his books. In an interview Woodward admitted he used a coauthor on this one. The story about Greenspan is glib and shallow. The book doesn't really describe who Greenspan is or his exact role in the boom (and subsequent bust). I was disappointed in this book and can't say I learned anything from it.
Rating: 
Summary: great book
Review: Woodward made a dry subject interesting - a good read and you may learn a little econ along the way.
Rating:
Summary: Nice book!
Review: I liked this book--gives us an insight into the thinking and views of one of the key decision makers of our country!
Rating:
Summary: A Let Down
Review: The less than stellar writing skills shocked me. Maestro is my first Woodward book. Sentence structure and word choice shows little effort or imagination. I got the feeling that he regretted taking on this project but was determined to make money on it in the near term rather than deferring it to a time he would be up to it. ... This is likely to be the poorest book ever to be written on Greenspan looking backward and forward. Woodward got walloped in this competition. Check out Greenspan The Man Behind Money by Justin Martin before you risk your money on this one. Wordward writes of Greenspan as a bright robot. Martin fleshes out an interesting character that is fun to read. While Woodward derides the economic knowledge of many Federal Reserve officials and politicians, his own economic knowledge shortcomings prevent his capturing the really big story behind the events. He is forced to exaggerate the potential drama behind nearly every tiny change in the federal funds rate. He has a complete lack of understanding of inflation risk and trivializes inflation levels of 3-4%. He does not even touch on the fact that having failed to stop inflation during the more than decade long boom we now have a new floor. It is not zero. The markets will anticipate long run inflation as highly likely to exceed 4% making current bond prices vulnerable. He appears clueless in the linkage of inflated stock prices and excessive money growth. He has made very little effort to research Federal reserve powers generally and stock market credit authority particularly. The idea that he could try to report on Greenspan's activities and provide the nuances with out understanding and describing Federal Reserve powers and regulations is flabbergasting. In a desperate reach for fabricated excitement, Woodward portrays the American economy constantly on the verge of collapse in every monetary crisis. While his desire is to show Greenspan as near superhuman, there comes a point he ought to realize that with crisis after crisis agilely shaken off we see how powerful the system is in current times. Greenspan is maestro for the most powerful competitive, resilient economic system ever developed. He does a good job placing the irrational exuberance problem in contest. Having watched stock market levels become excessive, Greenspan and the Fed had a real problem on their hands. While they in part created it, the problem of putting the genie back in the bottle without great damage remains one the most brutal policy problems for the Fed for as far as the eye can see. He recklessly brands Greenspan a "militant laissez-faire capitalist." It reveals Woodward's ultra liberal economic views. Can you really think the someone unrepresentative of mainstream economic theory could make it to Chairman of the Fed. I don't think so. He indicts Greenspan as insensitive to the poor. Yet, he offers not even dribble on the struggle to balance high employment and inflation. There is one heck of a lot more high drama in that endeavor, than his grinding discussion of each little rate change. I read every word of this book hoping that the wrap up would be worth the trip. In the end his Epilogue was lifeless. Knowing a little something about economics and being disappointed in the integrity of this book certainly makes me wonder about the authors integrity in his other books. I will think very carefully before I buy another Woodward. If you are a economics junkie like me buy the book an see what a twit Woodward is on this one. It may help us understand why press coverage on the economy and business is so poor. We can only hope that Greenspan will write his own book. So far no author sees the really big exciting story of what Greenspan has accomplished and what he has left undone or unresolved.
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